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Newly released British Documents for the year 1974 at the Public Records Office.

The British Government gives tacit clearance to Turkey to proceed with invasion

And agrees to blockade the Greeks from helping Cyprus

Following the coup in Cyprus Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit visited London for negotiations with the British Government.

According to the record of conversation on July 17, 1974, between the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary James Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit the latter bluntly asked for the British Government's cooperation to invade Cyprus through the British Sovereign Bases.

Ecevit clarly stated at the time that such the objective of the operation would be to restore the constitutional order overthrown b y the coup of the Greek junta that forced President Makarios to flee the island.

Although the British Government refused to join Turkey in such an operation they promised Ecevit to 'help' by agreeing to prevent Greece from sending assistance to Cyprus. However, the revealing factor in this case is the concealed intention of Turkey to invade and occupy the whole of the island if one considers the location of the British Bases in Cyprus.

The relevant extracts are as follows:

Mr Ecevit, beginning the discussion at the dinner table, said that the events in Cyprus amounted to no ordinary coup d’ etat but constituted a violation of international treaties.

Britain and Turkey, jointly or separately, should state that they did not recognise the new regime and that the old administration must be restored. If Makarios could not return, the Constitutional provisions should apply. As the two guarantors under the 1960 Treaty Britain and Turkey and the United States should warn Greece of the violation of the independence of Cyprus which had taken place, and should ask for the withdrawal of Greek forces under effective UN supervision. There should also be international agreement about effective control in the situation thereafter.

"...There should also be sanctions: a more effective Turkish presence on the island was essential, and Turkey wished to bring this about in co-operation with the British Government as the other guarantor, in order to safeguard both communities. The Turkish Government did not wish to exploit the situation in Cyprus, not did they wish to act alone and create anxieties thereby. The British Government was in a position to help Turkey to achieve this result, and to avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey. This could be done by allowing Turkey to send her forces to Cyprus through the British SBAs. He felt that this was a historic moment to use the bases to ensure the independence of Cyprus. Everyone, including the United States and the Soviet Union, would welcome such action which would justify the British military presence. He felt that action of this kind, coupled with a joint statement of British and Turkish objectives, would be a relief to the whole population of Cyprus and also to the population of Greece...The alternative was unilateral action by Turkey, which he felt would be inevitable later if not sooner - later would be worse and bloodier. If Britain were prepared to accept action o these lines, the Turkish authorities would be careful to avoid any embarrassment, by agreement on the deployment of Turkish forces...".

"...The Prime Minister said that he thought that he understood the meaning of Mr. Ecevit's remarks. If the situation of the Turkish community on the island, deteriorated, Turkey would feel it necessary to intervene. But he did not think that the SBAs could be used for that kind of intervention. Mr. Ecevit replied that he could not insist on the point. The bases were not essential for his purpose...The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr. Ecevit's remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible...".

Wilson rejects Caramanlis peace offer

Britain turns down Constantine Caramanlis in line with promise given to Ecevit

After the restoration of democracy in Greece the new Prime Minister K. Karamanlis asked Britain to intervene militarily and to condemn publicly the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The released documents reveal that the British Government had no intention of going as far as a public statement condemning the Turks and that it was still necessary for them to maintain a degree of even-handidness. On the 28 July 1974 a suggested text of reply from Prime Minister Wilson to Karamanlis was prepared which included the following: " You refer to our right and our power to intervene in order to prevent the generalisation of the conflict. If I am right in interpreting this as a suggestion that HMG should use military force I am bound to say that I cannot believe that this would do otherwise than exacerbate and complicate the situation...I am sure you will agree there can be no question of unilateral British military intervention under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution No.353, which we have all accepted. In the light of your message, I am sending a personal appeal to Mr. Ecevit to ensure that violations of the ceasefire are effectively brought to an end. I am sure that I can look to you to do the same.".

On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office informed the Private Secretary at No.10 Downing Street that together with the Americans they had warned the Karamanlis Government that they would not support any Greek military assistance to Cyprus. The Foreign Office document relating to the relevant message given to Mr. Karamanlis reads as follows:

"...There is a real risk that the Greeks will try to send a division by convoy from Crete to Cyprus. We and the Americans have told them that we would not support such action and would not be prepared to guarantee them air protection against the Turkish air force..."

The Turkish Air Force sunk their own destroyer

According to a progress report prepared for the Prime Minister, and whilst the Geneva Conference opened, the Turks were continuing to fan out from Kyrenia, particularly towards the South East. Turkish ships were still arriving in the port but they seemed to contain supplies rather than troop reinforcements. The British estimated that the Turks had by then 10,000 men, 44 tanks and 88 helicopters in Cyprus - they were the strongest land force there. The British in Cyprus were monitoring every movement and knew everything in full detail. The note to the Prime Minister said: "...the Turks are sensitive about our continuing reconnaissance flights over Kyrenia, but we have a legal right to conduct these and have told them so. Meanwhile, Ecevit has thanked us warmly for rescuing 72 Turks from the sea, who were part of the complement of a Turkish destroyer sunk by the Turkish Air Force."

HMS Hermes and company

HMS Hermes with 41 Commando Group embarked was warned off for operations in Cyprus at approximately 2215 16 July 1974. 41 Commando's Advance Party landed in Dhekelia at 1600 20 July 1974. The unit was given the task of securing the ESBA and receiving refugees.

According to various maps in recently released files HMS Hermes was not the only military ship cruising around Cyprus at the time of the Turkish invasion but one of many that actually had Cyprus 'under siege'. The position of some was only known to the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

Callaghan was informed in advance of the second invasion

Foreign Secretary James Callaghan whilst in Geneva was fully informed of the Turkish intentions and mounting preparations for the second invasion. On the 26 July the British Ambassador in Ankara alerted Callaghan for the preparation. On the10 August Air Vice Marshall F. R. L. Mellersh informed Callaghan of the likely Turkish plans. " Military aspects of the present situation - Likely Turkish plans. 1. The Turkish army is looking for an excuse to continue operations. The likely objective is to increase the size of their area to take in the entire East of Cyprus, bounded by a line from five miles east of Morphou, through southern suburbs of Nicosia and along the old Famagusta road to Famagusta. They consider that to achieve this they would launch a ground attack from their present position in the West and in Nicosia, combined with a parachute landing by two battalions in the Chatos enclave and possibly a beach landing in the northern of Famagusta Bay...".

