Kikapu wrote:Kifeas wrote:Kikapu wrote:
I'm sorry Kifeas, but I fail to see the connection between the UN charter you have provided and what we were talking about, which was the 48 "unalterable" articles of the 191 articles in the Cypriot Constitution that was agreed between TC's and GC's. Even if the Guarantors could not interfere, the TC's were within their right to refuse any changes.
Kikapu, I am sorry but so far I had the impression that you, along and together with Bananiot, was trying to tell me that Turkey indeed had a right to a say and the right to interfere then in 1963 against Makarios 13-point proposals, and that the constitution was “unalterable” (by us Cypriots alone,) because of the rights the 3 guarantors had as signatories of the 1960 treaties, something which would have required their approval as well. I was trying to explain to you that this was not the case in 1963, and that Turkey did not have such a right, because such a right would have been against the UN charter, and that should we the people of Cyprus -G/Cs and T/Cs, wanted to do so, we had every right to go along with any constitutional amendment we would have agreed among ourselves, without having to discuss this with any other country, be it one of the signatory guarantors or not. Turkey’s public rejection in 1963, before the TCs, and instead of the T/Cs, was an illegitimate interference within our internal affairs. This is what I was trying to say.
As I said, lets ignore all the guarantors for the moment, so that it is in compliance with the UN charter, it still leaves the TC's with a veto power in the Constitution to refuse any changes to be made to the Constitution. Even if the TC's wanted to make some changes, then the question becomes, how do you change the "unalterable" articles that was in perpetuity (for ever). No, Makarios should have left things alone and work with what both sides had.
Kikapu, it seems we speak two entirely different languages. Makarios did not change anything alone and unilaterally, but he only proposed changes. Technically and legally he did not have the right and the power to have done so, that is way he made the 13-point proposals to the TC side, and that is why the constitution remains unchanged up to this day, as it was back in 1960.
What happened in the meantime was for the intercommunal violence to brake out in Nicosia, and then to be transferred into other parts of Cyprus, as a result of the growing tension between the two communities and the fact that they were both gathering weapons and arming each ones paramilitary groups (the TCs started first the armament campaign and the GCs followed shortly after them in 1962.) Upon the breakout of violence between those gangs of the two sides -in which the TC community indeed suffered proportionately more casualties, the TC side decided to withdraw from the government immediately and called the constitution and the RoC as completely nullified and dead. It almost immediately set up its own separate administration which it called the Transient Turkish administration of Cyprus, and called upon all the TCs via Bayrak radio to stop co-operating or having any dealings with the non-existing for them RoC (essentially a kind of mutiny.) The GC side then, following upon, refused to allow some of the TC public servants to enter their offices. Turkey become threatening for invasion and partition. The TC side and Turkey went to the UN, together with the GC side, and tried to prove that the RoC was violated and nullified, and therefore it should stop from being recognized by the UN as the legal entity of the country. The UN apparently did not buy into this argument and ruled in a resolution in favor of the continuation of the existence and international legality of the RoC, and called upon the two sides to enter into a dialogue in order to bridge their political and constitutional differences in a peaceful way. It also sent in early 1964, upon the above resolution, the first UN contingents in Cyprus to keep the peace between the two sides. The T/C side did not withdraw its previous decision to establish of a separate T/C government within Cyprus, and either because of the conflict and violence or because of its own accords, it began establishing and withdrawing into the so-called enclaves. The G/C side exploited and manipulated the above T/C leadership actions and more importantly the above UN resolution calling for a dialogue, and kept the TCs side outside the RoC government -hypothetically or presumably until the intercommunal dialogue would start and conclude into an agreement. The two sides continued to transfer arms in Cyprus in order to increase their military premises and strongholds and the formal “UN ordered” dialogue did not seem to begin because none of the two sides seemed ready and willing for it. Violence continued to erupt occasionally during the period after the UN resolution, with the example of the kokkina fights in August 1964 and the bombing of GCs by the Turkish air force, etc.
Eventually the constitution remained unchanged becasue no dialogue had started in order to finally completelly agree on anything in this direction, but for the G/C side this was not important anymore, anyway, since the T/C community was kept outside of the RoC functions. Eventually, in 1968 the two communities decided to enter into a dialogue which produced some very good progress and results which remained unconcluded because of 1974.