in cases like ours the biggest challange for the mediators is to solve the problem of security. if they fail to do that their plan has no chances of success. in our case :
we (the gcs) are afraid of the turkish army - for historical reasons
the tcs are afraid of us being the majority- for historical reasons. concequently a demilitarized cyprus is for the tcs an insecure place. in that repsect the number of soldiers that were proposed to stay , were imo quite sensible. I would have prefered though instead of greeks and turks , that the respective armies were made (same numbers as AP) from gc and tcs.
i cannot see any other way to solve the security problem and have both sides satisfied.
the same works for the guarantor powers
it is a security factor for the tcs and an insecurity factor for the gcs.
here, as I said before, for me it is irrelevant , bc turkey will always attack cyprus (irrespective of the fact that it has rights or not) if we decide to harm the tcs. the recent israeli attacks in libanon should give us a clue how these things work
last, in this field, is third party guarantees. in our case the only party who could act as "third" party was the UN. studies of how civil wars ended , have shown that when a third party is present to monitor the terms of the agreement (mainly demobilisation) , the two parties do in general do not breach the agreement. in that respect AKELs call for guarantees from the UN, a week before the refferendum , were actually quite sensible.