Cyprus-Forum.com

[Panicos UK]

A ray of hope appeared in 1968 when U Thant, the UN Secretary General proposed that inter-communal talks should commence in order to resolve the Cyprus dispute. Osorio Tafall headed the negotiations, and Glafcos Clerides in his capacity as President of the House of Representatives represented the Greek Cypriots. Rauf Denktash in his capacity as President of the Turkish Communal Chamber represented the Turkish Cypriots. During the first phase of the talks which lasted from the 24th June until the 28th August, the Turkish Cypriots made considerable concessions in that they were prepared to accept broad amendments to the Cyprus Constitution. They agreed; to reduce Turkish Cypriot representation in the House of Representatives from 30% to 20%, to abolish the veto powers of the Vice-President, to abolish the need to acquire separate majorities to enact legislation, and to unify the lower courts. The Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make these concessions on condition that they received some local autonomy to administer their own affairs, and that Greek and Turkish villages were grouped together for the purposes of local administration. Makarios however was not content with the concessions and was adamant that Greek and Turkish villages should not be grouped together. On the 8th December 1972, the last round of inter-communal talks was held. On the 12th December, Clerides had a meeting with Makarios. The uncompromising attitude of Makarios persisted despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted all the 13 points proposed by him in 1963, and even went beyond them. Makarios would not yield on the issue of local government despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots had; abandoned their demand to group Greek and Turkish villages together, accepted that only the House of Representatives would enact legislation on local government matters, and accepted that administrative control would be exercised on behalf of the Government by a Civil Servant. Clerides strongly advised Makarios to accept the Turkish Cypriot proposals but Makarios would not be persuaded. According to Clerides, the decision of Makarios of 12th December 1972 not to compromise, after the concessions that the Turkish side had made, sealed his fate and that of Cyprus. The die was cast and the worst followed.

Tofallis. K. Dr, A History of Cyprus – An Illustrated History (The Greek Institute, 2002) P. 233

[Bananiot]

Lordo is correct about the Denkash-Klerides agreement, but it was in 1972 not 1973. Mysteriously (for some) Makarios rejected them. Also, it is worth remembering that Turkey, as early as 1964, sent a note to the TC leadership asking them to return to the RoC. Kucuk replied "we'd rather all emigrate than go back". It is very easy to blame Turkey for all our misfortunes but if we want to be honest we must also look at our stupid decisions too. Truth an only the truth can save us, if there is still a chance.

[boulio]

so instead of one large "trnc"in the north there would be multiple litte enclaves all all around the island

[Bananiot]

Come again? Do you ever think before you say something?

[boulio]

i do,do you bananiot?basically it was legalization of the enlcaves yes or no?in these agreements were there any provisions that diminished the turkish intervention rights?so basically you would have enclaves all over the island that if a conlict started in turkey can and would intervene.

kratoi en kratos

[Lordo]

Turkey had been ready to invade in 64 and 68. In 1973 they probably could not justify an invasion but that they were so able to invade in July 74 just a few days after the Coup shows the true state of affairs.

My own understanding is that a lot of the suffering of the isolated villages after 1968 was caused by the TMT who banned the TSC from contact with the GSC and imposed penalties ony one who disobeyed them.

Your understanding could not be further from the truth. We really must stop pretending that it is somebody else.

After 1968, whilst we were able to survive and life as normal as it could be in the enclaves, it was not TMT stopping people going back to their homes. They were destroyed by EOKA earlier. It was fear of EOKA which stopped people going back to their homes. Whilst I agree with you any trade between the communities were controlled in the cities, there was no such problem in the villages. We traded witrh GCs in other villages no problem. We did not boast about it but there was nothing TMT could do about it.

[boulio]

eoka a or b big difference

[Panicos UK]

Surely the result of the 1972 agreement would have been the re-integration of the Turkish Cypriots with the rest of Cyprus? i.e the enclaves would have slowly bbroken up and people would have gone back to their villages. Obviously it takes time to heal old wounds, but the process would have been started.