Callaghan in Geneva sought to extract acceptance of geographical federation

Therefore, and although Callaghan knew full well that the Turks in Geneva had no genuine intentions of reaching an agreement, he was working earnestly towards extracting as many concessions as he could from the Greek and GreekCypriot side on behalf of the Turks. Primarily their acceptance to the principle of geographical federation. Flash telegram from UK Mission in Geneva to Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 12 August read: "... The Turkish Government have tabled ambitious proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34% per cent of the island and have demanded a constructive reply by midnight. There is evidence, that, unless they receive such a reply, they will walk out of the Geneva conference and take military action in Cyprus early tomorrow morning. Slight prospect of a compromise and we are working on Clerides to table a counter draft which would at least concede the principle of geographical separation..."

On the 13 August Callaghan sent the following telegram to London. It read: " This morning Clerides handed Denktash a counter-proposal which, while it conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages, excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. I told Clerides and Mavros that this would not, in my judgement, satisfy the Turks. They had to face the reality that there would be no United States military pressure, that UNFICYP would not oppose the Turkish forces and that, as a result, there was no prospect of external help against Turkish aggression. I urged them to produce a counter-proposal which at least conceded the principle of geographical separation. Clerides said that he could not do so from Geneva: Greek Cypriot opinion was not ready and Makarios, with whom he spoke yesterday, would certainly disavow it. They agreed to fly to Athens and Nicosia to discuss the principle with their colleagues and to return tomorrow night a clear answer..."

However, as Callaghan knew very well, the Turks were not interested in agreeing to anything. They intended to attack and occupy more territory leaving the negotiating for later...

Draft Agreement

On the 13 August Callaghan read to Gl. Clerides and G. Mavros a draft agreement he had prepared for signature by Clerides and Denktash in the event of compromise. His draft referred to a fundamental revision of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, , to a federal government with a bi-communal nature of two autonomous administrations operating in appropriately defined geographical areas.

R. Denktash surprised them by producing his own proposal for a clear bizonal bicommunal federation.

According to the British released documents Turkish Foreign Secretary Gunes' plan for six cantons presented at the Geneva conference on the 12 August was the result of pressure by Dr. H. Kissinger who originally disagreed with the bi-regional federation, or bi-zonal federation and which London was promoting together with the Turks. Therefore Denktash's move to follow the next day 'with his own plan' for bizonal bicommunal federation reflected much better the real Turkish objectives. The talks broke down on the 14 August followed by the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The geographical solution of "biregional federation"

On the 16 August 1974 the Foreign Office official Mr. A. C. Goodison, noted the following:

" It is important that we should avoid any suggestion that in favouring the geographical separation of the two communities as the most viable solution of the Cyprus problem, we are working for the partition of the island. Partition has a bad name internationally. It would also be contrary to our obligations, both under the 1960 Settlement and as a fellow-member with Cyprus of the Commonwealth and the United Nations. I recommend that we should use the term "bioregional federation". We should reserve the term 'cantonal federation' for Mr. Gunes's proposal involving more than one area for each community..."

The British policy at 'stage III' (after both Turkish invasions)

Clerides was 'their man'

On the same day in a separate note the Foreign Office records the following:

" Building up Mr. Clerides. The chances of a radical settlement in Cyprus depend on having Clerides rather than Makarios at Stage III. The Secretary of State has already embarrassed Makarios by moving him towards stating his terms before we resume in Geneva' this line could perhaps be developed to Clerides' benefit. But there is not much we can do about this. The danger of a declaration of enosis was greatest on 14 August; we should take no preventive action against this unless we have some indication that it is contemplated. We do not want to suggest that ideas of this kind are current, given the assurances of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots at Geneva. We must also encourage the Greeks to continue to help Clerides by removing undesirable Greek influences from Cyprus. We must do what we can to discourage reprisals against the Turkish Cypriot community outside the Turkish zone... We should stick to the Secretary of State's line that the Turks have a case even though their methods are regrettable.

Constraining the Turks. It would suit our strategy if the Turkish armed forces ended up with 25/30 per cent rather than 40 per cent of the island. But they cannot be negotiated with in their present self-confident mood. We should therefore do what we can to make them more amenable by stage III. The particularly difficult problem will be the possible enforced transfer of the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish occupied zone. In one sense this could facilitate the bi-regional federal solution; on the other hand it would increase the danger of reprisals against Turkish Cypriots...".

23 September 1974. During a meeting between Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and his Greek counterpart G. Mavros the former said that it was clear that Turkey would insist on the division of Cyprus into two zones and asked whether the Greek Government and President Makarios would accept such a solution so long as there was a central federal Government. Asked (by Mr. Tsounis) as to why the Archbishop should commit himself at that stage Mr. Callaghan said it was desirable in order to achieve a sense of realism and to give support to Mr. Clerides".

Between the period of September and end of November 1974 the British Government went out of its way in order to secure support for Mr. Gl. Clerides at the forthcoming Athens meeting set to take place end of November beginning of December between Makarios, Karamanlis, Clerides and others. The meeting was crucial for the pursued policy by London and Clerides. Archbishop Makarios was to be pressured into giving written consent for Clerides to negotiate on a basis of geographical federation. Otherwise Clerides threatened with resignation. The Turks insisted on a public acceptance by the GreekCypriots of a solution based on geographical federation.

The 'Argo' speech

And it was in this context that Gl. Clerides on the 6 November 1974 dared to support publicly at the 'Argo'gallery in Nicosia the concept of a solution based on geographical federation. He said in his speech: "... What are the prospects of a solution to the Cyprus problems through negotiations without any illusions? First. Any thought that it is now possible for any solution to emerge on the basis of a unitary state is outside reality because Turkey would certainly not agree to discuss such a solution. If in the past there had been a possibility of finding a solution based on a unitary state/local autonomy for the Turks there is not such a possibility now. Second. Since the state cannot be unitary, the only solution that can now merge is that of a federal state. Such a solution can take various forms. It can be a cantonal solution through the creation of a number of cantons in which the Turks will be in the majority. This will be the best solution for us. The only solution can also be geographical federation based on two regions corresponding to the population ratio...".

On the 15 November 1974 James Callaghan sent the following oral message to Clerides.

