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PART II

3. The Cyprus Liberation Campaign

STRATEGIC CONCEPTION OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

In my General Plan' of insurrectionary action in Cyprus I defined this objective as follows:

'By deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice to draw the attention of international public opinion, especially among the allies of Greece. . .

'By continuously harassing the British in Cyprus, we must show that we are firmly determined not to yield, whatever the sacrifice, but that on the contrary we are prepared to continue until international diplomacy exercised through the United Nations, and the British in particular, are compelled to examine the Cyprus problem and reach a speedy settlement in accordance with the aspirations of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation.'

I also wrote in my General Plan:

It should not be supposed that by these means we should expect to impose a total defeat on the British forces in Cyprus. Our purpose is to win a moral victory through a process of attrition, by harassing, confusing and finally exasperating the enemy forces, with the object of achieving our main aim as defined [above] . . .' -

This clear strategic objective remained unchanged right to the end of the struggle and guided all our actions.

ORIGINAL STRATEGIC PLAN

I studied and took into consideration the following factors:

Terrain. Cyprus is an island with an area of 3,584 square miles, which can easily be blockaded by the opponent by sea and air and consequently can be cut off from all external supplies. The nature of the terrain did not facilitate the conduct of any conventional guerrilla operations. The two mountain massifs - Olympus and Pentadactylos - are everywhere easily negotiable on foot and are crossed in all directions by tarred roads. Troops can be transported by motor vehicle from the capital, Nicosia, to any point in the island in the space of about two hours. Finally, the small area made it possible for the British to conduct frequent and detailed searches.

Population. The inhabitants had no experience of war because the Cypriots had no military service. Though by nature peace-loving, the Greeks of Cyprus, who form 80 per cent of the population, lived in the belief and the steadfast hope that some day someone would be found to raise the standard of insurrection and win them their freedom.

This live and unshakeable yearning for freedom which inspired all Cypriots was my principal trump card.

Arms. These were non-existent and had to be imported, at any rate the bulk of them, before the beginning of the struggle, because later it would be very difficult to bring any in. The capture of arms from the enemy in sufficient quantities did not appear to be a practicable proposition.

The Opponent. The enemy had unlimited resources at his disposal and complete control of the island.

The strategic objective, as defined, and the other factors mentioned above formed the basis and dictated the lines of my 'General Plan' which consisted of the following:

1. Combat operations. Sabotage of government installations and posts.

Surprise attacks by a small number of highly mobile combat units against the British forces.

Each of these missions would have to be entrusted to special units which, at any rate at the outset, would have to be small in numbers, both because of lack of equipment and framed personnel, and for precautionary reasons, to enable me easily to modify my plan in accordance with developments with the greatest possible speed.

At first I concentrated my main effort on sabotage. As I wrote in my General PI "Because of the difficulty of conducting a systematic, large-scale armed guerrilla campaign and in view of the fact that the territory is not capable of absorbing large guerrilla forces, the main weight of the campaign will be placed on sabotage." Further on I say: AI do not believe that the number of shock groups should be more '49 than [the figure laid down in the Plan], at any rate initially. For a higher number would make it harder for them to hide or to get away in the event of attack. The terrain should appear empty so as to make dis- covery difficult by British search forces; passing through the enemy lines and escape will also thus be facilitated.'

However I did not exclude the possibility, should suitable conditions present themselves, of the guerrilla armed struggle developing on a bigger and more intensive scale than originally planned.

'Should events take a more favourable turn," I wrote in the General Plan, >and always provided that sufficient weapons are available, one

should not exclude the possibility of the armed struggle increasing

both in scale and intensity.

'Action under the [two] forms mentioned above [sabotage and armed

attack], if it is to attain its object, cannot be confined to minor and

intermittent operations against insignificant targets but must involve

a vigorous and continuous campaign, aimed at getting important

results.'

2. The laying down. in general terms, of subsidiary plans for passive

resistance, information, supplies etc.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CAMPAIGN

PREPARATION

Taking into consideration the special conditions of the struggle, as

outlined above, the preparatory stage passed through two phases.

The first consisted of two personal reconnaissances which I made

in Cyprus. On the basis of these, the General Plan was drawn up, the

methods to be employed during the struggle were studied, the first

combat units were formed and arrangements made for taking delivery

of the arms to be sent from Greece. On my return to Greece I devoted

my whole efforts to getting these supplies together. This phase lasted

from June 1951 to November 1954.

The second phase began with my arrival in Cyprus, which took

place in the greatest secrecy. It was devoted to organizing and training

the first combat units, to the selection and reconnaissance of the first

targets and to the drawing up of the plans of attack against these

targets. This phase covered the period between November 1954 and

1 April 1955, which date marked the beginning of the struggle. Field-

Marshal Harding, in articles published in the Daily Telegraph, admits

that at the time when we started operations, almost nothing was known

to the British authorities in Cyprus about our organization and the

names of its leaders.

The main feature which characterized both phases was secrecy.

Thanks to this, we were able to take the enemy completely by sur-

prise, so much so that, by the admission of the British authorities in

the island, several months after we went into action they still possessed

no positive information about the Organization. On 20 June 1955 the

British Commander of the Cyprus Police admitted to journalists that

he was completely in the dark about the Organization - E O K A - and

was not on its tracks.

