by bakala » Fri Mar 31, 2006 3:09 pm
Peter Moorehead, Daily Herald,
In September 1963 the Greeks were drawing up a plan of action aiming at
abolishing the so-called `excessive rights' of Turkish Cypriots by
`unilateral action' creating a fait accompli. According to Clerides, this
would have been achieved by the implementation of the Akritas Plan
prepared
by a select committee including the Interior Minister, ex-EOKA Commander
Yiorgadjis (Akritas). The Akritas plan, he says, declared that unalterable
objective of the Greeks "was to free the people of Cyprus [meaning the
Greeks] from the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, so that we [the Greeks]
would be free to exercise the right of self-determination (Enosis)."
Clerides, op. cit, p.207
He adds that any attempt by the Greeks to return to the policy of
self-determination - Enosis, had to pass through the process of amendments
of the Agreements. Clerides has been very clear about the decision of the
Greek Cypriot leadership to abolish the Agreements. He stated that, as far
as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, "They resented their existence,
because they barred the way to self-determination - Enosis. Therefore the
Greek Cypriots were ready and willing to struggle for their abolition."
Ibid, p.210
The interior Minister, Yiorgadjis, started recruiting suitable Volunteers
for his paramilitary force, selected from the ex-EOKA fighters by himself.
Apart from this, there had been two more paramilitary forces. One formed
by
the socialist leader, the personal physician of Makarios, Dr. Vasos
Lyssarides, the other was formed under Nikos Sampson, the notorious
EOKA-gunman. Clerides reveals that "both of these paramilitary forces were
created with the consent of Makarios." Ibid, p. 219
The forces of the secret Akritas Organization were stationed particularly
at
places in close proximity to Turkish villages. The late Professor Richard
A.
Patrick who was one of the leading authorities on the Cyprus problem
stated
earlier than Clerides that, "in 1962 weapons-training for company-sized
units was being conducted in the Trodos Mountains under the guidance of
the
Greek Cypriot officers of the Cyprus Army and using arms `borrowed' from
Government armories. By December 1963, there were up to 10,000 Greek
Cypriots who had been received and trained to some extent." Patrick
Richard
A, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 (Contario 1976)
pp. 37-38.
Clerides accepts that "The training of the Akritas forces was undertaken
by
officers of the Greek contingent stationed in Cyprus and its plans of
action, both defensive and offensive, were worked out at military
exercises
carried out at various places. The major exercise was carried out for
three
days in the Trodos mountains and the headquarters of the force during that
exercise was at the President Makarios's official residence in Trodos."
Clerides, op. cit p. 220
According to Prof Patrick, elements of the Greek Cypriot police and a
number
of Greek Cypriot irregulars were attempting to irritate the Turkish
elements
into action in December 1963. He believes that "had the incident of 21
December in the Tahtakale quarter of Nicosia not occurred, there can be no
doubt that a similar incident would have been precipitated by Christmas."
Patrick, R.A, op. cit, p. 38
The submission of the 13 points of amendment at the end of November 1963
created a major constitutional crisis, which in turn led to renewed
inter-communal fighting, as foreseen and planned by the Akritas Plan. This
crisis came at a very inopportune time. Turkey was facing a government
crisis and in Greece premier Karamanlis, "who had exercised a restraining
influence on Makarios" had resigned in June 1963. Prof. Pierre Oberling,
The
Road to Bellapais, The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New
York,
1982) p.84
Averoff says that, Makarios considered this situation in his favour and
changed his course. Without consulting the new Greek Government he adopted
the policy he had long been contemplating, "the policy which he thought
most
advantageous to Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot side). ...Within two months
tragedy and disaster had struck. Blood flowed freely, flames enveloped
island more than ever before. ... One after another, however, the
opportunities were missed. Jingoism, demagogy, stupidity, moral cowardice,
all led the beloved island further down the slippery slope, until at last
it
succumbed to the criminal intervention of mainland Greece on 15 July,
1974.
