Cyprus-Forum.com

[kimon07]

Well, ladies and gents,

It looks like that the coming weeks and months we are going to have a lot of fun and a lot to talk about.

The Guardian.

[quote]National Archives release colonial papers – Wednesday 18 April

Thousands of documents detailing some of the most shameful acts and crimes committed during the final years of the British empire were systematically destroyed to prevent them falling into the hands of post-independence governments. Those papers that survived were flown back to Britain and hidden for 50 years in a secret Foreign Office archive in breach of legal obligations for them to be transferred into the public domain…..”

The documents were secretly sent back to the UK when former colonies became independent. They shed new light on how British officials ran countries such as Kenya,
Cyprus and present-day Malaysia.

12.04pm: Sam Marsden of the Press Association has also been through the files. He reveals:

• Britain had already made plans to deport Greek Cypriot leader Achbishop Makarios to the Seychelles when it launched talks with him about ending a violent rebellion in the 1950s. Whitehall ruled out holding Makarios in the former house of the chief justice of the Seychelles, called La Bastille, promoting Seychelles governor Sir WIlliam Addis to compose this rhyme:

“Well in Sans Souci so let it be
Thus denying opposition opportunity
Of stating Archbishop ne peut pas rester tranquille [cannot sit still]
In a house with the name of La Bastille.”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/blog/2012/ ... intcmp=239

[GreekIslandGirl]

This is really interesting, Kimon, because it is only through these documents we can learn some of the truth of what forces drove Cyprus to this present position. No surprises as to why so many would have been destroyed by the British beforehand.

- The article says they (the remainder?) are housed at Kew Library. Perhaps someone who lives near there (Bill Cobbett?) can access some of them and share here?

[kimon07]

This is really interesting, Kimon, because it is only through these documents we can learn some of the truth of what forces drove Cyprus to this present position. No surprises as to why so many would have been destroyed by the British beforehand.

- The article says they (the remainder?) are housed at Kew Library. Perhaps someone who lives near there (Bill Cobbett?) can access some of them and share here?

Yes, it would be great if forum members would dig into them. But in any case, they will be on the net soon, while bits and pieces are already being published by various news papers (for instance, www.simerini.com.cy).

[Jerry]

There is a huge source here of inter-government communications about Cyprus
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus ... index.html

Section 14: Foot Proposals
Section 15: Macmillan Proposals
Section 16: Efforts to Convene a NATO Conference
Section 17: Discussions at the UN; Final Settlement of Cyprus
Section 18: Constitution of Rep. of Cyprus
Section 19: US Relations with Rep. of Cyprus

I found this one particularly interesting (sec 17), it gives the reasons why the Turks decided to take the talks seriously. My own view is that they also got wind of the impending UN legislation towards de-colonisation and tried to get an agreement before Makarios got wind of it.

"306. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State Athens, January 31, 1959, 4 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1 - 3059. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and Ankara.
3. When I took McGhee to meet Averoff this morning Foreign Minister made following observations on Cyprus talks:
A. While publicly he (EDIT, Averoff) is saying he is "neither optimistic nor pessimistic" privately he feels talks "are going well". Have reached a large measure of agreement, and while still difficulties in way including some demands Greece cannot accept, prospects of reaching settlement soon are hopeful.
B. Feels Turks earnestly and seriously searching for settlement for three reasons:
I. They are tired of Cyprus and under domestic pressure to settle Cyprus.
II. Disturbing situation in ME, particularly Iran and Iraq, make it essential this problem be resolved so that tripartite alliance/2/ can begin function again.
/2/Reference is to the 1954 alliance of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. 1 2
III. Turks came away from UN debate badly shaken, not so much because they failed to get their resolution through, but because they were soundly condemned in the speeches during debate and drew conclusion they do not have world opinion on their side. While he objects US stance UN debate, in retrospect feels it contributed to Turkish willingness to negotiate.
C. While talks with Turks going well--and this accounted for his hopefulness--his fear arose from what UK might do to sabotage talks. Said there are two elements in British Cabinet: Tory die-hards who are determined hold Cyprus and will use any means to torpedo talks; others consist of Ministers who are "indifferent" as to Cyprus but on whole prepared to be "helpful." He placed Macmillan in latter group. Said Zorlu agreed with him that British Government divided in this fashion and was also disturbed."
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus ... index.html

[GreekIslandGirl]

Unless Kimon objects, I'm going to post various snippets from some documents not available generally on the Internet but which were analysed by Mallinson in his new book* after he obtained them using the Freedom of Information Act (I think).