Had the British got wind of what we were doing during the prepara-

tory stage, it would have been impossible to transport the arms to the

island, and the struggle, even if it broke out at all, would have been

nipped in the bud. It is a generally recognized truth that careful

preparation and securing the element of surprise are half the secret of

success. The other half depends on skilful leadership. In my opinion,

given these two factors, numbers are not of such great importance in

guerrilla warfare. It is also significant that our opponent, strategically,

was taken by surprise: a fact due not only to the secrecy of our

preparations and of our first operations, but also to his lack of

preparedness and the unco-ordinated nature of his actions, both tacti-

cally and from the point of view of organization, that might have

enabled him to cope with such a struggle. Consequently, the enemy

wasted a good deal of time in preparations to enable him to take

action, with the known unfortunate results. The British army in Cyprus,

owing to the nature of its organization and formation, was a clumsy

weapon completely lacking in the training necessary for this kind of

fighting. The same applied to the police who, in addition, were not

equipped with suitable-arms, which were only hastily sent out from

England and distributed to them several months after we had gone into

operation. The British, in order to train their forces for guerrilla war-

fare, carried out their first joint army and police exercises in the

Kyrenia at the beginning of June 1955. According to information

supplied to us by a member of the police force who took part, the

tactics employed were the following: fast-moving transport was sent

out along the roads to cut off the retreat of the supposed guerrilla

groups, while other sections advanced over the mountain-tops in order

gradually to throw a tight cordon round the supposed area of flight of

the guerrillas. Troops surrounded every village, because the inhabited

areas were regarded as providing the main hiding-places where the

guerrillas could conceal themselves and receive food from the vil-

lagers. Helicopters flew above the area of operations to notify the

troops of any guerrilla movements.

The results of these exercises, as reported to me, were far from

encouraging for the British, who found that:

1. It was impossible to cut off all communication by road.

2. It was extremely difficult to search mountain terrain, especially

when thickly covered with forest.

3. It was also difficult to carry out effective search of the villages,

given the hostility of the inhabitants towards the British forces.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES

My main task was to create the instrument or instruments needed to

facilitate the execution of my plan, and to make the best use of them.

My efforts began during the preparatory stage and continued, at an

accelerated pace, throughout the duration of the struggle. I state below

what were the main organizational themes I had to face, and how I

dealt with each one.

ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT UNITS: The struggle in Cyprus

was of a quite special nature. Secrecy and the need to secure the element

of surprise made it necessary to avoid starting large-scale organiza-

tion too early.

The organization had to be carried out in Cyprus itself, on British-

occupied territory where we could not form a base of our own. The

organization of a revolutionary army in Greece itself to invade Cyprus

was not possible for the following reasons: the Greek Government

would not allow the organization of any such force on Greek territory

in order to avoid an open breach with Great Britain; an invasion of

Cyprus would have to be either by a forced landing, for which we did

not have the necessary means, or by the secret disembarkation of small

sections, with only the slightest chances of success, if at all. Further, it

would be extremely difficult for any such preparation to escape the

attention of the British agents in Greece. For this reason I ruled out

the organization even of small bodies and their dispatch, by sections,

to Cyprus.

Consequently, we sacrificed numbers for the sake of surprise. There

could be no question of disposing of a large or even adequate strength,

because of our great inferiority in resources. My advantage would lie

in the use of suitable tactics which would enable me, on each occasion

and within the necessary time-limit, to have the upper hand.

It followed that the combat units would be organized by degrees.

Initially we organized some sabotage groups in the towns These did

not exceed twenty in number. Later on, in July-August 1955, I brought

into action a few groups of guerrillas. As my resources increased, I pro-

ceeded to strengthen both sabotage and guerrilla units. But our

resources were extremely limited. Arms were imported from Greece

under great difficulties, in driblets, either through the parcel post or

through our couriers. Consequently, I was later forced to use shot-

guns, a quantity of which I seized from their owners in a single night.

I used them to form special detachments, called 'Shotgun Commando

Groups' (known, under their Greek initials, as OKT). They gave excel-

lent results in ambushes.

As regards munitions, at the start we were very short but gradually

we succeeded in supplying our own needs. Certain quantities we were

able to salvage from ships which had been sunk off the coasts of

Cyprus during the Second World War. Others we manufactured using

explosives obtainable in Cyprus itself and sold in the shops. We even

produced such things as land mines.

In this way we gradually succeeded, under fantastically difficult con-

ditions, in forming our invisible army which covered the whole island.

This army was everywhere, in the smallest village, in the furthest

point of the island. It was present everywhere but never showed itself.

As for its numbers, it is difficult even for me to say. For, ultimately,

because of our system, every Greek Cypriot, from the smallest child

to old men and women, belonged to, our~army, and fulfilled a mission

either as a combatant or in the auxiliary services. Furthermore, the

secrecy maintained throughout .the Organization was so perfect that

although our opponent managed to learn about its general lines, he

never succeeded in discovering the essential feature of the whole

secret machinery and consequently was unable to break it up and

crush it.

At first, the enemy tried to dislocate the Organization by arresting

dynamic elements, mostly young people, but without success.' Later, he

resorted to mass arrests (2,100 Greeks were rounded up in one night),

but again with no result. Our secret lay above all in the choice of our

fighters, in our system of organization and in the tactics followed,

which made it difficult for the enemy to capture them. Further, any

gaps in the ranks, from whatever cause, were at once filled from our

reserves which we were careful always to have ready up to strength.

PARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION: A revolutionary

movement and a guerrilla war, in particular, stand no chance of suc-

cess, whatever the qualities of their leader, unless they have the

complete and unreserved support of the majority of the country's

inhabitants, for it is to them that the movement will turn for assistance

of every kind (cadres and fighters, hiding places, concealment of

equipment and men, liaison agents, food supplies, propaganda, etc.).

My own military career has taught me that the collapse of the front

usually begins from the rear. Consequently, I devoted my attention

to organizing the population in order not only to get it actively to

participate in the struggle but also to enable it to hold out, seeing that

our struggle was above all a matter of time and endurance.

Already on 23 March 1955, in a letter addressed to Archbishop

Makarios in which I set out my General Plan of organization, I fore-

told the total participation of the people in the armed struggle through

uprisings and disturbances. I concluded as follows:

'Should the plan I have sketched above, namely, of acts of sabotage,

attacks on police stations, activity of guerrilla bands, etc., be crowned

with success, then I shall organize a general uprising of the youth in

the towns and in the rural districts, in the form of aggressive demonstra-

tions in which the organized population will take part.'

