Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

(C) Miliband told FM and lead-EU negotiator Babacan that
"now is the time for bold moves," urging renewed momentum in
Turkey's EU accession process. He focused specifically on
political reforms and Cyprus as areas for improvement.
Miliband warned that Turkey's disruptive behavior in
international organizations, such as in NATO regarding ESDP
and in OSCE regarding Cyprus, has begun to garner "ill will
from good friends." Regarding Cyprus, Miliband urged the GOT
to take bold unilateral steps to avoid being placed on the
defensive by the Greek Cypriots. GOT officials indicated
that starting any major initiative would have to wait until
after Cyprus' presidential election early next year. Babacan
expressed frustration at Cyprus' apparent lack of interest in
negotiating. Encouraging Babacan to keep up the pressure,
Miliband reiterated that Turkey "has a friend" in the UK.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07ANKARA2332.html

[boomerang]

(C) U/S Burns expressed continued USG support for UNSYG
Ban-Ki Moon's efforts to reignite talks between Turkish and
Greek Cypriots on a comprehensive Cyprus settlement and asked
Gul's advice on how best to move forward. Gul responded that
Cyprus is a frustrating issue for Turkey. It had supported
the Annan Plan, only to see the Greek Cypriots reject it. He
recalled as well the words of then-EU Enlargement
Commissioner Guenther Verheugen in the aftermath of the Greek
Cypriot vote against the Plan -- "We were cheated." Gul said
the EU has forgotten its promises to end Turkish Cypriots'
economic isolation and he asked that the U.S. continue to
urge the Europeans to make good on them. Burns said the U.S
would continue to work on behalf of a Cyprus settlement, and
would encourage UNSYG Ban toward that end.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07ANKARA2466.html

[boomerang]

(C) Apakan complained about hard-line and unhelpful
Cypriot Government positions and statements. Despite this,
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots still aim for a comprehensive
settlement under UN auspices, and the Annan Plan should be
the starting point. In the long term, the two sides need to
find a way to cooperate, share power and create a partnership
arrangement. Apakan elaborated on the Talat-Papadopoulos
September 5 meeting and presented a copy of the Turkish
Cypriot proposal that UN Special Rep Moller had allegedly
agreed is compatible with the July 8 Gambari process. Apakan
also urged an end to Turkish Cypriot isolation.

¶17. (C) Burns responded that our diplomatic relations with
the Republic of Cyprus will remain strong and that our goal
is a reunited island. Our ambassador in Nicosia sees Talat
as a reasonable, credible interlocutor who, if he had
substantial leeway to negotiate, could make progress. Burns
also noted tentative plans to visit Cyprus and said he will
seek Apakan,s advice before going. Among others, he will
meet with Talat. Burns agreed on the importance of the Annan
Plan, but said that a final settlement will require new ideas
and a new approach.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07ANKARA2467.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000055

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: TALAT VISIT SHOWS GOT INTERAGENCY
AGREEMENT ON CYPRUS


Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary and comment: "TRNC President" Talat enjoyed
full head of state honors during a January 3-4 visit to
Ankara that created broad interagency agreement within the
GOT on an effort to re-energize comprehensive settlement
negotiations on Cyprus. Talat's meetings with President Gul,
Prime Minister Erdogan, and Defense Chief of Staff Buyukanit
were warm and, unlike his January 2007 visit here, free of
tension. The GOT's Justice and Development Party (AKP)
leadership is committed to urging the international community
and the UN to press the new Greek Cypriot president, whoever
it may be, to engage in serious negotiations. It is also
committed to supporting Talat in those negotiations and
ensuring the Turkish side does not play the role of naysayer.
GOT leaders, including Buyukanit, also appear to support
Talat's pursuit of confidence-building measures in the short
term, to include the opening of the Lokmaci crossing. This
is the first sign we have seen that the GOT -- perhaps even
with the support of the military -- may be prepared to turn
its attention seriously to solving the Cyprus problem.
President Gul's apparent resolve is refreshing. If so, it
could be a plus for Turkey's flagging EU aspirations as well.
End summary and comment

¶2. (C) MFA Cyprus Department Head Can Oztas (protect) told us
Talat's January 3-4 visit to Ankara went very well and
offered an opportunity for GOT leaders to begin to seek
interagency agreement on addressing the Cyprus issue in the
near-term. They also proffered a proper welcome to Talat as
a visiting head of state. Former President Sezer had
declined to invite Talat for two years because of opposition
to Talat's perceived supportive "attitude" toward reaching an
accommodation with Greek Cypriots. When Talat had last
visited Sezer, he was not given head of state honors and
stayed in a hotel. On this visit, Talat stayed at the Camli
Palace, a state residence offered to visiting heads of state,
and was greeted upon arrival at the presidential palace with
a 21-cannon salute.

