Sotos wrote:But things are quite clear cut and universal when it comes to self-determination... and that is why I keep giving you real world examples!
No they are not. That is your 'narrative requirements' talking.
Sotos wrote:A minority that doesn't have its own separate territory can not have a full self-determination.
You are just confusing a right to self determination with a right to a sovereign state. A sovereign state is one
means by which expression of a peoples right to self determination can be expressed but it is NOT the same thing nor does a right to self determination mean a right to a sovereign state. You can not, by definition, have a sovereign state without its own separate territory of sufficient size that it is viable as a nation state but that does not mean that it is impossible for a people to be able to express their right to self determination without its own separate state and territory.
If you came to me at the end of British rule and said we want to unite Cyprus with Greece, but I understand why that is an anathema to you, so let's talk about how you might still be able to express your right to self determination within a wider Greek state that includes Cyprus and the parts of it that you live in, then we can talk. When you come to me and say its simply impossible for you to have any right to self determination as a community within a Greek state at all and you will be made a part of that Greek state regardless , then talk gives way to resistance and struggle.
Sotos wrote:self-determination is impossible because you simply can't have two groups which have separate self-determinations over the exact same territory!!
and yes I have 'cut out' YOUR use of 'full' - for all that means actually is not 'self determination' but 'sovereign state' and that is NOT what we are discussing here. You assertion above is just not true. Or if it is then section 235. of the SA constitution is based on an impossibility according to you.
SA constitution wrote: Self-determination
235. The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in
this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the
notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural
and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way,
determined by national legislation.
This explicitly provides for the possibility for a community within the state of SA to have a separate (or additional if you prefer) right to self determination without those groups having separate territory.
Sotos wrote:I can understand why you didn't want enosis.
Well that is a start I guess, so thanks for that, little as it is.
Can you also understand this (from my previous linked document) ?
While the scope and nature of governing has indeed been a subject of continuing debate, it is the concept of the ‘self’ that does the governing that has been the key problem for any theory attempting to elucidate the notion of self-governance. What is the ‘self’ to which this principle refers? The common and no doubt correct answer that it is the nation that does the governing, raises more questions than it answers. For what constitutes a ‘nation’ has been continuously debated both in theory and in everyday political contexts since the time of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
and this (from my previous linked document)
In the first article in the collection, Robert Ewin finds the defining characteristics of a nation in the ties of mutual affection or sentiment, often defined as ‘loyalty’, that binds its members. This view of the nation as a group bonded together with the ties of sentiment has a long and distinguished ancestry. As early as 1861, in his Considerations on the Representative Government, John Stuart Mill offered a similar view: ‘A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others’.[1] A century later, Brian Barry also referred to ‘a sentiment of common nationality’ and a loyalty to one’s nation as the defining feature of the nation as opposed to other kinds of groups.[2] Similar views of the nation are expressed by thinkers as diverse as Ernest Renan, in his seminal pamphlet What is a Nation? (1882) and Bertrand Russell in his now almost forgotten Political Ideals (1917).
If you can, can you not then understand (from my previous linked document)
the defining characteristics of a nation in the ties of mutual affection or sentiment, often defined as ‘loyalty’, that binds its members. This view of the nation as a group bonded together with the ties of sentiment has a long and distinguished ancestry. As early as 1861, in his Considerations on the Representative Government, John Stuart Mill offered a similar view: ‘A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others’.[1] A century later, Brian Barry also referred to ‘a sentiment of common nationality’ and a loyalty to one’s nation as the defining feature of the nation as opposed to other kinds of groups.[2] Similar views of the nation are expressed by thinkers as diverse as Ernest Renan, in his seminal pamphlet What is a Nation? (1882) and Bertrand Russell in his now almost forgotten Political Ideals (1917).
If you can understand that, can you not then see how in those terms of what is a 'people' and what is a 'nation' , seeking Cypriot Independence vs seeking union with Greece, fundamentally changes if TC and GC are a single 'people' (or nation if you prefer) or two separate ones. How under such definitions it is impossible to say that the desire for enosis was the valid will of a Cypriot people exactly BECAUSE enosis sought to destroy the ONLY thing that could bind and unite TC and GC together with common sympathies, such that we represented the essence of what a people/nation IS.