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Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus, 29 March 1986

Recognising with satisfaction that the initiative of the Secretary-General, which bore in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions and which began in August 1984 in Vienna and continued through the high-level proximity talks from September to December 1984 and the joint high- level meeting of January 1985 held in New York, has now resulted in an important step towards a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem; The parties agree on the following matters which are to be viewed as an integrated whole:

I.1 The Parties:

(a) Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979;

(b) Indicate their determination to proceed, at the date referred to in paragraph 15.1 below, to the establishment of a Federal Republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect;

(c) Reaffirm their acceptance of those introductory constitutional provisions that were agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-82;

(i) The Federal Republic of Cyprus shall have international personality. The federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all of the territory. The attributes of international personality shall be exercised by the federal government in accordance with the federal constitution. The provinces or federated states may act in their areas of competence in accordance with the federal constitution and in a manner that would not duplicate the powers and functions of the federal government as defined in the federal constitution.

(ii) The people of the Federal Republic shall comprise the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community. There shall be a single citizenship of the Federal Republic of Cyprus regulated by federal law.

(iii) The territory of the Federal Republic shall comprise the two provinces or federated states.

(iv) The official languages of the Federal Republic shall be Greek and Turkish. The English language may also be used.

(v) The Federal Republic shall have a neutral flag and anthem to be agreed. Each province or federated state may have its own flag using mainly elements of the federal flag. The federal flag shall be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of any other flag.

(vi) The federal government shall observe the holidays of the Federal Republic. Each province or federated state shall observe the federal holidays as well as those established by it.

(vii) The parties reaffirm all other points that were agreed upon during the course of the intercommunal talks as contained in the 'revision' dated 18 May 1982 concerning general provisions. Part I, fundamental rights and liberties. Part H, as well as Parts III and IV.

2.1 The powers and functions to be vested in the federal government of the Federal Republic shall comprise:

(a) Foreign affairs.

(b) Federal financial affairs (including federal budget, taxation, customs and excise duties).

(c) Monetary and banking affairs.

(d) Federal economic affairs (including trade and tourism).

(e) Posts and telecommunications.

(f) International transport.

(g) Natural resources (including water supply, environment).

(h) Federal health and veterinary affairs.

(i) Standard setting: weights and measures, patents, trademarks,

copyrights.

(j) Federal judiciary.

(k) Appointment of federal officers.

(1) Defence (to be discussed also in connection with the treaties of guarantee and of alliance); security (as it pertains to federal responsibility).

2.2 Additional powers and functions may be vested in the federal government by common agreement of both sides. Accordingly, the residual powers shall rest with the provinces or federated states. Federal legislation may be executed either by authorities of the federal government or by

way of coordination between the competent authorities of the federal government and of the two provinces or federated states.

3.1 The legislature of the Federal Republic will be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70-30 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation, and an upper chamber with a 50-50 representation. Federal legislation will be enacted with regard to the matters of federal competence as referred to in paragraph 2.1 above. The adoption of legislation on major matters, as for instance on ten of the twelve functions referred to in paragraph 2.1 above, will require separate majorities in both chambers. The adoption of legislation on other matters will require majorities of the membership in each chamber.

3.2 Appropriate constitutional safeguards and deadlock resolving machinery including special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government (e.g. on budgetary questions) will be incorporated in the federal constitution. In case of deadlock in the legislature, the proposed legislation may be submitted in the first instance to a conciliation committee of the legislature composed of three Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots, whose decision will be taken on the basis of majority vote including at least one Turkish Cypriot. If the deadlock persists, the president and vice-president of the Federal Republic will, upon request, appoint on an ad hoc basis one persons each, selected for their knowledge of the subject involved, who, with the assistance of experts as needed, including from outside the Federal Republic of Cyprus, will advise the legislature on ways the deadlock could be resolved. The matter may also be submitted to a referendum among the population of the community which opposed the draft legislation. Legislation adopted by the legislature may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community.

4.1 The Federal Republic will have a presidential system of government. The president and the vice-president will symbolise the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities. In addition, the executive will reflect the functional requirements of an effective federal government.

