Excellent analyses Kifeas.
I hope Bananiot will read and understand them.
After he is done with his flies i.e
Kifeas wrote:Secondly, the reason the GC side PROPOSED (and not unilaterally attempted) changes to the constitution was NOT because the constitution was a case of two equal partners (because such was not the case anyway,) but because it ruled it to have been unworkable, inefficient and unfair in terms of proportionality (70:30 instead of 80:20 that was the closest round ratio.).
The GC side proposed changes and invited the TCs for discussion on the basis of those proposed changes, something which Turkey (without having the right to voice its opinion) rejected it, before the TCs even gave their reply.
Secondly, the reason the GC side PROPOSED (and not unilaterally attempted) changes to the constitution was NOT because the constitution was a case of two equal partners (because such was not the case anyway,) but because it ruled it to have been unworkable, inefficient and unfair in terms of proportionality (70:30 instead of 80:20 that was the closest round ratio.)
The 1960 constitution, in its LETTER, was not PARTNERSHIP as such, set aside one between two EQUAL partners. The closed description one can give as to what IN FACT it was, should only be that the 1960 constitution as an ARRANGEMENT as to how the people of Cyprus -divided in two communities- would express and exercise their inherent political rights as Cypriot Citizens, with some excessively strong and counter productive provisions in order to secure that the smallest community of the two would not be marginalized, as it could or might have been the case in a simple one-man-one-vote direct democracy system. It was not a partnership as such, and it was not a partnership of two equal partners either, by its letter; even though, as I said, one may, by inference to its spirit, claim that it was a kind of a partnership notion.
Bananiot wrote: Makarios Droushiotis claims that Turkey knew of the plans of the Organisation….
Kikapu wrote:Kifeas wrote:Secondly, the reason the GC side PROPOSED (and not unilaterally attempted) changes to the constitution was NOT because the constitution was a case of two equal partners (because such was not the case anyway,) but because it ruled it to have been unworkable, inefficient and unfair in terms of proportionality (70:30 instead of 80:20 that was the closest round ratio.).
Kifeas,
So, do you believe, if the TC's agreed to a 80%-20%, that would have satisfied Makarios, because I don't think that was the problem. Would you want to destroy a country based on who had how many people working to whom and where. I really do not think so. Makarios did not want the TC's to have any say so at all in running the country, hence the problems that followed.
Bananiot wrote:Kifeas saidThe GC side proposed changes and invited the TCs for discussion on the basis of those proposed changes, something which Turkey (without having the right to voice its opinion) rejected it, before the TCs even gave their reply.
That is a pathetic lie and as such it serves no purpose whatsoever. Turkey and Greece were guarantor powers and both had their say on the matter. Both reccommended caution, Karamanlis and Inonu. Makarios even went to Ankara and Inonu gave him some very sound, friendly and honest advise.
Kifeas saidSecondly, the reason the GC side PROPOSED (and not unilaterally attempted) changes to the constitution was NOT because the constitution was a case of two equal partners (because such was not the case anyway,) but because it ruled it to have been unworkable, inefficient and unfair in terms of proportionality (70:30 instead of 80:20 that was the closest round ratio.)
This is a horrible lie! Kifeas still thinks that Turkish Cypriots are people with low intelligence that can easily be taken for a ride. Well, this may have been conventional wisdom over the years but we have paid dearly for entertaining such a notion. Everything behind Makarios's action had to do with enosis. To say and to repeat ad nauseum that it was just a proposition and that if you reject it we go back to square one and no love is lost, shows total direspect and utter ignorance of how politics are shaped.
