Moreover the Vice-President will have the right and duty to challenge before the Supreme Court:- (a) Any law or decision of the House of Representatives or the Budget approved by the House on the ground that it discriminates against the Turkish community.
(b) Any law or decision of the House on the ground that it is in conflict with the competence of the Turkish Communal Chamber.
Further the Vice-President will promulgate all laws and decisions of the Turkish Communal Chamber and will have, prior to promulgation, the right to return them to the Chamber for reconsideration.
There were other proposals of Turkish side which provided them political equality in different ways. A kind of "checks and balances" system. And there are also lots of details in proposals of Turkish side which were designed to make the constitution more workable, democratic but still to provide the "political equality" for TCs.
2- My approach to the problem, as you know, was quite simple: your side had set out to get certain Constitutional amendments; my side could agree to a great number of them provided that the inter-communal balance set out under the present agreements was not upset! For us, the retention of this balance which gave the Cyprus State its Cypriot character by providing for the co-operation in partnership of the two ethnic communities is, and has always been, very important, because without this balance the Cyprus State becomes, not a Cypriot State as it should be, but a Greek Cypriot State with the door wide open to Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). It is in this spirit and having particular regard to this aspect of the problem that my side has examined all your proposals and has authorised me to make concessions or to insist on the retention of a certain right. The arguments advanced in the Greek Cypriot leadership that the Turkish side is trying to lay the foundations of separation which will eventually lead to partition are utterly unwarranted by what I have tried to achieve at our talks; nor can any man of conscience accuse us of leading a partitionist policy except in reply to Greek Cypriot leadership' s continued call and agitation for Enosis; because we believe that if the Enosis policy is continued the way it has been since December, 1963 the complete separation of the two communities will become inevitable. My side's sincere belief is that if the Enosis cause (which has been the only issue which has divided us and which continues to poison our relations) is properly and adequately shelved a great deal of our troubles will be solved and the finding of a just and permanent solution will be all the easier.
3- Having thus underlined the important concessions made by my side, the spirit in which they were made and the difficulties, fears and doubts which still continue to overshadow our motivation it suffices to say that in making these concessions in order to satisfy your side's demands I always took into account the necessity which existed as a real and psychological factor of satisfying the needs of my community---need of security of life and property, need of satisfaction that administrative and economic discrimination would not be their ultimate lot! I feel sure that after all that has happened in Cyprus over the last eight years and the way my community has suffered no one can argue that these needs, real and psychological, are over- emphasized. Even so, I have taken the minimum requirements and asked for local autonomy in return of all the concessions which my side was prepared to make. On the functions of the autonomous local authorities we have agreed on almost all points with the exception of a few. This, by itself, should suffice to indicate that what the Turkish side is after on the question of local autonomy is not the creation of a state within the State as the Greek press seems to have been informed by your side
4- In short, we are asking for that minimum degree of protection which we envisage in local area system. In addition we feel that if we do not establish such a system of inter-communal balance the outcome of our concessions will be the establishment of a Greek Cypriot Republic and not a Cypriot Republic of inter-communal partnership, which was the sole objective of our talks.
5- Your side however, seems to have tackled the offers and counter offers made by either side as if these constituted the sole points of conflict between the two communities whereas the main cause of conflict continues to be as explained above in the philosophy of approach to the problem. But before I go into that matter I should like to request clarification of your stand on para 6 of my letter of 27 April, 1971 viz: as to whether you agree with me that if and when agreement is reached on matters tackled as a package deal "the remaining parts of our Constitution will stand in its present form subject to such minor adjustments necessitated in the light of agreement on the package deal." This point is very important for us; it forms part of the papers ex- changed between us and we need your answer on it in order to be able to as- sess the merits and demerits of your last letter.
6- Your answer to that part of my letter which indicated doubts as to ultimate Greek-Cypriot policy on Cyprus is a statement of fact merely on your mandate viz: that your instructions " to seek a solution of the Constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem in the context of an independent Cyprus have not been changed ", and does not categorically rule out the Enosis policy as a continuing and ultimate objective. You know our position on this problem: We cannot afford to negotiate a settlement in any way or form which does not effectively bar the way to Enosis (and double Enosis). This, I believe, was all along an understood sine quo non of our talks but the need to reaffirm it has become very important in view of the Yialousa speech of Archbishop Makarios and his reported statement to some National Front men that he will never sign any agreement which bars the way to Enosis and that all his efforts so far have been concentrated on achieving this objective and that he will never deviate from this policy! If this is your Leader' s stand, you' ll appreciate that our exercise is merely for talking' s sake. The 6 April 1971 statement by the Ministers, to which you refer in paragraph 6 of your letter, is of neutral value and does not in any way give us what we seek, namely, a categorical assurance that the Greek-Cypriot side will accept a permanent solution based on independence which independence will be effectively guaranteed-as hitherto-against overt acts (from within of without) directed at its disruption. I am sure that you' ll understand our anxiety and sensitivity over this issue: We cannot afford to go through the 1963-67 experiences again.