.... And so all our efforts ended in catastrophe." Averoff, op. cit, p.430
THE CHRISTMAS BLOODSHED
General Karayannis, the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard
reveals that when the Turks objected to the constitutional amendment,
Archbishop Makarios put his plan into effect and the Greek attack on Turks
began in December 1963. On 21 December, Greeks launched their planned
major
attack on Turkish civilians. The incident which was used as a pretext had
taken place in the Tahtakale quarter of Nicosia which was shared by Turks
and Greeks. When a Turkish woman refused to be searched bodly by a Greek
male who had not even produced any convincing evidence that he was a
policeman and while a crowd of Turks were gathered to protest this action
the `Constables' of Yiorgadjis opened fire cutting the Turkish couple in
half. This slaughter was used as starting signal for further firing on
Turkish civilian targets indiscriminately, including the statue of
Atatürk,
near Kyrenia gate, and even Lycee students, in the Turkish quarter of
Nicosia. Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük appealed for calm, but the CBC,
the Greek controlled state radio, did not broadcast his statement. Authors
like Robert Stephens, H. Scott Gibbons, H.D. Purcell, Prof. Oberling and
many foreign journalists vividly described the 1963-1964 assaults giving
concrete evidence that the Christmas attacks of the Greeks were preplanned
and their paramilitary and private armies were equipped with the arms and
ammunition supplied by the Greek leadership whose intention was to change
the state of affairs created by the Agreements, by use of all means,
including force of arms. For instance, Robert Stephens, a British author
observed: "There is no doubt that these forces were brought into action
during the crisis and that part of them got out of control, resulting at
one
stage in a small but savage massacre." Robert Stephens, Cyprus, A place of
Arms (Pall Mall press, London 1966) p. 181 .
Almost all foreign observes, had also jointly expressed almost identical
views that, the Greek police were issued arms by the interior Minister,
whereas the Turkish police had been disarmed the day before the fighting
started; that the 21 st December incident and the following attacks on the
Turks were "Obviously planned and premeditated." Reddaway, op. cit, p. 146
The result of the 1963-1964 Greek Cypriot attacks had been the destruction
of 103 Turkish villages and over a thousand houses and shops. Over 25,000
Turkish Cypriots, almost one fourth of the total Turkish Cypriot people
were
uprooted from their homes and had become refugees. The Greek attacks,
"clearly aimed at subjugating the Turks by a swift knock-out blow." Ibid,
p.
147 As a matter of fact it was stated in the `Akritas Plan' that the Turks
would be suppressed "immediately and forcefully."
THE GREEK ONSLAUGHT
The most dramatic and tragic Greek offensive was launched on the Christmas
eve on the Turkish positions in Kumsal area of Nicosia and particularly on
the mixed suburb of Kaymakli (Omorphita). The three children of a Turkish
Major who was serving as a doctor in the Turkish mainland contingent and
his
wife were killed in the bathtub where they hide themselves. The Greek
armed
gangs riddled them with machine-gun bullets. At midday Sampson, Who was
the
leader of a notorious EOKA assassination group during 1950's, with his
private militia made an all-out attack against the Turks of Küçük Kaymakli
(Omorphita). They attacked with much superior weapons, including light
anti-aircraft machine-guns. The Turkish Cypriots' resistance was exhausted
and resulted in heavy losses. 700 Turkish hostages, mostly women and
children were taken away by Sampson's gang and imprisoned in a Greek
school.
"The Greek irregulars ran wild, killing scores of Turks, including women
and
children, smashing and looting Turkish houses and taking hundreds of
hostages". Here are a few selected pieces from the international press
reporters who witnessed the Greek onslaught during the bloody Christmas
days
of 1963: "The 70 year old Turkish Imam of Omorphita was also killed
together
with his crippled son who were shot on sight". The following is how S.
Gibbons described the Greek attacks on two Turkish villages of Mathiati
and
Kochatis: As the terrified Turks shuffled along, cowering from the blows
from rifle butts, the mob rushed into the houses, dragged the blazing logs
from the fireplaces and threw them at curtains and on beds. The wooden
roof
beams, dried out over many years, smoked then crackled into flames. Along
the street the Turks were driven, dragging their wounded; women, many in
their night dress and bare feet.
