by MR-from-NG » Thu Nov 02, 2006 1:08 am
Sal,
This is good reading. Reliable and unbiased. A bit long but worth the read.
CYPRUS: TWO NATIONS IN ONE ISLAND
Bow Educational Briefing No.5
Source:
Stephen, Michael. 1987[?]. "Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island."
Bow Educational Briefing No.5. London. Pages 1-7.
ABOUT THE BOW GROUP
Established in 1951 as the Conservative answer to "Intellectual
Socialism" and the Fabian Society, the Bow Group took its name
from the Bow and Bromley Constitutional Club in London where
the first meeting was held. Founder-members were included Sir
Geoffrey Howe, Britain's present Foreign Secretary.
Now in its 35th year, the Bow Group has approximately 900 members,
mainly graduates and all selected by interview. Today nearly
100 members are in Parliament, including the Leader of the House
of Commons, John Biffen; Energy Secretary Peter Walker; former
Home Secretary Leon Brittan and former Defence Secretary Michael
Heseltine. The Bow Group is considered somewhat of a proving
ground for prospective MPs and rising Parliamentary stars.
At the 1983 General Election 24 members of the Group were newly
elected to Parliament, and other members serve as Members of
the European Parliament and as Councilors in Local Government.
Much of the research work of the Group is undertaken by a network
of Standing Committees on such subjects as Defence, Foreign Affairs,
Employment, Industry, Economic Affairs, and the Environment.
Each Committee brings expert and informed opinion to bear on
the main political issues of the day. This paper was commissioned
by the Foreign Affairs Standing Committee, the Chairman of which
is Robert Jackson, Member of Parliament for Wantage, and a former
Member of the European Parliament.
All these efforts combine with conferences, speaker meetings,
and the Group's authoritative political magazine Crossbow, to
influence the formulation and development of Conservative Party
policy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Michael Stephen is a Barrister and International Lawyer. He
was seconded to the British Delegation to the United Nations,
and is Secretary of the Bow Group's Foreign Affairs Committee.
He was Parliamentary Candidate for Doncaster North in the 1983
General Election.
ABOUT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN BOW PAPERS
The views expressed in Bow Papers are those of the authors. They do not
represent a collective view of the Bow Group, nor do they represent a
statement of the view of either of the Conservative Party or of the
Government. Bow Educational Papers are published as containing arguments
which merit consideration by the Conservative Party and by a wider audience.
==================================================================
Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island
BOW EDUCATIONAL BRIEFING No.5
British foreign policy has two principal aims; to maintain the
security of the British Isles, and to protect and enhance British
trading interests. Allied to these aims, and indirectly supportive
of them, is concern beyond our shores for justice and the rule
of law, protection of human rights, and the promotion of mutual
respect and understanding between peoples.
Each of these factors applies in a greater or lesser degree
to the island of Cyprus. The Eastern Mediterranean is important
to Britain's security, in relation both to the Southern flank
of NATO and to the situation in Iran and the Middle East. British
trading interests, whilst small in Cyprus itself, require stability
in the Region. Violations of human rights and breakdown of respect
and understanding between peoples in the Region threaten both
of Britain's principal foreign policy interests. Finally, Britain
has residual legal rights and obligations relating to the island.
A Prisoner of History
Like that other island across the Irish Sea, Cyprus is a prisoner
of its history. Its present is conditioned by its past, and there
is a grave danger that unless there is wisdom and imagination
in the management of its affairs its future will be fettered
too. Everyone who wishes the people of Cyprus well prefers to
look to the future, but the past is littered with well-intentioned
mistakes, and they will be repeated yet again if account is not
taken of the lessons of past failures. It is therefore necessary
to look in some detail at the reasons why the present situation
has arisen.
There is a popular belief that the Cyprus problem was caused
by the landing of the Turkish troops in 1974, and if only they
would withdraw the problem would be solved. This is a serious
misconception, for the modern Cyprus problem began in 1960, and
the landing of Turkish troops was the consequence, not the cause.
Moreover, there were in fact two military interventions in 1974;
the first was by Greece and the second was by Turkey.
For the time being Greek and Turkish Cypriots live apart. Does
their future lie in political association on the same basis as
before, or are their interests better served by secure geographical
foundations from which each community can deal with the other
on the basis of mutual respect?
The inhabitants of Cyprus have no common language (except English),
and no common religion, nor have they, except at the surface,
any common culture. This being so, any approach to the Cyprus
question which regards Cypriots as a nation is fundamentally
flawed. It is true that on a personal basis Greek and Turkish
Cypriots can enjoy friendly relations with each other, but the
history of the island shows clearly that their relationship is
fragile when they deal with each other collectively.
Cyprus became part of the Turkish Empire in 1571, at which time
the population was a mixture of people whose origins were in
many different parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe.
Three hundred years later the island became part of the British
Empire. During the second half of the 1950s a skillful and determined
guerrilla campaign was waged against the British in Cyprus by
EOKA, and organisation consisting of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots
committed not to independence but to ENOSIS, or political union
of Cyprus with Greece.
EOKA did not succeed in achieving ENOSIS, but the British Government
eventually reached the conclusion that its security requirements
could be met by withdrawing to two Sovereign Bases. Accordingly
in 1959 a series of conferences took place in London and Zurich
with a view to granting independence to the remainder of the
island, at which the five interested parties were represented,
namely Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots.
The Greek-Cypriots were represented by Archbishop Makarios, and
the Turkish Cypriots by Dr. Kutchuk. The two Cypriot leaders
were accorded equal status.
Negotiations were long and difficult, but eventually agreement
was reached upon the basic constitutional structure of a new
Republic of Cyprus. Agreement was also reached upon the terms
of a Treaty of Guarantee between Britain, Greece, Turkey and
the new Republic.
The 1960 Constitution
The Constitution (Cmd. 1093) represented a compromise between
the rights and aspirations of Greek and of Turkish-Cypriots.