For four years, alongside the armed campaign, there went on a con-

tinuous struggle as to which of the two opponents would win the

population over to his side. The weapon used by the British was

force. But it was found that the harsher the measures resorted to by

the British, the more the population became estranged from them and

inclined to our side. Civilized peoples cannot be won over 'through

violence, only through good treatment and a just and paternal adminis-

tration. The representatives of Britain in Cyprus, both soldiers and

civilians, behaved towards the inhabitants with an animosity which

was far from politic. They were completely deficient in that under-

standing of the mass psychology which is so essential a factor of

success in such circumstances. They showed by their behaviour that

they had been unable to penetrate the motives which had impelled the

Cypriot people to rise up against them. This was a serious disadvan-

tage. All the British Governors in Cyprus failed miserably in this

respect. In my Memoirs I have written an objective criticism of the

two Governors. Harding and Foot. and of their behaviour towards the

population. We, on the other hand, used methods which were in the

main based on mass psychology, we employed persuasion, we set an

example of endurance in the face of danger and privation, but above

all we stimulated the people's faith in the justice of their cause.

Throughout the struggle I never ceased for a single moment to strive

to hold the people's moral support. In this I was completely successful

and my appeal always met with full response on the part of all the

Greeks of the island, whatever the sacrifice demanded. Every call on

my part was regarded by the population as an order to fulfil a national

duty. My proclamations were looked upon as sacred documents. Every

man hastened to acquaint himself with their contents and to comply

with them. My orders overrode the laws of the local British administ-

ration. In this way, I won the confidence of the Greek population of

the island and every Greek Cypriot became a member of E o K A. The

reply which the Mayor of Nicosia, Mr Dervis, gave the British

Governor is a good example. When the latter demanded that the

inhabitants help to arrest members of EOKA, the Mayor replied:

'But we all belong to EOKA.=

The success of any revolutionary movement depends, amongst other

things, on political vision, skill and diplomatic tact towards the

population. Who wins over the people, has won half the battle. It is,

of course, one of the qualities of a leader to distinguish what means he

must employ for that end. One can lay down no rules, no ready-made

prescriptions.

I wish to stress that in the choice of my first key men I never

made any distinction of social class, either among townsmen or vil-

lagers, and this continued to be my policy throughout. Communist

revolutions usually start from the masses who have economic

grievances, that is, among the workmen and peasants; the movement

makes them all kinds of promises, and with the support of these

classes imposes itself on the rest. But national liberation movements

must express the will of the whole people. Liberation struggles succeed

only when they find a response among the people. True to these ideas,

I started my struggle by choosing my key men from the towns where I

found the youth better organized, with a more marked patriotic

enthusiasm for the fight, which was in time communicated to the whole

of the island.

I cannot say which class contributed most. For the whole Greek

population of the island rallied round the Organization as a single

man, burning with desire for combat, and every man gave what he

could. The one exception was, needless to say, the Communist leader-

ship, the mass of whose followers, however, deserted them: the only

ones who adhered by them were a few party officials and a small

number of fanatics, whereas the great majority condemned their

leaders and joined in EOKA'S struggle.

The organization of the population, as described later,

was so markedly successful that the whole Greek population of

Cyprus, roused from its slumbers, obeyed the order and took part in

the fight, regardless of sex and age. In the villages the women formed

resistance groups and stood up to the British attacks, some of them

falling victims to enemy bullets. In the towns young girls formed

sabotage and assault groups. Some of them were arrested and

imprisoned, while many women carried out dangerous missions as

liaisons or for the transport of arms.

At Geneva, where I was asked to speak on the Cyprus liberation

campaign, I was asked by someone the following question: 'What

you have told us about organizing the population is all very well, but

don't forget you had to deal with the British. But what would happen

if we had to do with Russians who, apart from the much more

rigorous measures they would be likely to take in order to overawe

b, the population, might even go so far as to deport all the inhabitants of

an insurrectionary region?'

My reply:" 'A people, who are determined to rise against their

masters and have the faith to continue the struggle, must always

reckon with the harsh measures which will be taken against them, and

must be ready to face them, otherwise it is better they should stay

quiet. A leader who places himself at the head of such a movement

without previously studying the people's capacities is bound to fail.

No one ever imagined that the Greeks of Cyprus would be able to hold

out against the harsh measures taken then by the British authorities.

But nevertheless they did hold out. The Nazis during the last war

took the most rigorous measures against the countries in insurrection

against them. They even established crematoria in Germany where

the inhabitants of the regions in revolt were transported and burnt.

Yet the peoples did not yield to force. As regards the deportations, it is

not such an easy matter to expel hundreds of thousands or even

millions from their homes, because then the question arises of how

these people are to be fed.

'Even if one ignores the international organizations which are sure

to intervene in such a case - and it is quite possible that the Russians

would ignore them - there exists another right, which they are bound to

take into account - namely the right of reprisal."

[fanourıo]

Missed Opportunity: Denktash-Clerides Letters, Spring & Summer 1971

The intercommunal negotiations resumed in 1968 and continued right up to the troubles of 1974. The two interlocutors for their communities were Rauf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots, and Glafkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots, the same two who continued to be, off and on, the main negotiators throughout the remainder of the century. What is interesting about these letters is that they demonstrate, as the set from the early 1960s also did, that the parties were never very far apart on significant issues; most of what separated them were procedural matters that could have been negotiated, had the will been present for a settlement. At root of the ostensible differences was again the matter of local self-governance. Of course, Clerides was not wholly in control of his side=s negotiations, just as Denktash was not the sole decision maker on his side. What happened in this period was a classic missed opportunity to settle the issue, as all sides now acknowledge.
Here we include Denktash's letter to Clerides, setting forth concessions but an insistence on local autonomy; a report on Clerides' rendition of the Greek government's pushing Makarios to accept this "surrender," but Makarios resisting; Clerides' formal response to Denktash, which adhered to Makarios's cautious line; a new round of letters in August; and Clerides, from his memoirs, underscoring the missed chance to settle the two communities' differences peacefully.

