Cyprus-Forum.com

[supporttheunderdog]

In my view Big Mak made a big mistake in 1955 when he turned down Hardings' offer of internal self rule....

1956 April ...just one year after the commencement of the EOKA struggle.

And in order to complete the picture I will mention again his second major mistake which you brought up under another thread a few months ago:

When the Americans started undertaking the initiative on the Cyprus problem after the bombings of 1964 (Atzesson Plan etc). Makarios, being by that time fully dependent on the votes and the support of AKEL, missed the chance to offer to the Americans a military base (similar to the ones in Crete) so as to secure NATO interests on the island and eliminate their fears of Soviet control on it.

Thanks for correcting me on the date of the discussion with Harding.

I would say that was possibly the the third mistake - the second possible mistake was in the period after the 1959 agreements up to the 1963/4 crises (if not up to 1967/8) in still thinking that Enosis was a viable option. It is possible that if genuine efforts had been made to make independance work, despite the buggeration factor of the complex and racist mechanisms, tnat the Crises of 1963 that lead to the partioning of the island could have been avoided. It was only a possiblity and potentially a small one at that because that would also require the Turkish Speaking Cypriots to work in good faith to make independance a sucess and I am not at all convinced that TSC were so willing and I am absolutely certain that Turkey iteslf was deliberately working to sabotage the agreements with the aim of effective control over at least a part of the island.

Otherwise I agree with you not making friends with America(but joining the non-aligned movement) was a bad idea. not that I am fan of the US or its foreign policy, which is nearly always motivated by American Self interest rathar than altrusim, and which supported Pinochet, Noriega, Saddam Insane, Bin laden and the tTaliban in Afghanistan....

[Piratis]

In my view Big Mak made a big mistake in 1955 when he turned down Hardings' offer of internal self rule. It was not what he wanted but if he had accept it I think we could have had a very different position in Cyprus today.

Maybe. But only if we take as a given that the British were Imperialistic assholes. Otherwise what would be better for Cyprus would be for the British to respect the self-determination rights of the Cypriot people from 1955 or even earlier.

If there had been any objections from eg the TSC this would have placed the objectors in the wrong.

That is not to say Turkey would not have objected and tried to interfere but he could have called on British support against foreign interference by Eg Turkey, and made the Turkish Speaking Cypriots in to the bad boys if they tried to disturb the political system with demands for separate structures based on language.

So who is "in the wrong" and a "bad boy" are only those who go against what the British support? Maybe that is how you see it, since you are British.

From the point of view of the native Cypriot people, who are in the wrong are those who imposed their rule on our island against our will and those who collaborated with them.

[Viewpoint]

The problem was the scum bags who wanted to give away Cyprus to Greece which meant a death sentence for some and the main reason why people fought fought back with evert means available to them. So in reality you are one of those scum bags.

[Get Real!]

Big Mak's Big Mistake

Please don't call him that. I get hungry just looking at it!

[Piratis]

The problem was the scum bags who wanted to give away Cyprus to Greece which meant a death sentence for some and the main reason why people fought fought back with evert means available to them. So in reality you are one of those scum bags.

The scumbags are the foreign invaders such as yourself. You are the ones who committed genocides and ethnic cleansing against the Cypriot people, and this is a historical fact, unlike the imaginary stories about "death tenses" that you create in your attempt to excuse your criminal actions.

Cyprus belongs to the Cypriot people, not to any foreign invaders and their settlers. The Cypriot people have every right to democratically decide where their island should belong. Those who do not respect the democratic rights of the Cypriot people are the ones that are responsible for the problems in Cyprus.

[kimon07]

.........I would say that was possibly the the third mistake - the second possible mistake was in the period after the 1959 agreements up to the 1963/4 crises (if not up to 1967/8) in still thinking that Enosis was a viable option. ...