[boulio]

here is what makarios thought :

The Junta Speaks, and Makarios Responds, to the Denktash Positions, June 1971

The Greek government, and especially the junta, were hardly a constructive force in the Cyprus imbroglio, but in viewing Denktash’s letter of April 1971, Athens urged Makarios to declare victory and withdraw - - i.e., Denktash and the Turkish Cypriots (and, by implication, Turkey itself) had accepted key pieces of the Greek Cypriot position and that Makarios should be able to live with the Turkish Cypriot insistence on local self-government. Here is commentary on Clerides' thinking at the time, sandwiched around Makarios’ response to the Greek colonels and, in effect, to Denktash. Then Clerides' official letter to Denktash follows.


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Clerides, in his memoirs, acknowledges that “a major mistake was committed by Makarios” and the Government in not accepting the advice the letter contained.

The letter correctly stated, Clerides admits, that Denktash had accepted all the "13 points” forwarded by Makarios in 1963, and in the bargain the Greek Cypriots were to give was local government in a separate, communal structure. The Turkish negotiators were willing to live with Greek Cypriot proposals with respect to the powers and functions of municipal governance, and hence, Clerides writes, “we were wrong to refuse the Turkish proposal,” which would provide that local authorities would be placed jointly under supervision of the president and the vice president of the state.

“Generally speaking.” Clerides continues, “all the advice given in the Greek Note was sound.” It maintained the concept of a unitary state and did not introduce federalism. It would have dealt with all the constitutional issues that provoked Makarios’ 13 Points in 1963. “The inexperienced Greek Cypriot leadership,” Clerides says, “not only rejected . . . the more mature advice of the ‘mother,’ but also accused her of having conspired with Turkey, behind the ‘daughter's’ back, to sell her down the river.”

The letter from Makarios

Nicosia, 24th June 1971.

Dear Mr. President,

I forward, attached to this letter, the letter of Mr. Glafkos Clerides, as approved by the Council of Ministers, which replies to the letter of Mr. Denktash of 27th April 1971.

The tone and the content of the reply of Mr. Clerides leaves the door open for the continuation of the talks, as recommended by the Greek Government and in accordance with our own intentions. I am of the opinion that the reply to Mr. Denktash does not offer to the Turkish Cypriots a pretext to interrupt the dialogue, except of course, if its interruption has in any case been decided. In drafting the reply we had in mind the views and recommendations the Greek Government forwarded to us in the Note of 9th June 1971, as well as the letter addressed to me by your Excellency, dated 18th June 1971, which was brought by Ambassador Angelas Horafas.

I regret, because, due to differences of opinion on certain views of the Greek Government, the reply to Mr. Denktash has not been drafted in accordance with such views.

As your Excellency recollects, I held the view originally that we should not accept any discussion on the issue raised by the Turkish side on local government, because even the mere acceptance of discussion would create an issue, which is not even foreseen in the provisions of the 1960 constitution. We accepted, however, to discuss the issue because of the insistent advice of the Greek Government, in order to demonstrate a spirit of good will towards the Turkish Cypriots. it was agreed with the Greek Government that it would be possible, without risk to grant local government of the first degree having as basis the village level. Subsequently, in the course of the negotiations, we accepted local government of the second degree having as a basis groups of villages. Despite our original objections we accepted that the grouping of villages or the areas would be defined on the basis of racial criteria. Emphatically, however, it was stressed, both by the Greek and Greek Cypriot side that in no case ought the Turkish proposal regarding the creation of a central local government authority be accepted. I consider that it would constitute a serious change of position from the above if we were to accept, as recommended by the Greek Government, a Turkish Minister or Deputy Minister, who would have competence on matters of local government. In fact we would have accepted the central local government authority in the person of the Minister or the Deputy Minister.

In your letter addressed to me you express the view that the presence in the Council of Ministers of a Turkish Minister with competence on matters of local government in its entirety, not only does not weaken, but on the contrary underlines the unity of the state. I disagree with this view. The fixing of areas of local government on racial criteria breaks the unity of the state at its base, and this separatism continues upwards by appointing a Turkish Minister. The fact has to be taken under consideration that he would exercise power and supervision on already separated first and second degree level authorities of local government. He would both in form and in substance constitute the central local government authority. Placing, on the other hand, the matters of local government of the Greek Cypriots under a Turkish Minister, for the sake of apparent unity, I consider nationally unacceptable.

