Cyprus-Forum.com

[GreekIslandGirl]

Quoting Don:

“Hold on a minute 250 GCs? didn't someone else say all the young GC boys were in the EOKA? It looks like you've inherited the GC habit of being economical with the truth.”

That is a classic contribution!

- Nevertheless, well done to all our brave young GC boys for helping defeat colonialist Britain.

[kurupetos]

Quoting Don:

“Hold on a minute 250 GCs? didn't someone else say all the young GC boys were in the EOKA? It looks like you've inherited the GC habit of being economical with the truth.”

That is a classic contribution!

- Nevertheless, well done to all our brave young GC boys for helping defeat colonialist Britain.

Including, the now ol'boy, Milti.

[GreekIslandGirl]

Quoting Don:

“Hold on a minute 250 GCs? didn't someone else say all the young GC boys were in the EOKA? It looks like you've inherited the GC habit of being economical with the truth.”

That is a classic contribution!

- Nevertheless, well done to all our brave young GC boys for helping defeat colonialist Britain.

Including, the now ol'boy, Milti.

Oh yes ... he shouted "PLONKERS!" to them all.

[Jerry]

As I recall, it was Great Britain who sought to extricate herself from the Treaty of Guarantee which might entail her having to face any Turkish Invasions (breathed a sigh of relief in 1964 ans 1967 that the USA did GB's job in seeing off the threats of Turkish invasions). In fact, the direct orders in 1974 were for all the British Forces including the brave UNFICYP to take cover in the Bases on the understanding that the Turks would leave them alone there.

That's not how Callaghan reported events in his memoirs. I would imagine that Kissinger's refusal to support the threat of military action is one of the reasons why GCs accuse him of being responsible for the illegal division and occupation of the island.


"I told Hartman that I had earlier made clear to Ecevit that although the British troops facing them were wearing United Nations berets, they would stand their ground in face of a Turkish Army encroachment and my country would not be prepared to see them pushed aside. Since that conversation the Turks had been heavily reinforced, but Britain was ready to strengthen a static defence against possible lines of Turkish advance by moving in more reinforcements and flying in further Phantoms. I would repeat the warning to the Turks on whom would fall the onus of challenging the United Nations, but I must be assured of American support if I were to do so, and in the light of our conversation this would apparently not be forthcoming. I continued that I understood American concern with the broad issues of the south-east flank of NATO but the United States was ignoring other perspectives, including Britain's role as a Guarantor Power and the safeguarding of the lives of thousands of British citizens.
As soon as Arthur Hartman had left, I fired off a telegram to Henry Kissinger, saying that these important differences were impairing our mutual confidence. I reiterated that it was not sufficient to approach the Turks solely through the medium of diplomacy. The correct policy was to tackle them on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and the military level. This was the most likely way to achieve results. As to his complaint that the British had introduced a military dimension, I reminded him that the reality was that this dimension was constantly hanging over the heads of the British troops who were heavily outnumbered by up to twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers.
Kissinger's response was to telephone Ecevit once more to renew his personal plea that Turkey should adhere to a political solution, telling him that he could expect no support if the Turks made a military move and that the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort to halt them. Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further."
http://web.archive.org/web/200610121950 ... laghan.htm

Yes, Jerry. His "Memoirs". As you can see, Kissinger sounds very 'reasonable' in these "Memoirs" also. He's glossed over the facts. Let's see, did Britain meet any guarantee commitments in 1964, 1967 or 1974, to come out fighting in Cyprus' defense? Where were the British forces and UNFICYP personnel during the 'action' in 1974?

I have never been a fan of Callaghan but, unlike you, I find it impossible to believe that he would publish untruths in his memoirs since they are open to scrutiny by others. Without US backing he knew that the UN force would suffer heavy casualties if they engaged the Turks.

Here's the UNFICYP version of events, more lies no doubt.
http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_ ... ic&lang=l1

[GreekIslandGirl]

As I recall, it was Great Britain who sought to extricate herself from the Treaty of Guarantee which might entail her having to face any Turkish Invasions (breathed a sigh of relief in 1964 ans 1967 that the USA did GB's job in seeing off the threats of Turkish invasions). In fact, the direct orders in 1974 were for all the British Forces including the brave UNFICYP to take cover in the Bases on the understanding that the Turks would leave them alone there.