The 13 Points: November 1963
The amendments to the constitution proposed by Makarios were fundamental in every respect, essentially altering the basis of the Aethnic@ arrangement for political governance. In this sense, then, the 13 Points must be seen as rewriting the treaties and governing instruments for all of Cyprus. Makarios, who certainly had legitimate complaints about the political paralysis that the 1959 accords had produced, acted unilaterally, without consultation with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and this itself became a source of friction. In a note attached to these points and the accompanying memorandum, Makarios said he was taking this radical step because the constitution as written by Greece and Turkey had created "difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State and impede the development of the country. In this respect I transmit herewith for your information a Memorandum setting out the immediate measures, which I consider necessary, to meet the situation. I have today conveyed the attached Memorandum to the Vice- President, Dr. Kutchuk, inviting him to talks with a view to resolving the various difficulties set out in the Memorandum. I have arrived at the decision to take this initiative in my earnest desire to remove certain causes of anomaly and friction between Greeks and Turks which prevent them from co-operating, to this grave detriment of the country. It is hoped that the Turkish Cypriots, after carefully studying this Memorandum, will agree that my proposals are both realistic and constructive." They did not.
One reason Makarios acted so peremptorily was because he had consulted with Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner (ambassador) in Cyprus, who apparently had signaled his approval. Makarios believed this meant that the British Government would back his constitutional overhaul, which turned out to be a false expectation.
Below are the 13 Points, with an explanation following, contained in the text of letters Makarios sent to the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on November 29, 1963.
(Note: the above represent the views of the above linked website's article writer.)
_______________________________________________________
Suggested measures to facilitate the smooth functioning of the state and remove certain causes of inter-communal friction
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, in its present form, creates many difficulties in the smooth government of the State and impedes the development and progress of the country. It contains many sui generis provisions conflicting with internationally accepted democratic principles and creates sources of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At the Conference at Lancaster House in February, 1959, which I was invited to attend as leader of the Greek Cypriots, I raised a number of objections and expressed strong misgivings regarding certain provisions of the Agreement arrived at in Zurich between the Greek and the Turkish Governments and adopted by the British Government. I tried very hard to bring about the change of at least some provisions of that Agreement. I failed, however, in that effort and I was faced with the dilemma either of signing the Agreement as it stood or of rejecting it with all the grave consequences which would have ensued. In the circumstances I had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. This was the course dictated to me by necessity. The three years' experience since the coming into operation of the Constitution, which was based on the Zurich and London Agreements, has made clear the necessity for revision of at least some of those provisions which impede the smooth functioning and development of the State. I believe that the intention of those who drew up the Agreement at Zurich was to create an independent State, in which the interests of the Turkish Community were safeguarded, but it could not have been their intention that the smooth functioning and development of the country should be prejudiced or thwarted as has in fact been the case. One of the consequences of the difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions is to prevent the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship, to undermine the relations between them and cause them to draw further apart instead of closer together, to the detriment of the well being of the people of Cyprus as a whole. This situation causes me, as President of the State, great concern. It is necessary to resolve certain of the difficulties by the removal of some at least of the obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the State. With this end in view I have outlined below the immediate measures which I propose to be taken.
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abolished.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for or replace the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. In consequence, therefore, all the constitutional provisions in respect of joint action by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be modified accordingly.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for or replace the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. The constitutional provision regarding the establishment of separate Municipalities in the five main towns to be abolished. Provision should be made so that: (a) The Municipal Council in each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councillors in proportion to the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such town by whom they shall be elected respectively. (b) In the Budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deducting any expenditure required for common services, a percentage of the balance proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of such town shall be earmarked and disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Turkish Councillors. 7. The constitutional provision regarding Courts consisting of Greek Judges to try Greeks and of Turkish Judges to try Turks and of mixed Courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to try cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks to be abolished.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished, (Provision to be made in case the Head of the Police is a Greek the Deputy Head to be a Turk and vice versa).
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Army to be determined by Law and not by agreement between the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be modified inproportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to either five or seven.
12. All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. If there is an allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the Turkish members of the Commission, its Chairman to be bound to refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished".
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, President of the Republic of Cyprus
Kifeas wrote:[Now, on your question above! The 80:20 was just one aspect of his proposals for constitutional changes. The other most important ones were the abolishment of separate majorities in the parliament and the abolishment of the veto rights of both the president and the vice-president. In view of them, no I do not believe he would have been satisfied with a mere reduction to of TC participation to 80:20 ratio. Nevertheless, regardless of the extensiveness and gravity of those 13 point proposals and the pre-mature timing that he had chosen to make them, they were mere proposals which the TC leadership could have chosen to negotiate them, not because it was obliged to do so but in order to diffuse the tension that was growing between the two communities. .