" I understand that you will be going to Athens soon for a meeting with Karamanlis and Makarios. I realise how important this will be for your own political future and for the future of the Clerides/Denktash talks. I also appreciate how sensitive an issue the Archbishop's return is and, for your own information only, I shall be advising the Archbishop to consider postponing it. I sincerely hope that you will be able to secure the support of Karamanlis and of the Archbishop for your own pragmatic approach to a long term solution. You should know that I hope to see the Archbishop on 21 November and that, if Karamanlis is successful in the lections, we shall be sending a message to him, stressing the importance we both attach to giving support and substance to your talks with Denktash. I greatly welcomed your recent observation that some form of geographical federation is inevitable. As you know, my own firm conviction is that the Turks will insist on a bi-regional geographical solution. While I fully appreciate the difficulty about accepting this publicly, I am sure that you are right at the very least not to exclude it...We shall be doing our best to impress this on Archbishop Makarios...".

Glafkos Clerides according to numerous British documents was an ardent supporter of the bi-zonal federation from the early stages knowing full well that that was the desired Turkish goal. That was the reason the British Government was standing by him and doing everything possible in terms of influence and persuasion to secure the Archbishop's agreement. Such an agreement would give Clerides a free hand to proceed on the desired basis.

The following extract from a telegram sent to FCO by the British High Commissioner in Nicosia is indicative enough:

" Neither my American colleague nor I have the slightest indication of any Turkish wavering on bi-zonal federation as the basis for a Cyprus settlement. This has been reaffirmed to me recently by both Denktash and the Turkish charge here. Crawford denies having suggested to Christophides that the Americans had information to the contrary: He has indeed been doing his best to bring Christohides round to a realistic acceptance of bi-zonal federation as the only solution likely to be accepted by the Turks. He has, however, had discussions with both Christophides and Clerides ( as have I also) about the possibility of a multi-cantonal variant of bi-zonal federation. This would not be the functional federalism which I believe the Archbishop to favour...it would instead be essentially bi-zonal with Turkish retention of a northern zone stretching notionally from Panagra and Myrtou in the east to Famagusta in the east...as a negotiating gambit this would, for the Greeks, have the advantage of softening the stark outlines of bi-zonality, and it would have a marginally better chance of acceptance by the Turks than straight functional federalism...I understand that Clerides still hopes that Makarios can be persuaded by himself and Karamanlis at the Athens meeting not to return to Cyprus for the present. But if this attempt fails, as seems likely, Clerides would concentrate on getting the Archbishop's signature to a formula which might include an agreement that Clerides should initially negotiate with Denktash for a brief period on the basis of a multi-cantonal solution, but if this made no progress, should then be free to switch to a full bi-zonal federation. An essential feature would be the Archbishop's signed agreement to back a Clerides negotiation on this basis...A major objective at the present stage must however be to keep Clerides in play...".

On another telegram dated 26 November Olver wrote: "... On the form of a settlement, Clerides agreed that a bi-zonal federation was still the Turkish aim:..He proposed to work in Athens for a protocol in which this was the first negotiating gambit, but it was agreed to reverr to a bi-zonal solution if this got nowhere".

Lord Caradon launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and consults the Foreign Office

Early in September 1974 Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon) launches the 'Friends of Cyprus' organisation and the same day has a meeting with the Foreign Office. They told him that they believed " the right solution is a bi-regional federal Cyprus. If we were to come out with this publicly and formally, it would, at this stage at any rate, risk others (particularly Makarios) stating their opposition to it equally publicly and formally. Clerides and Denktash both accept such an approach. It is premature to return to a Geneva-type conference...to do all we can in terms of quiet diplomacy to facilitate it. We hope to avoid other initiatives which will distract from it.".

The Kissinger factor

Dr. Kissinger originally preferred a solution based on the 1960 treaty

According to a telegram the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan sent to Prime Minister Wilson from New York, Kissinger (before the invasion) is recorded to support a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. It reads as follows:

" Kissinger stressed that he did not want to see a resolution to day at all. He was quite happy to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow at which Makarios could make a statement. But before any substantive move in the Council he hoped you would agree to get the Greeks and Turks together in London perhaps on Sunday, and try to work out a constitutional solution on the basis of the 1960 Treaty. The United States would give its full support and would join us in presenting a proposal on which a security council resolution could then be based. I asked what kind of constitutional solution he had in mind. He though we might try to shape it so that an acceptable alternative both to Sampson and Makarios could be agreed upon, for instance, Clerides. In fact this might mean the Greeks giving up Sampson, and ourselves and the Turks abandoning Makarios. For the Turks this should be no great sacrifice as they had never trusted him... Kissinger was clearly troubled that we might be committing ourselves too far without being able to calculate the longer-term consequences. He asked me to convey these further reflections to you at once, emphasising his deep concern...".

According to the British newly released documents a new picture is emerging vis-‡-vis the role of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The documents reveal that contrary to what had been promoted since 1974 the real driving force behind the events and policies was indeed the British Government all along and not the Americans. Dr. Kissinger in many ways followed the British. The documents show disagreements over the Cyprus issue and particularly the solution. For instance before the Turkish invasion Kissinger supported a solution based on the 1960 Treaty but preferred Clerides to Makarios or Sampson. And it was only after the invasion that he showed preference to cantons but yet not to bi-zonal federation. The documents reveal that bi-zonal federation had been accepted by Kissinger on the strong insistence of the British Government.

On the 16 November 1974 Henry Kissinger wrote a letter to James Callaghan informing him of his talk with Makarios on the 13th and assured Callaghan that they (USA) supported the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable. It read:

"...In our discussion of the future of Cyprus, I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. He is reluctantly beginning to accept the idea of a federation, but he insists that there must be a multiplicity of cantons under a strong central government. I understand that since our meeting, Makarios has let it be known that the US still holds open the idea of a multi-cantonal arrangement. I want to assure you that we support the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable arrangement and on this I think we are in complete agreement.

The clouds however, over what actually Kissinger told Makarios did not go away. The British came to the conclusion that Makarios could not have invented everything. Another extract from a minute by the South East European Department of the Foreign Office read as follows:

" There is clearly some confusion over the views of the American Government. Makarios, mistakenly or mischievously, believes that Kissinger accepts and indeed wishes to promote a multi-cantonal solution, and has convinced the Greeks of this interpretation of the American position. Dr. Kissinger in his letter of 16 November to the Secretary of State says specifically " I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. However Mr. Ramsbotham's telegram 3729 (British Ambassador in Washington) of 16 November reporting his conversation with Dr. Kissinger puts the point a little more ambiguously. For example " he (Dr. Kissinger) had been careful not to say flatly (to Makarios) that the bi-regional solution was the preferred American one". We hope to clarify the American position in a further conversation...".

