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[Robin Hood]

Paphitis:

But that was not what I was talking about. The entire Airbus Fleet has had extensive Flight management and Software issues and is still to this day plagued by excessive automation which needs extensive management.

I can’t find anything about significant software issues with Airbus in any searches, do you have a link?

That seems to be a conflict of terms! If it is plagued by 'excessive automation' why does it need 'extensive management' the more automation should surely equate to less management? (i.e. input from the crew.)

Your criticism of the 380 is really based on a rather flawed commercial concept that created an aircraft that the industry did not want or need, not its safety. Other than that I don’t have any significant argument with your views.

[Paphitis]

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ ... p-disaster

Airbus has had a lot of issues with mode selection. It's a much more complicated system than Boeing. There are massive issues with Situational Awareness on Airbus aircraft, moreso than on Boeing and that has caused many issues. It has also caused many accidents.

But Airbus has had some Flight management issues and sensor malfunctions of the Pitot Static Systems that bought down AF447.

Airbus was in a similar position to Boeing back then.

[Londonrake]

Funny. I’ve never given a thought to aircraft type, on what these days must be thousands of hours of commercial travelling.

Now though, I’m going to be sat there, with my G&T, going through all the relevant technical problems for type in my head.

Thanks guys.

[Paphitis]

Funny. I’ve never given a thought to aircraft type, on what these days must be thousands of hours of commercial travelling.

Now though, I’m going to be sat there, with my G&T, going through all the relevant technical problems for type in my head.

Thanks guys.

All manufacturers have had there little moments. they are not infallible.

Overall though, their safety record is not something to poke fun at. Both Airbus and Boeing are delivering incomprehensibly low accident and fatality rates. It's just that when an A330 or a B737 crashes, the consequences can be far reaching and quite shocking. It's big headlines.

But at the end of the day, these are big companies who obviously build fantastic aircraft and they will continue to do that for many generations to come and the aircraft will get better and better and more efficient and cost effective.

Also every new model has its teething problems. The B787 had the Lithium Battery issue which was causing havoc not that long ago. The B797 could have its first flight in 2020 and the first may be operational by 2024. As much as I would hope it will be smooth sailing, experience tells us that there will be something that will be problematic. Hopefully it will be something that won't kill people and can be sorted quickly.

This is cutting edge technology and things will go wrong.

[Robin Hood]

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/11/crash-how-computers-are-setting-us-up-disaster

Airbus has had a lot of issues with mode selection. It's a much more complicated system than Boeing. There are massive issues with Situational Awareness on Airbus aircraft, moreso than on Boeing and that has caused many issues. It has also caused many accidents.

But Airbus has had some Flight management issues and sensor malfunctions of the Pitot Static Systems that bought down AF447.

Airbus was in a similar position to Boeing back then.

That was a truly interesting article, although I think you are stretching the point a bit to blame it all on Airbus automation software.

The Air France flight was string of errors by an inexperienced crew who simply did not have the combined competence to deal with an extreme situation where their actions were part of the problem. Nothing really happened that an old fashioned hands-on aviator would not have been able to deal with.

These guys were totally reliant on a system and they never considered the ‘what if’ situation because they were totally reliant of information they had always accepted as ‘the truth’ and the system knew best! They didn’t question the system and that attitude is not just related to aviation!

This will give LR a great laugh because when you read the article you realise that because they concentrated on single issues they failed to consider the implications of other multiple indications occurring at the same time ......... something I regard as an ability to apply ‘lateral thinking’ they only saw what they had come to rely upon and could not think it out! The signs were there but they didn’t respond to them because The System was telling them something else.

But I think this comment was very valid:

An alternative solution is to reverse the role of computer and human. Rather than letting the computer fly the plane with the human poised to take over when the computer cannot cope, perhaps it would be better to have the human fly the plane with the computer monitoring the situation, ready to intervene. Computers, after all, are tireless, patient and do not need practice. Why, then, do we ask people to monitor machines and not the other way round?

Make the pilot fly the plane in manual with the system monitoring the pilot and giving him warnings when he goes wrong or makes a bad decision! They get paid enough for what they do so let them do what we all believe they do behind that closed door? Only allow auto for given periods of time when everything is stable. Let the automatic flight control system decide whether a choice for automation at that point in time meets all the parameters ....... and fit a pre-warning Auto Pilot time-out audio alarm.