Denktash=s letter to Clerides, April 27, 1971

27 April 1971

Dear Glafkos,

In view of recent public statements by your side on the ultimate Greek-Cypriot policy on Cyprus I have had some doubts about the use of continuing the talks which has, as an aim, the finding of a permanent solution based on independence. As, however, your letter of 9 April 1971 (in reply to my letter of 13 March) still seems to tackle the problem on the basis of independence I thought it right to put on record my personal views and sound you on some points, before putting the whole matter to my side.

It appears to me to be essential to re-affirm our terms of reference for the exploratory, informal talks which we have been having for almost three years. I believe we had agreed that we would be searching for a permanent solution based on independence and not an independence which one side or the other could utilize for furthering "national aims and aspirations. " In other words we would talk independence as an end in itself and not as a means to an end.

Secondly, we would be talking - - as indeed we have - - purely on the internal Constitutional matters and would not be tackling the international status of the independence which we would suggest to our respective sides, this being a matter to be discussed by all the interested parties at a later stage.

Thirdly, whatever we discussed was to be - - as you reiterate in your above referred letter - -ad referendum to our respective principals in the form of a package deal and, therefore, until there was an agreed package by us, there was no binding agreement on any specific matter.

I shall be grateful if you kindly confirm that the above statement also conveys your understanding of the position.

In view of the serious doubts raised by recent statements made by your side indicating utter disagreement of the first condition set out above, I should like to point out that in trying to settle our problem on the basis of a package deal I have always taken it for granted that the remaining parts of our Constitution will stand in its present form, subject to such minor adjustments necessitated in the light of agreement on the package deal.

In our discussions on the executive I had indicated my readiness to forego the veto rights, in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal security, but I note from your letter of 9 April 1971 that your position vis-a- vis the vice-president is quite different viz, you would consider having a vice president if he were merely a figurehead.

I should like, therefore, to underline the fact that apart from readiness to forego these veto rights I am not in any position to write off the existing duties and powers of the vice-president. I feel, very strongly, that in our form of society peace, understanding and mutual trust can only be cultivated by the two Supreme Heads of the Executive working in full harmony for the good of Cyprus.

On the question of the Communal Chambers your stand has been that the Turkish side can continue to have its Communal Chamber as set out under Part V of the Constitution with all its powers and functions as at present.

You have rejected my offer that your side should re-constitute the Greek Communal Chamber which has been "abolished" unilaterally since the troubles.

I shall take this matter up below in considering the package deal, but would like to underline, once again, the political position which has arisen due to your refusal to re-constitute the Greek Communal Chamber: All religious, educational, cultural and teaching matters; personal status; marriage, divorce; Courts dealing with Civil Status and religious matters; charitable and sporting foundations, bodies and associations created for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the respective Communities; taxation for above purposes; promoting the aims pursued by the Municipalities; controlling producer's and consumer's co-operative and credit establishments, supervision of municipal functions are amongst the powers and duties of the Communal Chambers.

After abolishing the Greek Communal Chamber your side has

(a) Created an unconstitutional ministerial post viz: Minister of Education of Cyprus when this Ministry deals purely with the Greek educational affairs. This is a political usurpation of our rights and an imposition upon us which we cannot accept.

(b) You have put a number of priests on the pay-roll of the Republic thereby forcing the Turkish-Moslem taxpayers to finance Greek religious affairs and thus cutting across the whole foundation of keeping such matters as Communal matters.

(c) The Greek co-operative activities have become Governmental activities.

(d) Greek Municipalities are run by bodies appointed by the "government"

(e) Greek Social and Sporting Foundations, bodies and associations are now part and parcel of matters supervised by "government".

Your claim, therefore, that "the Greek side shall not re-establish its Communal Chamber" is not purely a Greek matter to be decided by your side; such a decision involves the political and financial rights of the Turkish community and upsets the political, financial and social equilibrium which had been set up by the 1960 Agreements to the detriment of the Turkish community.

If we are to agree to the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber (on the assumption that later we may find a formula whereby we may agree to the non-establishment of the Greek Communal Chamber) we must be assured of the following:

(a) The unconstitutional post of the "Ministry of Education of Cyprus" must be abolished and Greek Education as such must be given to the President; the Turkish Education to the Vice-President. By decree they can each nominate a person to take charge of the Greek and Turkish education respectively.

(b) The salaries of the priests must be taken out of the budget of the Republic.

(c) Financial aspect of giving the functions of the Greek Communal Chamber to the "governmental" departments must be reviewed and adjustments must be made of the funds which will be given to the Turkish Communal Chamber so that we do not suffer any discrimination. For the same reason the Greek Co-operative Movement must be divorced from "Governmental" union or some formula, similar to the one suggested above on education must be found for the two Co-operative Movements.

All in all, I hope you'll agree that the wisest way will be to retain the structure set out in our Constitution and to retain the two Communal Chambers in their present form. If we do not do so the parity of treatment and status of the "Communal Affairs" of the two communities will have been destroyed and injustice done to the Turkish side as already done in the question of forced payment of priests' salaries!

As regard Article 171 on Sound and Vision broadcasting: I have suggested that this Article should be re-drafted subject to the right of the Turkish Community to set up its own sound and vision broadcasting. I have noted that you do not confirm, in your letter of 9 April, the fact that you had stated to me your agreement on the incorporation of Turkish municipal areas in the Turkish local authority context in conjunction with the grouping of such authorities (vide my letter of 13 March). I take this to be an oversight, and would like confirmation please.

2. I feel it necessary to know your final views on the above, as this knowledge will have an important bearing on our evaluation of the Greek Cypriot policy on Cyprus. In view of recent public statements on Enosis, my side finds itself in utter confusion and the belief that we are being invited into an agreement on independence which will be used as a spring-board for Enosis has gained ground. I mention this in order to enlighten you on the real purpose of my seeking clarification on the above points, which, in view of what has been said and done recently by your side, is of utmost importance to us.