1. Makarios gave up enosis shortly after he became President (if not while at the Seychelles). His rhetoric about enosis after that was empty and he used it just to maintain the support of the enosis supporters. He gave it up completely when he got in the unholy alliance with AKEL.
2. The 1963 crisis was just the second stage of the Turko-British Plan for partition, which was set in motion after April 1956 (and it is still developing) (see the “Bloody Truth about Cyprus” under the relevant thread where many references ).Therefore, nothing could have reversed the developments. Even the 13 constitutional amendments where nothing but a trap set by Britain to trigger the events.
3. If Makarios was supporting enosis he would not have sided up with all the then puppets of the Soviets such as Egypt and Libya etc, nor with AKEL, which made the Americans regard him as “Fidel Castro of the Mediterranean”.
4. If Makarios was supporting enosis in 1967, he would not have allowed the Greek Army Division to be withdrawn from Cyprus (like the Turks and AKEL insisted).
5. If Makarios was supporting enosis he would have suggested something very simple and attractive to the Americans.
A military base and American guarantees for the
safety of the Turkish Cypriots.

[kimon07]

In my view Big Mak made a big mistake in 1955 when he turned down Hardings' offer of internal self rule. It was not what he wanted but if he had accept it I think we could have had a very different position in Cyprus today.

Acceptance of the plan had the following potential benefits - He could have put in place a one-man-one vote political system which would have avoided the cumbersome arrangements later imposed in 1960 and the obvious obvious problems they caused.The need for the first evil A plan, the Acritas plan and all that flowed from it in 1964 could have been avoided........

All right.

Time to contradict the Turkish propaganda, which keps being reproduced, about the “Akritas Plan”.

The Akritas plan was a plan aiming the defence of the RoC against the expected Turkish insurgency, taking into consideration that the Turks were being armed and prepared for it since at least 1959, if not since April 1956, (with the assistance of the British) and they continued preparing till they staged it in 1963. By that time they had a whole army of 10,000 well trained and well armed and ecquiped militants, against whom the RoC was using mainly ….hunting shotguns and about 700 old wepons which had been handed over by EOKA when it was disarmed.

Follows the published text of the plan, analysis of it, evidences and testimonies, as included in the “Bloody Truth about Cyprus”, (page 297 further):

http://cyprusactionnetwork.org/yahoo_si ... 130049.pdf

C5: 1961-1963 – “AKRITAS Organization”

Due to the particular importance of this subject, as “the
major argument of the Turkish propaganda”, all the facts
are presented as they appear on the original evidence that
document them, naming only the sources that are already
public………..

The full text of the document was published in 1983
under the title ‘Document of Akritas [P. Georkadjis]
regarding the Objectives of the Greek Cypriot Side
and the Prospects as They Appeared toward the End
of 1963’.125 The following is a summary of the text:

Objectives

National struggles pass through various stages of
development and time limits, for their achievement
cannot be fixed. The final objective, the exercise of
the right of self-determination of the people, remains
unalterable. The strategy must be examined.
International Tactics
The first step is to convince international public opinion
that the Cyprus Question has not really been solved,
and that the solution requires revision. Among the
arguments in support of this is that revision of the
agreements, which are unsatisfactory and unfair, is a
question of survival and not an attempt on the part of
the Greeks to repudiate their signature. Furthermore,
coexistence of the two communities is possible.
After the first step has been achieved to a satisfactory
degree, the second would be to demonstrate that the
aim of the Greeks is to remove unreasonable and
unfair provisions, and not to oppress the Turks. This
must be done today as tomorrow will be too late.
[size=50]124. Necati M. Ertekun “The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus”, Nicosia 1984, p. 165.
125. Papageorghiou “Crucial Documents”, p. 250-257.

Since concerted action with the Turks is impossible
due to their unreasonable attitude, unilateral action is
justified. Revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots,
not giving anyone the right of intervention by force or
otherwise. The proposed amendments are reasonable
and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the
minority.
To secure their right of self-determination, the Greek
Cypriots must free themselves of those provisions of
the Constitution and the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance, which prevent the unfettered expression
of the will of the people and which hold dangers of
external intervention.
To implement the above, the following actions are
necessary:
Amendment of the negative elements of the agreements
and parallel lapse of the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance which would render legally and substantively
inapplicable the right of intervention under the Treaty
of Guarantee. Once relieved of the restrictions under
the agreements, the people will be free to express and
implement their desire. Lawful response to any internal
or external intervention would be by the forces of the
state (police or even friendly military forces).