Before some of the buildings had fully caught fire, groups of them dashed
inside, smashing furniture and dishware, grabbing valuables and stuffing
them them into their pockets. Terrified noises from behind the houses drew
the attention of the attackers to the Turkish livestock. Breaking into the
barns, they machine-gunned milk cows, goats and sheep. Hens were thrown
into
the air and blasted by bullets as they squawked and fluttered, their
pathetic bodies exploding in feathered puffs. The mob roared in
blood-crazed
delirium. The Turks were driven out of the village, along the freezing
open
road. Near the next village, Kochatis, an all Turkish area the tormented
refugees were left. While the Turks of Kochatis rushed out to help their
neighbours, the mob... returned to Mathiati to continue their orgy of
shooting, burning and pillaging". H. Scott Gibbons, Peace without Honour,
p.10
INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS
"A few days ago 1,000 people lived here in the village of Skylloura. Then
in
a night of terror 350 men, women and children vanished. They were all
Turks.
.... In the neighbouring village of Ayios Vassilios , a mile away, I
counted
16 wrecked and burned homes, they were all Turkish. From this village more
than 100 Turks also vanished; in neither village did I find a scrap of
damage to any Greek house. Peter Moorehead, Daily Herald, 1.1.1964
"On the Greek Cypriot side they have preferred the fighting to continue,
leading to the extermination of the Turkish Community." The Times,
4.1.1964
"On Christmas eve many Turkish people were brutally attacked and murdered
in
their suburban homes..." The Manchester Guardian 31.12.63
"It is clear that a conspiracy exists to wreck the constitution which if
it
was workable, is unworkable now. But this does not entitle Greek Cypriots
to
scrap the constitution and opt for Enosis. The Daily Telegraph, Editorial
2.1.1964
On the Christmas eve the 21 remaining Turkish Cypriot patients at the
Nicosia General Hospital were taken away by the Greek armed men never
again
to be seen.
MASS GRAVES
In the evening Greek Cypriot terrorists raided Turkish and mixed villages
near Nicosia and the Turkish inhabitants of Ayios Vasilios were brutally
dragged away. Many of them were killed in cold blood and put in a mass
grave. This mass grave was discovered on 13 January by the British truce
force and the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriot civilians were removed. The two
sons, 19 and 17 years old, and the granddaughter aged 10, of a 70 year old
Turk were lined up outside the cottage wall. The gunmen machine-gunned
them
to death. In another house, a 13-year old boy had his hands tied behind
his
knees and was thrown on the floor. While the house was being ransacked,
his
captors kicked and abused him. Then a pistol was placed at the back of his
head and he was shot. Altogether, 12 Turks were massacred that evening in
Ayios Vasilios. Then the gunmen turned their attention to the Turkish
houses. They looted and destroyed, and finally, exhausted, they set the
houses on fire. In isolated farmhouses in the same region, nine more Turks
were murdered. Gibbons, Op. Cit, p.73
The non-stop attacks on the Turks Continued until the Turkish jet fighters
flew low, over Nicosia and the Turkish Army Contingent left its barracks
to
take strategic positions. It was then that Makarios accepted to talk to
the
Turkish Cypriot leaders on the terms of a cease-fire, which was never
fully
implemented.
THE TRUCE FORCE
A joint Truce Force, composed of British troops and liaison officers from
the Greek and Turkish Contingents was set up under the British Commander,
Major-General Young on 27 December. A cease-fire line was drawn up by the
truce force dividing Nicosia into Turkish and Greek quarters, which was
called "the Green Line", because it was marked on the map with a green
china
graph pencil, which happened to be on the table. R.Stephens, Op. Cit,
p.185
It was only then that the foreign journalists were able to visit the
Turkish
areas, which suffered heavy attacks. Their report stunned their readers.