¶3. (C) During the two-day visit, Talat had one-on-one
meetings with President Gul and PM Erdogan, in addition to
delegation talks and a meeting with Parliamentary Speaker
Toptan. Talat, Gul, and Erdogan later had a private dinner
to continue their discussions. On second day of the visit,
Talat met with Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief Gen.
Buyukanit. Oztas said all meetings went very well and
allowed Gul and Erdogan to achieve consensus within the GOT
and with Talat on moving forward with serious negotiations
following the presidential elections in the ROC. Gul
committed to seek during his visit to Washington and New York
the following week the support of UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon for a
reenergized UN initiative to solve the Cyprus problem.

¶4. (C) Oztas noted Talat's meeting with TGS CHOD Gen.
Buyukanit as the most surprising aspect of the visit.
Buyukanit reportedly thanked Talat three times for Talat's
cooperation with Turkish forces on the island, representing a
near about face from meetings last January following Talat's
announcement on removal of the Ledra Street footbridge.
Oztas could not comment on whether the absence of tensions
during the meeting represents a fundamental shift in TGS
views on the broader Cyprus issue. It does, in his view,
indicate a willingness on the part of the military to go
along with the AKP-led government's plan to support Talat's
efforts to engage with whomever emerges victorious from
Cypriot elections.

¶5. (C) Talat and his Turkish hosts discussed moving forward
with confidence building measures. Oztas thought the opening
of the Lokmaci crossing could take place even if the
demarcation issue is not resolved, something he said UNSYGSR
Moeller has indicated previously. Following Greek Cypriot
elections, the Turkish side will look to engage immediately.
Oztas said MFA U/S Apakan made the point that serious
negotiations could be completed within a year. Talat was
more circumspect, and flexible, on how long negotiations
might last, but all agreed they need to start as soon as
possible. Gul underscored the seriousness with which the GOT
approaches this proposed new negotiating period, saying he
does not want the Turks to be the ones to get up from the
table and say no.

¶6. (C) From the standpoint of which Greek Cypriot
presidential candidate would be most receptive to
negotiations, Oztas noted that Talat and Papadopoulos are not
on the same wavelength and Papadopoulos does not seem serious
about entering into substantive talks on a comprehensive
settlement. The GOT really would prefer Christofias or
Kasoulidies, both of whom would be willing to negotiate.

ANKARA 00000055 002 OF 002


While Kasoulidies might be most flexible, he seems least
likely to win. If Papadopoulos does win, the Turks will be
prepared to deal with him as well. DISI and AKEL supporters
have a long, unfortunate history of fierce opposition, which
makes the prospect of supporters of one voting for the other
in a run-off against Papadopoulos problematic. Nonetheless,
both Kasoulidies and Christofias have focused their attacks
on Papadopoulos during the campaign. This allows one to at
least hope that whoever finishes third might be willing to
throw his support behind the other in the run-off against
presumed front-runner Papadopoulos.

¶7. (C) Whoever emerges as the next president of the ROC,
Oztas emphasized the need for pressure from the EU and the
United States on the Greek Cypriots to engage seriously in
negotiations in an effort to solve the Cyprus problem for
good. He noted the Swedes intended to gather like-minded
countries in New York with a view toward getting the U.S. and
other UNSC member states to press the UNSYG to intensify UN
involvement as well.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08ANKARA55.html

[boomerang]

UNCLAS ANKARA 000279

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

MONTREAL PLEASE PASS TO U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO ICAO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY OPPOSES ICAO PLANS TO TRANSFER SAR
RESPONSIBILITIES TO CYPRIOTS

This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Turkish MFA Civil Aviation officials
summoned PMA Counselor on February 12 to request U.S. support
at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Turkey has written an objection letter to ICAO leadership
opposing its plans to transfer "state" responsibility for
Search and Rescue (SAR) services around Cyprus from the UK to
the Cypriot Government. Turkey argues that doing so will
provide undue legitimacy to the "Greek Cypriot" government at
a time when the divided island faces the prospect of renewed
negotiations to achieve a political settlement. ICAO
counters, however, that this proposed change has no effect on
the current state responsibility, which they argue has always
been borne by the Cypriot government, and involves no more
than a change of name of the rescue coordination center. Post
requests guidance from the Department on how to respond to
the MFA's request for support. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On February 12, PMA Counselor was summoned to the
MFA Civil Aviation Department where he was briefed on an
impending decision by ICAO to transfer "state" responsibility
for Search and Rescue (SAR) services around Cyprus from the
UK's Episkopi Rescue Coordination Center to the Cypriotm
government (Larnaca RCC). MFA DDG Basat Ozturk argued that
doing so would provide undue legitimacy to the "Greek
Cypriot" government at a time when the divided island faces
the prospect of renewed negotiations to achieve a political
settlement. He added that this has heretofore been a UK
government responsibility and the GOT sees this as more than
a name change. In a letter from ICAO Council President
Roberto Gonzalez to Turkey's ICAO Representative, Vakur
Gokdenizler, Gonzalez argues that this proposal has no effect
on the current state responsibility for SAR in the Cypriot
region, which he says has always been held by the Cypriot
government, and that it involves no more than a change of
name of the rescue coordination center.