In Brussels in December 1974 Dr. Kissinger with the consent of the British Government promoted the restart of political talks between Clerides and Denktash but without preconditions as to the solution...

The diary of events

15 July 1974 - Military coup in Cyprus

17 July 1974 - President Makarios and Mr. Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, arrive in London. The former is received as President of Cyprus. They both have meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Callaghan asks Makarios if he wanted to see B. Ecevit. Makarios declined saying that there were so many GreekCypriots in London he preferred to see them. Press reports speak of massive Turkish Army build-up. According a high NATO official, members of NATO at a Council meeting voiced 'broad support for the elected regime of President Makarios and the territorial integrity of the island of Cyprus.

18 July 1974 - President Makarios flies to New York to address UN. The Security Council acknowledges him as President. Mr. Sisco, U.S. under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, arrives in London. He meets Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Ecevit, who later leaves for Ankara. Mr. Kissinger flies to California.

19 July 1974 - President Makarios speaks to the Security Council alleging the Coup was organised by the Greek Military Regime,. U.S. ambassador Scali says this is an issue still to be determined, and warns against a power vacuum in Cyprus if Greek Officers are permanently removed. The Security Council adjourns without a decision.

The Turkish fleet sails from Mersin. Mr. Sisco goes from London to Athens to Ankara.

20 July 1974 - Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The UN Security Council unanimously calls for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and the opening of negotiations.

21 July 1974 - Mr. Kissinger in Washington. Mr. Sisco returns to Athens. Negotiations for a ceasefire.

22 July 1974 - Turkey and Greece accept ceasefire from 1400 GMT. After the fall of Kyrenia Mr. Ecevit is reported as stating it will now remain "forever Turkish".

23 July 1974 - Collapse of Junta in Greece. Mr. Constantine Karamanlis is called on to return and become Prime Minister. Nicos Sampson resigns, Mr. Glafkos Clerides is sworn in as President.

24 July 1974 - Mr. Karamanlis is sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece.

25 July 1974 - First Geneva Conference opens. Turks continue to build=-up in Cyprus.

26 July 1974 - Turkish army continues to advance, captured Bellapais and had doubled area under its control since the cease fire.

28 July 1974 - Mr. George Mavros Greek F. Minister states that there was no question of Enosis and Greek Government requests special meetings of the Security Council and NATO Council in view of ceasefire violations.

29 July 1974 - Turkish Commanders ordered UN out of Kyrenia area. Continued reports of landing of Turkish tanks and troops.

30 July 1974 - Geneva Declaration signed, reaffirming ceasefire and establishing Un buffer zone. Ceasefire liens to be identified by 4-man military commission. Second Geneva Conference called for 8th August to consider constitutional issues.

31 July 1974 - UN confirms Turkish Army broken Geneva ceasefire by shelling Karavas and Lapithos.

4 August 1974 - A Turkish advance continues with daily fighting.

6 August 1974 - Lapithos, Karavas and Vasilia finally captured. Colonel Chakar, Turkish member of 4-man commission says that the attack does not violate the ceasefire because it is "mopping up small pockets of resistance".

8 August 1974 - Second round of Geneva talks begin.

9 August 1974 - Agreement on ceasefire lines is signed in Nicosia. At Geneva Turkey demands regional federation with more territory for Turkish Cypriots up to 34%. More than the Turkish Army already had captured.

13 August 1974 - Mr. Ecevit gave 24 hours to Greece to accept the Turkish proposals at Geneva.

14 August 1974 - 0200. Geneval talks break down. Mr. Callaghan requests meeting of UN and blames Turkey for not permitting 36 hours adjournment for consultation. 0500 major attack by Turkish army on a broad front.

15 August 1974 - State Department spokesman criticizes Turkey for invasion and says US will cut off arms to both Greece and Turkey if they go to war. Karamanlis announces Greece will not go to war but is withdrawing from military side of NATO.

16 August 1974 - Turkish army completes capture of Famagusta, and consolidates along 'Attila Line'. The British Foreign Office in co-operation with Gl. Clerides starts its adamant campaign in favour of the Turkish demand for bi-regional federation i.e. the bi-zonal bi-communal federation.

These are the most important revelations of the newly released documents. It should be noted that the most important documents relating to the coup (reports and FCO minutes) have been carefully retained as well as other documents. Also the Prime Minister's office was very unusually removing documents from selected files as late as days before their release.

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Cyprus : Intervention Timeline




The "Attila" Intervention of July 1974







Thursday July 18, 1974

Adana Members of the Turkish Amry's 39th Division begin boarding ships, while the Turkish-Cypriots (T/C) take positions in their enclaves. That information is relayed by KYP (Hellenic Central Intelligence Agency) in Kyrenia to Athens.
Athens The Hellenic 'K' plan is put into effect, and 20 Hellenic AF F-84Fs are moved to Kasteli, and 10 F-5s to Heraklion. The airplanes are prepared and could react on a 30 minute notice.


Friday July 19, 1974

13:00 Hellas Three of the Hellenic Navy's modern Type 209 submarines are ordered to move towards the region of Rhodes.

17:00 Adana The Turkish invasion of Cyprus is ordered to begin. A half hour later, British television is showing the departure of the Turkish fleet towards Cyprus.

Cyprus The Cypriot air defense plan 'Delta' is put into effect. At 21:15 a National Guard (NG) position at Apostolou Andrea reports sighting a group of 6 ships 40NM away, coming from Mersina. The movement of the ships is monitored now by SEP/A, and at 21:40 8-10 ships are detected moving from Mersina to Kyrenia.

20:30 Cyprus The two torpedo boats T1 and T3 are ordered to be ready for combat.



Saturday July 20, 1974
















Hellas The US pulls all nuclear weapons off Hellenic fighters.

01:30 Cyprus The 11 Turkish ships are now detected only 35NM away from Kyrenia.

02:00 Cyprus 6 ships are detected heading toward Ammochostos. Later on it will be known that these ships were merchant ships sent there to confuse the defending Hellenic forces.

04:30 Cyprus The 11 ships are now only 10-12 miles from the coast of Cyprus. There is no immediate response from the Hellenic side.

04:45 Ankara The Hellenic embassy is informed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry of the actions taking place.

05:00 Cyprus The two torpedo boats T1 and T3 are ordered to depart the port of Kyrenia and to engage the invading fleet.