Here are a few more brief pieces from their reports: "Dr. Vasos
Lyssarides,
a Greek-Cypriot M. P. and personal physician to President Makarios, told
me
tonight that he leads one of the organisations which have been fighting
the
Turks. This was the first confirmation of reports that about four private
armies on the Greek side were engaged in the clash." Daily Mail, 10.1.64
Several Turkish homes were ablaze tonight in the Omorphita area of
Nicosia,
and others were looted by Greek irregulars. This has brought new tension
to
the situation. Daily Telegraph 1.1.64
"By his erratic and intemperate behavior President Makarios is deepening
and
prolonging the crisis in Cyprus. ... His intention to abrogate Cyprus's
treaties with Britain, Greece and Turkey, disclosed an alarming lack of
appreciation of the realities. ... These treaties are the foundation of
Cyprus's independence and the only security for the continued existence of
the republic. New York Herald Tribune, 4.1.1964
"... The constitution gives the Turks numerous political guarantees. These
have not prevented bloodshed. They need to be transformed into something
more effective, particularly if the President is going to persist in his
idea of abrogating the treaties. So far he has given no indication of what
greater security he could offer the Turks. Indeed, talk of scrapping the
treaties has made them more than ever look over their shoulders to Ankara
for protection". The Times 4.1.64 Editorial,
THE LONDON CONFERENCE
On January 1st 1964, Makarios declared that the treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance were abrogated unilaterally. However, Duncan Sandys, the British
Minister for Commonwealth Affairs who was in Cyprus for cease-fire talks
had
strongly protested this move by visiting Makarios and warning him about
the
serious consequences of this folly. Eventually Makarios had to alter his
decision stating that it was the Greeks' desire to secure the termination
of
the two treaties by appropriate means. Sands also convinced both Cypriot
sides to participate in a meeting to be held in London in order to find a
solution to the problem. Turkey and Greece were invited also as guarantors
and interested parties. The London Conference failed to achieve any
result,
because the Greek side insisted on a revision of the constitution in
accordance with the 13 points submitted earlier by Makarios.
The British suggestion to send Cyprus a NATO force to replace the British
truce force was rejected by Makarios who insisted on having a UN
peacekeeping force instead under the control of the UN Security Council,
where Soviet Russia was a permanent member and the non-aligned states
could
also be influential. Both the Soviets and non-aligned countries were
openly
supporting Makarios.
DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Following this incident, Britain took the Cyprus issue to the Security
Council. After long discussions it was accepted by all parties that the UN
peace force would be sent to Cyprus for preserving international peace and
security and in order to achieve this, it would "use its best efforts to
prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary, contribute to the
maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal
conditions."
4 MARCH (1964) RESOLUTION
The reference made in this resolution to `the Cyprus Government' caused
some
confusion at the beginning. Because `Government of Cyprus', according to
the
London and Zurich Agreements had to be composed of both Turkish and Greek
Cypriot ministers with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice-president. Unfortunately the resolution 186 of 4th March 1964,
by-passed the question of who constituted `Government of Cyprus'. Stephens
says and many other international observers agree that "the Security
Council
resolution left this point vague, but in principle the UN continued to
deal
with Makarios and his Ministers as the Cyprus Government." R. Stephens,
op.
cit, p.193
The UN's equation, in practice, of `The Cyprus Government' with `the Greek
Cypriot administration of Makarios' provided an opportunity for the Greek
Cypriot side to maintain the wholly Greek cabinet and the Greek Cypriot
president as the only executive organ representing the whole of the
island.
This injustice had been the crux of the problem since and obstructed the
achievement of a viable, lasting and just settlement.
MEDIATION EFFORTS
The 4th of March Resolution (186) had also recommended the
Secretary-General
to appoint a mediator, in agreement with `the Government of Cyprus' the
three guarantor powers and the representatives of the two Cypriot
communities. The Secretary-General U Thant, appointed on 27 March 1964,
H.E.
Sakari Tuomioja of Finland as mediator. After Tuomija's sudden death Galo
Plaza was designated to complete his mission. His report was completed and
submitted to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965, ruled out both
self-determination and enosis. Both the Turkish and Greek sides expressed
their dissatisfaction with the report, thus it failed to contribute to a
settlement.
THE ROLE OF UNFICYP & VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964, had worked all along in
favour of the Greek Cypriot side. Apart from resulting in recognition of
the
totally Greek Government of Makarios as the Government of Cyprus it had
also
created a situation in which UNFICYP was not able to keep the peace and
implement the cease-fire arrangements. The Greek Cypriot policy of
preventing UNFICYP from doing its proper job and thus to achieve a unitary
Greek state, resulted in blocking the way for a settlement and caused more
sufferings for both Cypriot peoples. Despite the presence of the UNFICYP,
the Greek Cypriot offensive had never stopped and also developed into an
offensive of economic blockades and violation of the basic human rights of
the Turks, such as, freedom of movement, communication, work, etc... The
Turkish Cypriot refugees, who were living in tents at the Northern suburbs
of Nicosia, were short of food and medicine. When on 11 March, a convoy of
Red Crescent supplies were escorted to Nicosia by British armoured cars
`they were halted by armed Greek Cypriots. The sacks of flour were thrown
on
the street and ripped open with bayonets.' H. S. Gibbons, Op. cit, p.152
IN HUMAN EMBARGOES ON RELIEF SUPPLIES OF RED CRESCENT
By midsummer of 1964, the number of Turkish refugees reached a total of
25,000, about one fourth of the total Turkish Cypriot population. The
conditions in which they had to live were extremely terrible and their
survival depended only on the relief supplies of the Turkish Red Crescent
(counterpart of the Red Cross). Over 4,000 Turks who had been employed by
the Government as civil servants and labourers, lost their incomes. Social
benefits were also denied to the Turks by the Government of Makarios. On
top
of that, Makarios's economic restrictions were implemented against Turkish
enclaves on the grounds that their supplies included strategic materials.