Kikapu wrote:Kifeas wrote:[Now, on your question above! The 80:20 was just one aspect of his proposals for constitutional changes. The other most important ones were the abolishment of separate majorities in the parliament and the abolishment of the veto rights of both the president and the vice-president. In view of them, no I do not believe he would have been satisfied with a mere reduction to of TC participation to 80:20 ratio. Nevertheless, regardless of the extensiveness and gravity of those 13 point proposals and the pre-mature timing that he had chosen to make them, they were mere proposals which the TC leadership could have chosen to negotiate them, not because it was obliged to do so but in order to diffuse the tension that was growing between the two communities. .
Kifeas,
As always you lay out your case very well, so here is the 64 Thousand Dollar question. As you know, there were 48 "unalterable" provisions (or articles if you preffer) in the Costitution. How many of the 13 points of proposals were within the 48 "unalterable" provisions, which the British,Greece and Turkey were part of signatory of guarantors to the Constitution, so really, was there a chance in hell, that any of the 13 points of proposals could have been changed, if any of them fell into the 48"unalterable" provisions. Some of the points you mentioned, were really major ones, so my guess is, they were in the "48". There would have been a very good reason to have put them amongst the 48 "unalterables", so to make sure neither side would attempt to change them, as to give the New Republic a chance to grow with both the communities at the helm. So Makarios had no where to turn, except to ignore the whole Constitution, and the 1963 crises ignited. He could have of course, chose to live with it as it would have been better than being under the British rule. So I don't know how much blame you can put on the TC's or even on Turkey, when infact, at the end of the day, Makarios had the last say, and unfortunetly, that was war, and the rest is history.
Kifeas wrote:Kikapu wrote:Kifeas wrote:[Now, on your question above! The 80:20 was just one aspect of his proposals for constitutional changes. The other most important ones were the abolishment of separate majorities in the parliament and the abolishment of the veto rights of both the president and the vice-president. In view of them, no I do not believe he would have been satisfied with a mere reduction to of TC participation to 80:20 ratio. Nevertheless, regardless of the extensiveness and gravity of those 13 point proposals and the pre-mature timing that he had chosen to make them, they were mere proposals which the TC leadership could have chosen to negotiate them, not because it was obliged to do so but in order to diffuse the tension that was growing between the two communities. .
Kifeas,
As always you lay out your case very well, so here is the 64 Thousand Dollar question. As you know, there were 48 "unalterable" provisions (or articles if you preffer) in the Costitution. How many of the 13 points of proposals were within the 48 "unalterable" provisions, which the British,Greece and Turkey were part of signatory of guarantors to the Constitution, so really, was there a chance in hell, that any of the 13 points of proposals could have been changed, if any of them fell into the 48"unalterable" provisions. Some of the points you mentioned, were really major ones, so my guess is, they were in the "48". There would have been a very good reason to have put them amongst the 48 "unalterables", so to make sure neither side would attempt to change them, as to give the New Republic a chance to grow with both the communities at the helm. So Makarios had no where to turn, except to ignore the whole Constitution, and the 1963 crises ignited. He could have of course, chose to live with it as it would have been better than being under the British rule. So I don't know how much blame you can put on the TC's or even on Turkey, when infact, at the end of the day, Makarios had the last say, and unfortunetly, that was war, and the rest is history.
No kikapu, there were no unalterable provisions in the constitution, should we, the people of Cyprus, alone, in a referendum, would have decided so. No matter what the treaties implied, it became irrelevant from the moment Cyprus was accepted by the UN as one of its member states. From then on, what counts is what the UN charter says. In terms of international law, any treaties contravening the Charter -becasue of allowance of the right to any foreign country to have a say and a role in Cyprus's internal constitutional affairs, are subordinated to the provisions of the UN charter. The UN charter says that every member country has the right to sovereignly regulate its internal affairs, without any other country having the right to interfere and impose its will -with treaties or without treaties. As far as the particular issue is concerned, the treaties were essentially nullified, or better, buried under the UN Charter, which is the ultimate of international law.
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