C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001749
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2017
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CYPRUS WITH TURKISH MFA
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassador encouraged Turkey, in
conversations with MFA U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Berk July 6
and 7, to look for ways to avoid the appearance of
intransigence on Cyprus and take advantage of Papadopoulos'
vulnerability at home and in some EU capitals. He also urged
a forthcoming attitude toward proposed Papadopoulos/Talat
meetings and cautioned against continued sniping by Ankara at
UNSYG Special Representative Moller. Berk repeated Turkish
boilerplate. Apakan reiterated Turkey's hard line on the
July 8 process, but seemed to appreciate that a more nuanced,
tactical approach could be useful looking toward autumn
difficulties in the EU and maneuvering the Cypriots toward
real negotiations in 2008. We will continue to push this
theme. End Summary.
¶2. (c) During a meeting July 7 on various subjects
(septels), Ambassador asked Apakan's views on mooted
Papadopoulos/Talat meetings connected with the anniversary of
Gambari's July 8 process and with the work of the Committee
on Missing Persons. Apakan had just received a report on the
meetings idea, which he ascribed to Moller, and indicated
Ankara would be sorting out its views in coming days.
¶3. (c) Ambassador urged that Turkey consider how best to use
the current situation tactically. He said Papadopoulos is
under pressure at home and in some European capitals for
being too intransigent. This had led him to take certain
actions that, whether fair or not and whether Ankara likes it
or not, have made him and the Cypriot government appear to be
more flexible -- and Turkey less so. The appearance of
Turkish intransigence will not serve Turkey's interests in
the Cyprus negotiations and even less in its EU accession
work. While Turkey's options may be limited now by
parliamentary elections that are only two weeks away, it
should have more maneuvering room after.
¶4. (c) Looking past those elections, Ambassador continued,
Ankara has an opportunity to wrong foot Papadopoulos just as
he is now wrong footing Turkey. Pressure on him to be more
forthcoming is likely to continue as Cypriot elections
approach early next year. Agreeing to a formula that would
enable the Gambari process finally to move forward is more
likely to expose Papadopoulos' underlying inflexibility than
Ankara's current stonewalling ever will. Perhaps Turkey
could use this to lock in something it seeks. At a minimum,
it could confront and perhaps reverse the perceptions game
which it is now losing and which could be dangerous for
Turkey as it looks toward an EU progress report in November
and an EU summit in December.
¶5. (c) Ambassador also urged a positive response to the
proposed Papadopoulos/Talat meetings. If, as may be
reasonable, Turkey's July 22 parliamentary election makes
this inopportune now, then perhaps an adequate course would
be to do nothing and avoid responding until after July 22.
He strongly urged against any immediate, negative reply.
¶6. (c) Apakan replied with some distaste about the Gambari
process and Moller. He complained that the Cypriots insist
on raising property issues where they don't belong. The
Greek Cyprots want to ensure that the Gambari process is a
charade and that settlement negotiations never take place.
However, Apakan did express interest in the tactical
arguments. He noted the challenges Turkey will face late
this year in the EU. Decisions will depend on the next
government. Ambassador noted that constant sniping at Moller
has the perverse effect, perhaps especially in New York, of
ensuring that the SYG's special representative stays on. The
UN institutionally does not like the reality or appearance of
one side vetoing its mediators. If Turkey would shut up on
the matter, normal personnel rotations might take their
course, Ambassador suggested.
¶7. (c) In a separate conversation July 6, Deputy U/S Berk
complained that small confidence building measures (CBMs)
which some (including the US) are pushing cannot be separated
from a comprehensive solution, where all issues will be on
the table. Short term, the Greek Cypriot election cycle
prevents such a negotiation, but all efforts and preparation
should still be focused on comprehensive discussions. Berk
was not optimistic on the long run either. Polls of youth
attitudes on both sides of the island now show support for a
two-state solution. In principle, the two governments on
Cyprus support a confederation, but differ on what this
means. In Turkey's case, he said, the Annan parameters are
still valid when the negotiation process resumes. It is
impossible to start from zero, though some parts can be
re-negotiated. Berk appealed for continued US interest and
efforts with the Greek Cypriots and the UN.
ANKARA 00001749 002 OF 002
¶8. (C) Ambassador said the US is interested in exploring
ways to move the process forward. CBMs may be problematic,
but they are options. He made the same points as noted above
with Apakan on the importance of Turks not letting themselves
be portrayed as intransigent or unwilling to negotiate at a
time when the Greek Cypriots are looking more flexible. Berk
appreciated US efforts and advice. He said the GOT will look
for creative ways to keep the Greek Cypriots from exploiting
the situation.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07ANKARA1749.html