¶3. (SBU) Ozturk told us that Turkey has written an objection
letter to ICAO regarding this issue and Gokdenizler will meet
to discuss it on February 15 with ICAO leadership. The MFA
also met with a UK embassy representative on February 12 to
formally voice Turkish opposition to this transfer of
responsibility. Our UK embassy contact told us that she too
has requested guidance from London about the UK's position on
this issue.

¶4. (SBU) Ozturk requested U.S. support for Turkey,s position
at ICAO. Turkey's argument depends on its assertion that
such transfers of responsibility involving Cyprus cannot be
legitimate until a political solution is achieved on the
island,s status. The Greek Cypriot government is not bona
fide and thus does not represent the full citizenry of
Cyprus, they argue. Ozturk said that Turkey will refuse to
recognize any ICAO decision that transfers SAR
responsibilities under such circumstances.

¶5. (SBU) Action Request: Post requests guidance from the
Department on how to respond to Turkey's request for
assistance and support.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08ANKARA279.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000338

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SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: GOT PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY CYPRIOT ELECTION FIRST
ROUND; PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE


Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: GOT officials expressed pleasant surprise at
the unexpected outcome of the first round of Cyprus'
presidential election. Regardless of the final outcome,
Turkey remains prepared to press for resumption of final
settlement negotiations as soon as possible. The Turks are
hopeful the election result indicates a shift in Greek
Cypriot public opinion regarding such negotiations. They are
supportive of steps "TRNC President" Talat may be considering
as confidence building measures to help smooth the way toward
a resumption of talks. END SUMMARY

¶2. (C) MFA Cyprus Department Head Can Oztas (please protect)
told us GOT officials are pleasantly surprised that ROC
President Papadopoulos was eliminated in the first round of
Cyprus' presidential election. Oztas admitted the scenarios
for which they had prepared all included Papadopoulos at
least making it to the run-off. The GOT was and remains
prepared to make a push for resumption of final settlement
negotiations regardless of who wins the election. With
Kasoulides and Christofias getting through, the Turks are
much more optimistic that such talks will occur and may even
have a chance to succeed.

¶3. (C) MFA has prepared a public statement congratulating the
victor of the run-off and setting forth the GOT intent to
press ahead on talks. Per Oztas, senior-most MFA officials
have not yet decided whether to release the statement, but he
believes they will. We encouraged him to do so, noting that
a statement reflecting the GOT's positive outlook would
convey Turkish seriousness and sincerity. We asked that the
GOT consider a unilateral gesture to underscore that point
further, such as opening a port/airport to ROC vessels, but
Oztas said that is unlikely. He did not dismiss the
possibility of the GOT making a unilateral gesture at some
point, but said it will not happen until a viable process has
begun and there is a clear indication that the Greek Cypriots
are engaging with a view toward reaching a final solution.

¶4. (C) There is unanimity within the GOT on moving forward
with serious negotiations, Oztas said. He believes there
remains sufficient political will in Ankara that if a
settlement is within reach, PM Erdogan and his Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government will seek to seize it.
Much will depend on how talks progress. Oztas noted MFA
officials have, over the past few months, reviewed the final
Annan Plan, dividing it up into three sections. They believe
a large portion remains non-controversial and both sides
should be able quickly to agree to retain that. Other
aspects are no longer valid and will need to be discarded or
renegotiated. The remainder represents the most difficult
aspects which will form the crux of renewed negotiations.
For the Turks, certain key points remain non-negotiable,
including that the end result will be a "new state" based on
a bicommunal, bizonal federation in which the Turkish
Cypriots have the ability to govern their own affairs-- not
be a situation in which the ROC simply subsumes the Turkish
half of the island.

¶5. (C) Oztas said the GOT supports efforts of "TRNC
President" Talat to move forward with confidence building
measures that can help pave the way for a successful
beginning of negotiations. Oztas speculated that, as an
example, the Ledra Street crossing could be opened fairly
quickly.

¶6. (C) There are mixed views as to which of the two remaining
ROC presidential candidates might be better able to negotiate
a final settlement, per Oztas. However, MFA U/S Apakan
thinks Kasoulides can strike a deal that, in the end, will
gain approval of a majority of Greek Cypriots. Oztas noted
that with the plethora of experienced Cyprus-hands in charge
at MFA -- U/S Apakan, Deputy U/S Berk, and others -- the
right people are in place from the GOT perspective to push
this process forward to the end.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08ANKARA338.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000439

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DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: GOT REMAINS COMMITTED TO RENEWED PUSH FOR CYPRUS
COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 338
¶B. ANKARA 410