Among the banned materials were fuel, cement and even shoelaces. Makarios
also imposed restrictions on the imports of Red crescent supplies.
Consequently its supplies were examined at the port of Famagusta and on
many
occasions even more than half of goods were claimed to be `strategic
material' and thus were not allowed to be unloaded. The international Red
Cross had to fight to get its food supplies handed over to the Turks.
Ibid,
p.174
RESTRICTED AREAS
The restricted Turkish areas were increased to cover more places during
the
further Greek Cypriot attacks. After the Kokkina fighting, Makarios
stopped
all supplies not only to the Turkish areas of Nicosia, but also to Lefka,
Tylliria and Limnitis. Later in September, the Turkish sectors of
Famagusta
and Larnaca were also included in the restricted areas.
TURKISH CYPRIOTS' STARVATION
Makarios stated that essential foodstuffs based on a `caloric minimum'
were
allowed to the Turks. However the international Red Cross specialists and
neutral foreign observers found that Makarios's `calorific minimum' was
below the standards accepted in the civilised world. UN Secretary-General
U
Thant had to state that the restrictions, "which in some instances have
been
so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicated that the Government
of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a
substitute for military action."
The official figures published by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber,
stated `the number of Turks who received assistance from the Red Crescent
relief amounted to about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons,
23,500
unemployed and 7,500 dependants of missing persons, disabled and others.'
The UN Secretary-General, reported that, on receiving complaints about the
starvation of Turkish Cypriots, `UNFICYP carried out a preliminary survey
on
16 August 1964 and found that 40 percent of the (Turkish) villages had no
flour and 25 percent had flour for only one or two weeks.' Rauf R.
Denktas,
The Cyprus Triangle, (London 1988), p.39
The UN Secretary-General admitted that, `thousands of Turkish Cypriots
sought refuge in what they considered to be safer Turkish Cypriot villages
and areas' and thus denied the Greek Cypriot claim that this was an
organised exodus to partition the island. UN doc. S/8286
BUILDING MATERIALS BANNED
He also stated that, `another factor which has tended to aggravate the
refugee problem has been the Greek National Guard policy of asserting
Government authority by establishing a Greek military presence in Turkish
Cypriot areas.' UN doc, S/7001
It was further stated in the same report that, the appeal of the President
of the Turkish Communal Chamber for the assistance of UNFICYP in the
partial
removal of the Greek restriction on the building materials in order to
build
better shelters for the Turkish Cypriot refugees who were confined to
unhygienic settlements, was rejected by the Greek authorities and thus the
unhealthy, miserable and terrifying living conditions of the refugees
continued. An international research report on Cyprus, pointed out that,
`the world at large in general paid little attention to the plight of
Turkish refugees and gave them little in the way of sympathy or support.'
Minority Rights Group Report No:30 (London 1976)
According to Denktas, the whole burden of the Turkish refugees, amounting
to
no less than two million US Dollars a year was borne only by Turkey and
the
Turkish Red Crescent for eleven years, from 1963 to 1974. Ibid, p.42
HUMILIATION AND HARDSHIPS
Turkish Cypriots were subjected to humiliating searches and long delays at
roadblocks on the public roads. The Turkish areas were put under a total
blockade by the Greek authorities whenever they liked. They were even
preventing the entry of medicine and other essential supplies to the
Turkish
areas.