7- I should like to add a few more words in reply to the introductory parts of your letter. In para 8 you set out in three sub-paragraphs what you suggest to be our "understood terms of reference". The word "unitary" was never used by either of us. On the contrary we agreed that it was no use giving a name to the objective sought without first finding out the essentials leading to it. When the word "unitary" came to be used we discovered that different conceptions existed about its actual meaning. The Turkish side continues to understand from this word a form of government as set out by Zurich Agreements. Later, in one of our usual talks with the press, you agreed that the Zurich set up was a unitary state. If you confirm this view in writing I believe that a great deal of diversity will be avoided and my proposals to you will be better appreciated when tested in the light of the Zurich set up which we call "partnership" or "functional federated system" is of paramount importance for us. If Cyprus is to have a Cypriot Government and not purely a Greek Cypriot Administration we cannot see any way of achieving this other than by the retention of the Zurich set up. What we understand of this set up is this: Communal matters must be within the competence of the Communities while the two Communities must participate in governmental matters under agreed terms and conditions.
8-Your allegation that the Greek side does not wish to retain its own Communal Chamber has been thoroughly examined by my side. During the course of our talks I had explained to you that we would not object your re-naming the Central Greek Cypriot Authority which would deal with Greek Communal matters plus the autonomous Greek local affairs but I never left you under the impression that the Turkish side could accept any set up in which two central authorities (one Turkish and one Greek) did not exist. The importance of retaining this equality of status on which the whole framework of the new Republic is to be placed is too obvious a matter to need further amplification. Indeed, the way your side began to treat the "Greek Communal affairs " as Governmental affairs has underlined the absolute necessity of re-establishing the inter-communal equilibrium which exists under the 1960 Constitution.
9- You will see from the foregoing that what we have agreed to do is to take the existing foundations and the framework of the 1960 Agreements and try to make internal changes therein in order to meet your long-standing complaints about the excessiveness of the Turkish rights; thus I indicated willingness to (i) forego the veto rights; (ii) to add a new vice-president (Greek) to the House, (iii) to have the president and vice-presidents of the House elected by the whole House, (iv) to forego the necessity of separate majority votes in certain legislation, (v) to unite the Supreme Constitutional Court with the High Court, (vi) to unite the gendermarie with the police, (vii) to reduce Turkish participation in the Cabinet and the civil service to 20%, etc. In return for all these changes which your side sought to achieve we introduced the idea of creating autonomous local bodies for Greeks and Turks separately. Although in principle your side seemed to agree to such a set up, when it came to consider its shape or form we discovered that what your side was willing to grant had nothing to do with autonomy. In our proposals the set up was a very simple matter. It merely required the addition of the local authority affairs and functions to the functions of the autonomous Communal Chambers. In this context the problem could have been speedily solved without raising a hue and cry about attempts to create a state within the state and so on... But because your approach to the whole problem was quite different you put my whole suggestion on a foundation other than that created in the 1960 Agreements and thus our proposals were presented to the world as grotesque. I must, therefore, make it abundantly clear that all my statements to the effect that we were prepared to change the internal structure as set out in paragraph I above were made subject to the condition that two central authorities would be established for Greek and Turkish local authorities. In order to avoid multiplicity of such authorities I had suggested adding the functions to the Communal Chambers, if necessary by changing their names in order not to give the impression to your people that you had been forced by us to re-establish your Greek Communal Chamber which you had unilaterally and unconstitutionally " abolished ". The establishment of two central authorities therefore, is a fundamental issue for us, on which I am not authorized to bargain. On this issue however my alternative suggestions outlined in my letter of 27 April 1971 are still open for discussion.
As stated above the way in which your side has dealt with Greek communal affairs in the last few months has made it necessary for us to consider the re-establishment of the Greek Communal Chamber as an acute necessity. You will thus see that the question of the Greek Communal Chamber was not re-opened by us as a new and additional demand but had to be tackled in the light of what your side has done on the question of scholarships, priests' stipends etc., as outlined in detail in my previous letter.
