boulio wrote:like ive said ive never been to cyprus,i would like to go and even visit the north,this is all what people tell me that i work with,is it hersay maybe but thats all that i know from what the say.
Alasya wrote: Moving into G/C property in the North after 1974 was the
only practical option when faced with a growing refugee
problem caused by Greek Cypriot agression toward Turkish
Cypriots in the South, this is after all what created
the climate for Turkeys intervention. It was also
because refugee camps in the North, the area liberated
by the Turkish Army could only be used for temporarily
and the ceasefire was not originally meant to last 30
years.
MicAtCyp wrote:
What are you talking about bre one sided crap victim? Growing refugee problem??? Since when re, never you heard that from 1967 upto 1974 there was practically no intercommunal violence?
MicAtCyp wrote:
And are you with the opinion that only the TCs were harassed and killed during the years of intercommunal violence? Do you know that the number of dead people during all that period is about equal between the GCs and the TCs?
MicAtCyp wrote:
Refugee camps in the North?? Jesus, do you call 3 GC stolen houses fully furnished for each TC "a refugee camp"?
MicAtCyp wrote:
Have you ever seen a refugee camp in your life? Well, typically it was a dusty field with olive oil trees. Undeneath you will see packs of people, mothers with their babies crying, no water, no food, some blankets scattered around, perhaps some goats too.Worse than a gipsy camp. You will see the mothers sending their children to houses of non refugees begging for some milk or some beans. After a few weeks you see tents coming from the Red-Cross. And also those terrible and discusting tins of sardines as if those people could eat nothing else than sardines. Tins that today we throw to the cats and the dogs for food.That's what a refugee camp is. The Invasion occured in August. Guess what happened to those tents 4 months later when Winter came. Guess where those people were living for long long years upto 1983 until the refugee building camps were built.
What a vivid picture you paint of a refugee camp. It is a very acurate protrayal of how many many TC lived in the period 63-67 (and after for some) - but of course we all know that they lived like that was nothing to do with GC, it was just a self inflicted suffering of the TC community by the TC community (according to GC propaganda).
So do you accept that the GC refugees are today not 'refugees' in the sense of the picture you paint above?
The fact is money poured into South Cyprus after 74. Who was pouring money into the TC community when they were living as refugees in the period 63-67 (and after for some)?
-mikkie2- wrote:
How can you compare the scale of the effects of the invasion on what happened to the TC's in 63-67.
-mikkie2- wrote: So of course EVERYTHING that befell the TC's was the fault of the GC's. ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING. No fault on your part at all whatsoever.
-mikkie2- wrote:Around 20000 TC's were affected by this and they mainly left their houses on hearing word of what happened in other villages. Many people that tried to return a few days later were stopped from doing so by your TMT from going back. And why was the TMT forcing TC's to not economically interact with GC's? They were killing their own people for doing so! What was the reason for this?
The official Greek-Cypriot position is that the major portion of the Turkish-Cypriot refugee movement was both initiated and directed by Turkish-Cypriot leaders in accordance with a contingency plan to facilitate partition. Turkish-Cypriot leaders, on the other hand, claim that they had not developed any such contingency plan for population consolidation, nor did they initiate the movements which did occur. These leaders claim that their community members moved because they were intimidated by Greek-Cypriots, and that Turk-Cypriots fled, without prior planning, to the nearest refuge.
The author's investigations reveal that the overwhelming majority of Turk-Cypriot refugees moved only after Turk-Cypriots had been killed, abducted or harrassed by Greek-Cypriots within their village, quarter, or in the local vicinity. Most refugees expected to return to their homes within a few months at the most, and it was this assumption of an early return that facilitated their departure in the first place. In some instances, the evacuation of certain villages was encouraged by the expectation of an imminent invasion by Turkey. There was an understandable desire to withdraw from Greek-Cypriot areas which might become bombing targets of the Turkish air force. It was only in a few instances, after January 1964, that the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership took the initiative in recommending that certain villages should be evacuated. However, it is known that such advice was not always followed. Normally the Leadership was approached by village elders only after the villagers had already decided to evacuate, and they sought the Leadership's assistance In the pro- vision of transport and refugee housing. Any official administrative organization to direct refugee movements, or to oversee their welfare, was not established until the bulk of the refugees had already moved on their own initiative .
Generally, Turk-Cypriot refugees moved en masse to the nearest Turk-Cypriot village or quarter that was guarded by Fighters. In most cases, refugees fled from their homes, leaving clothing, furniture and food behind. Most of the abandoned villages and quarters were ransacked and even burned by Greek-Cypriots.
