It is really a wonder how the Turks can selectively take out parts of history so as to create a point. Greece was a very young country at the time. There was so much trouble inside it and it was so unorganised and a mess.
Greece's entry into the war on the Entente side was to be brought about only after a bitter and confused struggle inside Greece lasting for nearly three years in which Venizelos and the Allied powers were pitted against King Constantine. At first, Constantine and Venizelos agreed that Greece should remain neutral and that she must, above all, avoid a clash with the Allies, who controlled the seas round the long Greek coastline. But Constantine did not share Venizelos's belief that the Allies would win and that Greek neutrality should therefore be benevolent towards them. Both Venizelos and the Allies saw Greek neutrality as useful so long as it was a factor in keeping Bulgaria out of the war, but they believed that if Bulgaria attacked Serbia, Greece should go to the help of the Serbs in fulfilment of her treaty with them. Constantine, however, considered that Greece should remain neutral even if Serbia were attacked - - though he was also accused of waiting to bring Greece in on the German side at a favourable opportunity. The king's attitude was blamed on his personal germanophil preferences and the influence of his German wife; but a convincing case can also be made that, if he erred, it was not as a result of such personal reasons but from a mistaken view of the Greek national interest.
As long as there seemed to be any chance of keeping Bulgaria out of the German camp, by either threats or promises, Allied pressure on Greece to abandon her neutrality was not heavy and differences between King Constantine and Venizelos were not acute. But, as hope of influencing Bulgaria diminished, the Allies began a more serious effort to bring Greece into the war on their side, so as to provide support for Serbia. In January 1915, the British foreign secretary. Sir Edward Grey, offered Greece >important concessions on the coasts of Asia Minor= if she would join in a concerted Allied action in the Balkans. This was the first indication for the Greeks that the possibility of their acquiring territory in Asia Minor could be taken seriously. Venizelos pressed the king to accept this unexpected offer >in order to save the Greeks in Turkey and create a Great Greece which would include nearly all the provinces where Hellenism flourished through the long periods of its history=. He suggested ceding the port of Kavalla to Bulgaria in order to get the latter's co-operation. The king agreed to this, but the Bulgarians were not to be tempted.
The Allied offer, though not immediately accepted, was the beginning of the great Greek adventure which was to end, seven years later, in disaster in Anatolia. Even at this time, the Greek general staff under Colonel Metaxas warned that the conquest and control of western Asia Minor, which Venizelos envisaged claiming, would be an enterprise far beyond Greece's own resources. To accomplish his aims, Venizelos was counting on help from the Allies, and in a memorandum to the king on January 17, 1915, he wrote:
The proposal that very wide territorial concessions would be made to us in Asia Minor proves to me without the slightest doubt that the activities displayed by the New Hellas have attracted the confidence of certain Powers who consider her an important factor in the settlement of the Near East at the moment of collapse of the Turkish state. The support of these Powers provides us with the financial and diplomatic means to cope with the inherent difficulties of such a sudden increase of territory. Confident in this support, Greece can follow boldly the new and wonderful paths opening out for her.
On March 1,1915, Venizelos proposed that a Greek army corps be sent to support a renewed Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles. (The first attack, begun by warships on February 18,1915, had been inconclusive.) But the very next day, Russia vetoed the proposal, making it clear that in no circumstances would she allow Greece to take part in an Allied attack on Constantinople. The Russians now saw the Greeks as potential rivals in their own newly formulated claims to Constantinople and the Straits. The Greeks assured the British that their interest in Constantinople was merely sentimental: they only wanted to march into the city and be the first of the victorious troops to take Holy Communion in Saint Sophia. But they did not wish to stay there, and indeed would not accept the city if it were offered them. Such was the argument of the Venizelists, but the Russian veto was reinforced by the objections of the Greek general staff.
On March 6, King Constantine rejected the Venizelos proposal, whereupon the premier resigned. In new elections he was returned to power. When Bulgaria mobilised on September 12 - - a month after the Greek elections - -Venizelos asked for an Allied expeditionary force of 150,000 men to be sent to Greece. But the king objected that the landing of these forces would be a breach of Greek neutrality unless Bulgaria attacked Serbia to which Greece had treaty obligations. However, the Allied force was already at sea and, despite a formal protest from Venizelos, British and French troops landed at Salonika on October 5, 1915. The same day Venizelos resigned once more after the king, ignoring a parliamentary vote of confidence in the prime minister, had told him he opposed his policy of fulfilling the Serbian treaty.
In a further attempt to gain Greek support for Serbia, Sir Edward Grey offered, on October 16, to transfer Cyprus to Greece. But eight days later the new Greek government of Alexander Zaimis, backed by the king, formally refused the offer. The British foreign secretary's initiative, agreed upon at an informal meeting of the 'War Committee', was criticised both in the cabinet and in the House of Commons for having been taken without proper cabinet consultation. But, in fact, as Roy Jenkins points out in his biography of Asquith, the Cyprus offer had been thoroughly discussed by the cabinet in January 1915. George V's secretary, Lord Stamfordham, had then written to Asquith:
The King desires me to express the earnest hope that the Government will, on further consideration, decide to support Sir E. Grey's proposal and offer Cyprus to Greece on condition of her joining the Allies. . .. Financially Cyprus is I suppose a loss to this country. Strategically, HM understands that it has proved a failure, the harbours impracticable and ships obliged to lie off six miles from the coast."
The defeat and occupation of Serbia by the Austro-German armies forced the thirteen Allied divisions (eight French and five British) in Greece to withdraw into a fortified camp at Salonika and to treat the Greek government and army as potentially hostile. The Allies instituted a partial economic blockade of Greece, and sent an ultimatum to Athens demanding demobilisation of the Greek army, new elections and a truly neutral government.