05:10 Ankara A message from Bulent Ecevit is relayed to the Hellenic side.

05:15 Cyprus Torpedo boat T1 sinks after being severely damaged by Turkish aircraft fire.

05:23 Cyprus The T3 torpedo boat is struck by both destroyers and aircraft and sinks. 9 of the 10
crew members of T3 are killed.

05:25 Cyprus Turkish planes in support of their naval forces bombard the area of Kyrenia. Their aim is the destruction of the 3rd Tactical Regiment (Syntagma) and base of the 252 TP (Tagma Pezikou - Infantry Battalion). The first wave of invaders is composed of 1 LST, 2 LSM's, 20 LCU landing ships, 5 Destroyers, 2 Gun Boats, and around 3000 men.

05:30 Cyprus The Commando Units (Monades Katadromon) direct themselves towards the Agyrtas pass. Their mission is to prevent Turkish forces on the beachhead from reaching the Agyrta-Lefkosia T/C enclave.

06:07 Cyprus Turkish transport planes and helicopters dropped paratroopers at locations between Lefkosia and Bogazi, Mias Milias and Gerolakkou. Although the organized Greek resistance was spread thin due to the large Turkish forces, the Turkish side made numerous mistakes. One such example is the dropping of 120 troops on Mia Milia. When the villagers saw the troops in the sky, they took whatever firearms they had and started firing. From the 120 troops, 93 were killed, 1 was taken captive, while the rest fled.

06:30 Cyprus Turkish 'frogmen' are sent to Pentemili to investigate if any detonation devices exist, but none are found.

07:00 Hellas The 3 Hellenic submarines are ordered to submerge after being notified of the situation in Cyprus.

07:15 Athens War Council is formed where union with Cyprus is raised as a method of stopping the Turkish invasion. That is not declared, but all agree on the draft.

07:30 Cyprus 1 Gun Boat approaches the coast, pulls back, and the Turkish fleet shells the island with a barrage of fire.

07:30 Cyprus EL.DY.K (ELliniki DYnami Kyprou - Hellenic Contingent in Cyprus) with the aid of 19 T-34 tanks from 23 EMA, begin the shelling of the TOYRDYK base. A short time later, the attack on Kioneli starts, with
550 men from ELDYK, 1 NG company (loxos), and 15 tanks. While the Hellenic forces are advancing, Turkish troops are parachuting right over their lines. The losses suffered by the Turkish side are enormous. After a great number of Turkish AF (Air Force) attacks, the Hellenic side regroups to start another assault. By this time the Hellenic side has very few dead, few injured, and 100% of it's armored force.

08:00 Cyprus The Turks attempt an invasion at Glykiotisa, near the T/C village of Tembos. The 5 LCU's could not make the landing, and move towards Pentemili. There they face lightly armed NG forces, who inflict terrible loses on the Turks. From the 600 soldiers on those ships, only 150 make it back.

08:00 Cyprus Strong battles erupt in Ammochostos between T/C and Hellenic forces.
Cyprus Fighting between armed T/C and Hellenic forces ensues around Cyprus, including Pafos, Morfou, Leuka, Lefkosia, Lemesos, Kazivera, Kokkina, and Limniti.

08:30 Cyprus In Pentemili, the first landing ship reaches the shore, and 62 soldiers and 1 bulldozer prepare it for the larger assault force to come.

09:00 Cyprus The inhabitants of Kyrenia begin departing their city towards Pella Pais. Numerous civilians that were apprehended by the Turks are murdered.

09:30 Cyprus Helicopters position troops in the surrounding hillsides to provide cover for the larger invading forces.

09:30 Cyprus NG artillery units start shelling the Turkish units that have landed. The Turkish forces suffer serious losses, which are compounded by "friendly fire" from destroyers that hits their position.

09:30 Cyprus The Hellenic Navy landing ship "Lesbos" is ordered to Pafos while some 50 nm away. It is carrying 450 members of ELDYK.

10:00 Cyprus The battles on the island were intensified by the T/C who lived in the enclaves all over the island. At Lemesos, 450 EOKA B' fighters of the 203 TE (Tagma Efedreias - Reserve Battalion) faced off with 1000 armed T/C. In the village of Aydimou (west of Lemesos), 100 EOKA B' troops took more than 200 T/C soldiers as prisoners.

11:00 Athens A general draft is declared.

15:00 Hellas The Hellenic submarines "Glavkos" and "Nereus" are ordered to carry out military patrols in the area between Turkey and Cyprus. The "Triton" is told to patrol near Rhodes, while the "Proteus" is sent to the area between Smyrna and the Dardanelle straits.

17:00 Cyprus An additional force of about 1,400 Turkish paratroopers is dropped in the area between Kioneli and Agyrta.

17:00 Cyprus The Hellenic Navy landing ship "Lesbos" opens fire on Turkish positions in Pafos. The numerous and well-armed T/C soldiers surrender. The Turks believe this to be part of a greater Hellenic landing force, and send destroyers to investigate.

18:00 Cyprus The landing ship "Lesbos" leaves Pafos, moving south towards Egypt.

18:00 Cyprus The first phase of the Hellenic attack begins. Its purpose is the isolution of the Agyrta-Lefkosia enclave, and the destruction of the Turkish invasion force still confined on the beach. ELDYK and 23 EMA were to attack in the area of Kioneli-Lefkosia for a second time. The 361 TP and 399 TP would attack from the north and the area near Dikomo.

18:00 UN (16:00 Greenwich Mean Time) Security Council Resolution 353 is adopted unanimously. A cease-fire is to take effect on July 22 at 16:00.

19:30 Cyprus The 399 TP finally reaches its destination after being delayed by action against T/C forces. Since the coordinated attack did not take place, ELDYK was forced to again relinquish territories gained.

22:00 Cyprus The announcement is made that the T/C's in Pafos were surrendering. The T/C's of Ammochostos take cover behind the walls of the old city.

22:30 Cyprus The 399 TP begins its attack against Turkish positions in the enclave, but fails to achieve any decisive outcome in the short period available.

23:00 Cyprus The second phase of the Hellenic attack starts with 4 Commando Units (Monades Katadromon) - 31 MK, 32 MK, 33 MK, and 34 MK. They initiate attacks on Pentadaktilo from both sides of the enclave, in order to capture the Agyrtas pass.








