Overlooking the fact that the EOKA struggle of 1955-1959 did not result to what the vast majority of the Greek Cypriots (with the exception of the AKEL leadership) had hoped for (Autodiathesis-Enosis) due to wrong handlings in the political field, (such as the rejection of the proposals of Field Marshal Harding in 1956) the historical truth is that the mighty British Empire was defeated in it’s five year long war against EOKA, the Greek Cypriot guerilla organization, which was led by ret. Gen. George Grivas - Digenis.
Such was the failure of Britain to subdue EOKA that in 1959 the British government, fearing further spreading of the activities of EOKA on the island, and admitting that it could no longer afford to deploy so big a military force to maintain control of it, threatened (blackmailed) to partition Cyprus (double enosis plan) and withdraw from it all together.
http://britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Da ... iracy.html
and
http://ermis.lib.ucy.ac.cy/gsdl/cgi-bin ... 1a3d64f.10
Finally, George Grivas, the most glorious Greek Cypriot of modern history, walked out from his hide out as a national hero and his fighters paraded in Nicosia triumphantly while the British troops were pulling out of the island defeated and shamed by Grivas and his fighters.
http://www.troopsoutmovement.com/oliversarmychap5.htm
But, which are the reasons due to which the 40.000 elite, battle hardened, well trained, very much disciplined and very well equipped British Troops failed to subdue the 250 EOKA fighters?
Many explanations and reasons have been given already by historians. I challenge and invite the forum members to either dispute the British defeat or to express their opinion for it. From my part, I quote below what Great George Grivas himself said about this issue in his memoirs:
“I doubt whether there was a single boy above the age of twelve who did not take part in some mission during the Cyprus campaign. I know no other example in history where the whole of a country's youth, boys and girls, has taken so active and effective a part in the struggle for their country's freedom. Even the little boys of the primary schools played their part. Apart from the demonstrations in which they were at the side of their seniors, they carried on a peculiar struggle of their own, the 'Battle of the Flags', as they called it.
The British had forbidden the hoisting of the Greek flag on the buildings of Greek primary schools. This is one more example of the psychological ignorance shown by the authorities. They were even naive enough to proclaim that the Greek flag was a 'foreign' flag, so far as the little Greeks of Cyprus were concerned. This stupid and ill advised action on the part of the British was exploited by me for the purpose of exciting still further the fanaticism of the young pupils.
It was later that a real fight began. The pupils used to hoist the Greek flag on the school buildings while, British soldiers patrolled the villages in order to pull them down. This however exasperated the military because it took up the time of quite a number of troops who would otherwise have been available for operations against our other forces. In time, however, full-grown men also took part in this 'Battle of the Flags', laying a mine below the flag or in some other spot, with the result that the soldier trying to pull down the flag got himself blown up.
The action taken by the British to put a stop to the youth activities, apart from measures of repression, also took the form of preventive measures such as the following. The arrest and holding in detention camps of the most active pupils as well as of a number of teachers who encouraged their pupils in such activities; expulsion of those teachers who came from Greece; permanent or temporary closing of certain schools; and finally - most idiotic of all - the compulsory teaching of English to pupils of the Fifth and Sixth Forms in elementary schools for five hours per week, while reducing the hours devoted to Greek grammar and spelling to only three hours per week. All the above measures, however, failed in their purpose and merely fanned the pupils' fanaticism.
“The difference between our strategy and that of the British was striking. One can describe it by the following simile: the British were hunting field-mice with armored cars. But one can only catch mice with cunning, and the means one must employ are cats and traps. In the case in point, instead of ostentatious Army and Air Force operations, it would have been much better to have organized small 'man-hunting' parties, continually on the move, and capable of putting up the game from its hiding-place, just as a sportsman uses his dog to discover and start the quarry. It is true that the British published the news that they had brought in anti-guerrilla specialists from the Colonies, but I never came across them and I never heard anything of their activities.
Instead, the British flooded Cyprus with troops, so that one met a soldier at every step, with the only result that they offered plenty of targets and so sustained casualties. They completely ignored the principle of 'saturation of the terrain. In accordance with this principle, each separate kind of terrain has a limit to its capacity of absorption of means without risk. Beyond this limit, any increase in forces not only does not yield better results but, on the contrary, 'increases casualties and complicates movements to the extent of placing the operation itself in jeopardy. In a secret document emanating from Police Headquarters at Famagusta, dated 24 September 1956, it is specifically stated:
'The application of massive force will only suppress terrorism and drive it further underground. The only way to succeed in eradicating terrorism of the Cyprus pattern is to play them at their own cat and mouse game. This calls for ingenuity tempered with stealth and cunning, except that we must adhere to our own code of "Queens- berry Rules", which EOKA, of course, don't have to observe. We must absolve this disadvantage by even greater cunning and resolution.'
What could be more reasonable, simple and plain? The astonishing thing is that neither Harding nor those who succeeded him in command of the armed forces in Cyprus paid any attention to this wise and realistic advice. It is quite possible, however, that the British commanders did see how they ought to act but in practice were unable to follow this advice, because they were carried away either by events or by the sense of their own overwhelming material strength; for there is a great difference between theory and practice”.
See also:
Learning about Counter-Insurgency
John Kiszely
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/reposi ... zely(Dec06).pdf
It is perhaps surprising that the lessons of the Malayan Emergency were not more obviously learnt in Britain’s subsequent counter-insurgency campaign in Cyprus. For example, one of the clearest early lessons from Malaya, stated in the ‘Report of the Police Commission of Malaya 1950’,had been the importance of an impartial, disciplined police force. But only five years later, the British commander in Cyprus, Field Marshal Harding, was basing his campaign on a police force renowned not only for its partiality and ill-discipline, but also for its corruption and brutality, thus playing into the hands of the EOKA insurgents and their leader, Colonel Grivas. As James Corum has pointed out, If Harding carefully had planned to alienate the entire Greek population of the island and push the moderate Greeks into full support of EOKA, he could not have done better than by his policy of unleashing a horde of untrained, poorly-led Turkish police on the population…The abusive behaviour of the Cyprus Police was a godsend to the insurgents…
Colonel Grivas declared that the first act of the new government after Cypriot independence should be to raise a statue to Field Marshal Harding “since he has done more than
anyone else to keep alive the spirit of Hellenistic resistance in Cyprus”.
Comments any one?