By Makarios Drousiotis
Published on October 23, 2011
The debate over a bi-zonal federation remains the same today as it did 37 years ago
SOME 10 days ago, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus, Alexander Downer, was invited to speak about the federal political system to a gathering in Larnaca. Among the audience were individuals that went there to utter their own views, rather than listen.
From what was broadcast by the media, the event was not a discussion aimed at resolving queries about a federation, but an opportunity for some to have a go at Downer, whom they blamed because he was working for a federal settlement, which they considered unfair, undemocratic and racist.
Downer told them that their objections should have been conveyed to their leaders and not the UN envoy. He then pointed out that “we are here because we were invited by Mr Christofias to help solve the Cyprus problem, on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation”.
The federal settlement which has been debated since 1974, was formally accepted by President Makarios in 1977 and, for the first time, by Tassos Papadopoulos in 2006 by the signing of what came to be known as the ‘July 8 agreement’.
Since 1974, countless political discussions have been held, tens of thousands of articles published in newspapers, and elections (and a referendum) won and lost all on the subject of federation, but society is still where it started from. The debate taking place today and the arguments put forward are the same as those first heard in late 1974, when the bi-zonal federation became part of the Cyprus problem terminology.
Below are the main points of an early debate about federation dating back to 1975. The basic arguments - the fears of the consequences of consolidating occupation on the one hand and the fears of a compromise on the other - are so similar to what is being said today, that the debate may as well have taken place 37 days rather than 37 years ago.
Hard dilemmas
It is well known that Glafcos Clerides was the first politician in Cyprus who spoke about the need to accept a bi-zonal federation, immediately after the tragedy of 1974. He believed that the conditions created by the Turkish invasion made acceptance of a bi-zonal federation the only way to quickly solve the Cyprus problem.
Clerides was backed and encouraged by the then prime minister of Greece, Constantinos Karamanlis, who argued that the main concern was not the form of a Cyprus solution, but the proportion of occupied land that would be returned to Greek Cypriots. Karamanlis’ position was that an agreement on territory would have solved 90 per cent of the Cyprus problem and he pressured Makarios to accept a bi-zonal federation, in exchange for reducing the land that would remain under Turkish Cypriot control from 37 to 25 per cent.
Makarios agreed with Karamanlis half-heartedly. While he understood how difficult the situation was, he did not want to accept a federal settlement without a fight. Makarios proposed to start negotiations on a multi-zonal federation (several areas under Turkish Cypriot control all over the island instead of a one area for each community), while he kept entertaining the idea of avoiding a deal, until conditions became favourable for a better solution.
In April 1975 settlement talks were scheduled to begin in Vienna. The build-up to the talks was marked by a big debate in newspapers about the stance the Greek Cypriot side should have taken. Clerides was the only politician who accepted the bi-zonal federation. The rest of the political establishment was opposed to it while Makarios was prevaricating between accepting a quick solution and rejecting it in favour of a waiting game that became known as the ‘long and unyielding struggle’.
Clerides knew that the Holy Synod had secured a pledge from Makarios not to accept federation. As a result, the Church and its supporters were preparing society for the ‘struggle’. Clerides therefore decided to challenge Makarios to publicly clarify his intentions before the talks were to begin on April 28.
On April 1, Clerides made a speech about the Cyprus problem at Pnevmatiki Stegi in Nicosia. He took a clear stand in favour of a quick solution, even though this would be a bi-zonal federation, and argued against the ‘long struggle’, which would have made sense only if Greece and Cyprus were in a position to drive the Turks out of Cyprus by military means. The ‘long struggle’ option, he argued, would perpetuate the fait accompli and would lead to the arrival of Turkish settlers and the cementing of the occupation.
Clerides ridiculed the slogan that was being uttered by then EDEK leader Vassos Lyssarides, “every house a fort and everyone a patriot and soldier”, and challenged the local myths about the Security Council taking decisions with the sole purpose of enforcing the principles of the UN Charter. He also criticised all Greek Cypriot political leaders (including himself) for not telling people the truth. This failure, he argued, bred political immaturity and emotional slogans, which lacked any substance. “We're not the centre of the universe,” he said, adding that while many states, large and small, made sympathetic statements about our cause, they would never offer military assistance to Cyprus in a new confrontation with Turkey.
1975 prevails
Clerides’ pragmatic views sparked a furious reaction by Makarios’ close circle and the press. AKEL’s then general secretary Ezekias Papaioannou accused him of undermining the common line taken by Athens and Nicosia, and ignoring the National Council’s decisions and thus “essentially destroying the talks and weakening our position”. Lyssarides accused Clerides of “undermining the fighting spirit of Cypriot Hellenism”, while the Bishop of Paphos Chrysostomos declared from the pulpit: “Defeatism must not find a place in our souls. The defeatists have no place on the ramparts of the struggle.”
Following these reactions Clerides resigned as negotiator. According to close friends like Nicos Koshis, Clerides believed he could not negotiate the Cyprus problem with the conditions set by Makarios, who did not really want a deal and had got his ‘minions’ to stir public opposition to the idea of the hard compromises necessary for a solution.
“As a result, Clerides did not want to take part in a parody of Vienna, or (in the unlikely event of agreement) to publicly take a position in favour of the settlement, without the full support of Makarios and Karamanlis,” said a close friend.
On April 17, 1975 a special session of the National Council was held to determine Greek Cypriot strategy for the Vienna talks. The prevailing view was the Greek Cypriots should demand the implementation of UN resolutions. Papadopoulos argued that the Greek Cypriot side should not pursue a solution “that would be, or appeared to be contrary to UN resolutions”. Lyssarides argued that any distancing from the UN resolutions would weaken the position of Cyprus, while Spyros Kyprianou suggested that in Vienna, Turkish acceptance of the general principles of the UN resolutions was secured.
With the notable exception of Clerides, the rest of the Greek Cypriot leaders were guilty of selective reading of UN resolutions, focusing only on references to the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, while ignoring the fact that the UN had never explicitly condemned Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus.
They also ignored or overlooked the fact that resolutions (the General Assembly’s res. 3212, later adopted by the Security Council) linked the withdrawal of troops and return of refugees to an overall settlement through negotiations, ‘on an equal basis’, between the two communities of Cyprus and not between the Cyprus Republic and Turkey.
The ultimate defeat
Even the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kurt Waldheim, told Clerides that it was a mistake to believe that the Cyprus problem could be solved by the resolutions of the UN General Assembly. “He was sorry, that as Secretary-General, he said such a thing, but this was the reality,” Clerides wrote. It’s a reality which has never been accepted by the Greek Cypriot leadership.
Although 37 years have passed, the thinking remains the same. Political speeches begin and end with calls to respect UN resolutions, and the passing of time, instead of being seen as the big danger, is considered an ally in the talks without time-frames and arbitration.
For the sake of quick solution we should not accept any solution, AKEL insists to this day. Lyssarides still argues that every house should be a fort, although most youngsters now try to get out of doing military service. The 100,000 Turkish Cypriots who were in the occupied north in 1974 have become a minority, outnumbered by the droves of Turkish settlers. The northern Cyprus we left behind us in 1974 no longer exists, having been turned into a province of Turkey.
Clerides was fully vindicated, but the demagogues are still in control. They still serve up the rhetoric on UN resolutions and negotiations without timeframes and arbitration. The ‘long and unyielding struggle’, launched to rid us of partition, has imposed it upon us. And with the worst possible conditions.
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus-probl ... n/20111023