Sunday July 21, 1974

00:00 Hellas 4 Olympic Airways Boeing 707 aircraft carrying the 2nd MK land in Souda, Crete for refueling. Having originally departed from Mikra in Thessaloniki, these troops are to be deployed in Cyprus by 04:00. The flight duration to Lefkosia is expected to take 2 hours and 10 minutes.

00:40 Hellas The third Boeing 707 reports the blowout of 4 tires on the right main landing gear during landing. With this development the Commander of 2 MK requests - and is granted - the cancellation of the mission, seeing that his unit could not reach Lefkosia by 04:00. The unit returns to Mikra, and a new mission to send 35 MK on the night of July 21 is decided.
Cyprus The 3 TS (Tactical Regiment) takes a defensive posture. The 306 TE moves into posiions as north as the Kyrenia-Karavas road, while the 251 TP forms its lines at the village of Trimithi. East of Kyrenia was the 241 TP and army engineers tasked with mining the coast.
Cyprus The commando units are experiencing resounding results. The 31 MK and 33 MK, moving in from the west, capture the Kotsakagia mountaintop and numerous Turkish soldiers. 32 MK from the east delivered serious blows to Turkish operations and achieved its primary objectives.

02:30 Cyprus Radar stations indicate that 8 ships are headed from Mersina towards Kyrenia.

04:30 Cyprus Fierce battles are taking place on Pentadaktilo, but the Hellenic forces manage to extend their area of control to Aspri Moutti and other strategically advantageous positions. Turkish counterattacks rage until 08:00, greatly supported by their position in Ag. Ilariona.

04:30 Turkey Turkish aircraft depart to begin a new bombing campaign, the objective of which is the prevention of further Hellenic reinforcements from reaching the bewildered Turkish troops on the beachhead and Pentadaktilo.

06:00 Cyprus The NG launches an attack in Lemeso and captures the Turkish positions and over 1,000 prisoners.

09:00 Athens Another council is again formed to discuss the possibility of declaring war on Turkey. No decision is reached after 4 hours.

10:45 Cyprus The GEEF (General Staff of the NG) is ordered to maintain its present positions at all cost, since a political solution seems imminent.

12:00 Cyprus Turkey agrees to the British request to stop the aerial bombardment of Lefkosia for 2 hours, in order to allow foreign nationals to flee.

13:00 Cyprus With the Turkish forces planning the capture of the NG position in Ag. Pavlou, the Hellenic commandos begin leaving their strongholds on Pentadaktilo - a flawed strategic move.

13:00 Athens The Commander of the Armed Forces recalls the two Hellenic Navy submarines "Glavkos" and "Nereus" when they are some 90 nm west of Pafos.

13:30 Cyprus The 231 TP captures the village of Pileri.

14:30 Cyprus The Naval Commander of Cyprus is moving along the road between Mirtou and Asomatou, on his way to Karavas so as to determine the state of the Turkish forces on the beachhead and possible Hellenic measures. A force of about 10-12 Turkish paratroopers is dropped from a transport aircraft, and manage to injure the Commander prior to their destruction. His mission is postponed.
Cyprus ELDYK, now reinforced with the additional 450 troops that disembarked the "Lesbos", manages to obliterate an entire Turkish regiment at Kioneli. The GEEF once again orders the unit to withdraw, in order perhaps to make sufficient forces available for the defense of the airport.
Hellas The landing ship "Rethimno" heads to Cyprus carrying the 573 TP and 550 Cypriot volunteers.
Cyprus The Commander of the Naval Station in Pafos informs the GEEF that 3 ships (the destroyers Turkey had sent in search of the "Lesbos") have been detected. The GEEF responds that this is a Hellenic task force, knowing that its communications were monitored. The Turkish Air Force Command sends 7 aircraft to sink the ships, without first verifying the presence of Turkish vessels in the area.

14:35 Cyprus The Turkish aircraft spot the 3 destroyers 10 nm west of Pafos and begin their attack. The visible Turkish flags are ignored as a Hellenic attempt at confusion. 2 or 3 aircraft are shot down by the defending Turkish ships.

14:45 Cyprus The Turkish Navy destroyer "Kocatepe" is sunk, while the other two suffer significant damage that renders them non-battle worthy. The ships head towards Mersina having suffered more than 232 dead from the sunken ship alone. Turkey claimed this event as a resounding victory against the Hellenic Navy up until July 25 - the date they announced the loss of the "Kocatepe".

17:00 Cyprus Turkish Air Force planes bombard civilian targets in their attempt to provide support to the T/C forces in Ammochostos. Civilian casualties are also reported in Kazivera, another T/C enclave where battles were being fought.

21:00 Hellas "Operation Niki", the transportation of the 35 MK to Cyprus with 15 Noratlas aicraft, has begun. The aircraft are to fly at an altitude of 50 meters when they begin approaching Cyprus so as to avoid radar detection. Two aircraft land in Rhodes after experiencing navigational problems.


Monday July 22, 1974

00:00 Cyprus Hellenic forces have by now destroyed most T/C forces in enclaves across the island. The Agyrtas pass was been secured and the beachhead has been somewhat contained. ELDYK has not been able yet to link its positions with those of the Commando Units on Pentadaktilo, nor have the Turks been able in two days to reach the Agyrta-Lefkosia enclave from their beachhead position.

00:30 Athens The Armed Forces Command directs the anti-aircraft units around Lefkosia airport to halt firing, in anticipation of the arrival of the military transport aircraft. Due to delays, the GEEF does not begin informing its units until about 01:30.

02:00 Cyprus After about 5 hours of flight, the Noratlas transport aircraft being their final approach to the Lefkosia airport. Not aware of the identity of the aircraft, they Cypriot defenders open fire obliterating the first aircraft and damaging several others. A total of about 30 soldiers died, while 3 severely damaged aircraft had to be destroyed on the ground to eliminate evidence of the Commando Unit's deployment.

02:00 Hellas 10 F-4E Phantom II aircraft move from their bases in Tanagra and Andravida to Heraklio, Crete. One suffers damage during landing.

03:30 Cyprus The second Turkish assault wave is 10 nm from the coast of Kyrenia. Its mission is the conquest of Kyrenia and the merging of the beachhead position with the Agyrta-Lefkosia enclave prior to the implementation of the cease-fire.
The USA, Hellas, and Turkey successively announce that a cease-fire agreement will be honored starting at 16:00.

10:00 Cyprus The Turkish landing ships reach the shore, bringing numerous armored and mechanized assets such as American made M-47 and M-48 main battle tanks. The 3 TS and the 351 TP are unable to effectively contain this new invasion force.