I believe that you are under no misapprehension about the way in which I conducted the negotiations. From the beginning I told you that I could be willing to forego the veto-rights and accept a great number of your other suggestions for amending the Constitution subject to the establishment of separate autonomous local authorities for Greeks and Turks. The whole essence of my proposal lay in the creation of Central authorities for these bodies in view of the smallness of the units of which they would be made. In other words "The package deal" offer, as far as my side is concerned is closely tied up with the idea of establishing these central authorities. When you queried the wisdom of having these central authorities in addition to the Communal Chambers I pointed out that the functions could all be brought under one central authority for each community and that what name we gave to them was immaterial.
Arguments against such a set up may be found and some of these are to be real and substantial but none of these suffice to convince us that we do not need the protection which we see in this set up. At the moment psychological and real reasons, deep seated fears and anxieties and the bitter experiences of the past continue to motivate us.
The Legislative
On the Question of "The rights entrenched by the Constitution" the autonomous local authorities (when agreed) will be covered.
The Executive
My side cannot agree to the elimination of the existing rights of the Vice President apart from those on which we have specifically agreed. The joint exercise of the functions which the president and vice president have under the 1960 Constitution had created no difficulty whatsoever during 1960-63 period. On the contrary the existence of such a joint responsibility .will help the population realize that full co-operation exists at the uppermost level and the Head and Deputy Head of State will find the opportunity of meeting together, knowing each other and discussing current inter-communal matters in a better spirit of give and take. If the Head of State is allowed to reign as the Supreme Head on all occasions, the fact that he has been elected only by the Greek electors, will give his actions purely a Greek character, whereas, the Head and Deputy Head acting together will be able to show to the population that their actions are "Cypriot" rather than Greek or Turkish.
It may be true that in other states the powers and duties of the vice president are different, but we must not lose sight of the fact that in Cyprus the Republic is a compromise solution between Greek Cypriot demand that the island should unite with Greece and the Turkish Cypriot demand that it should not be so united. We have not yet reached the stage where the independence is accepted as an end in itself. Hence our inability to agree to a solution whereby the president, elected solely by the Greeks, should have the normal powers and duties of a president elected by a nation which has won its independence and accepts it as an end in itself.
If we avoid to see the peculiarities of Cyprus and the reasons (organic, psychological, political and factual) which have made the Cyprus problem what it is today, it will not be possible for us to find a reasonable solution merely by examining the Constitutional set up of other countries. The ills peculiar to Cyprus need special remedies and I feel that what we should try to do is to find the best solution applicable and not the best solution which to do is to find the best solution which has been applied elsewhere.
I will not comment on your mathematical analysis of the rights and votes of 82% Greek and 18% Turks and what would happen if there were more than one Turkish candidate for the vice-president etc. This way of looking at our problem is unrealistic. What matters is that two national communities exist in Cyprus and that these two communities (irrespective of their number) own the independence of Cyprus. Our attempt is for the purpose of finding an acceptable and agreed formula whereby the numerically many will enjoy its full powers and functions while the numerically less will not feel trodden upon, excluded and unwanted in an independent country which it has brought about on the basis of equality with its Greek Cypriot partners. The solution aimed at must be relatively the best solution because it will have to be a compromise between two opposing sides on the fundamental issues. Our option under these circumstances is either to work for a compromise solution which will help us live in co-operation and understanding in an independent Cyprus or to bow to Greek Cypriot demands for complete surrender of our rights and status. We have therefore, to be assured that adequate remedies exist for the protection of these rights and this status and that we are not at the mercy of the numerically many - - if the numerically many decides to be unjust and unfair.
It is with these thoughts and the bitter experiences of the past that we are forced to cling to certain rights and powers which under normal circumstances one might think to be unnecessary. No one can argue that the Turkish fears, doubts and suspicions vis-a-vis Greek Cypriot intentions in Cyprus are imaginary. These real and psychological factors do, unfortunately, colour our vision .and force us to seek protective measures. [size=24]Continuous good will and magnanimity on your part over a long period of time may dispel these fears and doubts and the future generations may well decide that such protective measures are not necessary for the welfare of the Turkish community.
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The years after, Klerides acknowledged that proposals of Turkish side were feasible and acceptable for GC side under the then circumstances. But I think your understanding is completely same with Makarios's understanding which was based upon "A Greek Cypriot state with a protected Turkish minority." All other alternatives were unacceptable for Makarios as he stated it many times and noted in Galo Plaza's 1965 report. Actually, this is also what Papadopulos wants as a more extreme successor of Makarios. But you should know that TCs will never accept being an ineffective minority in a GC state.[/b]