Internal Front

Activities in the internal field must be considered
in the light of the manner in which they would be
interpreted internationally and of their repercussions
on the national cause.
The only danger, which could be described as
insurmountable, is the possibility of external intervention
310 BLOODY TRUTH
by force, mainly because of the possible political
consequences. If intervention occurs before the Greek
Cypriots free themselves of the restrictions under the
agreements, then the legality of such intervention
would be debatable and even possibly justifiable.
The lesson that history teaches is that in not one
single case of intervention, whether legally justified or
not, has either the United Nations or any other power
succeeded in evicting the invader without serious
concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the
case of the Israeli attack in October 1956 on Suez,
which was almost universally condemned, although
Israel withdrew, it kept as a concession the port of
Eilat. Much graver dangers exist for Cyprus.
In order to avoid intervention, the first objective
must be careful selection of the amendments to be
proposed; if they are reasonable and justifiable, this
would ensure international support needed at the
stage of consultations among the guarantor powers,
Britain, Greece and Turkey, which, under the Treaty
of Guarantee, must take place before intervention.

Tactics
Reasonable constitutional amendments after efforts for
common agreement with the Turks have bee exhausted.
In order that intervention might be justified, a more
serious reason must exist than simple constitutional
amendment, such as the immediate declaration of
enosis or serious intercommunal conflict which would
be presented as a massacre of the Turks.
Since the Greek Cypriots do not intend to attack or
kill Turks, there is the possibility that as soon as the
Greek Cypriots proceed to the unilateral amendment
of any article of the Constitution, the Turks will react
spontaneously, creating incidents and clashes, or
intentionally stage attacks on and killings of Turks in
order to create the impression that the Greeks have
indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention
would be necessary for their protection.
Action for constitutional amendment will be in the
open, the Greek Cypriots always showing themselves
ready for peaceful negotiations. Activities will not be
provocative or violent in any way. Should incidents occur,
they will be dealt with lawfully by the lawful security
forces. All actions will be of a lawful nature.
Because, however, it would be naive to believe that
it would be possible to proceed to substantive acts
of amendment of the Constitution without the Turks
attempting to create or to stage violent clashes,
the existence and strengthening of the [AKRITAS]
Organization is an imperative necessity. The reasons
given are:
The counterattacks to any Turkish reaction must be
immediate, so as to prevent panic among the Greeks
risking the loss of substantial vital areas; suppression
of a planned or staged Turkish attack in the shortest
possible time giving the Greek Cypriots command of
the situation in one or two days, would ensure that
no outside intervention would be possible, probable
or justified; dynamic and effective response to the
Turks would facilitate subsequent action for further
amendments, because the Turks would know that any
reaction on their part would be either impossible or
seriously damaging to their community. In the event
of more generalized conflict, all stages, including the
immediate declaration of enosis, would be proceeded
312 BLOODY TRUTH
with, because then there would be no reason to wait
or to engage in diplomatic activity.
The task becomes even more difficult because, of
necessity and depending on the prevailing circumstances,
even constitutional amendments must be made in
stages. Despite this, irresponsible demagogy, street
politics, or a race as to ‘who bids higher in the stakes
of nationalism’ must be avoided. ‘Our acts must be
our most truthful defenders’. Exemplary self-restraint
and sangfroid must be shown.
The rest of the document is devoted to the need
for enlightenment, unity and discipline, secrecy and
procedures.

Evaluation: p 309 further.

Who Prepared the Document: p. 312 further.

Exploitation of the Document by the Turks: p. 313

Conclusion: p. 313.

Authentic Evidence: p.314 further.

[MR-from-NG]

In my view Big Mak made a big mistake in 1955 when he turned down Hardings' offer of internal self rule. It was not what he wanted but if he had accept it I think we could have had a very different position in Cyprus today.