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: GOT officials reiterated their commitment to
push for a new effort to achieve a comprehensive settlement
on Cyprus (Ref A) during March 3 meetings with EUR DAS Bryza.
Turkey sees 2008 as a "window of opportunity" to make
progress in advance of spring 2009 local elections in Turkey
and the December 2009 EU deadline for GOT compliance with its
Ankara Protocol obligations. The GOT's position regarding
the broad outlines of a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus
(i.e., a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation comprised of two
"constituent states" through a "virgin birth" into a "new"
federated state) has not changed. Nor has the Turks' view
that new negotiations should take into account the Annan Plan
as the culmination of 30 years of negotiations. GOT
officials conceded that use of the term "Annan Plan" raises
hackles on the island. They were willing to consider
alternative language (e.g., "the body of work," with
particular emphasis on the most recent phase of talks) to
express their belief that a new effort to reach a settlement
will not start from scratch. Ankara believes the Ledra
Street crossing could be opened "at any time" and merely
awaits a push from SRSG Moller. On the NATO/EU impasse, FM
Babacan expressed frustration with continued pressure on
Turkey to give in on NATO support for EU missions while the
ROC takes every opportunity to block Turkish involvement in
ESDP. END SUMMARY

2008: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
-----------------------------

¶2. (C) FM Babacan and MFA DU/S for Americas and NE
Mediterranean Haydar Berk told DAS Bryza in separate meetings
March 3 that Turkey is committed to pressing ahead for new
comprehensive settlement talks on Cyprus in 2008. Berk
claimed that Ankara had been committed to pushing for a new
round of negotiations regardless of who emerged as the victor
in the ROC's presidential election. With the emergence of
Christofias in Nicosia and a newly elected Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government in place in Ankara, GOT
officials see 2008 as a "window of opportunity." It hopes
the international community will press the UN hard to bring
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots together. MFA Deputy Director
General for Cyprus and Greece Kerim Uras said that GOT
officials fear failure to achieve a settlement during this
time frame could cement the growing schism between Cypriots
on both sides of the island and increase momentum toward an
eventual two-state solution, a result they do not want. Berk
noted that Turks will once again go to the polls in 2009,
this time for local elections. That, and the EU's December
2009 deadline for Turkey to meet its Ankara Protocol
obligations to open ports to Cypriot vessels, will make it
much more difficult to achieve substantial progress in 2009.

¶3. (C) GOT officials are looking forward to the UN's
assessment mission it expects to be led by Under Secretary
General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe. Once that visit
is complete, the Turks hope a new Special Representative will
be named by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and will move
quickly to push both sides to resume comprehensive settlement
talks. Should the Greek Cypriots insist, Ankara is prepared
to agree to resume talks under the rubric of the July 8
process, but Berk said any such talks should be seen for what
they are -- discussions preparing the way for comprehensive
settlement negotiations. As such, they should be conducted
in a finite time period, say six to eight weeks, then evolve
into full-blown talks on a comprehensive settlement.

DON'T IGNORE OVER 30 YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS; WE WON'T START
FROM SCRATCH
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶4. (C) Babacan, Berk, and Uras all emphasized the Turkish
view that talks must begin on the basis of the Annan Plan.
They cannot begin from scratch. DAS Bryza noted the
difficulty for Greek Cypriot leaders to agree to resuming
talks based on the "Annan Plan," given its overwhelming
rejection by Greek Cypriot voters in 2004. "TRNC President"
Talat's February 25 letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon with its
explicit references to basing new talks on the "UN
Comprehensive Settlement Plan of 31 March 2004" had been seen
by some in Washington and Brussels as a "cold shower" to the
prospect of re-launching comprehensive settlement talks.
Berk expressed genuine surprise, then understanding. Ankara
would not object to Bryza's suggestion of a new formulation
to describe its position that a new round of negotiations
must incorporate the progress made over the past 30 years,

and especially the last four years of talks during 2000-2004.
Berk and Uras expressed reservations about referring only to
"the body of work" previous negotiations have produced,
fearing G/C attempts to pull discussions back to issues
previously covered and resolved. Bryza agreed that no one
wants to see the progress achieved lost. He thought
reference to the "sequential body of work" or "the body of
work taking into account the most recent negotiations" or a
similar formulation might be more palatable for all.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES CAN JUMP START THE PROCESS
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶5. (C) In an effort to build momentum toward a successful
relaunch of comprehensive settlement negotiations, Berk noted
the Turkish side is ready to pursue several confidence
building measures. The Turkish Cypriots are ready to open
the Ledra Street crossing "at any time." They just need
UNSRSG Moller to bring together Talat and Christofias to
begin that process. Uras noted the Turkish side is also
prepared to allow UNFICYP officials to utilize the crossing
at Lokmaci, though efforts to patrol or otherwise establish
UNFICYP control of the crossing are unacceptable and will
remain a Turkish redline. Pointing to the disagreement over
demarcation of the border at that crossing, Berk said he saw
no reason why agreement to open the crossing could not be
made with the proviso that any legal claims by the Greek
Cypriot side to the disputed 30-meter wide strip of land
between the current and former Turkish Cypriot fortifications
would not be prejudiced, but rather deferred until eventual
demarcation of the entire border if required. Demarcation
had not been an issue at other crossings that have opened.
There was no reason it had to be at Lokmaci/Ledra Street
either. GOT officials believe, however, G/C authorities
continue to raise objections related to such details at Ledra
Street because of pressure from G/C business owners who fear
low-cost competition from their T/C counterparts on the other
side of the green line.

