THE GOVERNMENT said yesterday it would study in depth the latest declassified documents from the British Foreign Office, which concern US attitudes to Turkey following the invasion.
“What is published does not throw further light on what we already knew about the period referred to,” said Government Spokesman Kypros Chrysostomides.
“However, the government will study in depth these documents and if there is anything of public interest, it will be duly announced. I have no further comments, nor do I wish to enter into the details of what has been published in relation to these documents.”
The documents reveal the role of then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as recorded in a report by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who said the first priority of the US after the 1974 invasion was to keep Turkey happy.
Callaghan said that he had his doubts as to the extent the US would be willing to put pressure on Turkey.
Turkey itself had come to the conclusion that American pressure was just a “paper tiger”, the report said.
Callaghan said it was obvious that Kissinger cared more for the good will of Turkey and in keeping it as a bulwark between the Soviet Union and the Arab states.
He said that after the invasion, Britain had been willing to continue efforts for the normalisation of the situation in Cyprus and that he had sent two envoys to Washington in an attempt to undertake a new conference on Cyprus.
“But Dr Kissinger was unwilling to give the cordial support that I asked,” said Callaghan’s report.
According to Callaghan, in his discussions with the then British ambassador in Washington, on January 9, 1975, Kissibger said Cyprus was a regional case when compared with the role of Turkey, particularly in relation to American-Soviet relations.
The document also reveals that Callaghan himself accepted the statements by the Turkish side that President Makarios had tried to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of basic human rights.
London’s reaction to the declaration of the ‘Turkish Confederate State’ in Cyprus in February 1975 was also tepid, the report showed, while Britain along with France did not hesitate to sell arms to Turkey after the US Congress placed an embargo on such sales.
In addition, Callaghan’s report tried to justify why Britain had not done more to react to the invasion, saying that a conflict with Turkey would have resulted in a conflict with NATO, that British families and tourists in Cyprus would have been in danger, and that Britain only had limited resources on the island at the time.
Surprisingly, the report also reveals that Callaghan had doubts as to the long-term value of the British bases in Cyprus, but that US interest had persuaded them in terms of wider Middle East interests.
It said that although the Greek Cypriots would be glad to see the back of the British bases, they were discouraged from pushing the issue due to economic reasons and the fear that if the British left, Turkey would take over the eastern base at Dhekelia.