Lordo wrote:Talking of 1974, what exactly was Sampson planning with his Aphrodite 1 and 2 plans? Was it a Tea Party? I hope it included Turkish Coffee, Dengtash liked it sketto.
Quit your propaganda.
Aphrodite 1 and Aphrodite 2 were plans for the defense of Cyprus against a turkish invasion.
According to Aphrodite 1 the Nat. Guard would deal with the militants of the enclaves while the Greek Division would be used for the defense on the beaches and for the counter offensive against the beach head.
When the Greek division was withdrawn in 1967 by the Greek junta, the plan was amended to Aphrodite 2 according to which both legs of the defense would be undertaken by the National Guard, while the counter offensive would be spear headed by the Greek contingent (ELDYK) aided by other Nat. guard units (armored battalions commando battalions etc). Unfortunately, due to the messy situation that followed the coup against Makarios, Aphrodite 2 was not implemented.
Aphrodite Two Defense Plan and Counter Offensive
The Cyprus National Guard High Command had planned a massive island-wide assault on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves of Cyprus, in the event of a Turkish invasion, so as to quickly eliminate these enclaves as potential footholds for a bridgehead. The initial plan (drawn up by Georgios Grivas in 1964) was given the codename "Aphrodite One" and relied upon the presence of a full Greek division of 10,000 troops with heavy weapons. This division however, had been withdrawn from the island in 1967, and so a new plan was drawn up prior to 1974, named Aphrodite Two, and was to take the form of a major ground offensive against the enclaves, instigated at the initiative of the Greek Cypriots rather than the Greeks.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_o ... _Offensive
If Turkey did not intervene who exactly was going to defeat your elam boys of 74?
As I said above, both plans were to be implemented only in the event of an invasion. Therefore the invasion was not made to stop any of these plans from being implemented but on the contrary it triggered the partial implementation of Aphrodite 2 i.e., the elimination of the enclaves of Larnaca, Paphos and Limassol, if I remember well.
Actually, that was one of the major mistakes committed by the National Guard, i.e., instead of using its full force to fight off the invading force and to eliminate the fragile initial bridge head during the first night of the invasion, it wasted a lot of forces against the enclaves. It would have been enough to simply contain the enclaves by posting garrisons around them so as to have all main units available on the beaches.
And the second major mistake was that the units which were to defend the shores (infantry and artillery) instead of being deployed there when the invasion was imminent, or even LATEST during the first night of the invasion, when the beachhead was still small, fragile and in total confusion, (as General Demirel admitted in his memoirs) they were sent to take their positions on the beaches at noon the second day of the invasion and they were destroyed completely on their way there by the TAF.