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21 OCTOBER 2004



Cyprus: Objective realities, validity of Greek Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan and the way forward

in the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot people must be freed from being the hostages of the Greek Cypriot side and must be treated, as a polity, at par with the Greek Cypriot polity. Put differently, the Greek Cypriot side must be prevented from using its unjustly and illegitimately acquired weight in Brussels to further hurt its ex-equal partner, the Turkish Cypriot people, and to settle scores with its neighbor, Turkey


Part III

These new circumstances and realities can now frustrate or act as a catalyst for opening the door for a new analysis and for new strategies/remedies. The international community, especially the United Nations and leading nations, can capitalize on this new opportunity to bring stability and a sustainable resolution to Cyprus. No doubt this will require leadership and bold steps, among which could be the following:

* The international community to change the game plan and paradigms surrounding the Cyprus issue by levelling the playing field and empowering the equal status and legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot polity. Turkish Cypriots should not be kept under international isolation through no fault of their own. There can be no movement on the Cyprus issue without creating a cost for the Greek Cypriot side.
* The international community to free the Turkish Cypriot people from subordination to the Greek Cypriot side by ending all economic, social and political embargoes that have been unjustly applied on them since 1963. The Turkish Cypriot side is expecting the international community to fulfil its commitment following the referenda results of April 24, 2004 that the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side would end and that all restrictions (embargoes) on North Cyprus would be removed. It is pertinent, in this regard, to recall some of the remarks made by international personalities and organizations:


"I applaud the Turkish Cypriots who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it entailed for many of them. (I) hope that ways will be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves through no fault of their own." (U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, April 24, 2004.)

"The Turkish government displayed great courage. The Turkish Cypriots did, as well, on voting for it (the secretary-general's plan). And so, I think there should be some benefits to the Turkish Cypriots for having voted 'yes' for this Plan." (U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, interview with the press, April 26, 2004.)

"Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this result. Now we have to end the isolation on the north. The (EU) commission is ready to take various measures for that aim." (Gunther Verheugen, EU enlargement commissioner, April 26, 2004.)

"I think it is important, as I indicated to the prime minister, that we end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. We made it clear we must act now to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes in respect to trade, in respect to air travel." (Tony Blair, prime minister of the UK, during his visit to Turkey, May 18, 2004.)

"The international community and in particular the Council of Europe and the European Union cannot ignore or betray the expressed desire of the majority of Turkish Cypriots for greater openness and should take rapid and appropriate steps to encourage it. The Turkish Cypriots' international isolation must cease." (European Parliamentary Assembly Resolution no. 1376 [2004]).

"I would hope that the members of the council can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development" (The Secretary-General's Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus to the Security Council, May 28, 2004, S/2004/437, p.2).