The story so far seems to be that Britain knew Cyprus and Greece were meant for enosis through history and desire of the people and they agreed with all this; but the USA (NATO) came on the scene and had other plans ...

Roughly:

13th September 1945, MP, Noel-Baker, proposed 10 steps to Ernest Bevin:

"I believe each of the 10 measures I propose, including the return of Cyprus to Greece, will at some stage become a matter of practical necessity;

[...]

The return of Cyprus to Greece:
There is no doubt that the population of Cyprus ardently desire to rejoin Greece, and that feeling is beginning to run high."


(NB No Parliamentary objections were raised to ceding Cyprus to Greece.)


1947; Deputy Under Secretary of State, Oliver Harvey:

"... I suggest therefore that further consideration be given to the question of the cession of Cyprus to Greece.

[...]

The action of H. M. Government .... makes our continued presence in Cyprus indefensible.
[...] we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of there.

4. It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus."



* William Mallinson, (2011), "Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents Since World War II"

[kimon07]

Object did you say? Honored

[GreekIslandGirl]

Object did you say? Honored

Thank you, Kimon. I hope you don't end up regretting my Legacy of interference!

So, I'll continue the snippets with the 1947 document of Oliver Harvey's (Deputy Under Secretary of State) proposals to the Permanent Under-Sec of Foreign Affairs (Orme Sargent; who previously [1945] had raised no objections to ceding Cyprus to Greece). The atmosphere builds up as they drag their heals on doing this and fear increasing violence from the Cypriot population.


~

"5. British administration in the island is meeting difficulties owing to increasing Cypriot non-co-operation. Hitherto serious violence has been avoided, [...] we cannot hope that this will last long.

6. It would be tragic if Anglo-Greek relations were now to be poisoned by an EAM campaign of violence in Cyprus. Moreover, we are exposed to the risk of a member of the Slav bloc raising Cyprus at the UN for our embarrassment. What convincing defense could we make there I do not know."


(This is were the USA rears its ugly head ....)



"7. Our own position for holding the US to the necessity of assuming new responsibilities in Greece would be greatly strengthened if we ourselves had contributed Cyprus.

8. I do not know whether Cyprus would prove to be an economic asset to Greece but it would be the greatest possible contribution to Greek morale and British influence. (We are still living on the credit of Mr. Gladstone's retro-cession of the Ionian Isles.)

9. For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force."


~
(As we know, these arguments fell on deaf ears .... )
~

[kimon07]

Object did you say? Honored

Thank you, Kimon. I hope you don't end up regretting my Legacy of interference!

Thrilled!

"5. British administration in the island is meeting difficulties owing to increasing Cypriot non-co-operation. Hitherto serious violence has been avoided, [...] we cannot hope that this will last long.

6. It would be tragic if Anglo-Greek relations were now to be poisoned by an EAM campaign of violence in Cyprus. Moreover, we are exposed to the risk of a member of the Slav bloc raising Cyprus at the UN for our embarrassment. What convincing defense could we make there I do not know."

So unbelievably stupid? So unbelievably ignorant? Didn't they know that the Greek communists (EAM) and the Cypriot communist where wholeheartedly against any uprising for enosis? Christ!!


(This is were the USA rears its ugly head ....)

"7. Our own position for holding the US to the necessity of assuming new responsibilities in Greece would be greatly strengthened if we ourselves had contributed Cyprus.

To say the least. And Greece would be just to happy to agree that Britain would keep a military presence on the island forever and ever, just like the American bases in other parts of Greece. And everything would had been settled with no bloodshed and no turbulence within the NATO alliance.

8. I do not know whether Cyprus would prove to be an economic asset to Greece but it would be the greatest possible contribution to Greek morale and British influence. (We are still living on the credit of Mr. Gladstone's retro-cession of the Ionian Isles.)

9. For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force."

Wise advise.

[GreekIslandGirl]

Harvey's reasoned arguments for ceding Cyprus to Greece, and stark warnings if this,the will of the majority, was not done, were dismissed.

His exasperation at the reluctance to let go of Cyprus was summed up in this sentence from a document of 3 November 1947:

"When the Greeks in despair turn to the methods of the Irish, the Jews, the Hindus, and the Egyptians, then, I suspect, the British people will rise and compel the government to evacuate."

He was predicting that Britain would only give up Cyprus if it was fought for.

[Don Kelley]

There is an old saying which goes "If you've nothing worthwhile to say don't say it".