The UN Secretary-General described the hardships imposed upon Turkish
Cypriots as `enormous' and said in a report to the Security Council:
"These
hardships include restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians,
economic restrictions, the unavailability of some essential public
services,
and the sufferings of refugees." UN Doc. S/6426
He later reported that, `about one third of the Turkish population was
estimated to need some form of welfare relief.' UN Doc. S/7611
The Security Council failed adequately to respond to these serious
hardships
faced by the Turkish Cypriots and left thousands of civilian Turks to
suffer
further in the hands of the Greek authorities.
UNFICYP'S ROLE
The Greek Cypriots had done everything to check the movement of the UN
peace
keeping force (UNFICYP) and to prevent their entry into military areas
under
their control. They intended to use UNFICYP as a force to help the Greek
Cypriot gunmen and so-called `Government' forces to eliminate the Turkish
Cypriot resistance, which they branded as a `revolt' against the state.
"The
UN were effectively completely cut off from observing the Greek Cypriot
war
preparations. Gibbon, op. cit, p.166
ARMS AND FORCES FROM GREECE
The Greek Cypriot side, in close collaboration with Greece, had acted in
defiance of the cease-fire arrangements ignoring the efforts of the
mediators for a just settlement and even against the provisions of the 4
March 1964 Resolution which envisaged a return to normal conditions. The
establishing of a Greek National Guard and importation of arms from
Greece,
Egypt and Czechoslovakia, the shipment of thousands of the mainland Greek
troops, with the officers and ammunition clandestinely, to Cyprus, as
agreed
between Makarios and the Greek Premier Papandreou were not a sign of
peace.
It was later admitted by the son of the Greek premier, Andreas Papandreou
that the Greek military force in Cyprus reached to more than 20,000 by the
spring of 1965. Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, (New York 1970)
pp.132-3
The Greek Cypriot National Guard, in easy stages, was reinforced with
9,000
men and 950 officers from Greece who landed in Cyprus secretly, fully
equipped and heavily armed. Taki Theodoracopoulos, The Greek Upheaval (New
Rochelle, N.Y, 1978) p.138 The First Commander of the National Guard was,
Lieutenant-General Karayannis, of the Greek Army. He was later, replaced
by
the EOKA leader General Grivas, who returned secretly to Cyprus in June
1964
`to coordinate future military action against the Turkish Cypriot people.'
THE KOKKINA BATTLE
Grivas immediately began touring the island, calling for Union with
Greece.
He declared: "I shall not leave this island, until I return to Greece with
the title deeds of Cyprus in my pocket." The Turkish Cypriots' stronghold
on
the northern coast was the enclave of Mansoura-Kokkina, an area which had
been the only place where military supplies from Turkey could be received.
A
few hundred Turkish students who were studying in Turkish Universities and
in Britain had been dispatched secretly to this area for its defence.
Grivas
and Yiorgadjis decided to occupy this area and wanted to create
situations,
which would justify their attack. They dispatched new forces to the area
and
their military build-up continued in July 1964. By 7 August the Greek
National Guard at the area reached to 2,000 troops with six 25 ponder
guns,
two 4 barreled Oerlikon 20 mm guns, mortars and armed cars. In addition,
three newly acquired Russian built Greek patrol boats, armed with 40 mm
guns, patrolled the sea off the Turkish enclave. H.S. Gibbons, op. cit, p.
167
When the new Commander of the UNFICYP General Thimayya protested to
Makarios
about the build-up, he was promised by the Archbishop that they would not
attack before giving due warning. But on 6 August, only 2 days after this
promise was made, the Greeks attacked, overrunning the UN posts. The
attacks
were heavier the next day and the Greek forces began to advance on
Kokkina.
The Greek patrol boats were also shelling the Turkish enclave. The UN
protested but the Greeks had completely disregarded the UN warnings. The
Turkish Cypriot student fighters, were faced with a total annihilation. At
the very last minute Turkish jets flew over the area in a warning
demonstration with the hope that the Greeks would cease their onslaught.
Grivas and Yiorgadjis, the interior Minister who were at the area, ordered
the onslaught to continue to the end. The next day, on 8 August, the
Turkish
student fighters evacuated their positions and retreated to Kokkina for a
last ditch stand. Around 200 Turkish women and children, took refugee at
the
UN camp at Kato Pyrgos. The Greeks resumed their bombardment from all
sides.