Although the Greek-Cypriots were more numerous the Turkish-Cypriots
had lived in Cyprus for 400 years as a distinct community, and
were willing to join the new Republic in exercise of their right
of self-determination only if that basic fact of political life
in Cyprus was formally recognized. The alternatives were two
separate states, a condominium division of the island between
Greece and Turkey, or continued British rule. It was eventually
agreed upon that the new state would be a bi-communal Republic.
Its structure was therefore unique because it was a quasi-federation
in which there were two political entities within only one geographical
area.
The bi-communal nature of the Republic is fundamental to the
state of affairs created by the 1960 Treaties, and from its very
inception the Republic of Cyprus had never been a unitary state
in which decisions are made solely on the basis of one-man-one-vote.
The two communities were political equals; not in the sense that
each had the same legislative or executive powers, for those
accorded to the Greek-Cypriots by the Constitution were greater
by virtue of their numbers; but in the sense that each existed
as a political entity, just as both large and small states exist
as political entities within the structure of the European Community.
At the conclusion of the negotiations the Prime Minister of
Greece made the following declaration (Cmd 680):
'From the very outset of these negotiations our main preoccupation
was that there should be no victor in them, except the people
of Cyprus themselves. I am certain we have achieved this. It
is the best solution because its main foundation is co-operation
between Greeks and Turks in the island, and in our two countries.
And it is the best solution because it leaves to the island's
majority the rights enabling it to develop in the most appropriate
manner all aspects of its life, while it secures for the minority
a splendid opportunity for maintaining its character and institutions,
as well as for enjoying their generous share of common authority
and responsibilities.'
The means by which the Constitution gave effect to the agreement
were fourfold; political, legal, administrative, and military.
The President was to be a Greek-Cypriot and the Vice-President
a Turkish-Cypriot. Legislative authority was vested in a House
of Representatives, of whom 70% would be Greek-Cypriots and 30%
Turkish-Cypriots, but legislation was subject to the veto of
the President and / or Vice-President in certain specified circumstances.
Moreover, legislation relating to certain matters of sensitivity
as between the two communities required a separate majority of
the representatives from each community.
The interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution was entrusted
to a Supreme Constitutional Court, which consisted of three judges,
a Greek-Cypriot, a Turkish-Cypriot and a neutral as President
of the Court. The Council of Ministers was to consist of seven
Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots. The Civil Service
was to consist of 70% Greek-Cypriots and 30% Turkish-Cypriots.
Further, by Article 173 (1) it was provided that separate municipalities
were to be established in the five largest towns, subject to
transitional provisions and to review within four years.
Underpinning the Constitution were the armed forces of the Republic
and, in the last resort, the three Guarantor Powers. By Article
129 it was provided that the Army should consist of 2,000 men
of whom (subject to transitional provisions) 70% would be Greek-Cypriots
and 30% would be Turkish-Cypriots. The strength of the Police
and Gendarmerie could be varied, but only with the agreement
of the Vice-President.
By Article 185 it was declared that the territory of the Republic
could not be divided, nor integrated wholly or in part with the
territory of any other State. Finally, Article 182 provided that
the basic Articles (listed in Annex III to the Constitution)
and which had been agreed at Zurich; could not be amended.
The Republic of Cyprus Breaks Down
Sadly, and with the benefit of hindsight it now appears that
the Greek-Cypriot leadership never intended to operate the Constitution
to which they had agreed, and on the basis of which independence
had been granted and international recognition accorded. As early
as September 1960 Archbishop Makarios said: "The Cause of ENOSIS
has not died. I cannot say that ENOSIS has been forgotten." (New
York Tribune, 27.9.60).
From the beginning, before the Turkish-Cypriots had exercised
any powers, the Greek-Cypriots failed to implement constitutional
provisions which did not suit them. They failed for example to
implement Article 129(1) for the establishment of the national
army in the ratio 60 / 40, which was regarded by the Turkish-Cypriots
as an essential practical safeguard; but they did discharge large
numbers of Turkish-Cypriot police auxiliaries and recruited Greek-Cypriots
in excess of the numbers permitted by Article 130. They also
instituted compulsory military service for Greek-Cypriots alone,
contrary to Article 129(2).
They also failed to establish the ratio 70 / 30 in the Civil
Service as required by Article 123 on the pretext that suitable
Turkish-Cypriots could not be found. Further, they failed to
implement Article 173 which provided for separate municipalities.
The Turkish-Cypriots regarded this too as an important practical
safeguard, and responded by creating their own municipalities
and by taking the issue to the Supreme Constitutional Court of
Cyprus.
On 25th April 1963 the Court ruled that Article 173 had not
been complied with, but Archbishop Makarios declared that he
would ignore the judgment, and did ignore it (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63).
The neutral President of the Court, a West German citizen, resigned
on 21st May 1963 and thereafter the Turkish-Cypriots were excluded,
sometimes by actual physical force; from most of their positions
in the Institutions of the Republic. The United Nations tried
to mediate, but the Greek-Cypriots would not allow the Turkish-Cypriots
to return unless they accepted fundamental changes to the Constitution
(UN docs. S/5950, S/6569, S/7350).
On 30th November 1963 Makarios demanded that the Turkish-Cypriots
accept 13 amendments to the Constitution, which included no less
than eight of the basic articles enacted for their protection;
and which only three years before it had been expressly agreed
could not be amended. It is said that these demands were prompted
by frustration caused by the exercise by Turkish-Cypriots of
the rights conferred upon them by the Constitution. However,
the history of the period 1960 to 1963 shows that it was the
very existence of those safeguards to which the Greek-Cypriots
objected, for they prevented them from ruling Cyprus in the interests
of Greek-Cypriots alone, and were an obstacle to ENOSIS.
The Greek-Cypriots has agreed to a bicommunal republic but now
wanted to change it unilaterally into a unitary state in which
their voting power would be paramount. On 2nd January 1964 the
Daily Telegraph wrote "The Greek-Cypriot community should not
assume that the British military presence can or should secure
them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the minority.
We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
However, the Greek-Cypriots then proceeded to rule Cyprus as
if the Turkish-Cypriots no longer had any constitutional role.
