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[brother]

20 OCTOBER 2004 TURKISH DAILY NEWS


Cyprus: Objective realities, validity of Greek Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan and the way forward


Under the influence of misinformation and the push of Greece within the EU, and without regard to the rule of law and the root causes of the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish side was effectively treated by the EU as the villain seeking secession from the legitimate Greek Cypriot government of Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriots were treated as the victims


Part II

C. The question of 'Turkish mainland settlers'

This issue has at least three very important dimensions: political, economic and humanitarian.

On the political front, by using the politically loaded word "settler" regarding Turkish mainlanders residing and working in North Cyprus and by challenging the capacity of Turkish Cypriot authorities to grant "citizenship," the Greek Cypriot side is, on the one hand, trying to register the claim that it is only their authorities who can grant citizenship, and on the other, that "Turks" are not welcome in Cyprus.

In essence, through this position, the Greek Cypriot side is trying to establish the point that even in the absence of a settlement and partnership institutions, Greek Cypriot authorities are solely and "divinely" authorized, on behalf of both sides, to issue "firmans" on the citizenship issue. In doing so, they, of course, feel entitled to make as many Greeks, Russians, Pontian Greeks, etc., "citizens of Cyprus" without asking Turkish Cypriots, and, as such, do not consider these deeds as acts that disturb the demographic balance on the island.

On the economic front, because Turkish Cypriots are the undesirable other (challenge to the Hellenic character of Cyprus, uninvited guests, even "sub-humans") and must be "hurt" further with embargoes and isolation so that they will eventually succumb to Greek Cypriot wishes, they must not have a vibrant economy. Turkish workers and manpower significantly contribute to the economy of North Cyprus; therefore, every argument and tool must be used to make their stay in Cyprus "illegitimate." While the very vibrant construction sector in North Cyprus is totally dependent on Turkish construction workers, the agricultural and tourism sectors depend largely on human recourses from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot economy would collapse completely without the Turkish workforce, the presence of which has now become an integral part of its economic infrastructure. Per capita income in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is now calculated to have reached $7,500 -- a rise of approximately 50 percent over a period of two years.

Unfortunately, the current Greek Cypriot leadership is guided by the type of archaic reasoning and logic outlined above instead of looking upon the island as a regional, European and a global opportunity for the two partners and co- owners, where each side would use its assets, roots and influence in both the West and the East to maximize returns for the whole of Cyprus, thus making the island a "partnership of civilizations" model for the rest of the world.

Nicos A. Pittas, a Greek Cypriot political analyst writing for the Cyprus Mail, had the following comments in his article of Aug. 29, 2004 regarding settlers:

"He (Mr. Papadopoulos) also wails that the Annan plan allows some settlers, a lot of settlers, maybe even all the settlers, to stay. So what? If Cyprus needs something almost as much as water, it is cheap labour. We already import tens of thousands of foreign workers from all over the world to do our dirty work, so what is so awful if some of them are Turks? In any case given that we are now in the EU and someday probably so will Turkey with resulting mobility rights throughout the EU including Cyprus, what is so catastrophic with permitting 50,000 Turks, most of whom have lived on Cyprus for most of their lives, to stay?

Currently, Greek Cypriot authorities are using all of their powers and influence in the EU to undermine an EU Commission proposal for direct trade between North Cyprus and the EU in yet another attempt to subordinate the Turkish Cypriot side and its economy to Greek Cypriot rule.

On the humanitarian front, the attitude and position of the Greek Cypriot side regarding the citizens of an EU candidate country, which they humiliatingly describe as "Turkish mainland settlers," is discriminatory and de-humanizing, to say the least.

In a study released in late 2003, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group criticized the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for stating in a report that it published on June 24, 2003 that settlers in Northern Cyprus are coming from "one of the least developed regions of Turkey" whose "customs and traditions differ significantly from those present in Cyprus." The British Helsinki Human Rights Group study pointed out that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Report "expresses the kind of racist sentiments supposedly deplored by the Council of Europe."

D. The claim that the U.N. secretary-general's plan was 'not the product of negotiation nor did it constitute an agreed solution between the parties'

The question that needs to be answered here is whether the United Nations provided the necessary framework where ample opportunity was given for negotiation and agreement to take place, or whether the Greek Cypriot side preferred to be seen to be negotiating -- while putting all the blame on the Turkish Cypriot side -- in order to prevent the realization of a partnership settlement based on the principles of bi-zonality and political equality. A study of the developments between late 2003 and April 24, 2004 reveal without doubt that the Greek Cypriot side in fact refrained from negotiation with the objective of preventing the realization of a partnership settlement and that they are now merely inventing excuses to cover up their hidden agenda.