I could speak more extensively on this point, but I do not consider it necessary to expand on it. In view of the above it is not necessary to refer to the Turkish demand regarding separate Turkish local police. The Greek Government believes that with the sole exchange of satisfying, to a certain extent the Turkish Cypriots on the subject of local government the present enclaves would be dissolved, the Turkish Cypriots would accept practically all the "13 points" of my old proposals, and this would constitute an important gain.

But, by accepting local government, as proposed, the enclaves, are not dissolved. On the contrary, they are made permanent and are legitimised. It is true that most of the 13 points of my old proposals, which were formulated under different circumstances, are accepted. The exchange which is demanded, in any event is too large and its acceptance would present the Zurich and London Agreements as a better situation, despite the fact that we do not desire a return to them.

I have referred particularly to the subject of local government because this constitutes the greatest obstacle in the talks. On other points of disagreement the reply to Mr. Denktash speaks with argumentation and I do not consider it necessary to make reference to them in this letter. The line, which we have drawn, in common both on the constitution and the international aspect of the Cyprus problem and their interconnection, is the most appropriate. I believe that deviation from this line will lead to a solution which would be nationally harmful.

In your letter, Mr. President, you reject the circulating rumours, which allege that your proposals of the Greek Government have been accepted in advance by Turkey and that in close understanding with Turkey you plan a conspiracy against me. I wish to assure you that I have never wanted to be part of such rumours.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I refer to the last paragraph of your letter, which states that if the proposals of the Greek Government are not accepted the Greek Government would find itself faced by "hard necessity to take those measures, which national interest and the best interests of the Cypriot Hellenism demand, irrespective how bitter they might be".

The content of this paragraph creates the impression of a threat, though I find it difficult to accept this interpretation or impression as accurate. If, however, the said paragraph really constitutes a threat, I regret to say that an unacceptable situation is created, which as the person on whom Cypriot Hellenism has placed its trust, I cannot ignore. It would, consequently, be desirable that the necessary clarifications should be given, in order to be able to continue our harmonious co-operation for the benefit of the common national cause.

With heart-felt wishes,

Makarios


Clerides responds to Makarios.

Makarios asked for Clerides’ views before sending a letter drafted to respond to Denktash. Here is a summary of the points he made:

(1) Clerides argued that local self-government was a legitimate subject of negotiation in spite of its absence in the London-Zurich agreements. “Denktash from the first meeting in Beirut offered to make concessions regarding the executive, the legislative, the judiciary, the civil service and the police, on condition that we would accept autonomy in local government.” This was a principal, possibly the principal, position of the Turkish Cypriots; to ignore this would have been tantamount to negotiating in bad faith.

(2) Clerides also rejected the notion that the integrity of a unitary state was challenged by having a Greek Minister and Turkish Deputy Minister overseeing local government authorities. The notion that a central authority of Turkish local self-government was being created also was rejected by Clerides. Such authority would be at the direction of the constitutionally supreme Council of Ministers, and leislating power would remain in the hands of the House of Representatives.

(3) Accepting areas of local self-government on communal basis was, in the thinking of some, tantamount to legalizing the Turkish enclaves. Clerides rejected this, saying it “demonstrated how limited was our political thinking and what a narrow concept we had regarding the realities of everyday life.”

Makarios responded to Clerides by saying: "your views legally may be right, but the problem is not legal, but political. If our objective is to reduce the excessive rights which the Zurich Agreements gave to the Turkish Cypriots and make the Constitution workable, we should not add other rights in the place of those we subtracted and thus create again an unworkable Constitution." The letter below was then sent without any revisions.

[Pyrpolizer]

Nothing in the UN Resolution on the day of the invasion justifies the invasion. It was an illegal foreign invasion. Nothing less. No valid excuse!

RESOLUTION 353 (1974)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1771st meeting,
on 20 July 1974



The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, at its 1779th meeting, about the recent developments in Cyprus,

Having heard the statement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements of the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other Member States,

Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and the continuing bloodshed,

Gravely concerned about the situation which has led to a serious threat to international peace and security, and which has created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,

Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreements,

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

2.Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3.Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;

4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;

5. Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government of Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

6. Calls upon all parties to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus to enable it to carry out its mandate;

7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1781st meeting.

Excuse me, but wasn't this the resolution the UN adopted after our Hero Leader MakaRios spoke at the UN actually begging Turkey to "intervene" to give him his throne back? When it says foreign troops doesn't it mean the Greek Coupists in there?