11:00 Cyprus Turkish destroyers start shelling positions south of Ag. Georgios, in order to weaken the Hellenic defensive lines. An attempt by landing ships to approach Kyrenia harbor fails.

11:07 Hellas 12 F-84F aircraft are ordered to depart towards Cyprus. That order is canceled after a few minutes.

11:45 Cyprus The 251 TP, 306 TE, and 60 members of 31 MK withdraw towards Kyrenia following a Turkish offensive with armored and infantry units.
Cyprus In addition to their offensive against Kyrenia, Turkish forces also mount attacks in the east against Mpella Pais and Dikomo. At the mountaintop location of Aetofolia, control changes hands from the 231 TP to the Turks and vise-versa. At Aspri Moutti the 399 TP and 361 TP fight overwhelming forces to maintain their positions. To the west, at Karavas, NG positions successfully repel armored Turkish forces. In Lefkosia, to the south, fighting intensifies in the streets of the northern suburbs and along the "green line".

12:00 Cyprus In Ammochostos, the T/C's had agreed to surrender to UNFICYP. The Turkish Air Force hastily bombards the city to prevent such a development, which results in the death of numerous civilians and UN personnel.
Hellas A pair of Turkish F-102 aircraft harass an HU-16B Albatross aircraft. When 2 Hellenic Air Force F-5's approached the area, one F-102 turned and fired an AIM-4 Falcon air-to-air missile but missed. One of the F-5's fired an AIM-9 Sidewinder to destroy the one aircraft, while the other was pursued until it crashed after exhausting its fuel supply.

12:24 Hellas The F-84F aircraft are again ordered to depart, only to once again be ordered to turn back.
Cyprus The Turkish forces enter Kyrenia killing the Cypriot and English civilians trapped in the city.

14:00 Hellas The planned mission use of the F-4E Phantom aircraft is canceled.

15:00 Hellas The 2 Hellenic submarines are once again ordered to sail towards Cyprus.

16:00 Cyprus The cease-fire is supposed to commence at this time. The Turks ignore it until they achieve their strategic goals.

16:00 Cyprus The NG ceases fire, while the 399 TP leaves its position at Aspri Moutti and moves towards Dikomo and Syghari.

17:00 Cyprus The Turkish forces finally manage to link their beachhead positions with the T/C enclave of Agyrta-Lefkosia.
Cyprus Turkish destroyers and aircraft continue to bombard Hellenic positions near Kyrenia till nightfall.



Tuesday July 23, 1974






<This document is currently being revised>

[insan]

Callaghan: 'But you are continuing to mass troops all the time. When will this end?' GüneÕ: 'When the Turkish villages have been evacuated and their security is assured'. Callaghan: 'A successful outcome to this conference is in your interest too. Mavros has made some proposals, what do you think of them?'

This was an opportune moment for GüneÕ to put his cards on the table.

GüneÕ: 'Mr. Callaghan, today there is no government authority in Cyprus. First of all, we must fill this vacuum. Until constitutional order is restored, cer- tain provisional rules must be observed. (1) The Turkish-Cypriot regions must be administered by Turkish-Cypriots and the others by the Greek-Cypriots. (2) In order that the State Presidency may return to legality, Denkta1's powers must be restored and he should be enabled to collaborate with derides. (3) The state of siege affecting Turkish-Cypriot villages must be ended. (4) We should meet again in 7 day's time to work out the establishment of a new order. (5) Let us create wide security zones round the Turkish units and the Turkish villages until a final settlement is reached. These are my proposals. If they are accepted, there will be no need for further Turkish troop movements'.

Callaghan: 'What about the airport?'

GüneÕ: >It can be put under the control of the three guarantor powers or even operated under ajoint system'.

Callaghan: >I gather that you reject Mavros's suggestion that your troops withdraw to their July 22nd lines'.

GüneÕ: >I think what I have said is quite clear'.

Callaghan: 'Couldn't Ankara at least announce that there will be no further Turkish advances? If they will do this. I will try to get the Greeks to agree to your proposals'.

GüneÕ: 'We have no wish to make things more difficult than they are, but you cannot expect us to sacrifice our vital interests. I will consult Ankara, but I don't expect a positive reply'.

Callaghan: 'The Greeks may be content if we place U.N. troops round the Turkish units'.

GüneÕ: 'Definitely unacceptable. I don't think it reasonable that I should agree to the imprisonment of our troops without some reciprocity. The most I can accept is the creation of a wide demilitarised zone, without any U.N. forces in the area.

With the tension growing, it was going to be difficult to reconcile these widely divergent points of view. In an effort to save the conference, Callaghan got in touch with Buffum, the U.S. special envoy, and then with Kissinger himself, whom he asked to put pressure on Athens and Ankara as only American support could prevent a break-down. At 16.00 hrs Callaghan had a last meeting, first with Mavros and then with GüneÕ, in the hope of discovering some common ground. Mavros, who had been given the Turkish proposals, was still awaiting a reply from Athens. GüneÕ, on the other hand, entered the room bearing Ankara's negative response. He told Callaghan: 'Ankara not only rejects the suggestion that Turkish troops should retreat to the July 22nd positions but also the proposals that U.N. troops should seal off the Turkish units and also that an assurance should be given that Turkish advances will cease. The agreement is a package deal; we cannot accept one item and reject the rest. Moreover, would not such a declaration be taken as an admission that we are in the wrong?'

Callaghan was very annoyed and got red in the face. He said: 'You are plunging into a morass and may land yourselves in a position similar to that which Britain faces in Northern Ireland. If you don't sign an agreement, leaving the door open for the withdrawal of your troops, you will be the loser in the end'.

GüneÕ: >If signing the agreement means abandoning our rights, isn't it better not to sign?' GüneÕ went on to remind Callaghan of the arrival of RAF Phantom jets in Cyprus following Turkey's tightening of the ring round the Nicosia airport. 'You have thereby scored a success, but you would be well-advised not to venture any further.'

Towards evening, an uneasy silence prevailed. What now? Was the conference doomed? Was Mavros really returning to Athens, or was it just bluff? No, it was not bluff! In Athens, the generals were pressing Karamanlis to declare war, whilst student demonstrators were shouting 'We want to fight in Cyprus.' These events could not be ignored; evidently Karamanlis was between the devil and the deep. Meanwhile, Kissinger was on the phone again, first to Karamanlis and then to Ecevit; whilst, in Geneva, the foreign ministers were holding conferences. At the one held by Callaghan, he informed journalists that he had asked Kissinger to use his influence in both Athens and Ankara.