In review, the pattern of refugee movement was not one that seems to have been designed to facilitate partition.
Although it appears unlikely that there was any centralized co-ordination of the Turk-Cypriot refugee exodus, there is ample proof that Turk-Cypriot political and military leaders controlled the return of refugees to their former homes. It is known that in late 1964 some local Fighter commanders resorted to armed threats and even murder to prevent some refugees from moving into government controlled areas,[69] but it is not known to what extent such actions were directed or condoned by leaders in Nicosia. However, such coercion should be put in perspective. The government was prepared to encourage the return of Turk-Cypriot refugees provided that they accepted government authority and that they did not return to 'sensitive' areas. Such areas included locations adjacent to Turkish-Cypriot enclaves or National Guard positions, and also mixed villages in which returned Turk-Cypriots would outnumber Greek-Cypriots. In addition, known Fighter leaders were specifically prohibited from returning. The acceptance of such pre-conditions would have won for the government the victory that it had failed to achieve by its armed offensive. In addition, the hostility of many local Greek-Cypriots was such that Turk-Cypriots did not believe that the government could fulfill its guarantees that returning refugees would not be molested. In any case, by August 1964, the abandoned homes were looted and often burned-out ruins. Neither community had the resources to rebuild the houses, to purchase new farming equipment or to provide resettlement grants. The side that undertook such indemnities would also be tacitly admitting to a degree of responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem, and that neither community was prepared to do.
(to TC areas following the outbreak of violence in dec 63)Telephones were disconnected, and road blocks were erected around the main Turk-Cypriot villages and quarters.
There is no doubt that this propaganda [GC controlled state radio and television braidcasts portraying the TC as starting an armed insurection] generated an intense Greek-Cypriot enmity against the Turk-Cypriot community, and encouraged a number of revenge murders throughout the island. Many Turk-Cypriot employees were turned out by their Greek-Cypriot employers; some left on their own initiative. However, most Turk- Cypriots simply found it too dangerous to attempt to go to work in Greek-Cypriot areas.
On 12 January 1964, in the presence of foreign reporters, British Army Officers and Red Cross officials, a mass grave was exhumed at Ayios Vasilios. The grave contained the bodies of 21 Turkish-Cypriots who were presumed to have been killed in or near Ayios Vasilios on 24 December. The observers verified that a number of the victims appeared to have been tortured, and to have been shot after their hands and feet were tied.[9]
With British troops patrolling cease-fire lines in Nicosia and Larnaca, Greek-Cypriot leaders thought that Turkey would not invade. President Makarios therefore announced on 1 January 1964 that he had unilaterally abrogated the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. However, when Sandys made it clear to Makarios that such an abrogation would almost certainly provoke a Turkish invasion, this declaration was quickly changed to a statement of intention to terminate the Treaties by the appropriate means. Subsequently, Sandys persuaded both Cypriot communities, as well as Greece and Turkey, to send representatives to a conference in London, beginning on 15 January, to thrash out the problem.
When the London Conference convened, the Greek-Cypriots insisted on abrogating the Zurich-London Agreements. They wanted a unitary form of Cypriot government which would be free to amend its own constitution. They agreed to incorporate some Turk-Cypriot minority rights into the constitution but insisted that such rights should not be guaranteed by threats of external intervention.