All the reserves of the Central Bank were appropriated for the
benefit of Greek-Cypriots, and they purported to enact legislation
which was in violation of the Constitution, for example the Administration
of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964, the President
of the Republic and Members of the House of Representative (Extension
of Term of Office) Law 1965, and the Public Service Law 1967.
Violence and Economic Discrimination
From December 1963 there were serious incidents of violence
against Turkish-Cypriots, and since they were only 18% of the
population, and lived in scattered communities they were easy
targets despite the presence in Cyprus of UN forces. The violence
against them became so bad that British troops had to intervene,
and the Parachute Regiment in particular is still remembered
by Turkish-Cypriots for their bravery in their defense. However,
the position of British troops eventually became untenable and
they withdrew.
On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following
report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish
Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered
in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there
and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print.
Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish-Cypriot
inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on 26th December
1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the
presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots,
at Limassol, was reported by The Observer on 10th February 1964,
and there were many more.
On 8th December 1967 the UN Secretary-General reported to the
Security Council (UN doc. S/8286):
"When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued
during the first part of 1964 thousands of Turkish-Cypriots fled
from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive
or carry, and sought refuge in what they considered to be safer
Turkish-Cypriot villages and areas."
On 10th September 1964 the Secretary-General reported (UN doc.
S/5950):
"UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties
throughout the island during the disturbances . . . it shows
that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages,
527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered
damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed
totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia
50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have
been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."
From 1963 to 1974, and despite the continued presence of UN
forces, Greek-Cypriots continued to attack Turkish-Cypriots.
They raided isolated Turkish-Cypriot villages, destroying homes,
schools and even places of worship, and forcing their former
inhabitants to withdraw into enclaves for mutual protection.
On 15th February 1964 a shipment of arms for Greek-Cypriots was
discovered at Famagusta harbour, which provoked the following
statement from the British Government: "We had ample information
to show that the import of arms is taking place with the full
knowledge and approval of the Cyprus Government, and this is
not a matter which is tolerable at a time when we are trying
to keep the peace on the island" (Hansard, Vol. 689, Col. 844).
The Turkish-Cypriots formed a militia of their own and did fight
back, but there was little they could do against overwhelming
numbers. The only power likely to be able and willing to protect
them was Turkey, if they could persuade it to act under the 1960
Treaty of Guarantee. On 1st January 1964 Makarios announced his
decision to abrogate the Treaty (The Times, Daily Telegraph,
2.1.64).
In September 1964 the Secretary-General reported to the Security
Council (UN doc. S/5950):
"In addition to losses incurred in agriculture and in industry
during the first part of the year, the Turkish community had
lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over
4,000 persons who were employed by the Cyprus Government. The
trade of the Turkish community had considerably declined during
the period due to the existing situation, and unemployment reached
a very high level as approximately 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots had
become refugees. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber
had dropped considerably, as a yearly subsidy formerly received
from the Government had ceased to be granted in 1964. Furthermore,
a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment
relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half
the population came to be on relief."
During the period 1963 to 1974 the freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots
was severely restricted (UN docs. S/5764, S/5950, S/7350); they
were denied postal services (UN docs. S/5950, S/7001); their
access to building materials, electrical equipment, motor parts,
fuel, chemicals and many other commodities was severely restricted
(UN docs. S/5950, S/7350); and Turkish-Cypriot refugees had to
live in tents and caves at risk to their health.
On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General reported "The
economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities
in Cyprus, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount
to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks
to force a potential solution by economic pressure." (UN doc.
S/5950).
On 21st April 1966 the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Patris published
a top secret document which had come into its hands and which
it attributed to the Greek-Cypriot leadership. This document
was a detailed plan for the achievement of ENOSIS by the forceful
suppression of the Turkish-Cypriots, the abrogation of the Treaty
of Guarantee, and the management of world opinion. It has become
known as the "Akritas Plan". It is impossible to prove that this
document is authentic, but if it is not, the actions of the Greek-Cypriot
leadership at this time are a remarkable coincidence.
On 26th June 1967 the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives
adopted a very significant resolution as follows:
"Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus,
the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it
will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all
Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and
undivided Cyprus with the Motherland."
Faced with this attitude toward them on the part of the Greek-Cypriots,
there were many in the Turkish-Cypriot community who felt that
their only chance for a secure future lay in Union of part of
Cyprus with Turkey, and calls for "Taksim" were heard. However
this was a reaction to the situation in which they found themselves
and was not something which the majority of Turkish-Cypriots
preferred. They had secured a perfectly reasonable settlement
in 1960 and it was in their interests to make it work.
It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to
condemn the usurpation of the constitution by force but actually
rewarded it by recognising the Greek-Cypriot administration as
the Government of Cyprus (S.C. Res. 186 of 4th March 1964).
Greece Invades Cyprus
In 1967 there were further serious episodes of violence against
Turkish-Cypriots, and in 1971 the EOKA leader General George
Grivas returned to Cyprus and established the EOKA-B organisation
committed, as was EOKA of the 1950s, to ENOSIS. According to
a letter dated 2nd July 1974 from Makarios to the Greek Government,
the Greek-Cypriot National Guard was from the outset the main
supplier of men and materials to EOKA-B. Turkey did not respond
to this violence except by way of sporadic air attacks.
However, events moved inevitably into a critical phase, and
on 15th July 1974 a large force of Greek-Cypriot and Greek troops
deposed Archbishop Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot administration,
and killed many Greek-Cypriots in the process. One of the EOKA-B
leaders, Nicos Sampson, was installed as President and EOKA-B
began systematically to murder the Turkish-Cypriot people of
the island, who fled as far as they could to the North. EOKA
demonstrated the same brutality as they had employed against
British soldiers and their families from 1955-1960. The intention
was completely to Hellenise Cyprus and to declare ENOSIS.