4.2 The president will be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president will be a Turkish Cypriot. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature and the Council of Ministers in areas to be agreed upon, it being understood that the scope will exceed that covered by the 1960 constitution. The president and the vice-president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the Council of Ministers for reconsideration.

4.3 The Council of Ministers will be composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7 to 3 ratio. One major ministry will be headed by a Turkish Cypriot, it being understood that the parties agree to discuss that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be a Turkish Cypriot. The Council of Ministers will take decisions by weighted voting, that is a simple majority including at least one Turkish Cypriot minister. It is understood that the parties agree to discuss that weighted voting will apply to all matters of special concern to the Turkish Cypriot community to be agreed upon.

4.4 Appropriate constitutional safeguards and deadlock resolving machinery related to decisions by the Council of Ministers, including special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government, will be incorporated in the federal constitution. In case of deadlock, the president and vice- president of the Federal Republic will, upon request, appoint on an ad hoc basis one person each, selected for their knowledge of the subject involved, who, with the assistance of experts as needed, including from outside the Federal Republic of Cyprus, will advise the Council of Ministers on ways the deadlock could be resolved. The matter may also be submitted to areferendum among the population of the community which opposed the draft decision. A decision by the Council of Ministers may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community.

5.1 The Constitutional Court, when ruling on disputes relating to the distribution of powers and functions between the federal government and the provinces or federated states and on such other matters as may be assigned to it by the parties in accordance with the federal constitution, will be composed of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and one non-Cypriot voting member,

6.1 As regards freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property, a working group will discuss the exercise of these rights, including time-frames, practical regulations and possible compensation arrangements, taking into account guideline 3 of the 1977 agreement.

7.1 Territorial adjustments, in addition to the areas already referred to in the 5 August 1981 Turkish Cypriot proposals, will be agreed upon. These territorial adjustments will result in the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state comprising in the order of 29 plus per cent of the territory of the Federal Republic. It is understood that when discussing the actual territorial adjustments the two sides will have in mind the 1977 high-level agreement including 'certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community' and the questions related to resettlement. Both sides agree to suggest special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides. These areas will remain under their respective civilian jurisdictions.

8.1 A timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot military troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees, will be agreed upon prior to the establishment of a transitional federal government. In the meantime, military deconfrontation measures will be pursued by both sides, using the good offices and assistance of UNFICYP.

8.2 The two sides undertake to discuss these issues in good faith and to consider each other's concerns on them.

9.1 A Fund for Development of the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state shall be established with a view to achieving an economic equilibrium between the two provinces or federated states. A fund will also be established to facilitate the resettlement of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons, and for the Turkish Cypriots displaced as a consequence of the implementation of paragraph 7.1. The federal government shall contribute to these funds. Foreign governments and international organisations shall be invited to contribute to the funds.

10.1 The Varosha area and the six additional areas delineated in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981 will be placed under United Nations interim administration as part of the UNFICYP buffer zone for resettlement by....

11.1 Both parties agree not to take any action tending to prejudice the process outlined in this agreement, both on the international scene and internally.

12.1 The Nicosia international airport will be reopened under interim United Nations administration with free access from both sides. The United Nations will conclude the arrangements to that effect by....

13.1 Adequate machinery for considering allegations of non-implementation of confidence-building measures will be agreed upon. The Secretary-General will make appropriate recommendations to both sides in this regard.

14.1 The parties to agree to establish working groups to work out the detailed agreements on the matters referred to in this agreement, whose elements are inter-related and constitute an integrated whole. The working groups will carry out their work under the direction of joint high-level

meetings. These joint high-level meetings will take place every threeto four months, on the basis of an agenda prepared by the Secretary-General, to discuss the issues which remain to be negotiated under this agreement, to review the work and provide guidance to the working groups. The joint high-level meetings will be convened by the Secretary-General after adequate preparation.