In December 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary- General calling for the resumption of substantive negotiations on the basis of his plan. When the secretary-general met Mr. Papadopoulos in Brussels on Jan. 29, 2004, Mr. Papadopoulos reiterated his call, stressing categorically that he sought a solution before May 1, 2004. He reassured the secretary-general that he did not seek "forty or fifty" changes to the plan, and that all the changes he would seek would be within the parameters of the plan.

After getting similar signs from the Turkish Cypriot side, Turkey and Greece, the U.N. secretary-general invited the parties to New York on Feb. 4, 2004 to begin negotiations on Feb. 10, 2004. Following intensive negotiations, the two sides reached agreement on Feb. 13, 2004 on a three-phase process leading to separate simultaneous referenda on a finalized plan before May 1, 2004. The three phases were:

Phase I: The parties would seek to agree on changes and to complete the plan in all respects by March 22, 2004 in Cyprus.

Phase II: In the absence of an agreement in Phase I, the secretary-general would convene a meeting of the two sides -- with the participation of Turkey and Greece, in order for them to lend their collaboration in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of the secretary-general's plan.

Phase III: As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock, the parties invited the secretary-general to use his discretion to finalize the text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of the secretary- general's plan.

When the negotiations re-convened in Cyprus on Feb. 19, 2004, Mr. Papadopoulos insisted that all federal laws, constitutional laws and cooperation agreements (all 131 of them) had to be completed by March 22, 2004 for the plan to be considered complete. More than 250 Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot technical experts worked day and night to finalize these legal texts, about 90 percent of which was finalized by March 22, 2004, with some differences remaining between the parties on the remaining 10 percent.

In the political negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side kept producing papers on their demands, while the Turkish Cypriot side was busy trying to produce counter proposals that would address the interests and needs of both sides. The secretary-general wrote in his report of May 28, 2004 to the Security Council that:

"The Turkish Cypriot side was generally prepared to engage on Greek Cypriot proposals and to discuss matters on a realistic basis, and sought to make counter-offers and compromise proposals."

Unfortunately, although the technical committees succeeded in achieving much of their task, progress was not possible at the political level and the secretary-general had to move to Phase II of the process.

Accordingly, when on March 24, 2004 the secretary-general's advisor, Alvaro de Soto, proposed an opening meeting of the two sides, with Greece and Turkey present in Burgenstock, Switzerland, in order to lend their collaboration, the Greek Cypriot side indicated that it did not wish to meet in this format in spite of the fact that it had accepted this arrangement in New York on Feb. 13, 2004. This undermined the whole purpose of Phase II of the agreed plan to move the process forward and no progress was therefore possible in spite of all the bridging proposals of the secretary-general and the efforts of friendly countries.

The secretary-general was therefore forced into moving to Phase III of the process and at close to midnight on March 31, 2004 he presented the two sides a finalized plan, as per the agreement of Feb. 13, 2004, which included further improvements beyond those already suggested by him in his bridging proposals.

On his return to Cyprus, Mr. Papadopoulos delivered an emotional address to Greek Cypriots on April 7, 2004 calling on them to give a resounding "no" reply to the secretary-general's plan, while using the state machinery to make sure that the Greek Cypriot referendum result would be negative.

After confirming categorically to EU officials and to the secretary-general in their Brussels meeting on Jan. 29, 2004 that he sought a solution before the accession of "Cyprus" to the EU (before May 1, 2004), Mr. Papadopoulos was bold enough to call on the Greek Cypriot people to wait till after their membership of the EU when, he said, they will have more leverage against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in realizing their objective of further upgrading and politically armoring the Greek Cypriot "Republic of Cyprus." Mr. Papadopoulos in fact made several unofficial attempts both in Cyprus and in Burgenstock to delay negotiations and agreement till after May 1, 2004 thus proving his insincerity about agreement by May 1, 2004.

Following all of this, on Sept. 23, 2004 Mr. Papadopoulos had the face to claim at the general debate of the 59th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that "Despite the hard work invested in the process by all involved, the end product of this effort was judged to be inadequate and it fell short of minimum expectations for a settlement for Greek Cypriots. Firstly, (because) the Annan Plan was not the product of negotiation nor did it constitute an agreed solution between the parties."