Makarios himself fled, and eventually reached the United Nations
where, on 19th July 1974 he declared in the Security Council
(S.C.O.R. 1780th mtg.) that the coup was an invasion in violation
of the independence of the Republic and that it was the work
of Greek officers directed by the Military Government in Athens.
The coup took place not because Makarios had abandoned ENOSIS
but because he was no friend of the Greek military Government,
and was not proceeding towards ENOSIS fast enough for their liking.
Turkey's Response, and the Treaty of Guarantee
Five days after the overthrow of Makarios, and one day after
his speech to the UN, the Turkish Government (at that time a
Social Democrat Government), acted against the Greek invasion,
and landed troops in the North of the island. The Greeks and
Greek-Cypriots argue that the Turkish military action and subsequent
presence is illegal. The Turks and Turkish-Cypriots say it is
legal.
By Article 1 on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee the Republic of
Cyprus had agreed:
(a) to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial
integrity and security,
(b) to ensure the maintenance of respect for its Constitution,
and (c) not to participate in any political or economic union
with any State. Further, the Republic declared prohibited any
activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union
with any other State or partition of the Island.
By Article II it was agreed that the Guarantor powers would:
(a) recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity
and security of the Republic, (b) recognise and guarantee the
state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution,
and (c) prohibit, so far as concerned them, any activity aimed
at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus
with any other State or partition of the island.
Finally, by Article IV it was agreed that in the event of a
breach of the provisions of the Treaty the Guarantor powers:
(a) would consult together with respect to representations or
measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions,
and (b) reserved the right, insofar as common or concerted action
might not prove possible, to take action with the sole aim of
re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty.
As at 20th July 1974 the "Republic of Cyprus" had quite clearly
failed to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, or
security, and had failed to maintain respect for its Constitution,
as required by Article I of the Treaty. In particular it had
failed to maintain respect for the Human Rights of its people
recognised by and embodied in the Constitution. Further, Greece
was itself in gross and obvious breach of Article II of the Treaty
and accordingly, as required by Article IV, the United Kingdom
and Turkey consulted together in London on 17th and 18th July.
Greece was invited, but declined to attend.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus formed the view
(HC 331 1975/76 para. 22), that during these consultations Turkey
had proposed joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee,
and this was confirmed by Prime Minister Ecevit on 14th August
1974 (Daily Telegraph 15th August). However the Labour Government
in Britain refused to take any effective action, even though
they had troops and aircraft in the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus.
They argued that Britain was under no duty to take military action,
but Article II provided that Britain would guarantee the independence,
territorial integrity and security of the Republic, which it
manifestly failed to do. The Select Committee concluded that
"Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation
to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government
refuses to give."
The responsibility therefore fell upon Turkey, as the only Guarantor
willing to act, and on 20th July Turkish forces landed in Cyprus.
The legal authority for their action rests not only upon the
breaches of the Treaty identified here, but also upon the breaches
committed before 1974 by the Republic of Cyprus at the instance
of the Greek-Cypriots, and which have already been mentioned.
Violence Continues
After the Turkish landings it was argued by the Greek-Cypriots
that even if the first landing was legal the extension of the
area under Turkish control from 22nd July to 16th August 1974
was illegal since there was no longer and subsisting breach of
the Treaty. However, the facts do not support this view, because
large scale murders of Turkish-Cypriot families continued to
take place, particularly in the villages of Aloa (Times, Guardian,
21st August), Zyyi, Sandallaris, Mari, Maratha, and Tokhni, and
again despite the presence in Cyprus of UN troops. In Tokhni
on 14th August 1974 all the Turkish-Cypriot men between the ages
of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were
taken away and shot.
In Zyyi on the same day all the Turkish-Cypriot men aged between
19 and 28 were taken away by Greek-Cypriots and were never seen
again. On the same day Greek-Cypriots opened fire in the Turkish-Cypriot
neighbourhood of Paphos killing men, women and children indiscriminately.
On 23rd July 1974 the Washington Post reported "In a Greek raid
on a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population
of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given
orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before
the Turkish forces arrived." (See also Times, Guardian, 23rd
July).
On 24th July 1974 France Soir reported "The Greeks burned down
Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the villages
around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who have no weapons
live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes
and go and live in tents in the forests. The Greeks' actions
are a shame to humanity." On 28th July the New York Times reported
that 14 Turkish-Cypriot men had been shot in Alaminos.
The "Republic had once again failed to maintain respect for
the constitution.
On 22nd July Ecevit called upon the UN to "stop the genocide
of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared "Turkey has accepted a cease-fire,
but will not allow Turkish-Cypriots to be massacred." (Times
23rd July). On 29th July he was reported by the Daily Telegraph
as follows: "Security on paper will not satisfy us. Every Turk
in every corner of the island must feel at home. This we regard
as an inalienable human right. So called security measures which
have left Turkish-Cypriots in fear of attack and massacre are
no good." The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on 30th August
1974 "the massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof
of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention".
In any event military action never really ceased between 20th
July and 16th August. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots continued
to lay mines and construct strongpoints around the Turkish positions,
and the Turks continued to reinforce their troops and to send
out patrols.
In that position Turkish forces were not secure, and could certainly
not protect the siege in Famagusta. On 8th August the Guardian
reported that they had been under sustained mortar attack for
20 days, and on 17th August the Daily Telegraph reported that
in the first three days of the siege an estimated 2,000 mortar
bombs had fallen on them. Accordingly the Turkish army moved
our of its bridgehead and advanced upon Famagusta with the object
of rescuing the Turkish-Cypriot population of Famagusta and of
securing a viable defensive position. The siege of Famagusta
was lifted on 16th August.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus reported in
1976 "The second phase of military operations was inevitable
in the view of your committee as the position reached by the
Turkish forces at the time of the first cease-fire was untenable
militarily and they needed tanks and armour to consolidate their
position and secure Famagusta."
Since that military action, and following the residual exchange
of population by agreement in 1975 between Archbishop Makarios
and Rauf Denktas, who had by then become the Turkish-Cypriot
leader, Greek-Cypriots have lived in peace in the Southern part
of the island and Turkish Cypriots have lived in peace in the
Northern part.