3. Assuming that your answer on the above will be affirmative my views on the package deal are as follows:

The police:

(a) On the question of the police the Turkish side has indicated its willingness to agree

(i) To reduce its share of man-power from 30% to 20% as requested by you;

(ii) To amalgamate the gendarmarie with the police as requested by you;

(iii) To retain Article 132 whereby "forces stationed in parts inhabited in a proportion approaching one hundred per centum only by members of one Community shall belong to that community";

(iv) To retain Article 131 which provides that the Head and the Deputy Head shall not be of the same Community; in return for having police or peace-keeping officers with jurisdiction solely in local authority areas.

In all parts of the world where local authorities exist, they have their own peace-keeping authorities. This, in no way hampers the smooth functioning of the Central Police Authorities in matters which fall within their jurisdiction. Local police will be there to help the Central police authorities to carry on with their duties, while giving to the local people that sense of security which is so vital in view of the behaviour of the Greek policemen during the inter-communal troubles.

In view of the important concessions which we are prepared to make on d) and (ii) above I hope you'll agree to the setting-up of local authority police and thus complete the discussion on this matter.

The judiciary:

(b) As regards the judiciary

(i) I would be prepared to accept your offer of 5 Greek 2 Turkish Judges (provided provision is made for Turkish judges to sit on every appeal in which Turks are involved) if you will agree to my proposals for retaining Article 159.

On the question of the Courts one matter remains unsettled, although we had discussed it, in the early stages of our talks, and that is, the nature and character of the Courts which will be dealing purely with "local authority" matters.

I presume elected or honorary justices of the peace could attend to such matters.

(ii) If you agree to accept 6 Greek and 3 Turkish judges in the Supreme Court, subject to the provision above, I would be willing to make Article 159 optional for the litigants as proposed by me during our talks. In case (i) above is agreed upon it will be essential to make a transitional provision for securing the seat of our third judge in the Supreme Court pending retirement.

The legislative:

(c) On the legislative, in view of your agreement that

(i) The Constitution shall not be amended except with the 2/3 votes of the Turkish Members and your acceptance of the present electoral procedure whereby members of the House are elected on separate Greek and Turkish electoral rolls I am willing to agree to your proposal of having two vice-presidents (one Turkish) of the House and to have the president and the vice- presidents elected by all the members jointly if you agree that the House will have 60 Greek and 15 Turkish members; instead of 48 Greeks and 12 Turks as proposed by you. I am also prepared to abandon the present system whereby any amendment of the election law should be with the majority votes of the Turkish members if you agree that the first Election Law be drafted and agreed upon prior to the signing of the agreement in general subject to its binding constitutional effect for the purposes of its amendment later on.

The executive:

(a) Subject always to the basic requirement for all alternatives, that Turkish representation all through the political and administrative hierarchy shall be not less then 20%, I propose the retention of the present system as set out in the Constitution, subject to the removal of the right of veto and consideration of what new powers will be given to the President and the Vice-President in the light of our overall agreement

-Alternatively-

(b) I am willing to consider the abolition of the Council of Ministers and adoption of a full presidential system as in U.S.A. subject to the retention of the powers of the Vice-President as at present and consideration of what new powers will be given to the President and the Vice- President in the light of our overall agreement.

-Alternatively-

(c) I am willing to consider the abolition of the existing Presidential system subject to provision that where the president is a Greek the Prime Minister shall be Turkish (elected by Turks) with adequate Turkish seats in the Cabinet, (as in Lebanon) and agreement on the rights and powers of the P.M. and the Cabinet,

In (a), (b) and (c) above the question of Minister of Education should be settled in the light of observations made above on this point. Two junior ministerial posts (one Greek one Turkish) may be considered as an alternative to my suggestions above, responsible to the President and Vice-President respectively.

In Belgium there are, I understand, two such ministries.

Local Government: (including Turkish municipal areas) I propose that

(a) The powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the local authorities should be embedded in great detail in the Constitution. Your offer that this should be done through legislation to be passed by the House is not acceptable to us in view of the past record of the House which had stalled on the passing of the necessary legislation for the municipalities and thus created a political impasse on a purely municipal issue.

(b) That the Central Authority or Coordinating body for local governments should be

(i) The Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers, or

-Alternatively-

(ii) The president and a committee appointed by him from amongst the elected Greek members, for the Greek local authorities; the vice-president (or the prime minister) and a committee appointed by him from amongst the elected Turkish members for the Turkish local authorities; or

- Alternatively-

(iii) Two junior ministerial posts (one Greek and one Turkish) to be created to look after Greek and Turkish local authority affairs responsible to the President and Vice-President respectively; I cannot accept your offer that the autonomous local bodies should be under the District Officer for any purpose; because this is not compatible with their autonomy. In case of ultra vires the Courts will have the right to look into any complaint lodged by any person or authority of the Republic.

4. So far I have indicated to you my willingness to advice my side to make concessions on practically all points which you have raised with me in return for agreement on local autonomy affairs - the only ground on which the Turkish side has put forward balancing demands. Your side has shown willingness to pocket all the concessions without any reciprocity on any Turkish demand. Your list of concessions on page 6 of your above-referred letter is somewhat misleading. The Turkish side has not asked for the amendment of the Constitution. It is the Greek side which has put forward certain proposals for amendment and practically on all these points we have tried to accommodate you. Our counter offers made with a view to softening the Greek blow of drastic amendments is being treated by you as "acceptance of Turkish offers", whereas these were indications to you as to the limit of our accommodation in agreeing to your proposals. The only grounds on which we have asked for something has been the local autonomy, and on this ground you have not even agreed to the Status of the authority which we are to setup. Our demand has been for local autonomy, your offer has been on limited local authority.