That's not how Callaghan reported events in his memoirs. I would imagine that Kissinger's refusal to support the threat of military action is one of the reasons why GCs accuse him of being responsible for the illegal division and occupation of the island.


"I told Hartman that I had earlier made clear to Ecevit that although the British troops facing them were wearing United Nations berets, they would stand their ground in face of a Turkish Army encroachment and my country would not be prepared to see them pushed aside. Since that conversation the Turks had been heavily reinforced, but Britain was ready to strengthen a static defence against possible lines of Turkish advance by moving in more reinforcements and flying in further Phantoms. I would repeat the warning to the Turks on whom would fall the onus of challenging the United Nations, but I must be assured of American support if I were to do so, and in the light of our conversation this would apparently not be forthcoming. I continued that I understood American concern with the broad issues of the south-east flank of NATO but the United States was ignoring other perspectives, including Britain's role as a Guarantor Power and the safeguarding of the lives of thousands of British citizens.
As soon as Arthur Hartman had left, I fired off a telegram to Henry Kissinger, saying that these important differences were impairing our mutual confidence. I reiterated that it was not sufficient to approach the Turks solely through the medium of diplomacy. The correct policy was to tackle them on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and the military level. This was the most likely way to achieve results. As to his complaint that the British had introduced a military dimension, I reminded him that the reality was that this dimension was constantly hanging over the heads of the British troops who were heavily outnumbered by up to twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers.
Kissinger's response was to telephone Ecevit once more to renew his personal plea that Turkey should adhere to a political solution, telling him that he could expect no support if the Turks made a military move and that the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort to halt them. Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further."
http://web.archive.org/web/200610121950 ... laghan.htm

Yes, Jerry. His "Memoirs". As you can see, Kissinger sounds very 'reasonable' in these "Memoirs" also. He's glossed over the facts. Let's see, did Britain meet any guarantee commitments in 1964, 1967 or 1974, to come out fighting in Cyprus' defense? Where were the British forces and UNFICYP personnel during the 'action' in 1974?

I have never been a fan of Callaghan but, unlike you, I find it impossible to believe that he would publish untruths in his memoirs since they are open to scrutiny by others. Without US backing he knew that the UN force would suffer heavy casualties if they engaged the Turks.

Here's the UNFICYP version of events, more lies no doubt.
http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_ ... ic&lang=l1

Nothing you have presented contradicts my initial post or that the 'memoirs' were glossed - so Callaghan said "this" to Ecevit and said "that" to Turkey! Big deal You have merely presented the excuses of Britain and UNFICYP which they later used to support their (in)actions. My point still stands; Britain regretted signing up as a guarantor and only a few years later was helping redraw the treaties with the possibility of allowing enosis with Greece in order to free themselves from a possible future military showdown with Turkey on Cyprus' behalf.

[Jerry]

As I recall, it was Great Britain who sought to extricate herself from the Treaty of Guarantee which might entail her having to face any Turkish Invasions (breathed a sigh of relief in 1964 ans 1967 that the USA did GB's job in seeing off the threats of Turkish invasions). In fact, the direct orders in 1974 were for all the British Forces including the brave UNFICYP to take cover in the Bases on the understanding that the Turks would leave them alone there.

That's not how Callaghan reported events in his memoirs. I would imagine that Kissinger's refusal to support the threat of military action is one of the reasons why GCs accuse him of being responsible for the illegal division and occupation of the island.