Very many innocent people of both communities were killed and
went missing in the turmoil of 1974, and in the heat of battle
there must have been excesses by individuals on both sides, but
the responsibility for this must rest firmly upon the Greeks
and the Greek-Cypriots for creating the conditions in which Turkey
had no choice but to intervene by force. There is in any event
a big difference between excesses or mistakes committed in war,
and systematic massacres committed in cold blood.
The population exchanges themselves have also caused hardship
to both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, but people have over the
past twelve years adjusted to their new circumstances. It nevertheless
remains essential for people on both sides to be properly compensated
as part of any overall settlement.
It is further argued that even if the 1974 landings were lawful
the Treaty permitted Turkey to intervene with the sole aim of
re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty, and
that the continuing presence of Turkish forces is not to re-establish
the 1960 state of affairs but with intent to annex Cyprus wholly
or in part Turkey or to create two separate States. Again the
facts do not support the argument, because if such had been Turkey's
intention they would never have supported the framework for a
new constitution for the whole island proposed by the UN Secretary-General
in 1984, and again in 1986, and which excluded both annexation
and two separate states.
Having regard to the events of 1960 and 1974 no serious section
of Cypriot opinion, whether Greek or Turk, regards re-establishment
of the 1960 Constitution itself as practical, and indeed on 12th
February 1977 Makarios and Denktas agreed that thenceforth they
were seeking a bi-communal federal Republic. This was reaffirmed
by Kyprianou, successor to Makarios, in 1979, and was even the
view of the British Foreign Secretary, who answered "yes" to
the following question from the House of Commons Select Committee
on Cyprus (HC. 331 1975/76, page 55 para, 141):
"Would the Foreign Secretary agree that we could hardly restore
the 1960 Constitution, since at least two of the provisions which
were enshrined in the Constitution, the separate municipalities
and the Turkish (Cypriot) share of the police and civil service,
were never in fact implemented?"
Although it is impossible to re-establish the 1960 Constitution
itself it continues however to be practical to re-establish the
1960 state of affairs in substance, namely respect for the human
rights of all Cypriots and respect for the existence of both
communities as political entities, and in the meantime for the
most basic right of all, namely the right to live in peace, to
be guaranteed. It would be absurd to argue that by making it
impossible the re-establish the 1960 state of affairs in its
entirety, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots could deprive Turkey of its
right to guarantee the survival of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
Negotiation for a New Constitution
At the first Geneva Conference on 30th July 1974, Turkey, Greece
and the United Kingdom acknowledged the existence in Cyprus of
two autonomous administrations representing the Turkish-Cypriots
and the Greek-Cypriots respectively, and it was agreed that negotiations
should be carried on to secure a workable constitution for Cyprus
as a whole. Since then the leaders of the two communities have
held frequent talks. In 1978 the Turkish-Cypriots proposed the
reopening of the Famagusta suburb of Varosha which contains many
hotels and had lain derelict since 1974, provided Nicosia airport
was opened to all, but this was rejected.
The Turkish-Cypriots could not live fore long in a state of
limbo. They needed a constitution to regulate their political
affairs and democratically elected institutions to govern them,
and accordingly, on 13th February 1975, they declared Northern
Cyprus to be a Federated State, with the intention that it should
one day form part of a federal republic for the whole of Cyprus.
They did not at that stage declare independence.
However, by November 1983, having failed to reach agreement
with the Greek-Cypriots on the creation of a Federal Republic,
they declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus. The Republic functions as a multi-party democracy, with
a President, Prime Minister, and Legislative Assembly.
They nevertheless made it clear that establishment of the Republic
does not preclude the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation
for the whole of Cyprus, and this was formally reaffirmed by
the Legislative Assembly as recently as 12th March 1985.
The framework for a future political solution based on a federal
system of government uniquely structured for the circumstances
of Cyprus will be found in the Denktas-Makarios accords of 1977,
the Denktas-Kyprianou 10 point agreement of 1979, the UN Secretary-General's
"Opening Statement of 1980" and the Secretary-General's 1984
and 1986 draft framework agreements.
The UN Plans
The 1984 draft framework agreement had been prepared by an exhaustive
series of talks under the auspices of the Secretary General,
and the Turkish-Cypriots were assured by him that the document,
dated 27th November 1984, was acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots.
On that basis the Turkish-Cypriots agreed to go to the UN to
sign it, but when Denktas arrived in New York he found that Kyprianou
wished to re-negotiate it.
Kyprianou's announcement at the Summit surprised even his own
people, and on his return home a motion censure upon him was
passed by the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives. In the
course of the debate Mr. Clerides, leader of the Democratic Rally
Party said:
"Right from the first day of the meeting, Kypranou asked for
the re-negotiation of everything from A to Z. Among the points
he asked to re-negotiate were issues that did not fall within
the scope of the Summit, and issues which were already discussed
and agreed upon. He should not have brought forth again issues
already debated and agreed upon with Denktas."
In the same debate Mr. Papaiannou, Secretary-General of the
AKEL party, said:
"Kyprianou never adopted the basis of the federation, which was
agreed upon by Makarios and Denktas, and Kyprianou never exerted
any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis
of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the Summit agreements."
The Secretary-General resolved to try again, and on 12th April
1985 he prepared a document which he described as a "consolidation"
of the 1984 draft. It did however contain major differences,
and since it had been negotiated with the Greek-Cypriots alone
it was a document different in kind from the draft framework
agreements of 1984 and 1986. Denktas rejected it in a letter
to the Secretary-General on 8th August 1985 and in the same letter
expressed surprise that the document had first come to his attention
through the Greek-Cypriot press.
However, after the two rounds of intensive technical talks held
separately with both sides at official level in November -- December
1985 and February-March 1986, the Secretary-General on 29th March
1986 presented the two sides with a new "Draft Framework Agreement".