In order to complete this review I would like to put on record, once again, the vital concessions which I have indicated willingness to make; concessions, for which, the Greek side seems determined not to give anything in return, thus raising the pertinent question whether the exercise of the local talks was merely for amending the 1960 Constitution in such a way as to make the Independent Republic of Cyprus a convenient spring-board for Enosis! My whole purpose in these talks has been to amend the Constitution in such a way as would satisfy your side's demands without diminishing in any way or form the juridic stat- us of the Turkish Community and without imperiling the ultimate safety of the independence of Cyprus:

Concessions which the Turkish side has shown willingness to make:

(a) Abolition of the provisions of the Constitution which necessitated the appointment of non-Cypriots to the posts of Presidents of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court;

(b) The amalgamation of the Supreme Constitutional Court with the High Court;

(c) The amalgamation of the gendarmerie with the police;

(d) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20%;

(e) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring majority vote of both Communities in the public commission;

(f) Abolition of the provision of the Constitution requiring separate majority votes in the House on legislation dealing with all taxation matters, elections, municipalities.

(g) Abolition of veto powers in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security;

(h) Reduction of Turkish participation in the Army from 40% to 20%;

(i) Making it optional, for litigants to resort to the protection of Article 159.

(j) Reduction of Turkish participation from 30% to 20% in Town Planning Affairs as per Article 176.

I hope the above will give us a new ground for tackling the problem anew in a spirit of give and take. So far the Turkish side has been on the giving end; I hope your side will find it possible to be a little generous and understanding so that we can reach agreement on all outstanding issues.

Yours sincerely,

Rauf R. Denktash
President, Turkish Communal Chamber

[fanourıo]

convinced or not yet?

[fanourıo]

This is a brief review of conflict resolution efforts. Please note that most hyperlinks in this section will take you outside this site.

The inability of the two communities to agree to a set of governing principles and institutions for forty years has drawn countless conflict interveners to the island. Most of these have been official negotiators and diplomats. The main narrative and attached documents describe most of the important initiatives by the United Nations to resolve the impasse. The major powers, particularly the United States and Britain, have ongoing attempts within the U.N. framework. Some dozen or more special representatives to Cyprus are active. Individual embassies in Cyprus, such as the Slovak mission, conduct more informal efforts to bring the two sides together. Many governments, such as the Swiss, fund projects to find solutions and reduce tensions.

The numbers of civil society groups, typically called non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are involved is also impressive. In the last few years, perhaps a dozen significant projects have been engineered by NGOs from outside Cyprus. Individuals, funded by the Fulbright Commission and others, have played a role as well, particularly in fostering the bicommunal activities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens. Academic researchers have contributed many useful ideas.

Increasingly, civil society in Cyprus is taking up the challenge of reconciliation. Civil society is a loose concept, but it typically designates the space between the family and the state in which new ideas can be developed, experimented with, and refashioned to provide institutions and other mechanisms to solve problems. In Cyprus, civil society is in an embryonic form. In Greek Cyprus, the traditional ties of village and Church, and the vibrant economy, have tended to retard the development of NGOs dedicated to substantive issues. In Turkish Cyprus, the village traditionalism was also strong, but since 1974 the strong state (Turkey), the presence of the military, and the weakness of the economy have combined to slow down the emergence of civil society organizations. (It is worth noting that civil society in this sense is also an undernourished phenomenon in Turkey and Greece, certainly well behind the rest of Europe and much of Africa, the Americas, and Asia.) But this is changing. More and more groups interested in the national problem are appearing, and some have very substantive agendas.

The Approaches

The main goal of the official negotiators since 1974 has been to engage the two parties in substantive negotiations that could lead to a reconstitution of the Cyprus nation, typically envisioned as either a federation or a confederation. The talks, usually facilitated by the United Nations, have from time to time demonstrated some small progress but have not apparently come close to a final settlement. The method is classic third-party facilitation, with sets of ideas profferred, and good offices used as a platform for convening the antagonists. Greece and Turkey have not officially been part of these processes (as they were in the past), but they have played a role in the background. The uncertain rapprochement between Athens and Ankara wrought by foreign ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, has created a better atmosphere for negotiations, but as of this writing (early 2001) this warmer climate between the motherlands has not produced any change in the Cyprus talks. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiators, led by Rauf Denktash and Glafkos Clerides, have become stuck in a seemingly irreconcilable set of positions, with Denktash insisting on a two state solution with some Cyprus-wide interlocking institutions, and Clerides holding out for a bizonal federation, with guarantees for Turkish Cypriot safety in the absence of Turkish troops. The United States ostensibly supports the Greek Cypriot position, but its strong alliance with Turkey has meant that Washington will not put effective pressure on Ankara.

Below this official negotiating level, a considerable amount of activity is pursued by governments and quasi-official organizations to break the impasse. A number of governments have convened parties to the conflict to promote dialogue, confidence building measures, and what is sometimes called functional reconciliation. The latter is a technique in which antagonists are brought together not to solve the main points of difference but to address other, common problems, such as environmental protection. In Nicosia, this has occurred in a decades-old discussion and planning on sewage and water treatment common to both sides of the Green Line. An example of other semi-official efforts to create elite-level dialogue was Richard Holbrooke's attempt, while American assistant secretary of state (1993-96), to create a bi-national business leaders forum, which ended in failure.

NGOs have pursued similar means of bringing Turkish and Greek Cypriots together. The Fulbright Commission, a funding mechanism for scholars and overseen by the State Department, began a program to bring conflict-resolution specialists to Cyprus to work with the two communities in a constructive manner. (See the evaluation of this effort.) The first and probably the most successful of these was the work done by Ben Broome, a communications expert at George Mason University in Virginia (and now at Arizona State University), who virtually created the bicommunal community of Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line. This community of perhaps 200 active participants has attempted to build relationships across the divide in a number of ways, from choral groups to problem-solving workshops on the conflict. A great amount of mediation training has also been pursued by a number of NGOs. Broome has continued to convene groups of Cypriots off-island to build relationships and explore the ethnic problems besetting the island. The Peace Research Institute, Oslo*, one of Europe's major research and action organizations, has also attempted to create forums for dialogue between elites of both camps. Seeds of Peace, based in Jerusalem, started a youth-oriented project in 2000. Off island, the work of conflict resolution has been much less energetic, as one would expect, although the London community of Cypriots, which is enormous, has a number of activities percolating; the most important forum has been the Association of Turks, Greeks, and Cypriots*---their web site has many useful features and articles. A number of Americans have conducted occasional workshops* about possible solutions as well.