"I told Hartman that I had earlier made clear to Ecevit that although the British troops facing them were wearing United Nations berets, they would stand their ground in face of a Turkish Army encroachment and my country would not be prepared to see them pushed aside. Since that conversation the Turks had been heavily reinforced, but Britain was ready to strengthen a static defence against possible lines of Turkish advance by moving in more reinforcements and flying in further Phantoms. I would repeat the warning to the Turks on whom would fall the onus of challenging the United Nations, but I must be assured of American support if I were to do so, and in the light of our conversation this would apparently not be forthcoming. I continued that I understood American concern with the broad issues of the south-east flank of NATO but the United States was ignoring other perspectives, including Britain's role as a Guarantor Power and the safeguarding of the lives of thousands of British citizens.
As soon as Arthur Hartman had left, I fired off a telegram to Henry Kissinger, saying that these important differences were impairing our mutual confidence. I reiterated that it was not sufficient to approach the Turks solely through the medium of diplomacy. The correct policy was to tackle them on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and the military level. This was the most likely way to achieve results. As to his complaint that the British had introduced a military dimension, I reminded him that the reality was that this dimension was constantly hanging over the heads of the British troops who were heavily outnumbered by up to twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers.
Kissinger's response was to telephone Ecevit once more to renew his personal plea that Turkey should adhere to a political solution, telling him that he could expect no support if the Turks made a military move and that the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort to halt them. Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further."
http://web.archive.org/web/200610121950 ... laghan.htm

Yes, Jerry. His "Memoirs". As you can see, Kissinger sounds very 'reasonable' in these "Memoirs" also. He's glossed over the facts. Let's see, did Britain meet any guarantee commitments in 1964, 1967 or 1974, to come out fighting in Cyprus' defense? Where were the British forces and UNFICYP personnel during the 'action' in 1974?

I have never been a fan of Callaghan but, unlike you, I find it impossible to believe that he would publish untruths in his memoirs since they are open to scrutiny by others. Without US backing he knew that the UN force would suffer heavy casualties if they engaged the Turks.

Here's the UNFICYP version of events, more lies no doubt.
http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_ ... ic&lang=l1

Nothing you have presented contradicts my initial post or that the 'memoirs' were glossed - so Callaghan said "this" to Ecevit and said "that" to Turkey! Big deal You have merely presented the excuses of Britain and UNFICYP which they later used to support their (in)actions. My point still stands; Britain regretted signing up as a guarantor and only a few years later was helping redraw the treaties with the possibility of allowing enosis with Greece in order to free themselves from a possible future military showdown with Turkey on Cyprus' behalf.

Go on have the last word Oracle, there's no point in arguing with a British and Turk hating bigot. Your simple view - Brits all bad, Turks all bad Greeks all good, pathetic.

[GreekIslandGirl]

Stop throwing a strop, Jerry.

In a document from the Southern European Department (FCO), dated 11th March 1971:

"We have been through the 1963 papers, which tend to confirm that the Thirteen Points were indeed framed with British help and encouragement."

The main reason they encouraged this was for the dissolution of the Treaties of Guarantee which obligated Britain more than it was interested in participating (i.e. to safeguard Cyprus' sovereignty since by then they had decided the Bases were sufficient for Britain's needs). See Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History.

[Jerry]

Stop throwing a strop, Jerry.

In a document from the Southern European Department (FCO), dated 11th March 1971:

"We have been through the 1963 papers, which tend to confirm that the Thirteen Points were indeed framed with British help and encouragement."

The main reason they encouraged this was for the dissolution of the Treaties of Guarantee which obligated Britain more than it was interested in participating (i.e. to safeguard Cyprus' sovereignty since by then they had decided the Bases were sufficient for Britain's needs). See Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History.

Well I suppose if Makarios could change the Treaty so could the UK. Strange how Britain still has the largest contingent in UNFICYP if it has no interest in ROC's security.

As to your "confirmation" of the British "help" in framing the 13 points - UTTER CRAP.