He had again laid a compromise position on the table after full
consultation with both sides. He had again proposed a solution
in the belief that it was acceptable to both sides, and that
it formed a framework which dealt with the entirety of the Cyprus
problem. He fully understood the interrelated nature of all
elements involved and offered the plan as an integrated whole.
The Secretary-General's 1986 plan called for the reunification
of Cyprus as a bi-national, bi-zonal federal republic with a
Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President,
each with defined veto powers over a bi-cameral legislature.
The proposals would have reduced the land area under Turkish-Cypriot
control from 35.8 % of the island to a little over 29% but they
were nevertheless accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots on 21st April
1986.
Kyprianou on the other hand, after consultation with Athens,
refused to accept it and rejected the entire draft saying that
it had "negative points," and he is once again seeking to re-negotiate.
However, the UN Secretary-General made it clear on 11th June
1986 that his proposals took fully into account the concerns
of all parties and that he did not intend to take up counter-proposals
put forward by Mr. Kyprianou. He called on the Greek-Cypriots
to think again.
Greek-Cypriot Objections
The Greek-Cypriots demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops as
a precondition to any settlement, and label them an army of occupation.
Turkish troops are not however an army of occupation but are
in Northern Cyprus at the request of the inhabitants for their
protection; and in view of the treatment which Turkish-Cypriots
have received from 1963 to 1974 they would be foolish to ask
Turkey to withdraw its troops before trust and confidence had
been established between the two communities. They nevertheless
made the rather surprising concession (Draft Framework Agreement
1986 art. 8.1) that a timetable for withdrawal should be agreed.
It is true that Greece is no longer ruled by the military government
which invaded Cyprus in 1974, but no one can yet tell whether
ENOSIS is finally dead in both Greece and Cyprus, nor whether
the era of political instability in Greece is at an end, nor
whether the Greek-Cypriots would not again use their superior
numbers to threaten the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
Certainly the Turkish-Cypriots are not yet ready to take that
risk and should not be expected to do so.
Greek-Cypriots also demand that they should be completely free
to move about, to establish themselves, and to own property,
in the Turkish-Cypriot area. And these have become known as
the "three freedoms". However, this would expose Turkish-Cypriots
to risk of terrorists attacks, to being overrun by superior numbers
again, and to being overwhelmed by the superior economic power
of the Greek-Cypriots.
In view of their past experience Turkish-Cypriots cannot be
expected to agree to this until much greater confidence between
the two communities has been established, for where a choice
has to be made between these freedoms and freedom to live in
peace, the latter must clearly prevail. They did however accept
(Draft Framework Agreement 1986 art. 6.17) that these three issues
will be discussed within that framework.
Greek-Cypriots complain that people from Turkey have been allowed
to make their homes in Northern Cyprus since 1974, but they forget
that large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots emigrated to Turkey, Britain,
the United States and the other countries during the period 1963
to 1974 when life in Cyprus was made very difficult for Turkish-Cypriots.
In fact during this period emigration of Turkish-Cypriots was
actively encouraged by the Greek-Cypriot administration. In
any event the 1960 Constitution did not prohibit immigration.
Greek-Cypriots also complain that the names of towns and villages
in the North have been changed, but settlements with both Greek
and Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants have had both Greek and Turkish
names for as long as anyone can remember.
Greek-Cypriots say it is an injustice that Turkish Cypriots
occupy 35.8% of the land area of the island although they are
only 21% of the population today. However, there are four answers
to this. First, it is not an internationally accepted principle
that ethnic groups occupy such proportion of the land areas as
their numbers bear to the total population, and there are very
few, if any places in the world where such is the case.
In Cyprus, Turks and Turkish-Cypriots owned almost 100% of the
land when the British arrived. During the period of British
colonial rule their holdings were gradually reduced so that by
the time of independence in 1960 they were registered owners
of only about 30% of the land. It is therefore true that today
they occupy more land than they owned at the time of independence
but land areas are meaningless in themselves.
In 1974 Turkish-Cypriot owned large areas vineyards in the South
and they have acquired in exchange large areas of land which
is unsuitable for cultivation due to scarcity of water and due
to salination. They have also have acquired in exchange some
good beaches and hotels but the main hotel complex at Varosha
is an unusable ruin as a result of the Greek-initiated war of
1974, and it is extremely difficult for Turkish-Cypriots to develop
their tourist industry in view of boycotts practiced against
them, particularly in the field of air transport, which are mentioned
low below.
Second, the area in which the Turkish-Cypriots live is the minimum
necessary to establish a viable defensive position and to ensure
reasonable economic viability. The Turkish-Cypriots did not
wish to live in a divided island, and are well aware of the
benefits of a larger economy, but for Greeks and Greek-Cypriots
to complain about the division, having caused it to occur, is
rather like a boy who kills both his parents complaining about
being an orphan.
Third, the Turkish-Cypriots have, by accepting the UN draft
framework agreement, agreed to negotiate a reduction of the land
area under their control.
Fourth, the Turkish-Cypriots have accepted that as part of an
oral settlement compensation will be paid to those on both sides
who have lost their land and other possessions
Some Greek-Cypriots even call for one-man-one-vote in Cyprus
as a whole, but for the same practical reasons Turkish-Cypriots
cannot be expected to agree to that at the present time. In
any event, as already mentioned, when Cyprus became independent
Turkish-Cypriots did not become citizens of the Republic as individuals,
having no more than minority status, and it was agreed by Archbishop
Makarios in 1977, and reaffirmed by his successor in 1979 that
the future of Cyprus demanded a bi-communal federation and not
a unitary state.
The Turkish-Republic of Northern Cyprus is labeled a breakaway
state, but in fact it was the Greek-Cypriots who broke away from
the Republic established by the 1960 Constitution and established
unilaterally a Greek-Cypriot state which they continue to call
the Republic of Cyprus.
Is There a "Government of Cyprus" Today?