¶6. (C) GOT officials hope other confidence building measures
might be pursued in short order. Uras cited two, including:

-- opening a newly paved road to enable Turkish Cypriots more
easily to access the town of Pyla; and

-- opening a new crossing in the west of the island to
connect Turkish Cypriot residents in the Kokkina enclave to
the remainder of the "TRNC," as well as allow Greek Cypriots
in the west of the island to drive directly to Nicosia rather
than the more circuitous route currently used.

GREEK CYPRIOTS NEED A CHANGE IN MINDSET
---------------------------------------

¶7. (C) Asked how the U.S. could be most helpful in getting
comprehensive settlement talks re-started, Uras said it would
be useful if we could convince the Greek Cypriots to change
their mindset about the need to isolate the Turkish Cypriots
in all areas. If the G/C side wants eventually to have a
true partner in the north as the country re-unifies, it will
have to demonstrate its willingness to work with Turkish
Cypriot authorities. The repercussions of the Greek Cypriot
policy of isolation is becoming increasingly dangerous on
some issues. Berk and Uras pointed to mounting difficulties
created by the Greek Cypriots on air traffic control that
have endangered the lives of passengers, citing a recent
example of an Onur Air flight from Istanbul to Cairo being
forced to circle for two hours while airline operations
officials were forced to scramble to re-file flight plans
with European air traffic control officials to remove
reference to Ercan Airport as a potential emergency landing
site for the flight. Admitting that claims of T/C economic
isolation are perhaps part myth, part reality, Uras said the
T/Cs are actually doing increasingly well, which only
improves prospects for a possible two-state solution. Uras
noted that a change in attitude toward the Turkish Cypriots
by the G/C side would show the Greek Cypriots are not trying
"to strangle them," and improve prospects for successful
comprehensive settlement talks. Berk reiterated that Turkey
is prepared to be flexible and has an action plan on Cyprus
that will enable the GOT to move quickly to respond favorably
to substantive progress on negotiations, to include opening a
port to Cypriot shipping.

¶8. (C) Berk said the GOT is also open to suggestions on other
steps it might take to facilitate the process. He urged the
United States to consider appointing a special envoy for
Cyprus negotiations once the UN assessment mission has been
completed. Uras noted the importance of the nature of the
appointees to be named by the UNSYG as a new SRSG and by the

Greek Cypriots as their chief negotiator. Both individuals
will have to be skilled negotiators who are able to
demonstrate flexibility. The Turks prefer a new SRSG who is
not a citizen of an EU member state. This would avoid the
dangers the GOT sees in the EU becoming somehow directly
involved in the negotiations. Uras also pointed to the need
for the UN to beef up its office in Nicosia to handle the
increased duties when serious negotiations resume.

NATO/EU
-------

¶9. (C) According to FM Babacan, the NATO/EU impasse is very
frustrating for the GOT. Turkey has been uniquely supportive
of NATO throughout the Cold War and has supported the U.S. on
enlargement and changing NATO. Cyprus is blocking Turkey on
EU cooperation, and Turkey is starting to believe there
should be a choice: isn't Turkey a long-standing, trusted
ally? Compared to Turkey, Cyprus's contribution to security
cooperation is minimal. Babacan said Turkey was trying to
contribute more to NATO/EU efforts, but is blocked at every
corner and was unsure Turkey could compromise. He described
NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer's letter on the
subject as "unfortunate." Ambassador stressed that we
support Turkey's position, are encouraging European capitals
to do so as well, and are not asking Turkey to compromise.
However, noting the Afghanistan model, he suggested Turkey
consider a way that would allow informal policy coordination
in support of the Kosovo police mission to proceed while we
tackle the bigger issues. One way forward might be a
non-NATO, non-EU "Kosovo contributors" meeting, hosted by
Belgium. The U.S. does not want Turkey to be isolated at the
March 6 NATO FMs meeting. Babacan said Turkey was ready to
be isolated, but appreciated the U.S.'s effort to help chart
a way forward (Ref B).