The alternative is to get rid of pilot intervention all together and rely on a bunch of highly qualified Indian engineers to write infallible but triplicated software operating triplicate control systems. What could possibly go wrong?

As a site Director once said to me as we introduced automated process control to his plant, “Can’t you just put a START and STOP button on my desk, then I could fire all the bloody operators?”

[Paphitis]

I did not blame Airbus software. The Air France issue was a combination software and hardware issue with the static sensors and enti-icing failures and various IAS sensor errors and disagreements giving erroneous airspeed indications.

there were in addition to that other factors as there will be other factors to the Ethiopian Crash and many of those other factors might not be due to Boeing and let's not forget that blame is never laid to any entity. That is a bedrock of the industries safety systems and its also International Law.

Lawyers will play the blame game not the regulators.

Boeing is just having a similar moment to what Airbus has already been through.

Other than that, these are all hurdles that will be overcome.

[Kikapu]

In the AF447 case, once the pilots no longer knew which way was up or down and had no clue what they were doing, had they just switched the Auto Pilot back on again, would the computers on board could have solved the problem in seconds and set the plane back on on it’s normal attitude again with the information that was already pre programmed into the system?

Also, does the cockpit not have a GPS, telling pilots how fast they are moving separate from the information they get to the air speed from the pitot tubes? The passengers get to see how fast they are moving on the Flight maps back of the seat screens. Are the passenger’s map screen information coming from the plane’s cockpit instruments or are they independent with GPS system?

There are three options in flying complex planes in seems.
1. Pilots monitoring automation
2. Automation monitoring Pilots
3. Automation monitoring Automation

In the long run, I believe option 3 will become the norm for safely flying in future planes, which are likely to be more complex than the planes we have today.

[Paphitis]

In the AF447 case, once the pilots no longer knew which way was up or down and had no clue what they were doing, had they just switched the Auto Pilot back on again, would the computers on board could have solved the problem in seconds and set the plane back on on it’s normal attitude again with the information that was already pre programmed into the system?

Also, does the cockpit not have a GPS, telling pilots how fast they are moving separate from the information they get to the air speed from the pitot tubes? The passengers get to see how fast they are moving on the Flight maps back of the seat screens. Are the passenger’s map screen information coming from the plane’s cockpit instruments or are they independent with GPS system?

There are three options in flying complex planes in seems.
1. Pilots monitoring automation
2. Automation monitoring Pilots
3. Automation monitoring Automation

In the long run, I believe option 3 will become the norm for safely flying in future planes, which are likely to be more complex than the planes we have today.

I'm not very up to date with this crash right now Kikakpu. I read the report a long time ago, and vaguely remember that there was a Pitot Static Failure which results in erroneous Indicated Airspeed readings. The Flight Management Computer might not have been much help at all.

Yes aircraft have GPS and this gives them Ground Speed (speed over the ground). Indicated Airspeed and Ground Speed are 2 separate things. When we fly an Aircraft we fly an Indicated Airspeed or speed through the air. All our approaches are flown on IAS. True Airspeed (TAS) is another thing again.

TAS - no pressure correction
IAS - applies a pressure correction
GS - speed over the ground (takes into consideration winds)

As to your options, there have been numerous studies into this conducted by the military, NASA, and manufacturers like Boeing, and they are finding that the 2 pilot crew is critical to safety and only a 2 pilot crew is able to deliver the nuances of aviation safety because automation is not able to assess risk or have the AI to comprehend and decipher all the variables and assess all the risks and take the most appropriate action. A Flight Management Computer isn't going to make those critical decisions on whether it should conduct a Missed Approach or Go Around, or not depart at all due weather. We already have the automation and the FMC can indeed fly an entire flight from 200FT to virtually on the ground with a CAT 111 Instrument Landing System but those 2 pilots are very much in charge and absolutely critical.

So it is a incorrect to suggest that the AF447 pilots crashed this aircraft. It is also incorrect to suggest that the FMC would have saved the flight. The Autopilot would have blown a gasket if it was getting erroneous IAS readings and would have either failed or the auto throttle would have reduced power further thus deepening the stall.

Basically, the Swiss cheese holes lined up, and AF447's number was up. It was a doomed flight.

For as long as people cross the road, people will get run over. For as long as cars travel the roads, their will be fatal crashes and for as long as aircraft take to the air, there will be a small number of flights that will meet their end. It will never change. the only thing that changes is that we get better and better and safer and safer but I don't think we can ever be infallible.