For the time being the Greek-Cypriots occupy the Cyprus seat
at the UN. They claim to represent Cyprus at Common-wealth Heads
of Government meetings, and all Ambassadors and High Commissioners
of Cyprus throughout the world are Greek-Cypriots enjoying full
diplomatic privileges, although no Turkish-Cypriots Vice-President
of Cyprus has had any say in their appointment. They do their
utmost to prevent the Turkish-Cyprus case being heard in any
international forum.
It is quite astonishing that the world is prepared to recognize
the claim of the Greek-Cypriot administration to be the Government
of the whole of Cyprus, for not only is it clear that they do
not speak for the Turkish-Cypriots nor control the northern part
of the island but there is no legal basis to their claim. Their
case could at first sight rest on one of two alternative bases,
either the 1960 Constitution or general international law.
When Cyprus became independent its Government derived its authority
the Constitution, but that Constitution gave the Turkish-Cypriots
an absolute rights to a place in the institutions of Government.
It was declared, as already mentioned, that the Vice-President
must be a Turkish-Cypriot, with defined veto powers, and Turkish-Cypriots
were entitled to membership in the prescribed proportions of
the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Assembly, the Civil
Service, the Courts of Justice, and the Security Forces.
The Turkish-Cypriots having been excluded from their positions,
and the Vice-President having been denied the right to exercise
his constitutional powers it cannot possibly be said that the
1960 Constitution is still functioning. It is alleged that the
Turkish-Cypriots voluntarily withdrew, but it is quite clear
from the history of the period since 1960 that they did not.
Even if they had withdrawn voluntarily it does not follow that
the 1960 Constitution would have continued to function; because
it was designed to operate, and could only operate, on a basis
of partnership between the communities.
International law defines an independent state as a territory
with defined boundaries, with a government to which the inhabitants
are habitually obedient, and which is free from political control
by any other state (Lauterpacht, "Recognition in International
Law" paras. 10-13). Applying this definition to Cyprus it is
apparent that the Southern part is a separate state, having a
Greek-Cypriot government to whom the inhabitants are habitually
obedient. The Greek-Cypriot people are free to choose, and have
in fact chosen their own constitution. They say that it is the
1960 Constitution, but it is in reality a modified version excluding
Turkish-Cypriot participation. It is notable that on his re-election
in 1973 Makarios took a modified form of oath which avoided a
declaration of respect for the 1960 Constitution.
Applying the same principles, a separate state also exists in
the North, with a government deriving its authority from a constitution
enacted by the Turkish-Cypriot people, which excludes Greek-Cypriot
participation.
It is arguable that neither is a separate state because they
are under political control of Greece and Turkey respectively.
It is true that each of those countries has a significant military
presence in the island, and that they have enormous political
influence, but it is doubtful whether it amounts to control sufficient
for the purposes of international law. If it did, there would
be many countries, particularly in Eastern Europe which would
not be independent states.
Economic Discrimination
Whether they are the lawful government of Cyprus or not, the
Greek-Cypriot administration have obtained for Southern Cyprus
almost all the EEC aid allocated for the whole of Cyprus. Under
the first financial protocol of 1979, 30 million ECU were allocated
to Cyprus, and a further 44 million under the Second Financial
Protocol of 1984.
It is said that these funds have been applied for the benefit
of both communities and this may be true in theory, but the overwhelming
benefit has accrued to the Greek-Cypriots. If a customs union
were established between the EEC and Cyprus before a settlement
had been achieved between the two communities the Greek-Cypriots
would benefit even more and the Turkish-Cypriots in all probability
be excluded entirely.
The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots have succeeded in constructing
an international boycott against the Turkish-Cypriots. Their
own economy has prospered, and they have profited considerably
from the economic displacement which has occurred in nearby Lebanon.
By contrast it is impossible to post a letter to Northern Cyprus
directly, nor to fly nor send goods or passengers by sea directly
anywhere other than Turkey, nor communicate directly by telex
or telephone. In a highly competitive world economy these disadvantages
are serious, and it is therefore hardly surprising that Turkish-Cypriots
enjoy a lower standard of living than those in the South, that
their tourist industry is handicapped and that they are forced
to accept subsidies from Turkey.
International Attitudes
In view of the history of the Cyprus question from 1960 to the
present day it is surprising that the world continues to refuse
recognition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, continues
to practice a partial boycott against them, and continues to
accord unequal political treatment to Greek and Turkish-Cypriots.
Why should this be?
Most of the of the world do not really care whether the Turkish-Cypriots
are treated fairly or not. The Islamic countries would probably
recognize them tomorrow, but the matter is marginal to their
interests and the slightest pressure from Britain or the United
States is sufficient to keep it off their agenda.
Turkey's interest in Cyprus is not entirely altruistic for,
as long as tension exists between Greece and Turkey, Greek control
of Cyprus, is not something Turkey would find acceptable since
it lies only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland. Turkey has
of course granted recognition to the TRNC, and has provided economic
and military assistance at considerable cost to its economy,
but Turkey has not until recently been willing to bring economic
and political pressure to bear in support of the Turkish-Cypriots
to anything like the same extent as Greece has done for the Greek-Cypriots.
This appears to be changing.
In Greece there appears to be a romantic attachment toward Cyprus
rather similar to that of Argentina toward the Falkland Islands,
and internal political capital is to be made in Greece by taking
a hard line on Cyprus. It is seen in Athens as part of the wider
questions of the Aegean, which has soured relations between Greece
and Turkey for so long.
On 22nd September 1986 the Wall Street Journal expressed the
view in an editorial that "the problem of Cyprus can be summed
up in two words, Andreas Papandreou. The last thing the socialist
leader wants is a resolution of the island's differences. He
would lost his opportunity to accuse Turkey of devious intentions
which he does to distract the Greeks from their decrepit economy.
Just as important he would lost the collusion of the US Congress.
Since Turkey's 1974 military intervention US said has been held
to a 10:7 ratio for Turkey and Greece. That allows Mr. Papandreou
to influence military aid to Turkey by not making full use of
his own."
However, in view of the extremely poor results obtained by Mr.
Papandreou's socialist party, PASOK, in the October 1986 local
elections in Greece it remains to be seen how long he will continue
to conduct international affairs of that country.