The United Nations' inability to stop the inter-communal violence, or to prevent the Cyprus Government from importing large amounts of Russian and Czechoslovakian arms,
On 14 June 1964, General Grivas returned to Cyprus. In the next two months 5,000 Greek troops arrived to form the Greek Army in Cyprus under his command.[48] The 950 men of the Greek
-mikkie2- wrote:
Your failure to appreciate what happened to the GC's and the scale of what happened to me shows how little you actually care about a unified Cyprus and more to do with what you can gain at the expense of your compatriots
. Movement: Coercion and Political Manoeuvring
The period from 21 December 1963 to 10 August 1964 was the most violent phase of the Cypriot conflict. Both communities estimate that several hundred of their members were wounded. In addition, several hundred were kidnapped and temporarily held hostage until exchanges were arranged. Official records show that 191 Turk-Cypriots were known to have been killed and 173 are still missing and now presumed dead. On the Greek-Cypriot side, 133 are known to have been killed and 41 are still missing and presumed dead. It is probable, however, that the figures for Turkish-Cypriot deaths include some who were killed accidentally by their own hand or by other Turk-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot deaths are probably understated. There are indications that some casualties, for propaganda reasons, were never publicly announced. Also, casualties among Greek Army soldiers in Cyprus are not included in the Cyprus Government's figures. It may be more prudent therefore to accept that approximately 350 Turk-Cypriots were killed in this period while about 200 Greek-Cypriots and mainland Greeks were killed.[5]
pantelis wrote:. Movement: Coercion and Political Manoeuvring
The period from 21 December 1963 to 10 August 1964 was the most violent phase of the Cypriot conflict. Both communities estimate that several hundred of their members were wounded. In addition, several hundred were kidnapped and temporarily held hostage until exchanges were arranged. Official records show that 191 Turk-Cypriots were known to have been killed and 173 are still missing and now presumed dead. On the Greek-Cypriot side, 133 are known to have been killed and 41 are still missing and presumed dead. It is probable, however, that the figures for Turkish-Cypriot deaths include some who were killed accidentally by their own hand or by other Turk-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot deaths are probably understated. There are indications that some casualties, for propaganda reasons, were never publicly announced. Also, casualties among Greek Army soldiers in Cyprus are not included in the Cyprus Government's figures. It may be more prudent therefore to accept that approximately 350 Turk-Cypriots were killed in this period while about 200 Greek-Cypriots and mainland Greeks were killed.[5]
Also, like EOKA, the TMT was strongly anti-communist and brought intense pressure to bear on Turkish Cypriot members of left-wing unions and clubs. Premises were burnt down, some left- wing Turkish personalities were killed, hundreds of Turkish Cypriot members of the communist-led PEO (Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour) felt it necessary to leave and were in fact advised to do so for their own safety by their Greek Cypriot comrades.
On 7 June 1958, following a bomb explosion outside the Turkish press office in Nicosia, there was an immediate invasion by Turkish rioters of the Greek sector, and Greek Cypriot residents were expelled from a mixed district.
A first reaction to this document must be that for a nation of 556,000 this was a very elaborate and very rigid constitution.
The seventy-thirty ratio in the public service: The Turkish Cypriots required that the proportion should be attained within five months of independence as had in fact been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the President-elect and the Vice- President-elect. The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not overnight draw from 18 % of the population which was poorly qualified suitable candidates to fill 30% of the jobs. Standards and qualifications could not be lowered; after three years the Greek Cypriots published figures to show that real progress had been made in all grades towards the objective. But the subject rankled and aroused resentment in both communities. At the end of 1963 there were 2000 appeals outstanding in the Supreme Constitutional Court about public appointments.
191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks remained missing and could also be presumed dead. There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia and Nicosia. Food and medical supplies had to be shipped in from Turkey. 24 wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Later Turkish Cypriots returned to 5 of their own villages and 19 of the mixed villages. Most of the moves seem to have been spontaneous and hasty, following a local incident of violence, the people leaving clothing, furniture, and food behind. But in some cases orders were received for the people to go, and once villagers had moved, the Turkish paramilitaries, now much expanded in numbers and known simply as 'the Fighters', exercised substantial coercion to prevent returning in most cases to government-controlled areas. The necessary territorial basis for partition was being found.
-mikkie2- wrote: Erol
You quote that the population of GC's was 800000. In 1974 the population of Cyprus was around 600000.
-mikkie2- wrote:
To justify things using numbers is false because most of the troubles were within mixed communities where you probably had an equal number of people from each side being affected.
Turk-Cypriots generally left those mixed villages in which they were in a minority. In addition, they left 10 mixed villages in which they were the majority, according to the 1960 census. However, hundreds of Greek-Cypriot armed reinforcements moved into many mixed villages in which Turk-Cypriots were in the majority, and so, at the time of their exodus, the Turk-Cypriots were in fact in the minority. In any case, the majority-minority status is more accurately defined by taking a broader view than one confined to the ethnic composition of each village in isolation. Invariably a Turkish-Cypriot majority in a given mixed village gives way to a minority status if the regional situation is considered.
-mikkie2- wrote:And if you want quotes from your favourite web site (http://www.cyprus-conflict.net):
-mikkie2- wrote:
And to counter your arguments again:
Not so simple to argue then.
And for your information, I have lost family during the 1974 'peace operation'. My grandfather died a broken man, without knowing the fate of his son. He suffered for 20 years. We only recently found out he was killed by a bomb dropped by a Turkish plane on a truck he was travelling in.
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 0 guests