* The United Nations to revisit the U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Cyprus. This is necessary in view of the new state of affairs in order to ensure that the Turkish Cypriots are not subordinate to Greek Cypriots or their political authority and in order to ensure that they are not left in international isolation and deprived of their rights due to the Greek Cypriot rejection of the secretary-general's partnership plan.
* European institutions to look for ways to empower the Turkish Cypriot administration as the authority that exercises effective control over North Cyprus. Protocol No. 10 of the 2003 Act of Accession stipulated that the Greek Cypriot administration does not exercise effective control over North Cyprus. In fact, the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, and the state of affairs created thereof, does not allow either the Greek Cypriot community/partner or the Turkish Cypriot community/partner to exercise control or authority over the other, or to represent the other. Each community/partner elect their own representatives.
* The EU to take all necessary steps to put an end to the unjustified embargoes and give effect to measures to connect the Turkish Cypriot people with the rest of the world. It must be remembered that part of the restrictions on Turkish Cypriots were dictated in the decisions of the European Court of Justice in the Anastasiou cases, where the rationale stemmed from the lack of ability to cooperate with the authorities in North Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots must have a closer and direct cooperation with European Union institutions and must not be deprived of the advantages conferred by EU treaties.
* The EU and the member states to establish direct contacts with North Cyprus. Strictly speaking, under the circumstances described in this paper, the emergence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been the result of necessity and, as such, recognition is the right of the state that emerged, resting on the free and democratic choice of the Turkish Cypriot people. But this is not the issue here. The issue is that the Greek Cypriot side does not have the right to be the government of the Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus and therefore, a formula has to be found to allow for direct contacts with, and equal opportunities to, the Turkish Cypriot polity, without subordinating it in any way to the Greek Cypriot polity. The non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus should not therefore prevent direct contacts with the Turkish Cypriot side. In fact, in the case of Taiwan, the EU had developed modalities through contacts at the "administrative level" to facilitate trade. Furthermore, the authenticity of North Cyprus documents could be checked by European Commission authorities and not by the Greek Cypriot administration. The Council regulation defining the terms under which the provisions of EU law will apply to the green line between the two sides in Cyprus is far from meeting the legitimate interests of the Turkish Cypriot side and the new realities on the island following the referenda on April 24, 2004. It is imperative that the direct trade and financial aid regulations prepared by the EU Commission go through as proposed by the commission.
* The European Union to provide technical assistance in upgrading Gazimagosa Port and help in preparing the ground so that newly furbished Ercan Airport could be opened for international traffic. All these could be done in full compliance with the related acquis with the proviso that this will not be used in any other way than for economic development of North Cyprus.
* The European Union should provide financial and technical assistance for the development of physical and social infra-structural projects, including projects in the electricity sector and a major skills development program to train qualified personnel for the tourism sector. The EU could also provide technical assistance to the Turkish Cypriot side in project preparation, undertaking, feasibility studies and application for aid from EU structural and regional funds. Turkish Cypriot citizens and Turkish Cypriot companies registered in North Cyprus should be able to tender for EU funded projects. Any assistance coming from the EU or from international funds should not be linked, directly or indirectly, to the outstanding property issue.
* The EU to accept Turkish Cypriot certification to facilitate free movement of peoples and goods. The assistance of the EU to open direct mail, telephone and electronic links between North Cyprus and EU as well as the rest of the world will also provide a major step towards the ending of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people, who have proven their readiness to be the part of the EU and the world.
* The EU to open an office in North Cyprus to facilitate direct relations. Such an office should provide technical assistance for harmonization with the acquis. It should also function as a paying and audit agent to facilitate transfer of EU funds for the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot people.


The Turkish Cypriot side could itself contribute to efforts to bring stability and resolution by doing, among other things, the following:

* Initiate a process, together with the EU Commission, to harmonize the Turkish Cypriot legal, economic and political system with the European Union acquis.
* Reorganize its administrative and legal infrastructure in order to improve efficiency and compatibility with EU and international norms.
* Assist in combating illegal immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering as well as other threats to public order and public/international security.
* Create effective domestic remedies in North Cyprus especially as regards issues relating to property and public order.
* Look forward to a new cooperative relationship with the Greek Cypriot side on all issues as two good neighbors and as the two co-owners of the island.
* Make sure that the territory under its control continues not to be used for any subversive or terrorist activity against the Greek Cypriot side or any other neighboring country.
* Work towards a customs union agreement with the Greek Cypriot side and with Turkey in parallel with its harmonization process with the EU.
* Remain committed to settling the outstanding property issue in a way that would satisfactorily compensate legitimate property owners.


Conclusion

As also stated by the U.N. secretary-general on several occasions, a balanced comprehensive settlement plan for Cyprus requires visionary and bold political leadership on both sides of the island, as well as in Turkey and Greece, all of which have to be in place at the same time and to actively engage in the resolution process with determination in order to secure the needed balanced compromises for settlement. They all have to work hard to convince their respective peoples of the needed compromises and the benefits of a partnership settlement. While the political leadership in Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot side and to some extent Greece demonstrated that they were ready to grasp the opportunity, the political leadership on the Greek Cypriot side remained in the grip of selfish ethno-nationalism in spite of a concentrated effort by the international community, including some heavyweights like the United States, the EU and Britain. With his track record as a leading nationalist, I don't think that the Greek Cypriot president, Tassos Papadopoulos, can now change his vision for a Greek Cypriot-dominated Hellenic Cyprus and can look upon the Turkish Cypriots as co-owners of the island and their equal partners in partnership.

The sheer size of the Greek Cypriot "no" vote raises fundamental questions and has significant implications, considering that this was the first time that the Greek Cypriot public was being asked to vote on a bi-communal, bi-zonal partnership solution of the problem. The referenda results have shown without doubt that the outstanding majority of Greek Cypriots are calling into question many fundamental aspects of the secretary-general's plan, a culmination of decades of negotiation, including those provisions that translated the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot people into practical terms, bi-zonality, security arrangements and the virgin birth approach. The "virgin birth" design of the plan allowed each side to maintain its position on how the new state of affairs would come into being since both sides rejected the sole continuity of the other. In his broadcast speech on April 7, 2004 before the referenda, Tassos Papadopoulos was very clear in his challenge to the complete philosophy and fundamental aspects of the plan when he said:

"We are asked to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, the only security of our people, the only shield and guarantee of our historic physiognomy -- to dissolve our internationally recognized state entity exactly at the very moment this is reinforced through our accession to the European Union. I have received a state that was internationally recognized. I will not hand it over as a community, without the right to speak internationally."