[Kikapu]

In the AF447 case, once the pilots no longer knew which way was up or down and had no clue what they were doing, had they just switched the Auto Pilot back on again, would the computers on board could have solved the problem in seconds and set the plane back on on it’s normal attitude again with the information that was already pre programmed into the system?

Also, does the cockpit not have a GPS, telling pilots how fast they are moving separate from the information they get to the air speed from the pitot tubes? The passengers get to see how fast they are moving on the Flight maps back of the seat screens. Are the passenger’s map screen information coming from the plane’s cockpit instruments or are they independent with GPS system?

There are three options in flying complex planes in seems.
1. Pilots monitoring automation
2. Automation monitoring Pilots
3. Automation monitoring Automation

In the long run, I believe option 3 will become the norm for safely flying in future planes, which are likely to be more complex than the planes we have today.

I'm not very up to date with this crash right now Kikakpu. I read the report a long time ago, and vaguely remember that there was a Pitot Static Failure which results in erroneous Indicated Airspeed readings. The Flight Management Computer might not have been much help at all.

Yes aircraft have GPS and this gives them Ground Speed (speed over the ground). Indicated Airspeed and Ground Speed are 2 separate things. When we fly an Aircraft we fly an Indicated Airspeed or speed through the air. All our approaches are flown on IAS. True Airspeed (TAS) is another thing again.

TAS - no pressure correction
IAS - applies a pressure correction
GS - speed over the ground (takes into consideration winds)

As to your options, there have been numerous studies into this conducted by the military, NASA, and manufacturers like Boeing, and they are finding that the 2 pilot crew is critical to safety and only a 2 pilot crew is able to deliver the nuances of aviation safety because automation is not able to assess risk or have the AI to comprehend and decipher all the variables and assess all the risks and take the most appropriate action. A Flight Managment Computer isn't going to make those critical decisions on whether it should conduct a Missed Approach or Go Around, or not depart at all due weather. We already have the automation and the FMC can indeed fly an entire flight from 200FT to virtually on the ground with a CAT 111 Instrument Landing System but those 2 pilots are very much in charge and absolutely critical.

So it is a incorrect to suggest that the AF447 pilots crashed this aircraft. It is also incorrect to suggest that the FMC would have saved the flight. The Autopilot would have blown a gasket if it was getting erroneous IAS readings and would have either failed or the auto throttle would have reduced power further thus deepening the stall.

Basically, the swizz cheese holes lined up, and AF447's number was up. It was a doomed flight.

For as long as people cross the road, people will get run over. For as long as cars travel the roads, their will be fatal crashes and for as long as aircraft take to the air, there will be a small number of flights that will meet their end. It will never change. the only thing that changes is that we get better and better and safer and safer but I don't think we can ever be infallible.

Paphitis, I was referring to the guardian article you had posted earlier mainly on the AF447. I thought you had read it.

In the article, the forward motion of the aircraft at one point was just over 70 knots as it was falling to the sea with a very nose up attitude, as the aircraft had stalled. As confused as the pilots were in the beginning because of the frozen pitot tubes giving erroneous instrument readings which caused the Auto Pilot to kick out, at this point, all the pilots had to do was to keep the plane level at the present power setting, just as it was just before the AP kicking out. Once the de-icing was activated and the pitot tubes were free from icing, it started giving the correct information to the instruments, even though the pilots did not trust these readings and continued to pull back on the stick making matters worse. Once the instrument were getting the correct information, couldn't the AP correct everything if it was switched back on again to resume flying on previous computer settings?

As a sailor, I understand the differences between True Wind (Speed + Direction) and Apparent Wind (Speed+ Direction), and even if the GPS was reading Apparent Speed (speed over the ground) at 70 knots forward motion, that is about 20% of normal speed surely at 35,000ft for the Airbus 330. That would require almost a 400 knots headwinds, which is unheard of to get such a low GPS speed for the pilots to not to realize they were in a stall and falling out of the sky, since the GPS speed was totally separate from instrument speed fed by the pitot tubes.

[Paphitis]

In the AF447 case, once the pilots no longer knew which way was up or down and had no clue what they were doing, had they just switched the Auto Pilot back on again, would the computers on board could have solved the problem in seconds and set the plane back on on it’s normal attitude again with the information that was already pre programmed into the system?

