US State department transcripts of conversations between all parties involved in the negotiations before during and after the invasion in 1974. There's reams of the stuff. Reading between the lines Kissinger pretends to "hang back" rather than put pressure on Turkey to desist but actually reveals his true intentions.
Turkey's true intentions are also revealed in a telegram from the US embassy in Nicosia.
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Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right—grab what they want and then ne- gotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war be- tween the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi……..
Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey— that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm.
(Page 468) Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
Nicosia, August 25, 1974, 1300Z.
2622. Subj: Turkish Intentions on Cyprus.
1. Turkish actions on ground, and statements by officials both here and in Ankara, have reinforced our initial impression that Turkish Army intervened to protect the security of mainland and not assist local com- munity, except insofar as this relates to primary purpose. Best indication this regard is total write off of enclaves located in southern half of island. Despite repeated radio requests for aid, so far as we aware, Turks made no effort reinforce or resupply these areas. Turk mainland Commander in Larnaca, who exfiltrated in civilian dress via Dhekelia, reportedly told British that his instructions were to offer token resistance before surren- dering. Said he had ample ammo and weapons to have continued fight for extended period. (This info, which contradicts accounts put out by Turk Cypriot leaders, largely confirmed by UNFICYP observation.)
2. Thus, while Turks had force to occupy entire island, and di- vide it up as they wished, they carefully limited operation to grabbing. sufficient territory to insure that they would be in predominant posi- tion to dictate future status of an independent Cyprus. As we read their intentions, Turkey wants a federal (confederal) state and has little or no interest in creation of an independent Turk Cypriot mini-state or move towards double enosis.
3. Either of latter two courses would run contrary to basic reason for intervention since, by implication, they would open the door to in- troduction of substantial Greek mainland forces onto island. This would place Turkey in position of having southern ports (and heart- land cities) again endangered or of going to war to take entire island, destroying island’s quasi-independence, and facing prospect of pro- tracted guerilla struggle.
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/or ... /96606.pdf