¶10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08ANKARA439.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000482

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND TALAT ON THE SAME PAGE

REF: A. ANKARA 439

¶B. ATHENS 367

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: "TRNC President" Talat's March 6 visit to
Ankara underscored the congruity of Turkish views and those
of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts on the way forward
toward resuming comprehensive settlement talks. The GOT
position remains unchanged: it wants to push forward on
comprehensive negotiations, intends to stay one step ahead,
and believes the basis of a deal can be found in language
agreed upon in the Annan Plan. GOT officials are looking
forward to the initial meeting between Christofias and Talat
as well as to the expected follow-on UN assessment mission
led by Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn
Pascoe. Turkish officials, not looking to make any
unilateral concessions at the moment, are focused on making
positive progress toward establishing negotiations. Once it
becomes clear there is serious intent on both sides, the GOT
will be ready take steps to push the process to completion.
PM Erdogan has written to the UNSYG as well as to P-5 and EU
leaders emphasizing Turkey's support for resuming talks and
laying out its long-standing position on negotiations. The
GOT looks to the USG to maintain the important role it played
and constructive position it held during negotiations leading
up to the 2004 Annan Plan referenda and aftermath. END
SUMMARY

¶2. (C) MFA Deputy DG for Cyprus and Greece Kerim Uras told us
"TRNC President" Talat's March 6 meetings in Ankara were
scheduled as a "quick coordination visit," during which Talat
briefed President Gul, PM Erdogan, Deputy PM Cicek, MFA U/S
Apakan, and Deputy U/S Berk on Christofias' election as
president of the ROC. Talat discussed what, in his view,
Christofias' election means for resuming comprehensive
settlement negotiations and briefed on some of the new
ministers who will join Christofias' cabinet. Although some
of AKEL's leftist rhetoric causes occasional heartburn in
Ankara, the view that AKEL historically has had "no Turkish
blood on its hands" resonates here and leads to a sense of
optimism. Uras noted that the GOT and "TRNC" had coordinated
in January their approach to the post-election period. There
were no changes as a result of this latest visit. The
Turkish side intends to continue to press hard for
comprehensive talks to begin as soon as possible and to try
to remain "one step ahead" of the G/Cs to keep the pressure
on.

¶3. (C) The one step ahead approach does not, for the moment,
include plans for unilateral concessions by Turkey. Uras
said opening a port to Greek Cypriot vessels or similar steps
that have been suggested are "not in the cards right now."
He added the GOT will be ready to do the right thing if it
becomes evident to all that there is serious intent on both
sides of the island to strike a comprehensive deal. Turkey
continues to emphasize its belief that talks should use as a
basis the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of 2004. The
Turks' core redlines remain that a final settlement must be
based on bi-zonality, political equality of the two sides,
and equal status of the two constituent states that will form
a new federation. Those are the principles PM Erdogan wanted
to underscore in sending similar letters to UNSYG Ban
Ki-Moon, EC President Barroso, P-5 heads of state, and EU
member heads of state (other than Christofias). (Text of
letter to President Bush, passed to us informally, in para 8.)

¶4. (C) Pointing to the reference in the letters to the "UN
Comprehensive Settlement Plan," we reminded Uras of DU/S
Berk's March 3 discussion with DAS Bryza (ref A) regarding
the G/C sensitivities to that terminology. We reiterated our
hope that the Turkish side can emphasize its wish not to
begin negotiations from a blank slate by making reference to
"the body of work" with particular emphasis on the most
recent phase of negotiations from 2000-2004. Uras said the
GOT understands that but, for now, believes that clearly
stating its position is important and that G/C sensitivities
should not prevent the Turks from expressing their opinions,
especially in private. The GOT has no intent to release the
text of Erdogan's letter to the public. In contrast, Uras
pointed to public comments made by Christofias during his
March 4-6 visit to Athens (ref B) where he used vitriolic
language that pushes all of the Turkish buttons (e.g.,
"Turkey is an occupation force," "the Annan Plan does not
exist anymore," any attempt to resurrect it would be "akin to
waking a vampire to us.") The G/Cs, as part of their
domestic politicking, seem to feel no compulsion to avoid
making provocative statements.

¶5. (C) Uras said the GOT looks forward to the initial meeting
between Talat and Christofias sometime the week of March 17,

ANKARA 00000482 002 OF 002


as well as to the follow-on UN assessment mission led by Lynn
Pascoe. He added the Turkish side is hopeful the UNSYG will
name both a new head of UNFICYP and, separately, a new
special envoy who is a non-EU member state citizen. While
the new head of UNFICYP can take care of everyday issues on
the island, the hope is the new SRSG will choose not to live
on the island, but rather come and go as negotiations
require. Uras noted when UNSRSGs live on the Greek side of
the island, they tend to adapt certain Greek Cypriot
prejudices toward the T/Cs, an eventuality the Turks hope
Moller's successor will avoid.

¶6. (C) Uras reiterated GOT optimism that the remainder of
2008 and the election of Christofias represent a window of
opportunity to achieve a lasting Cyprus settlement. He
pointed to a very positive March 4 article in the Nicosia
Greek language daily "Politis" that, according to Talat, was
an unprecedented commentary on the need for Greek Cypriots to
treat their Turkish compatriots with compassion and as equals.

