Sotos wrote: From what I know traitors in those times were branded those who collaborated with the British. Those who were murdered were either such collaborators, communists, or members of the other community. Very few people were murdered because they "advocated a pan Cyprian approach", at least among GCs. (maybe some of those where also communists and they were murdered because of that)
My view and belief is that there was use of intimidation and violence by both TMT and EOKA against elements in their own communities against those that opposed the respective causes of enosis and taksim. 'Communist' (as well as non communists) that supported the respective 'national' causes of taksim or enosis was not subject to the same levels of intimidation and violence (and even murder) as those 'communists' that spoke openly of the dangers, for Cyprus and all Cypriots, of the respective communities 'national' causes. In the case of murder of such people the numbers were indeed 'very few' but not zero.
Sotos wrote:Unfortunately that doesn't work in practice like that. If the TCs were convinced that they have more to gain by collaborating with Britain & Turkey why wouldn't they do it?
I am not sure I understand what your argument is ? Are you asking why would a a TC (or GC) support and argue that we should not pursue community based agendas as it became clear that British rule was going to end sooner or later to get as much for their community as possible from that change ? If you are then my answer would be because they were wise enough to understand that doing so would only allow foreign interest to use the tactics of 'divide and rule' to secure their interests at the ultimate costs of all Cypriots, which is exactly what happened. And there were such Cypriots, not many but some, who were wise enough to understand this before the fact. And they were persecuted, almost exclusively by elements in their own communities, that were not so wise.
Sotos wrote:Starting from the last, I did not imply that the TCs are any worst than GCs. If the situation was reversed we would do what you did, and you would do what we did.
Glad to hear that and thank you for clarifying it.
Sotos wrote: It is clear that the TCs didn't want just "not enosis" but a lot more which was a result of their greed being fueled by UK and Turkey.
I am not sure this is clear to me. I think most ordinary TC did not want to be worse off post British rule than they were under it. Nor is it a case that under British rule the TC were on average some kind of 'upper class' or 'elite' in Cypriot society. On average in the years leading up to 1960 (and after it) a TC was much more likely to be working in a hotel than own it. On average the TC community per head was poorer than the GC one by a significant margin. Their biggest fear was enosis replacing British rule because they feared that under such a system they would be significantly worse off. This might not have been the reality but it is not hard to understand why this was widely believed by TC at that time. I accept that in the theoretical absence of enosis the TC community would still have had fears that in a unitary state they could also be worse off than under British rule and would still have 'negotiated' for some 'protections' but it is my sincere belief that in such an environment they simply would not have been able to secure the same level of 'advantages' even with the support of Turkey than those they gained under the 60's agreements. The whole structure of the 60's agreements was about creating an 'independent' Cypriot state in which enosis could not implemented by a numerically dominant GC population after independence. For me it is not hard to believe that the primary objective of the average TC post British rule was more about 'not being worse off' than about 'being better off' - even though they did in the end secure very large and significant advantages.
Sotos wrote: In this case the "threat" from Greece was not that "we can protect you but we will not just to punish you because you didn't listen to us", but more like "this is the best we can do for you and if you choose something else we will not be able to help you". Greece simply didn't have the power to disallow anything to UK & Turkey. The most they could do is political support, e.g. if ethnic cleansing happened then Greece could have prevented the result from being internationally recognized. But they didn't have the power to prevent the ethnic cleansing if Turkey and UK decided to do it.
I do I think understand what you are saying and I do not really disagree with it (I think?). My point however is different (I think ?). It is true that leading up to the agreements Greece had supported and promoted the GC cause of enosis, using all the power and influence it had available to it. This at a time when Greece itself still had many large domestic problems and challenges following the devastation of WW2 (far worse in Greece than anything experienced by Cypriots) and the prolonged wars and fighting that continued in Greece after such has ceased everywhere else in Europe. They did work 'hand in hand' with the GC leadership to promote the cause of ending British rule in Cyprus and replacing it with enosis and worked hard, raising the issue over and over in the UN on the GC communities behalf and challenging British interests and rights in Cyprus by all means they had. It was largely as a result of these efforts on the part of Greece that the tri party negotiations that led to the 60's agreements were called. I think it is absolutely the case that Karamanlis was of the opinion that the agreements proposed by the tri party conferences was the 'best that could be realistically achieved' and that Greece had done all that it could as one of the three parties involved in negotiating the deal. He believed it was the best deal possible and when Makarios threatened to refuse to sign it he sought to make Makarios believe that signing it was a 'lesser evil' than not signing it. He threatened to stop supporting the GC community and their cause , as Greece had done so staunchly up until that point, with the specific intent of making Makrios believe that he had 'no choice' but to sign. In that sense to my mind it was undoubtedly a 'threat' in the purest meaning of the word. What is more I think it is highly probable that of all the external pressure being brought to bear on Makarios to sign the agreements, this was the one that may well have had the greatest impact on him. If this threat from Greece had not been made, and understanding that Greece could not oppose Britain and / or Turkey militarily and their ability to block Britain from imposing recognised partition politicaly was limited, I think the chance that Makrios would have not signed was far greater.