Also, does the cockpit not have a GPS, telling pilots how fast they are moving separate from the information they get to the air speed from the pitot tubes? The passengers get to see how fast they are moving on the Flight maps back of the seat screens. Are the passenger’s map screen information coming from the plane’s cockpit instruments or are they independent with GPS system?

There are three options in flying complex planes in seems.
1. Pilots monitoring automation
2. Automation monitoring Pilots
3. Automation monitoring Automation

In the long run, I believe option 3 will become the norm for safely flying in future planes, which are likely to be more complex than the planes we have today.

I'm not very up to date with this crash right now Kikakpu. I read the report a long time ago, and vaguely remember that there was a Pitot Static Failure which results in erroneous Indicated Airspeed readings. The Flight Management Computer might not have been much help at all.

Yes aircraft have GPS and this gives them Ground Speed (speed over the ground). Indicated Airspeed and Ground Speed are 2 separate things. When we fly an Aircraft we fly an Indicated Airspeed or speed through the air. All our approaches are flown on IAS. True Airspeed (TAS) is another thing again.

TAS - no pressure correction
IAS - applies a pressure correction
GS - speed over the ground (takes into consideration winds)

As to your options, there have been numerous studies into this conducted by the military, NASA, and manufacturers like Boeing, and they are finding that the 2 pilot crew is critical to safety and only a 2 pilot crew is able to deliver the nuances of aviation safety because automation is not able to assess risk or have the AI to comprehend and decipher all the variables and assess all the risks and take the most appropriate action. A Flight Managment Computer isn't going to make those critical decisions on whether it should conduct a Missed Approach or Go Around, or not depart at all due weather. We already have the automation and the FMC can indeed fly an entire flight from 200FT to virtually on the ground with a CAT 111 Instrument Landing System but those 2 pilots are very much in charge and absolutely critical.

So it is a incorrect to suggest that the AF447 pilots crashed this aircraft. It is also incorrect to suggest that the FMC would have saved the flight. The Autopilot would have blown a gasket if it was getting erroneous IAS readings and would have either failed or the auto throttle would have reduced power further thus deepening the stall.

Basically, the swizz cheese holes lined up, and AF447's number was up. It was a doomed flight.

For as long as people cross the road, people will get run over. For as long as cars travel the roads, their will be fatal crashes and for as long as aircraft take to the air, there will be a small number of flights that will meet their end. It will never change. the only thing that changes is that we get better and better and safer and safer but I don't think we can ever be infallible.

Paphitis, I was referring to the guardian article you had posted earlier mainly on the AF447. I thought you had read it.

In the article, the forward motion of the aircraft at one point was just over 70 knots as it was falling to the sea with a very nose up attitude, as the aircraft had stalled. As confused as the pilots were in the beginning because of the frozen pitot tubes giving erroneous instrument readings which caused the Auto Pilot to kick out, at this point, all the pilots had to do was to keep the plane level at the present power setting, just as it was just before the AP kicking out. Once the de-icing was activated and the pitot tubes were free from icing, it started giving the correct information to the instruments, even though the pilots did not trust these readings and continued to pull back on the stick making matters worse. Once the instrument were getting the correct information, couldn't the AP correct everything if it was switched back on again to resume flying on previous computer settings?

As a sailor, I understand the differences between True Wind (Speed + Direction) and Apparent Wind (Speed+ Direction), and even if the GPS was reading Apparent Speed (speed over the ground) at 70 knots forward motion, that is about 20% of normal speed surely at 35,000ft for the Airbus 330. That would require almost a 400 knots headwinds, which is unheard of to get such a low GPS speed for the pilots to not to realize they were in a stall and falling out of the sky, since the GPS speed was totally separate from instrument speed fed by the pitot tubes.

The FMC will not take into consideration the Ground Speed.

The only time we even look at it is when we are given speed restrictions or told to cross a particular way point at a certain time for Flow management into busy ports to achieve our slot time.

Other than that, it's all IAS and the Autopiliot will only fly an IAS. If the IAS is showing 250 knots, then that is what the autopilot and pilots will interrogate.

And because we are children of the magenta line, we will just input the time and the FMC takes care of the rest and adjusts airspeed as necessary.

I don't take media articles that seriously. I just posted it because it was a lazy source and someone asked for a source. I would much rather read the reports but I literally don't have the time right now and would rather not read it because my brain is going to explode. Need some time out of aviation dude. I got all these online re-currency exams to do and am in the sim on the 7th and 8th at like 3 am ...