¶7. (C) Uras also underscored the importance Turkey places on
U.S. support for the negotiating process. Noting that the
U.S. is an ally of all the guarantors and has good relations
with parties on both sides of the island, he said the USG can
play a critical role in ensuring comprehensive talks take
place and are constructive. He also made a plea for the U.S.
to adhere to its long-standing position of support for the
key principles that comprised the Annan Plan, pointing to the
June 11, 2004 speech by then-U.S. Deputy PermRep James
Cunningham before the UN Security Council as a strong
statement of support that was deeply appreciated by the GOT
and which it hopes remains U.S. policy.

¶8. (C) Text of PM Erdogan Letter to President Bush:

I am glad to observe that there is a renewed sense of
optimism in the international community for significant
progress and hope that the year 2008 offers a window of
opportunity for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting
settlement in Cyprus. Turkey is ready to assist the efforts
of the UN Secretary-General to revive the negotiating process
as soon as possible, between the two sides under his
good-offices mission. As a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, we would greatly appreciate your support in
our search for a comprehensive solution.

It is our considered view that the new round of full-fledged
negotiations should resume as soon as possible, from where we
left off in the spring of 2004, on the basis of the UN
Comprehensive Settlement Plan and thus the long-established
UN parameters, mainly bi-zonality, political equality of the
two sides and the equal status of the two constituent States
which will bring about a new partnership State.

To this end, I would like to underline that we continue to
support the constructive approach adopted by the Turkish
Cypriot side, which is reflected in the words and actions of
President Mehmet Ali Talat. In this context, I believe that
the guarantor States should all contribute and actively
support the process.

For your information, I would like to reiterate once again
that our expectation from the European Union and its members
States is to encourage the Greek Cypriot side to find a
solution that will bring peace and stability to the two
peoples of the Island and the region as a whole. We continue
to regard the EU's commitment to accommodate itself to the
solution as a fundamental aspect of the comprehensive
settlement.

It is my firm belief that lifting of the unjust isolations
imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people will also contribute to
finding a comprehensive solution. In view of the previous
commitments, I hope Your Excellency will take a leading role
so that concrete steps are taken in this regard.

I would like to inform you that I have already conveyed these
views to the UN Secretary-General.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Prime Minister



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08ANKARA482.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000709

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: UN USYG PASCOE CONSULTS MFA ON CYPRUS
PROPOSAL

REF: A. ANKARA 481
¶B. ANKARA 439
¶C. ATHENS 367

Classified By: Acting PolCouns Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Following consultations in Nicosia and
Athens, UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs
Pascoe visited Ankara April 8 to discuss the UN's proposal
for the next round of comprehensive Cyprus settlement talks.
MFA sources report the GOT is pleased with the details Pascoe
laid out in meetings with FM Babacan and MFA Under Secretary
Apakan, who underscored the importance of comprehensive UN
involvement and the need for a general negotiations timeline
up front. In addition, Apakan emphasized Cypriot President
Christofias and "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
President" Talat must conduct the final negotiations in order
to reach a politically sustainable agreement. In a brief
follow-on meeting with UK Ambassador Nick Baird, Pascoe
reportedly discussed the impact of the closure case against
Turkey's ruling party on the GOT's ability to throw its
political weight behind the Cyprus process. Baird and Pascoe
also talked about identifying possible (constructive) roles
for P-5 members France and Russia. End Summary.

¶2. (C) UN Under Secretary General Pascoe previewed his
proposal for the comprehensive settlement talks in Cyprus
with FM Babacan and MFA U/S Apakan during his April 8 trip to
Ankara. MFA Cyprus Department Head Can Oztas told us Pascoe
briefed Babacan in general terms on his recent Nicosia and
Athens meetings and explained the UN proposal. With U/S
Apakan, however, he delved into greater detail. Oztas
reported Apakan emphasized the GOT wants the UN involved in
the entire process, noting "Without the UN, there will be no
structure." Apakan also underscored the need to establish a
general schedule outlining the time and place for each phase
of the talks before beginning negotiations. Unlike "TRNC"
leader Talat's declaration that negotiations should be
concluded by the end of 2008, Apakan reportedly told Pascoe
that Turkey's timeline is "more flexible." According to
Oztas, Pascoe estimated the negotiations phase could be
concluded in roughly a year with a summer 2008 start date.

¶3. (C) Pascoe told GOT interlocutors that the Greek Cypriots
have agreed to use the Annan Plan as a basis of negotiation,
but will not publicly announce it, reported Oztas. Pascoe
envisions working groups would meet for three months to
review and "check off" technical aspects previously agreed
upon in roughly 7,000 pages of the Annan Plan. Once the
three month period concluded, the working groups would not
meet again. An additional 2,000 pages reflect undisputed
standing agreements related to Cyprus from the 1960,s
onward, and according to Oztas, Pascoe told GOT officials he
did not expect these to be controversial. The remaining 200
pages, including issues like securities and guarantees, would
require full negotiations. Apakan underscored the importance
of Cypriot President Christofias and "TRNC President" Talat,
endowed with the full authority of their legislatures,
personally conducting those talks in order to reach a
successful and sustainable agreement.