Acceptance of the plan had the following potential benefits - He could have put in place a one-man-one vote political system which would have avoided the cumbersome arrangements later imposed in 1960 and the obvious obvious problems they caused.The need for the first evil A plan, the Acritas plan and all that flowed from it in 1964 could have been avoided........

All right.

Time to contradict the Turkish propaganda, which keps being reproduced, about the “Akritas Plan”.

The Akritas plan was a plan aiming the defence of the RoC against the expected Turkish insurgency, taking into consideration that the Turks were being armed and prepared for it since at least 1959, if not since April 1956, (with the assistance of the British) and they continued preparing till they staged it in 1963. By that time they had a whole army of 10,000 well trained and well armed and ecquiped militants, against whom the RoC was using mainly ….hunting shotguns and about 700 old wepons which had been handed over by EOKA when it was disarmed.

Follows the published text of the plan, analysis of it, evidences and testimonies, as included in the “Bloody Truth about Cyprus”, (page 297 further):

http://cyprusactionnetwork.org/yahoo_si ... 130049.pdf

C5: 1961-1963 – “AKRITAS Organization”

Due to the particular importance of this subject, as “the
major argument of the Turkish propaganda”, all the facts
are presented as they appear on the original evidence that
document them, naming only the sources that are already
public………..

The full text of the document was published in 1983
under the title ‘Document of Akritas [P. Georkadjis]
regarding the Objectives of the Greek Cypriot Side
and the Prospects as They Appeared toward the End
of 1963’.125 The following is a summary of the text:

Objectives

National struggles pass through various stages of
development and time limits, for their achievement
cannot be fixed. The final objective, the exercise of
the right of self-determination of the people, remains
unalterable. The strategy must be examined.
International Tactics
The first step is to convince international public opinion
that the Cyprus Question has not really been solved,
and that the solution requires revision. Among the
arguments in support of this is that revision of the
agreements, which are unsatisfactory and unfair, is a
question of survival and not an attempt on the part of
the Greeks to repudiate their signature. Furthermore,
coexistence of the two communities is possible.
After the first step has been achieved to a satisfactory
degree, the second would be to demonstrate that the
aim of the Greeks is to remove unreasonable and
unfair provisions, and not to oppress the Turks. This
must be done today as tomorrow will be too late.
[size=50]124. Necati M. Ertekun “The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus”, Nicosia 1984, p. 165.
125. Papageorghiou “Crucial Documents”, p. 250-257.

Since concerted action with the Turks is impossible
due to their unreasonable attitude, unilateral action is
justified. Revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots,
not giving anyone the right of intervention by force or
otherwise. The proposed amendments are reasonable
and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the
minority.
To secure their right of self-determination, the Greek
Cypriots must free themselves of those provisions of
the Constitution and the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance, which prevent the unfettered expression
of the will of the people and which hold dangers of
external intervention.
To implement the above, the following actions are
necessary:
Amendment of the negative elements of the agreements
and parallel lapse of the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance which would render legally and substantively
inapplicable the right of intervention under the Treaty
of Guarantee. Once relieved of the restrictions under
the agreements, the people will be free to express and
implement their desire. Lawful response to any internal
or external intervention would be by the forces of the
state (police or even friendly military forces).

Internal Front

Activities in the internal field must be considered
in the light of the manner in which they would be
interpreted internationally and of their repercussions
on the national cause.
The only danger, which could be described as
insurmountable, is the possibility of external intervention
310 BLOODY TRUTH
by force, mainly because of the possible political
consequences. If intervention occurs before the Greek
Cypriots free themselves of the restrictions under the
agreements, then the legality of such intervention
would be debatable and even possibly justifiable.
The lesson that history teaches is that in not one
single case of intervention, whether legally justified or
not, has either the United Nations or any other power
succeeded in evicting the invader without serious
concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the
case of the Israeli attack in October 1956 on Suez,
which was almost universally condemned, although
Israel withdrew, it kept as a concession the port of
Eilat. Much graver dangers exist for Cyprus.
In order to avoid intervention, the first objective
must be careful selection of the amendments to be
proposed; if they are reasonable and justifiable, this
would ensure international support needed at the
stage of consultations among the guarantor powers,
Britain, Greece and Turkey, which, under the Treaty
of Guarantee, must take place before intervention.

