It is customary for GCs to describe the Turkish landings in 1974 as invasion, and for the TCs to call it intervention, and one sees these two different terms used on this site as elsewhere. The diffference implied is essentially between an unjustified and a justified act, though invasion itself need not have that negative meaning — the Normandy invasion of 1944 is a good example of that. Mr Bush and Mr Blair would argue that so is the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
However, a distinction is made nowadays between invasion and intervention, even though the intervention necessarily involves an invasion. Kosovo illustrates the point. In 1999 Nato forces invaded Serbia, bombed Belgrade, and occupied part of its territory. But the West — America and Europe — sees this as intervention (good) not invasion (bad).
The difference between one and the other is more than political spin, though there is some of that. The so-called ‘Kosovo doctrine’ justifies re-branding invasion as intervention if its purpose is to prevent the ethnic cleansing of one minority by a ruling majority. The Serbs seemed bent on wiping out their Muslims in Kosovo and the only way that could be stopped was by the use of armed force, justified on humanitarian grounds. However the operation was limited to this objective only, and not to the conquest of Serbia itself.
Intervention is therefore a term which now describes a limited military action, involving the use of armed force in another sovereign territory, where the aim is to keep two sides apart in order to prevent the murderous oppression of one by the other— provided that this is much more than civil conflict but a descent into genocide.
This was defined under Article II of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group ’ and included not only killing but ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’, or ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’. It became a punishable international crime for anyone complicit in it, attempting it, conspiring to commit it, or inciting it.
This justified intervention in Kosovo, where the Serbs were judged guilty by the West of engaging in the ethnic cleansing outlawed by the UN. Does it justify Turkish intervention in Cyprus? Its rights as a guarantor power under the1960 treaties are the most oft-quoted defence for its decision to use military force in 1974 but these were intended to restore the constitutional arrangements agreed in the original settlement, an option scarcely open to it in the circumstances then obtaining and when another of the three guarantor powers, Greece, had already invaded the island. The ‘Kosovo doctrine’ if applied retrospectively would provide a better defence, but only if the charge of genocide could be sustained against the Greek Cypriots in respect of their treatment of the Turkish-Cypriots in the eleven years before Turkish troops landed on the island. This is a charge vehemently denied by the Greek-Cypriots, whose president only recently claimed that ‘not a single Turkish-Cypriot’ died at their hands, and that the only massacres were committed by TCs.
Turkish intervention as opposed to Turkish invasion — a distinction which is important to both sides — would seem therefore to be matter of determining whether their actions were on a par with those of Nato in Kosovo and whether they acted to prevent ethnic cleansing of the Turkish-Cypriot minority by the Greek-Cypriot majority with government endorsement, direct or indirect — an international crime. The question therefore depends on an an honest account of what happened between Christmas 1963 and July 1974, the period in which the Greek-Cypriots are alleged to have been engaged in the same kind of crime as the Serbs in Kosovo. If true, it was genocide, justifying intervention; if false, then Turkey invaded the island on a pretext and without just cause. It really is as simple as that.