Among the Cypriot civil society organizations and individuals, a number of initiatives have been started, including some work on school curricula and the teaching of history, building a business education center, news media, youth programs, web sites, and the like; and some labor unions have held widely publicized cross-border meetings. The bicommunal community in the north and south holds considerable promise for further and more substantive activity.

The Results

The brief descriptions above, which scarcely touches on the range and number of efforts, indicate a depth of interest and inventiveness that is encouraging. Involvement in non-official activities carries with it a certain risk in both societies. The prevailing mindset in the south is that Turkish Cypriot organizations are agents of Turkey and not to be trusted. Moreover, the central cause of Greek Cyprus is not reconciliation, but justice---which is to say, return of land occupied by the Turkish military in 1974. So those who aim for reconciliation without preconditions are at risk of being ostracized in a society that is closely knit ideologically and small by any standard. In the north, the risks can be even greater if activity is viewed as implicit criticism of the state; a number of activists have been harassed by the Turkish authorities and military, sometimes violently. Denktash closed down bicommunal activities in 1997, making it difficult to meet and exposing bicommunal activists to additional inconvenience or worse. The Greek Cypriot authorities have made meetings difficult, too, by its border restrictions that limit access for Cypriots and non-Cypriot activists.

The NGO efforts have promoted dialogue, skills, trust, relationships, institutions, education, and the like---all necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for peace. New and recent emphases on exploring history (an approach at the root of this educational Web site), cleansing school curricula of hyperbolic and militant nationalism, and involving institutions and people not previously a part of the reconciliation culture are important advances.

At the semi-official level, the dialogues and workshops have no doubt had some salutary effects of exploring problems and options, and building relationships. Indeed, one of the obvious benefits to all the dialogues and meetings between the two sides is the creation of personal ties, an essential condition for the success of any final settlement. But, like the NGO efforts, they are too frequently managed poorly, without the resources or long-term commitment that conflict resolution requires. The supposition, for example, that mediation skills training or more dialogue will produce some tangible results, in the absence of other kinds of initiatives, is ill-founded.

The official efforts have been more glaring in their failures and fundamentally insincere in their conduct and norms. The expectations wrought by the political cultures on both sides constrain the possibilities for compromise. The most hard-line elements on each side regularly intervene to impose discipline on the negotiators---i.e., the political leaders in negotiations have little room to maneuver for fear of being seen as appeasers. This is particularly true in Greek Cyprus, where the Church still plays a militant role opposing even a federation, and political parties jockey for advantage relentlessly. In the north, the Denktash regime is somewhat safe from electoral challenges, but must answer to Ankara. In neither society are the values of reconciliation nurtured by political institutions, the news media, or the educational system, so the public as a whole cannot be expected to support far-reaching solutions. And the presence of so many outside negotiators relieves political leaders of responsibility for failure; it may be that the U.N. and other such interlocutors should simply pull out. The U.S. stance, for instance, is fundamentally dishonest---insisting on the Greek Cypriot position but unwilling to expend significant political capital on persuading Ankara to negotiate in good faith. The U.K. is so discredited by its disgraceful colonial administration that it is not considered trustworthy either.

What will alter this very rigid and static situation is difficult to say. Conflict resolution at any level must be cognizant of political and social realities. Dialogue and relationship building continue to have value. Functional reconciliation projects and confidence building measures can be effective tools. The lure of the European Union may alter the dynamics measurably and unpredictably. But the rigidity of the two incompatible negotiating positions suggest something more disruptive is needed. The social values underlying this rigidity must be transformed in order to break the deadlock. Some interveners are addressing this through explorations of history, stereotypic views of "the other," and similar emphases on "tolerance" or more fundamental changes toward acceptance. But substantial political transformation rarely occurs without a public demand for change, a demand that is typically articulated by a social movement. (To see a more complete explanation of this argument, see my paper on public demands and peace, and a bibliography, by clicking here.) This is absent in Cyprus (although more apparent recently in Turkish Cyprus), and without such demands---which in effect give politicians permission to compromise---the possibilities for a near-term settlement are remote. It may be that an attitude change has already occurred sufficiently to support such a social movement, reflecting a fatigue with the problem or a willingness, in an atmosphere of prosperity or prospective prosperity, to put aside differences in the interests of a permanent settlement. (Such attitudes could be explored by expert survey research.) Whatever the current state of public opinion, however, a more active and insistent public demand must be manifested. Social movements usually introduce far-reaching ideas that have a tenuous or poorly understood support among the public; these movements confront the shibboleths of officialdom while educating the public on the utility or morality of an alternative future. That is probably what is needed in Cyprus in the coming months and years, unless Cypriots from all sides are willing to have another foreign solution imposed (the EU's rules on openness, for example), or are willing to live in a bitterly divided island.

[Piratis]

convinced or not yet?

Convinced that you can selectively copy & paste opinions of others? Sure.

The fact remains: Turkey illegally occupies Cyprus and we are in a cease fire of war that started with the Turkish invasion in 1974. Do you disagree with this fact?

Also what I and the majority of Greek Cypriots say is that we will not capitulate and we demand the respect of the sovereignty of our country and our human and democratic rights and we will fight for them until the end.

These are the facts of today. If you want to go to the past in order to excuse any crimes committed by Turkey against us today and for the last 32 years, here is what I say to that:

First of all I have to make something very clear:

I believe that we should leave the past behind, we should forgive each other, stop all illegalities and move ahead with a united democratic country without racist discriminations and with respect to the human rights of all Cypriots.