Tactics
Reasonable constitutional amendments after efforts for
common agreement with the Turks have bee exhausted.
In order that intervention might be justified, a more
serious reason must exist than simple constitutional
amendment, such as the immediate declaration of
enosis or serious intercommunal conflict which would
be presented as a massacre of the Turks.
Since the Greek Cypriots do not intend to attack or
kill Turks, there is the possibility that as soon as the
Greek Cypriots proceed to the unilateral amendment
of any article of the Constitution, the Turks will react
spontaneously, creating incidents and clashes, or
intentionally stage attacks on and killings of Turks in
order to create the impression that the Greeks have
indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention
would be necessary for their protection.
Action for constitutional amendment will be in the
open, the Greek Cypriots always showing themselves
ready for peaceful negotiations. Activities will not be
provocative or violent in any way. Should incidents occur,
they will be dealt with lawfully by the lawful security
forces. All actions will be of a lawful nature.
Because, however, it would be naive to believe that
it would be possible to proceed to substantive acts
of amendment of the Constitution without the Turks
attempting to create or to stage violent clashes,
the existence and strengthening of the [AKRITAS]
Organization is an imperative necessity. The reasons
given are:
The counterattacks to any Turkish reaction must be
immediate, so as to prevent panic among the Greeks
risking the loss of substantial vital areas; suppression
of a planned or staged Turkish attack in the shortest
possible time giving the Greek Cypriots command of
the situation in one or two days, would ensure that
no outside intervention would be possible, probable
or justified; dynamic and effective response to the
Turks would facilitate subsequent action for further
amendments, because the Turks would know that any
reaction on their part would be either impossible or
seriously damaging to their community. In the event
of more generalized conflict, all stages, including the
immediate declaration of enosis, would be proceeded
312 BLOODY TRUTH
with, because then there would be no reason to wait
or to engage in diplomatic activity.
The task becomes even more difficult because, of
necessity and depending on the prevailing circumstances,
even constitutional amendments must be made in
stages. Despite this, irresponsible demagogy, street
politics, or a race as to ‘who bids higher in the stakes
of nationalism’ must be avoided. ‘Our acts must be
our most truthful defenders’. Exemplary self-restraint
and sangfroid must be shown.
The rest of the document is devoted to the need
for enlightenment, unity and discipline, secrecy and
procedures.

Evaluation: p 309 further.

Who Prepared the Document: p. 312 further.

Exploitation of the Document by the Turks: p. 313

Conclusion: p. 313.

Authentic Evidence: p.314 further.

Greeks in general. They are a nation of liars: brilliant liars, spectacular liars, breathtaking liars.

[Viewpoint]

The problem was the scum bags who wanted to give away Cyprus to Greece which meant a death sentence for some and the main reason why people fought fought back with evert means available to them. So in reality you are one of those scum bags.

The scumbags are the foreign invaders such as yourself. You are the ones who committed genocides and ethnic cleansing against the Cypriot people, and this is a historical fact, unlike the imaginary stories about "death tenses" that you create in your attempt to excuse your criminal actions.

Cyprus belongs to the Cypriot people, not to any foreign invaders and their settlers. The Cypriot people have every right to democratically decide where their island should belong. Those who do not respect the democratic rights of the Cypriot people are the ones that are responsible for the problems in Cyprus.

You are the one who wanted to give my country to another country against my will...we fought for survival. You are clearly the scum bag for wanting to turn Cyprus into Greece. Now the shoe is on the other foot and the North is turning into Turkey you cry like a baby.

[Sotos]

Cyprus is not your country. You are a foreign Turkish Settler. Cyprus is a Greek island and your kind was brought to MY island by the Turkish invaders... just like you invaded our Greek mainland and the other Greek islands. We are the ones who fight for freedom and survival from you Mongoloid invaders. If you had stayed in your own homeland instead of invading and trying to take ours then there would be no Turks in Cyprus and no problems.