The amendments to the constitution proposed by Makarios were fundamental in every respect, essentially altering the basis of the Aethnic@ arrangement for political governance. In this sense, then, the 13 Points must be seen as rewriting the treaties and governing instruments for all of Cyprus. Makarios, who certainly had legitimate complaints about the political paralysis that the 1959 accords had produced, acted unilaterally, without consultation with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and this itself became a source of friction. In a note attached to these points and the accompanying memorandum, Makarios said he was taking this radical step because the constitution as written by Greece and Turkey had created "difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State and impede the development of the country. In this respect I transmit herewith for your information a Memorandum setting out the immediate measures, which I consider necessary, to meet the situation. I have today conveyed the attached Memorandum to the Vice- President, Dr. Kutchuk, inviting him to talks with a view to resolving the various difficulties set out in the Memorandum. I have arrived at the decision to take this initiative in my earnest desire to remove certain causes of anomaly and friction between Greeks and Turks which prevent them from co-operating, to this grave detriment of the country. It is hoped that the Turkish Cypriots, after carefully studying this Memorandum, will agree that my proposals are both realistic and constructive." They did not.
One reason Makarios acted so peremptorily was because he had consulted with Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner (ambassador) in Cyprus, who apparently had signaled his approval. Makarios believed this meant that the British Government would back his constitutional overhaul, which turned out to be a false expectation. Below are the 13 Points, with an explanation following, contained in the text of letters Makarios sent to the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on November 29, 1963.
http://web.archive.org/web/200608081840 ... points.htm

[loyalcypriot10]

EOKA replaced the Brits with trhe more powerful and agressive Turks. Is that a good result for Hellenism?

[GreekIslandGirl]

Stop throwing a strop, Jerry.

In a document from the Southern European Department (FCO), dated 11th March 1971:

"We have been through the 1963 papers, which tend to confirm that the Thirteen Points were indeed framed with British help and encouragement."

The main reason they encouraged this was for the dissolution of the Treaties of Guarantee which obligated Britain more than it was interested in participating (i.e. to safeguard Cyprus' sovereignty since by then they had decided the Bases were sufficient for Britain's needs). See Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History.

Well I suppose if Makarios could change the Treaty so could the UK. Strange how Britain still has the largest contingent in UNFICYP if it has no interest in ROC's security.

As to your "confirmation" of the British "help" in framing the 13 points - UTTER CRAP.

The amendments to the constitution proposed by Makarios were fundamental in every respect, essentially altering the basis of the Aethnic@ arrangement for political governance. In this sense, then, the 13 Points must be seen as rewriting the treaties and governing instruments for all of Cyprus. Makarios, who certainly had legitimate complaints about the political paralysis that the 1959 accords had produced, acted unilaterally, without consultation with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and this itself became a source of friction. In a note attached to these points and the accompanying memorandum, Makarios said he was taking this radical step because the constitution as written by Greece and Turkey had created "difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State and impede the development of the country. In this respect I transmit herewith for your information a Memorandum setting out the immediate measures, which I consider necessary, to meet the situation. I have today conveyed the attached Memorandum to the Vice- President, Dr. Kutchuk, inviting him to talks with a view to resolving the various difficulties set out in the Memorandum. I have arrived at the decision to take this initiative in my earnest desire to remove certain causes of anomaly and friction between Greeks and Turks which prevent them from co-operating, to this grave detriment of the country. It is hoped that the Turkish Cypriots, after carefully studying this Memorandum, will agree that my proposals are both realistic and constructive." They did not.
One reason Makarios acted so peremptorily was because he had consulted with Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner (ambassador) in Cyprus, who apparently had signaled his approval. Makarios believed this meant that the British Government would back his constitutional overhaul, which turned out to be a false expectation. Below are the 13 Points, with an explanation following, contained in the text of letters Makarios sent to the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on November 29, 1963.
http://web.archive.org/web/200608081840 ... points.htm

The document I refer to follows on from yours.

"... the British Government's role is indisputable. In a letter of 11th March 1971 from Seconde (Southern European Department, FCO), to Ramsbotham (High Commissioner in Cyprus), the former writes:
"We have been through the 1963 papers, which tend to confirm that the Thirteen Points were indeed framed with British help and encouragement; that the then High Commissioner [Clark] considered them to be reasonable prospects; and that our intention was to promote their acceptance by the Turks"
Ramsbotham (HC, Cyprus) wrote later to Seconde:
“Makarios, ever the gentleman, took sole responsibility for the Thirteen Points” PRO FCO 9/1353-WSC 1/1"

ibid