Cap wrote:Command Workshop?
Was that where the british soldiers were hiding when the Anatolians invaded?
Get your facts right Cap, Callaghan's memoirs.
I told Hartman that I had earlier made clear to Ecevit that although the British troops facing them were wearing United Nations berets, they would stand their ground in face of a Turkish Army encroachment and my country would not be prepared to see them pushed aside. Since that conversation the Turks had been heavily reinforced, but Britain was ready to strengthen a static defence against possible lines of Turkish advance by moving in more reinforcements and flying in further Phantoms. I would repeat the warning to the Turks on whom would fall the onus of challenging the United Nations, but I must be assured of American support if I were to do so, and in the light of our conversation this would apparently not be forthcoming. I continued that I understood American concern with the broad issues of the south-east flank of NATO but the United States was ignoring other perspectives, including Britain's role as a Guarantor Power and the safeguarding of the lives of thousands of British citizens.
As soon as Arthur Hartman had left, I fired off a telegram to Henry Kissinger, saying that these important differences were impairing our mutual confidence. I reiterated that it was not sufficient to approach the Turks solely through the medium of diplomacy. The correct policy was to tackle them on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and the military level. This was the most likely way to achieve results. As to his complaint that the British had introduced a military dimension, I reminded him that the reality was that this dimension was constantly hanging over the heads of the British troops who were heavily outnumbered by up to twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers.
Kissinger's response was to telephone Ecevit once more to renew his personal plea that Turkey should adhere to a political solution, telling him that he could expect no support if the Turks made a military move and that the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort to halt them. Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further.
http://web.archive.org/web/20061012195007/http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/callaghan.htm