The general secretary of the newly formed Gezi Party is neo-classical metal guitarist, Reşit Cem Köksal (below).
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/gezi ... or-1157176
Turkey’s domestic development has also suffered setbacks. After a decade of significant economic growth and considerable democratization, Turkey’s reforms, European integration efforts, and economy have slowed considerably. At the same time, the unpopular Syrian war, the AKP’s expanding Islamist political agenda, and Erdoğan’s personalist and authoritarian ruling style are deeply polarizing the country. Successive AKP electoral victories, Erdoğan’s personal involvement at all levels of policymaking, and his proud, but mercurial, personality have led him to believe he has a mandate to remake Turkey, regardless of strong opposition to his views. From his decisions about urban design to his pronouncements about how Turks should conduct their lives, the Islamic orientation of his political vision has also become more apparent. The government has increasingly sought to muzzle any disagreement with its policies by reining in press freedom—by bringing criminal and civil cases against journalists, harassing media outlets with raids on their offices, charging fines, and friendly hands taking over or temporarily closing newspapers. Turkey is now ranked 154th out of 179 countries on the World Press Freedom Index, six spots behind Russia.
Such politically motivated harassment, arrests, and convictions have not been limited to the media, however. The AKP has conducted several large-scale criminal trials for coup plotting—known as “Sledgehammer” and “Ergenekon”—targeting primarily the military, in an effort to diminish its political power in Turkish society and its frequent propensity to intervene in politics, including as recently as 1997. They have led to the arrest, detention, prosecution, and imprisonment of hundreds of high-ranking military officials and AKP critics. Not all were innocent; the senior military hated the AKP. But the trials have raised concerns about due process, civil rights, and judicial neutrality.
Erdoğan’s style of rule—viewed by many Turks as an authoritarian swerve from the democratic reforms that marked AKP’s first years in power—sowed the seeds of dissent. In May 2013, those seeds blossomed in Gezi Park. Protests initially sparked by the government’s planned razing of this rare green space in Istanbul soon spilled into the adjacent Taksim Square and spread to many parts of the country.
But rather than calm tensions, Erdoğan chose to solidify his base and rally his very sizeable group of core supporters. His combative rhetoric cast the unrest in sectarian terms and himself as the bulwark protecting observant Sunnis from their enemies. Officials have blamed seemingly every ethnic and religious minority within Turkey for having a hand in the protests. Such narratives have only further polarized Turkish society, not simply between secular and religious, but between the conservative Sunnis whose interests the AKP government protects and all other segments of Turkish society who feel their rights are being trampled. Further social tension has been created by the Turkish government’s aggressively pro-Sunni policy in Syria, as Erdoğan has at times accused Turkey’s Alevis of supporting Assad due to “sectarian solidarity” with Syrian Alawites, misleadingly equating the two sects.
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