14.2 Each working group will be composed of delegations from the two sides and will bechaired by a representative of the Secretary-General. The working groups will begin their meetings at the United Nations premises in Nicosia on.... Each working group will prepare a programme of work and will submit it for approval and guidance to the joint high-level meeting which will take place at the United Nations premises in Nicosia on....

14.3 The representative of the Secretary-General chairing each working group will every three months prepare an assessment of the progress made by the working group, which will be presented to the next joint high-level meeting together with the views of the Secretary-General.

15.1 The parties agree that, the required working groups having completed their work and having obtained the approval of the two sides, the transitional federal government of the Federal Republic of Cyprus will be set up on....

16.1 The Secretary-General will remain at the disposal of the parties to assist in the elaboration of this agreement, and, if required, in its interpretation.

LETTER OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL. 20 APRIL 1986

Dear Mr Secretary-General,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 29 March, 1986 with which you enclosed the document entitled 'Draft Framework Agreement'. I should like to assure you that we are committed to a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem as a matter of urgency. It is precisely because of that commitment that we believe that, before the Greek Cypriot side expresses its views on the contents of the 'Draft Framework Agreement' you have presented, it is necessary that there be agreement on the basic issues of the Cyprus problem as a matter of priority.

For this reason I request you to adopt one of two alternative procedures:

I. To convene an International Conference in respect of the international aspects of the Cyprus problem, namely,

1. Withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation and settlers; and 2. Effective international guarantees.

II. In the event that the holding of such an International Conference proves impossible, to convene a High Level Meeting to deal with the following matters, namely,

1. Withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation and settlers;

2. Effective international guarantees; and

3. Application of the three freedoms, that is freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property.

These issues should be resolved in conformity with the UN Charter and Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus, including Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550. I am anxious that your mission of good offices should succeed and I consider that adoption of one of these two procedures is the best way to ensure that rapid progress is made to a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

SPYROS KYPRIANOU

President of the Republic of Cyprus.

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The Turkish-Cypriot attitude to the Interim Agreement' proposal.

Throughout the 1980s the Turkish Cypriots were under the leadership of Rauf Denktash, a fact very much reflected in the intercommunal talks and in the attitude of Turkish Cypriots to the Interim Agreement proposal. The fundamental issue for the Turkish Cypriot leadership was the nature of the federal government in any given proposal. It argued that 'federation must be built from the basis of the existing two de facto administrations and that Cyprus should be a "decentralised" or "weak", federation with provisions for slow and long-term progress to a customs union and centralised fiscal and economic policy-making.' Obviously, this differed widely from the Greek Cypriots' idea of a centralised federation, which Turkish Cypriots asserted was not a genuine 'federation', because a strong central government would have powers to override the units." This difference sometimes showed itself in a bitter fashion: at one stage Denktash called his opposite number Kyprianou 'a shortsighted Enosis puppet', lacking all qualities of seriousness, responsibility and understanding.

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The times Denktash had gone crazy!

The Greek Cypriot attitude to the 'Gobbi Initiative'. Because of the confidentiality of the negotiations, it is difficult to say precisely what the Greek Cypriot response was to every item in the Gobbi initiative, but the main obstacle was clearly the nature of the federation, particularly the interpretation of the term 'bizonality'. As the Press and Information Office of the Government of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot side) put it, The Turkish Cypriot side insisted on partition through the establishment of two separate administrations under a loose federal system. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriot side indicated that it was not prepared to relinquish any significant part of the territory under occupation. The Turkish Cypriot leadership gave clear evidence of its intention to consolidate the faits accomplis rather than seek a solution, when in July 1982 it decided to grant Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Anatolia title deeds to Greek Cypriot property.

Emotional disappointment of Denktash that Kyprianou had caused, driven Denktash crazy



Childish retaliations and tricky political aproaches of both side's leadership had once again frustrated all efforts for a solution to Cyprus problem.


The same stupidity, reciprocal slyly approches continued until 1986. Then came the "European Solution" idea. In May 1987, EU protocol initialed by "RoC".


We are in 2005. RoC became a full member of EU but couldn't help to solve the problem. The story still goes...