To sum up, in view of the adverse conditions surrounding the U.N. negotiation process, the April 24, 2004 referenda results were virtually a foregone conclusion. Especially with the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot government of Cyprus by the EU as the sole interlocutor for "Cyprus" and the removal of the condition foreseen in the 1992 U.N. Set of Ideas that EU membership would follow a settlement between the two sides, there was no need left for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a partnership settlement since they could realize all of their objectives, including EU membership under the claim that they represent the whole island, unilaterally, while the hands of the Turkish Cypriot side were tied under embargoes and political isolation. The failure of the United Nations to prepare the ground for meaningful and fair negotiations and to level the playing field in a way that would respect the equal legitimacy of the two sides also contributed to this result. Partnerships require a "glue" factor to hold the partners together. Professor Tozun Bahceli of King's University College, Canada, pointed out at a conference at Eastern Mediterranean University, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on April 29, 2004 that the partnership option was attractive to the Greek Cypriot side so long as a two-state solution was a real possibility.

Under the influence of misinformation and the push of Greece within the EU, and without regard to the rule of law and the root causes of the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish side was effectively treated by the EU as the villain seeking secession from the legitimate Greek Cypriot government of Cyprus, while the Greek Cypriots were treated as the victims. The consequence of these false perceptions and assumptions immunized the Greek Cypriot side from suffering any consequences for their intransigence. If the pursuance of a zero-sum strategy entails no consequences, there is naturally no incentive to settle for less. This point was confirmed in the emotional pre-referenda address of Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos, in which he went as far as saying that he had been entrusted an internationally recognized republic and that he was not going to reduce it to the status of a community.

The way forward

New facts and a new state of affairs have emerged in Cyprus as a result of the referenda of April 24, 2004. The international community cannot now ignore the changing paradigms in Cyprus, which call for the development of new policies and strategies to match the new needs.

Among the elements of the new facts and the new state of affairs could be listed the following:

* The two peoples of the island are qualified to, and are capable of, exercising their separate inherent constitutive powers as we have seen in the recent referenda.
* In exercising their equal constitutive powers, each party represented itself and no other.
* The Turkish Cypriot side supported the secretary-general's plan, which foresaw a bi-zonal, bi-national partnership, by a majority of 65 percent, while the Greek Cypriot side rejected the partnership plan by a majority of 76 percent. This result has made the secretary-general's plan null and void.
* The Greek Cypriot vision of a Greek Cypriot-dominated Cyprus has not changed. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriot side is continuing to resort to every means and argument in order to undermine the principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality that are the agreed pillars of a new partnership settlement. In this regard, the emotional pre-referenda address of Tassos Papadopoulos was in essence a challenge against bi-zonality, political equality and the "virgin birth" approach under the guise of "functionality," and against the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance under the guise of "security."
* The referenda results have shown without doubt that even after so many years of concentrated effort by the international community, the Greek Cypriot side does not believe in partnership and does not respect the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot people. Since an imposed partnership is not an option, the onus is now on the United Nations and the international community to free the Turkish Cypriot side from the yoke of Greek Cypriots.
* The Greek Cypriot argument based on the "state of necessity" principle lost whatever ground it had since it has become obvious that it was, and is, the Greek Cypriot side that has been contributing to the continuation of the abnormal situation.
* It has now become obvious that what was the partnership "Republic of Cyprus" has in fact turned into the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus in which the Turkish Cypriot people, as an equal corporate body, are no longer a partner or a party.
* It became clear that the intransigent side in Cyprus is not the Turkish Cypriot side and also that the Greek Cypriot side has no ground to hold the Turkish Cypriot side hostage under international isolation.
* It became evident that the absence of a level playing field, and the one-sided conditionality applied by the European Union, have contributed to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side and have prevented the reaching of a negotiated settlement.
* It became visible that the Turkish Cypriot side has been subjected to injustice and discrimination since 1963.
* The Turkish Cypriot side and the international community lost more confidence in the Greek Cypriot side, which failed to keep its promise that it would support the secretary-general's plan for a settlement by May 1, 2004 if its EU membership process was kept on track.
* It became obvious that it is in fact the Turkish Cypriot side that is confronted with real security and political threats and that needs more safeguards and guarantees against the Greek Cypriot side, which is obsessed with the vision of dominating the island.
* The unilateral EU membership of the Greek Cypriot side has further strengthened their hand, thus contributing to the asymmetry of power between the two sides and further undermining the chances of fair negotiation.