It seemed to be the final hour of Turkish students and General Thimayya
told
the Turkish Cypriot leaders on phone that Makarios refused to order a
cease-fire and that he could do nothing more. Ibid, p. 168
TURKISH AIR BOMBARDMENT
The only hope for the Turkish fighters was the Turkish jets, which arrived
at the very last minute and intervened to check the Greek advance. They
bombarded the Greek military positions in the area. The Turkish Cypriot
student fighters were saved and the area continued to be held by the
Turkish
Cypriots, as an enclave since then. On 9 of August the Security Council
called for cease-fire and the battle of Kokkina ended.
MAKARIOS ORDERED THE ATTACK
U Thant reported to the Security Council on 10 September 1964 that it was
not the Turks who started the Kokkina battle. He emphasized that the
"strenuous attempts of the UNFICYP to secure a cease-fire was continually
hindered" by the `Government' forces. Glafkos Clerides revealed that "on
the
advice of the Military command and Grivas the Government of the Republic
(Makarios's Administration) ordered the attack on Mansoura-Kokkina, ...
without previous consultation with the Greek Government. p10 Clerides, My
Deposition vol II, p. 87
THE ACHESON'S PLAN
Talks were going through the summer months of 1964, between Turkey and
Greece, under the guidance of the former US Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, who proposed the union of Cyprus with Greece on condition that a
portion of the island would be ceded to Turkey in full sovereignty to be
used as a military base and there would be two or three small areas of the
island where the Turkish Cypriots would be in the majority. The Turkish
Government accepted this plan in principle as a basis for negotiations.
The
Greek Government rejected it. Later, Acheson altered his plan to satisfy
the
Greek side. According to this modified plan, the Turkish base instead of
being a permanent sovereign base would be leased. He also modified his
proposals about two or three Turkish Cypriot cantons. The Turkish
Government
rejected the second Acheson plan and the Greek Government accepted it
half-heartedly, but changed its mind again when Makarios took a negative
stand. Thus, the Acheson mission did not produce any result. On 19 August
1964, before the Geneva talks had not completely failed, the Greek Premier
sent the Defence Minister, Garoufalias to Cyprus to present Makarios with
a
plan for ENOSIS. "The plan was simple enough. Cyprus would declare ENOSIS
and Greece would accept it. The Government of Cyprus would stand down and
Greece would assume the responsibility for what may come." Clerides, op.
cit, p.150
THE GREEK JUNTA AND CYPRUS
A group of Greek Colonels headed by George Papadopoulos took over the
power
in Greece by staging a military coup on 21 April 1967. Makarios invited
Colonel Papadopoulos to Cyprus on 9 August. Clerides says that
Papadopoulos
explained to Makarios his regime's policy, which was "to strengthen the
defence of the island, to promote the cause of Enosis and to maintain
close
and friendly relations between the two governments." Ibid, p. 193
The Greek junta was anxious to achieve success on one of the national
issues
in order to maintain its prestige and consolidate its position. They chose
the Cyprus problem for this purpose and hurriedly got in touch with the
Turkish Government for a meeting on the issue. A top-level meeting took
place between Turkey and Greece in September 1967 at two frontier towns,
on
opposite sides. The Greek premier Kolias proposed enosis for a final
solution of the Cyprus problem "which was produced by the ignorance of the
real difficulties they were about to face." Clerides, Up. Cit, p.194
THE ENOSIS RESOLUTION
A few months after the military Coup in Athens the Greek Cypriot leaders
decided to manifest their ultimate desire to the Greek Colonels who took
over the power. On 26 June 1967 the deputies had unanimously passed a
resolution declaring that the struggle for enosis would continue until it
was realized. The enosis resolution was as follows: "Interpreting the
age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that
despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle being
conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle ends in
success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the
motherland, without any intermediary stage."
DENKTAS ARRESTED
Denktas, who had secretly tried to land Cyprus on 31 October 1967 with a
speed boat was arrested at Karpass area and was confined in military camp
in
Nicosia where the Greek mainland officers were in charge. After having
been
questioned by G. Clerides he was transferred to the police custody where
he
remained until it was decided by the Greek Cypriot Government not to
prosecute him if he agreed to leave Cyprus. Denktas accepted the offer and
on 12 November he was sent back to Ankara on a plane.