This statement alone reveals the true intentions of Mr. Papadopoulos and his supporters, who have commanded the 76 percent majority. This fact alone entitles Turkish Cypriots to reconsider their position about entrusting their fate to Greek Cypriots, even in the context of a new bi-zonal partnership settlement. It is therefore time for both Turkish Cypriot authorities and the international community to start considering and promoting the "next best alternative" (BATNA) for the Turkish Cypriot people, bearing in mind that the Turkish Cypriots cannot give up their distinct identity, political equality, the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, and the needed bi-zonality which, together, are essential for their physical, political and economic survival and security. The existence of a strong Turkish Cypriot BATNA could also deter the Greek Cypriot side, as also pointed out by Professor Tozun Bahceli, from pursuing zero-sum strategies and could re-generate mutual interest in partnership based on real political equality.

I would argue that the main reason for the failure of the repeated peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus could be traced to deficiencies in process design. The burden of this shortcoming cannot wholly be placed on the shoulders of the U.N. secretary-general or his staff. Major international players, including the EU, have contributed to this failure and to the biased circumstances that conditioned the relations of the international community with the two sides. The ignoring of the rule of law regarding Cyprus also contributed to the deficiencies in the process design. For its part, the EU blatantly failed in benefiting from its catalytic capacity in Cyprus, and accession was realized without a settlement and under the "time-bomb" claim that the Greek Cypriot administration represents the whole island.

Overall, processes were initiated at times that did not match with the existence of a mutually perceived notion of deadlock (mutually hurting stalemate); not enough attention was paid to the need for a level and fair playing field (Turkish Cypriots had to negotiate under embargoes and the claim that the Greek Cypriot authorities represented the whole of Cyprus); windows of opportunity (like the EU membership of Cyprus) that could have equally induced the parties for settlement were mishandled; the root causes of the Cyprus issue were not adequately analyzed and addressed; and so-called "confidence-building measures" were put into practice that amounted to the dependence, and even subordination, of the Turkish Cypriot side on the Greek Cypriot side (like the EU asking Turkish Cypriots to export their goods through Greek Cypriot ports) rather than promoting confidence building through interdependence -- an essential requirement of partnership.

To re-open the door for settlement, I would therefore suggest as a starter that the shortcomings which have undermined the negotiation processes so far be remedied -- starting with the lifting of all embargoes on North Cyprus, and, parallel to this the political empowerment of the Turkish Cypriot side as an equal party in Cyprus.

As the U.N. secretary-general pointed out in his May 28, 2004 report, the Greek Cypriot leadership is challenging the fundamental aspects of his bi-communal, bi-zonal partnership plan and there is no justification under these circumstances for isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development. The Greek Cypriots must be stopped from holding the Turkish Cypriot people their political and economic hostage.

Finally, I would argue that we cannot develop policies and strategies regarding Cyprus in isolation of Turkey and Greece and the region as a whole. It will not suffice to contain or seemingly solve the problem of Cyprus without taking into account the realities of the island and of the volatile region Cyprus finds itself in between Europe and the Middle East, as well as, of course, the reality that Greek Cypriots have connections to Greece and Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. The partnership option of the two equal peoples still seems the best opportunity for Cyprus, but for this option to be realized we must make absolutely sure, in the spirit of partnership and for reasons of balance and sustainability, that neither side is subordinate to the other in the setting up of the partnership and in its functioning. The realization of this vision will not be possible unless there is island-wide and international consensus on the magnitude and significance of what we are trying to achieve. This necessitates an appreciation of the island-wide, regional and global benefits that partnership between the two peoples and cultures of the island would bring. For the island, this would mean peace, security, stability, prosperity and synergy; at the regional and global level, it would mean the cooperation and partnership of two civilizations that some people have recently chosen to condemn to perpetual obscurity through the dogma called the "clash of civilizations". Only an international community acting in unison has the political force to achieve this vision. But in the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot people must be freed from being the hostages of the Greek Cypriot side and must be treated, as a polity, at par with the Greek Cypriot polity. Put differently, the Greek Cypriot side must be prevented from using its unjustly and illegitimately acquired weight in Brussels to further hurt its ex-equal partner, the Turkish Cypriot people, and to settle scores with its neighbor, Turkey.