Thus the drama increased. Withdrawal from the conference by Athens would inevitably increase the tension between Greece and Turkey, but what would happen to the new-found democracy in Greece? . . . Without hardening its tone, the world press began to put pressure on Turkey. By evening, the focus had shifted from Geneva to the long-distance talks between Kissinger, Karamanlis and Ecevit.

[insan]

Saturday, July 27th 1974

The Geneva meeting continues The Saturday morning editions of the international press voiced the opinion that the Greeks had secured an advantage. Banner headlines, in almost all papers, quoted the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, as saying: If the Turks don't halt, I shall quit the conference.' By such clever manoeuvering, Athens was exerting every effort to procure international pressure on Ankara. I went to see our delegates. They were pretending to be not in the least worried over the possibility of Greece's withdrawal from the conference. Then GüneÕ looked in on us. Not the old GüneÕ who was wont to emerge from meetings in a humorous, and indeed hilarious, mood but a different GüneÕ, one that was grim and surly. He told us that he was going to see Mavros, and hurried away. I learned later that the telephone exchanges of the previous night had had their effect. Kissinger had been assured by Turkey that there would be no more advances and, by the Greeks, that they would not enter the Turkish Cypriot villages. Greece, having found a imddle course at last, abandoned the idea of quitting the conference. The meeting between GüneÕ and Mavros was intended to give the impression that the two Foreign Ministers had reached an understanding. Callaghan later joined them and it was decided that the experts should get together and hammer out a joint communique. At the experts' meeting, the main delegates were Wiggin for Britain, Kirca for Turkey and Bitsios for Greece; and there were many heated arguments particularly on the cease-fire and the role of the U.N. Peace-keeping force, UNFICYP.

Wiggin: 'Mr. Kirca, can you give us an assurance that your forces will halt their advance if the other side stops firing?'

Kirca: Immediately!'

Bitsios: 'But, at the moment, there are various bands of irregular soldiers about who will not take orders from us. Would the Turks feel justified in further advances if one of these groups acted in an irresponsible manner?'

Kirca: 'I'm afraid I do not understand. You send Greek officers to command them and now plead that "you cannot control them." This, I cannot accept. I speak for the whole of our forces, including the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters, and I expect the Greek delegation to be in a similar position. Mr. Mavros is asking for an undertaking that Turkish units will not advance even if fired on or if Turkish villagers are subjected to massacre. Is this reasonable?' Kirca further rejected Bitsios's proposal that there should be a security zone of about 600 m controlled by UNFICYP. He wanted the zone to be increased so that the Turkish units should be out of rifle range. He also objected to the presence of UNFICYP within the zone. He next took up the question of the Turkish villages. He proposed that the Greeks should withdraw from the villages that they had occupied and should also lift the blockade round them. This was more than Bitsios could swallow. He said: 'Let me put it bluntly. I cannot accept this. Since we are here to restore peace, everyone must feel that the outcome is acceptable. We are being asked to agree to the occupation of our land by Turkish troops while withdrawing our own troops from Turkish areas which we occupied during the fighting. What sort of logic is this? How can you expect the Greeks to withdraw? I ask you, do you really want them to pull out?'

Kirca: 'Yes!'

Now, raising his voice a little more, he went on: 'Let me, too, make myself clear. The Greek soldiers and the Greek National Guard must leave the Turkish-Cypriot villages AT ONCE. They must pull out and leave the Turkish- Cypriots to manage their own affairs once more. That is what we demand.' In the utter silence which followed, the British delegates simply stared at both the Greek and Turkish delegations.
Bitsios: 'What does this mean? The Turkish delegation is talking in the harsh manner of an army of occupation. When on earth has an occupying power remained where it was while the other side withdrew? Can you give me one single instance? These talks have at least exposed Turkey's true intentions. No one can sign such a document. Are you trying to get us to sign an admission of defeat? You stand to gain nothing by humiliating Greece.' A real argument was going on.

Kirca: 'Mr. Bitsios, it is high time you adjusted yourself to the realities. You seem to have consolidated your hold on the Aegean whereas Turkey is now in Cyprus merely to safeguard the security of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This mission has not yet been completed. There are people still suffering on the other side. We cannot make any concessions regarding our motives and objectives. Sampson's forces, who overthrew Makarios, must leave the Turkish villages. There is no alternative.'

Bitsios and Cunis tried not to be provoked, but there was no stopping Kirca. '. . . I said that the Turkish troops would not advance unless fired on. I now wish to amend that. So long as a single Turkish village is occupied by Junta officers who are collaborating with a man who boasts in his paper of having organised massacres of Turks and who prides himself on the number of Turks he has killed, the advances will continue.' And having said this, he banged his fist on the table. The British delegates suggested that it was time for a cup of coffee.

It was now 00.45. The Turkish delegates had not imagined that the meeting would last so long, but Callaghan is reported to have told his group to work until they secured a positive result -- till morning, if necessary. Over coffee, Wiggin drew Kirca aside and asked: 'Why are you taking such a hard line on this section of the communique?' Kirca explained: 'Mr. Wiggin, in Turkey we have both democracy and public opinion. Only one-tenth of the Turkish-Cypriots live in the area now held by the Turkish armed forces; nine-tenths can be annihilated by the Greek army any time it wishes. If the Turkish Foreign Minister goes back to Ankara without ensuring their safety, he will be hanged upside down. I can't, therefore, ask GüneÕ to sign this.' Turning to Bitsios, Kirca said: 'Mr. Bitsios, I quite understand your feelings as a man . . . But you are not in a position to demand further concessions. By halting where it now is, the Turkish army is already making a big concession. I am afraid you will have to accept defeat.'

As the sun rose over Lake Leman, nine men, utterly exhausted and with tempers frayed, were still trying to get their views across to one another. Their hair dishevelled, their ties awry, their eyes red with fatigue, they were making a superhuman effort to put in the final touches. The diplomats were as completely exhausted as the soldiers in Cyprus, irrespective of nationality. A strange comparison, especially when one takes into consideration the time wasted and the lives lost. As one felt the warmth of the silently rising sun, one was tempted to ask: 'Why can't people come to an understanding?' The streets were completely empty. The diplomats came out of the conference hall and went their several ways, just like soldiers returning from sentry duty, dragging their weapons behind them. The cock-fight would soon be resumed.