The best early reaction
Joseph Cotterill of FT Alphaville has written the best detailed analysis of the Cyprus deal: Scratch one stupid idea [Updated]:
Here are the key points (head over to AV for the full read (then come back!))
1) In case you didn’t get the memo the first time, this still isn’t about spanking money-launderers. (because there's no differentiation between foreign and domestic customers with over €100k)
2) It’s a depositor bail-in — for two specific banks, one of which is in full resolution. (rather than forcing all customers at all banks to contribute, as in the first - hated - bailout plan)
3) It’s also a senior bank bond bail-in. (Holders of Laiki’s senior unsecured debt look fully wiped out - those at Bank of Cyprus will take a brisk haircut)
4) Emergency Liquidity Assistance. -- Was this the week we found out that ELA will be protected from default no matter what? (under the deal, the assistance supplied by the European Central Bank to Laiki is now transferred to Bank of Cyprus)
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And over at Reuters, Felix Salmon points out that the winding-down of Laiki is a rather big deal for a rather small country:
The resolution of Laiki is going to give the world a very real example of what happens when a too-big-to-fail bank is allowed to fail.
Laiki is small by global standards, but very large by comparison with Cyprus’s GDP. If Cyprus can survive Laiki’s collapse, then maybe — just maybe — the world could cope with the “resolution” of a big bank like Citigroup. But that’s a very big “if”.
More likely, the costs to Cyprus of allowing Laiki to fail will be enormous, both politically and economically. And 800,000 Cypriots will for years to come be paying the price of what Mohamed El-Erian elegantly calls “bailout fatigue”.