Greece has capitalized upon romantic notions of ancient Greece
as the home of democracy, and has powerful interests in international
shipping, finance, and tourism. Its influence in these areas
has been used to the full to apply pressure in support of the
Greek-Cypriots. Greeks will not hesitate, in any international
economic or political form, to cause an unpleasant scene if there
is the slightest softening of attitudes toward the Turkish-Cypriots.
They will even go so far as to make an implied threat to withdraw
from the Western Alliance.
One country in which the efforts of Greece have been particularly
successful is the United States, for not only is there scope
for economic pressure, but there is a powerful Greek-American
lobby in United States politics, which has been used to the full.
The United States is also interested in facilities offered by
the British military basis which exists in the Southern part
of Cyprus.
The Soviet Union is naturally interested in Cyprus, by virtue
of its proximity to the Middle East and to the exit from the
Black Sea. They have a considerable diplomatic presence in Southern
Cyprus, and they have recently proposed an international conference,
the centerpiece of which is the proposition that all foreign
troops, should depart from the island. Andreas Papandreou is
a supporter of this proposal.
It is no secret that the Soviet Union, via Bulgaria, is supporting
the far-left Republican Turkish Party in Northern Cyprus. It
is already a significant force in Turkish-Cypriot politics and
its appeal, as in all other countries, is to those who perceive
themselves to be poor and disadvantaged. The longer Northern
Cyprus continues to suffer economic discrimination the stronger
will the far-left become.
The Secretary-General of the United States has been helpful,
but the General Assembly has not. It has shown bias towards
one party to the dispute, and year after year it has adopted
totally unrealistic resolutions sponsored by the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots
with unquestioning support from the Soviet bloc and the "non-aligned
movement". These resolutions have served only to polarise the
situation.
Legal Arguments
The legal argument which is usually deployed against Britain
runs as follows. Britain is a party to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,
Article II of which provides, as indicated above, that Britain
will recognize and guarantee the independence and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs
established by the basic articles of its constitution, and that
Britain will prohibit, insofar as it concerns her, any activity
aimed at promoting directly or indirectly union with any other
state or partition.
It is therefore argued by Greece and the Greek-Cypriots that
if Britain were to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus she would be failing to recognize the territorial integrity
of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established
by the basic articles of its constitution, and would be failing
to prohibit activity aimed at promoting partition.
It is surprising that this charge should be maid by a country
which, for most of the period from 1960 to 1974, had itself ignored
the Treaty by failing to respect the independence of Cyprus and
by not only failing to prohibit activity aimed at promoting union
with itself but by actually engaging in it; and by a community
by which for most of the same period had failed to maintain respect
for the constitution of the Republic. Moreover, when it suited
their purposes from 1964 to 1974 the Greek-Cypriots repeatedly
declared the Treaty to be invalid (Cmnd. 6579 para. 4(c)).
However, whether valid or not the above-mentioned provisions
of the Treaty of Guarantee do not preclude Britain if she so
wishes from recognising neither the Greek-Cypriot nor the Turkish-Cypriot
administration as the government of Cyprus and adopting an entirely
neutral position.
Further, British recognition of the Greek-Cypriot administration
as the Government of Cyprus is inconsistent with Britain's obligation
to recognize and guarantee the state of affairs established by
the basic articles of the constitution.
That state of affairs was one in which the Turkish-Cypriots
were entitled to participate in all the decision-making processes
of government and to exercise veto powers in clearly defined
circumstances.
For Britain to deal with officials in whose appointment Turkish-Cypriots
have been denied their constitutional role, and for Britain to
recognize as the acts of a "Government of Cyprus" decisions in
which Turkish Cypriots have had no part, is not only a failure
to recognize and guarantee, but it is actually to assist the
continued violation by Greek Cypriots of the state of affairs
established by the constitution.
British Interests
The main focus of Greek and Greek-Cypriot pressure has been
Britain, not only because of its historic connection with the
island and its residual legal role, but because the presence
of the basis in the South of Cyprus causes, or used to cause,
a particular vulnerability.
Over the years since 1960 there has been an implied threat to
British economic and political interests, directly and via the
Greek lobby in the United States. However, in 1963 when the
breakdown of the Republic of Cyprus became evident, the military
bases in Cyprus were of greater significance than they are today.
It is always convenient to have bases where aircraft can land
and where troops can be stationed, but the increased range of
aircraft and the realignment of British Defence strategy have
rendered the bases largely redundant as garrisons. There are
some training areas which are still useful, but they are not
indispensable.
The strategic importance of Cyprus today lies more as a location
for radio and electronic intelligence stations, important parts
of which are not even in the sovereign base areas. However,
these facilities do not require large military basis and could
if necessary be located in Turkey, where other such facilities
exist, or even in Northern Cyprus. In both those places the
installations and personnel would be more secure than in Southern
Cyprus, as the recent terrorist attack on the Akrotiri base has
shown.
On the economic and political scene too, times have changed.
Turkey is awakening as an economic power, and the potential
there for British industry and commerce is of major importance.
Politically Turkey is finding its way back form military rule
to democracy, and the present Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal is
a politician of the center-right. His recent visit to Cyprus,
well knowing the Greek protest which was likely to, and did,
echo around the world is a strong indication that Turkey is no
longer prepared to accept the treatment which the world has so
far been disposed to accord to the Turkish-Cypriots. In the
strategic dimension too, Turkey is far more important to NATO
than is Greece.
Time for Change
For so long as the status quo continues the Greek-Cypriots will
be no more likely to conclude an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriots
than they were when they rejected the Secretary-General's plan
in 1984 and 1986. If a settlement is to be achieved , there
have to be a change in the balance of costs and benefits. It
is time for signals to be given by the United Kingdom and the
United States that the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve
a settlement cannot go on forever, that the Turkish-Cypriots
in twice accepting the UN plan have done enough, and equal treatment
is likely to be accorded to them soon. If no progress is made,
equal treatment should in fact be accorded.
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