¶4. (C) Pascoe met briefly with UK Ambassador Nick Baird
before departing Ankara, according to UK Embassy contacts.
Pascoe told Baird his meetings with GOT officials were
general, but positive; the Turks made the right noises. The
two primarily discussed the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) closure case and its impact on Prime Minister
Erdogan's ability to throw his political weight behind
resolving the Cyprus issue. The two leaders also talked
about possible (constructive) roles for P-5 members France,
primarily, and Russia.

¶5. (C) Oztas noted that while the GOT will support whatever
the "TRNC" finds acceptable, Turkey's redlines remain
unchanged. All parties must uphold the Treaty of Guarantee
and Alliance. In addition, the final settlement must be
based on bi-zonal, political equality of the two sides, and
equal status of the two constituent states that will form a
new federation. Oztas reported the GOT has, thus far, seen
no real change in the Greek Cypriots, position on the
settlement plan other than Christofias says he would to

ANKARA 00000709 002 OF 002


negotiate in contrast to former Cypriot President
Papadopoulos' refusal to talk. Talat wants to see deeds and
not talk, according to Oztas. He added although Talat and
Christofias were "comrades in arms" in support of a
settlement, Talat still carries a sense that he was betrayed
by Christofias following the latter's 2004 decision to oppose
the Annan Plan after saying he intended to support it.

¶6. (C) The GOT has established a policy to refrain from
making public comments that could prejudice the negotiations
process, stated Oztas, a step Pascoe acknowledged during his
meetings with Babacan and Apakan. Oztas emphasized CHOD
Buyukanit's April statement that Turkish troops would remain
on the island until "a just and permanent peace is
established" was taken out of context by the press.
Buyukanit, claimed Oztas, was referring to the 650 Turkish
troops afforded by the Guarantee and Alliance Treaty.
Erdogan, visiting Sweden at the time, quickly clarified that
Turkish troops would begin withdrawal as soon as an agreement
was signed. Oztas added Turkish Land Forces Commander GEN
Basbug,s previously scheduled April visit to Cyprus
unfortunately came on the heels of Buyukanit's impromptu
trip, giving the impression that the Turkish military was
attempting to influence the process.

¶7. (C) Oztas called the incident that led to the temporary
closing of the Ledra Street crossing as "unfortunate." When
an unruly group approached the crossing, the "TRNC" police
stepped outside their guard posts to investigate. Viewing
the troops' movement as a hostile act, the group left and
shortly returned with anti-Turkish banners. The police then
denied passage. He cited media speculation that
Papadopolous, who opposed opening Ledra Street, may have
orchestrated the demonstration to occur while Christofias was
in London. Oztas reported the issue now seems to be
resolved.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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DEBLAUW

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08ANKARA709.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: U/S APAKAN PREVIEWS CYPRUS GRIEVANCES TO
BE RAISED WITH TROIKA DELEGATION


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) During a May 5 meeting on various subjects, Turkish
MFA U/S Apakan outlined GOT concerns about Cyprus that he
planned to raise with the EU Troika during its May 6 meetings
in Ankara. His purpose was not to complain, but to highlight
areas where Greek Cypriots and President Christofias are
acting unhelpfully. Apakan bemoaned that Cyprus is using its
EU membership as leverage against both Turkey and the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)." Furthermore,
he argued the Greek Cypriots' efforts to evoke EU
jurisdiction on broader Cyprus issues is an ill-disguised
attempt to link Turkey's accession aspirations to a
settlement. If Christofias has legitimate problems with the
negotiations, he should address them with Talat, not the GOT.

¶2. (C) Apakan planned to report five specific examples of
Greek Cypriot counter-productive behavior. First, the ROC
has prohibited high-level EU representatives from meeting
with "TRNC President" Talat. The policy that Papadopoulos
adopted in 2004, Apakan claimed, Christofias has chosen to
continue. Second, Christofias has pursued legal claims
against two projects extended to the Turkish Cypriots under
EU financial protocol. The EU Court of Justice's agreement
protects EU companies on both sides. Third, Christofias has
endeavored to make Turkish implementation of European Court
of Human Rights decisions a benchmark required to open
Chapter 23 on judicial and basic rights. This is something
new and an additional Greek Cypriot demand that extends
beyond the eight chapters that were frozen at Nicosia's
insistence in 2006. Fourth, Apakan noted Christofias has
created an "unfriendly tone" by frequently criticizing
Turkey, adding that the GOT has refrained from replying and
"microphone diplomacy." Finally, the Greek Cypriots are
reportedly trying to amend long-standing EU policy that
refers to future accommodation in the form of a comprehensive
settlement and interest in Cyprus having one voice and
sufficiently strong institution to be effective in the union.
Changes proposed by the Greek Cypriots aim to modify this to
provide for their continued dominance in post-unification
institutions.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08ANKARA890.html