Unfortunately I notice that there some people that insist on using a tiny and selective part of the past as an excuse for the continuation of illegalities and their demand for a "solution" that will be based on racist discrimination of people based on their ethnic background (which is something that exists in no democratic country in the world)

To those people Greek Cypriots deserved the violations of their human rights for the last 32 years and they deserve to be convicted for eternal violation of their human rights in a country that discriminates against them because of their race.

The fact is however that Turks in Cyprus have committed 100 times more crimes against Greek Cypriots than the other way around.

Greek Cypriots have been the majority on the island of Cyprus for 3000+ years. Their interaction with Turks starts in the 15th century, were the Turks attacked our island. This also answers the question "Who started it" for anybody that thinks that this is important:

Throughout the period of Venetian rule, Ottoman Turks raided and attacked at will. In 1489, the first year of Venetian control, Turks attacked the Karpas Peninsula, pillaging and taking captives to be sold into slavery. In 1539 the Turkish fleet attacked and destroyed Limassol. Fearing the ever-expanding Ottoman Empire, the Venetians had fortified Famagusta, Nicosia, and Kyrenia, but most other cities were easy prey.

In the summer of 1570, the Turks struck again, but this time with a full-scale invasion rather than a raid. About 60,000 troops, including cavalry and artillery, under the command of Lala Mustafa Pasha landed unopposed near Limassol on July 2, 1570, and laid siege to Nicosia. In an orgy of victory on the day that the city fell--September 9, 1570--20,000 Nicosians were put to death, and every church, public building, and palace was looted. Word of the massacre spread, and a few days later Mustafa took Kyrenia without having to fire a shot. Famagusta, however, resisted and put up a heroic defense that lasted from September 1570 until August 1571.

So now it is clear how the interaction of Turks with Greek Cypriots started in Cyprus, and the question "Who started it" is answered as well.

What followed were 300 years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus. During these 3 centuries Greek Cypriots were oppressed second category citizens. They had to pay multiple times the taxes of muslims and their testimony in courts was not accepted. Whenever they tried to revolt against their oppressors they were slaughtered.

So here we have a period were Turks were oppressing and killing Greeks in Cyprus. The result of this period was 300 years of oppression against GCs and 10s of thousands of Greek Cypriots dead.

The next "round" of conflict between the two communities was at the end of the British rule in Cyprus, and then from 63 to 68. During this period extremists from both sides were committing crimes and atrocities.

This is the only period that TCs remember, but even here they remember only their own casualties and not the crimes that they had committed against GCs.

So this is a period were both sides had about an equal number of casualties, some 100s for each side.

Then in 1974 the illegal coupists overthrow our president and Turkey found the excuse to invade Cyprus. No TC was killed by the coupists before the invasion had started, but only after.
The result of the coup/invasion was 6000 GCs dead and 200.000 GCs ethnically cleansed. On the other side the TCs had only a couple of 100s of victims.

The next period is the 32 years of illegal occupation and insistence from Turkey to violate international law and human rights. This continues until today.

Conclusion:
1) The Turks "started it" in the 15th century
2) The Turks have committed much much more crimes against Greek Cypriots.
3) The Turks insist on their crimes today
4) Greek Cypriots have committed crimes as well, but only a tiny fraction of the crimes that the Turks have committed.

Still, Greek Cypriots are more than willing to put all these behind as long as we are not provoked by people that remember only the 1% of history that suits that in order to prove that Greek Cypriots are the evil people that deserve even more crimes against them.

Therefore I ask from people on this forum to either:

1) Leave the past behind. Do not try to excuse crimes and illegalities in 2006 with events that happened in the past. Concentrate on how we can find a solution that will respect all Cypriots equally without racist discriminations and human right violations.

Or, if doing (1) is impossible for you then at least:

2) If you believe that the past should be used to determine who is the "good" and who is the "bad" one and that this should be the basis of solving the Cyprus problem (instead of democracy, human rights and legality, that I propose) then at least use the whole history and not the tiny bits that suit you.

[fanourıo]

so what do you suggest?

[Piratis]

so what do you suggest?

Legality, democracy, human rights, no racist discrimination and a constitution based on the constitution of any other EU country. This means finally something normal for Cyprus, and normal means solution.

Moving from one abnormality to another can not be a solution but only part of the problem.

We should keep fighting for what is right and just. When will will manage that nobody knows. However if we do not give up, then it will not be a matter of "if" but a matter of "when", even if that "when" will be after 400 years.

Even if we do not manage to achieve what is just in our life time then we can at least die with dignity, and with the satisfaction that we caused as much damage to our enemies as possible.

(enemies = those that violate the sovereignty and independence of our country and reject democracy and human rights for all or part of Cypriots)

[zan]

so what do you suggest?

Legality, democracy, human rights, no racist discrimination and a constitution based on the constitution of any other EU country. This means finally something normal for Cyprus, and normal means solution.

Moving from one abnormality to another can not be a solution but only part of the problem.

We should keep fighting for what is right and just. When will will manage that nobody knows. However if we do not give up, then it will not be a matter of "if" but a matter of "when", even if that "when" will be after 400 years.

Even if we do not manage to achieve what is just in our life time then we can at least die with dignity, and with the satisfaction that we caused as much damage to our enemies as possible.

(enemies = those that violate the sovereignty and independence of our country and reject democracy and human rights for all or part of Cypriots)

There is no abnormality onlt partition through greek intransigence. Swallow your medicine like a good boy and say sorry for your fathers actions.

[Piratis]

I will say sorry for the 1% of blame that we have, when you say sorry for the 99% of blame that you have. In fact, even that 1% of our blame wouldn't be there if your fathers just stayed in Mongolia instead of invading and stealing the lands of others. Then again thats the only thing those barbarians knew how to do, and as I see the Turks didn't get any more civilized since then.

[Piratis]

To whom are you referring to?

Our attitude is the attitude of the people that are under illegal foreign occupation. The attitude that you would find in France or in Greece during the Nazi occupation, the natural attitude that people that fight a foreign invader should have.

What attitude would you prefer from us to have? The "bent to be fucked" one?