[Piratis]

brother, your title is absolutly missleading. This is the Turkish position, part of the well known Turkish propaganda, and has nothing to do with EU.

This documents are full of lies and propaganda, and have absolutely nothing worth of dicussing.

Anyways, tell to the Turks to write more of those crap. The will get our answer in December.

[brother]

THIS IS NOT DEBATED BY YOU BECAUSE THEY TELL LIES AND THE ROC TELLS TRUTHS, IS THAT WHAT YOU THINK, THEN YOU ARE TRUELY BLIND, WHAT A SHAME I THOUGHT YOU WAS MUCH SMARTER THAN THAT.

AND IF YOU DO VETO THEM, WHAT DO YOU THINK THAT WILL ACHIEVE EXCEPT THAT CYPRUS WILL ALWAYS BE DIVIDED AND YOU WILL LOOK AT THE NORTH FROM A DISTANCE.

[Piratis]

AND IF YOU DO VETO THEM, WHAT DO YOU THINK THAT WILL ACHIEVE EXCEPT THAT CYPRUS WILL ALWAYS BE DIVIDED AND YOU WILL LOOK AT THE NORTH FROM A DISTANCE.

We look the north from a distance for 30 years already. The "good boy" tactics didn't help us in the past, and they will not help us in the future either.
Turkey will only solve the Cyprus problem when they realize that diplomacy tricks are not enough, and satisfying the Americans and the British alone will not get them in the EU.

Turkey should do real compromises and they should realize that they can not win everything. Being a member of EU while at the same time occupying an EU member is not possible because we will not allow it to become possible. We can not force Turkey out of Cyprus, but we can keep them out of the EU. They have a decision to take, and the faster they take it the better for all of us. If they count that Cyprus will bent, then then I hope Papadopoulos will erase such hopes in December.

I am not saying that we should veto Turkey now. But now the solution of the Cyprus problem should be stated as a prerequisite for the Turkish accession.

[brother]

look if the ROC shows goodwill to the tc rather than blocking every effort then you would stand strong and the tc would stand with you and turkey would leave, but first you must stop tassos from punishing the tc which is happening every time you block efforts to take them out of isolation.

[MicAtCyp]

Brother where is the good will of the TCs?
Either of the Ordinary people or the TC Politicians?
Do you see any good will in raising 2 Turkish(!!) flags on the Apostolos Andreas Monastery? Do you see good will to the fact they cut its cross from the top and wont let anyone put a new one?
Do you see good will in tearing off from the geography books we sent to our enclaved children, of the map of Cyprus? Just because the villages had their real names on? The capital of France is called Paris myfriend and not Guneslikoy and if some invadors decide one day to call it Guneshlikoy,shame on them, and double shame on them for tearing off any maps that call it Paris.
Do you see any good will in refusing to open more gates for the people to cross?
Do you see any good will to the fact that the majority of them still want an as much as possible separate state built on our own properties?

Finally do you see any good will in issueing us a visa at the crosspoints.A visa to visit my own country, my own home and properties as a tourist!!!
Do you see good will in bringing in settlers and more settlers and giving them full citizenship rights?
Do you see good will in selling our properties to the North-properties that dont belong to them-and then coming to the south and claing their own properties back?
I heard this is what Arif Mustafa did.

[-mikkie2-]

I was not sure if Arif sold property in the north. Is that speculation or fact?

However, I don't think we can deny his rights if he wishes to stay in the south. It is a thorny subject, but we must go by the law. Its the only way.

[mehmet]

Goodwill is more than words. There is lots for both communities to do.

[metecyp]

This is the Turkish position, part of the well known Turkish propaganda, and has nothing to do with EU.

Just out of curiosity, what qualifies as propaganda for you?

[Piratis]

Just out of curiosity, what qualifies as propaganda for you?

Everything. "Turkey is innocent", "there are no settlers", "there is no one legal state in Cyprus", "there are two peoples" etc etc. I was thinking to quote some parts, but then I would have to quote the whole article since the whole thing is nothing more than the usual Turkish propaganda that can convince nobody except those that help them to produce it. (and maybe those that have no clue about the Cyprus problem)