THE KOPHINOU TRAGEDY
3 days after this incident the Kophinou tragedy had occurred. On 15
November
General Grivas ordered an attack on the Turkish village, Kophinou, which
was
situated on a strategically important crossroads leading to Limassol both
from Nicosia and Larnaca. The Greek side were claiming then that the Turks
at Kophinou had "repeatedly prevented the (Greek) police patrols from
entering the mixed village Ayios Theodoros, a few miles away on a
hillside.
Ibid, p.200
The Greek side wanted to remove all Turkish roadblocks and put all Turks
in
the area under the direct control of the Greek National Guard. Clerides
admits that "On 13th and 14th November, strong units of the National Guard
and select units of the Greek police surrounded the villages of Kophinou,
Ayios Theodoros and Mari. The joint Army Headquarters informed Athens that
the units had moved to their position and the operation would commence on
14th of November." Clerides, op. cit, p.207
What remained now was to provoke the surrounded Turks to open fire or
resist
further to Greek police patrols in order to start the attack. The Turks
informed UNFICYP that further patrols would be resisted because armed
patrols would cause an increased tension. Meanwhile the UN began
negotiations with local Turkish leaders about how the Greek patrols would
he
conducted. Grivas without waiting the outcome of these negotiations
ordered
his 3,000 troops to move in. "The 2,000 Guardsmen, already positioned in
the
area, rushed forward. Mortars and heavy artillery went into action against
the Turks." Gibbon, op. cit, p. 177.
The Greek `hordes' rushed up, seized the UN troops who were supposed to
keep
the peace, and forcibly disarmed them. Then they smashed the UN radio to
prevent their communication with UNFICYP headquarters. The attacks on the
Kophinou Turks by the Greek forces were so brutal that Turkey decided to
intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee, and thus once more the two NATO
allies were brought to the brink of war. Even a 90-year-old Turkish
villager
who was paralyzed and confined to bed was riddled with machine gun bullets
and then his mattress was set alight. Many Turks who were surrendered were
taken away, with their hands raised, and machine-gunned. Turkish houses
had
set on fire after being looted. Six houses and the schools were completely
destroyed by fire. Over 40 houses were partly destroyed. Following the
information received that a Turkish air strike was imminent and Turkey
might
intervene, the Greeks began their withdrawal, on 16 November. The UN who
moved in found 24 Turks dead including 2 women.
All foreign observers once more realised how ineffective was the UN peace
keeping force to protect the Turks and peace. The UN Secretary-General
reported on 8 December 1967 that the Kophinou operation had "caused heavy
loss of life and had grave repercussions." UN doc. S/8286 He concluded
that
the Greek attack on the Kophinou area had been planned in advance.
WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK FORCES
Ankara's strong reaction put into action an intense diplomatic activity.
The
US president, Johnson, sent his special envoy Cyprus Vance to the area. He
succeeded in defusing the crisis and secured an agreement according to
which
Greece agreed to withdraw her forces and General Grivas, the Commander of
the National Guard. However, it was discovered later that the withdrawal
had
been only partially carried out and when the UN had taken this up with the
Greek Cypriot leaders it was explained that the remaining Greek officers
and
men were on contract to train the Greek Cypriot National Guard, itself an
unconstitutional force. That was of course yet another Byzantine trick.
Denktas, op. cit, p. 51-52
THE POLICY OF `FEASIBLE SOLUTION'
Following the Kophinou attack Makarios realised that a new policy, based
on
diplomacy rather than violence, should be followed. He therefore declared
on
12 January 1968 that the new Greek policy was to seek a `feasible solution
and not the desired solution' thus implying that enosis was still the
desirable, but not, at the time, a feasible solution.' Clerides, op. cit,
pp
214-5 Thus the issue of enosis was shelved temporarily and only by
necessity. As a result of this policy, Rauf Denktas, who had been banned
by
the Greek Cypriot administration from entering Cyprus since 1964, was
allowed to come back. In April 1968 he had a triumphant return to Cyprus.
PROVISIONAL TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION
As a direct result of the Greek Cypriot armed attacks and economic
pressure
the Turkish Cypriot side was left with only one alternative: To defend
themselves and to set-up their own administration. The Partnership State
created by 1959-60 Agreements was usurped by Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish
Cypriots were ousted from all government organs by force of arms. Thus on
28
December 1967, following the brutal attacks on Kophinou, the `Provisional
Turkish Cypriot Administration' was established
You should stop them, they make you illussional. 
