Cyprus-Forum.com

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UNCLAS ANKARA 003821

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE; PLEASE PASS TO USAID/E&E STUDZINSKI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD EAID PREL PGOV ECON CY TU
SUBJECT: GOT DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN "TRNC" DECISION TO BLOCK
POTATO SALE

REF: NICOSIA 977

¶1. (SBU) We discussed reftel points on June 28 with Engin
Solakoglu, MFA Cyprus Department chief of section. Solakoglu
told us the GOT played no role in the decision by Turkish
Cypriot authorities to cancel a deal to export Turkish
Cypriot potatoes to Europe through the Greek Cypriot port of
Limassol. He said the GOT does not get involved in such
minor Cypriot issues, particularly given that the current
"TRNC" government is more sensitive than its predecessor to
being perceived as taking instruction from Ankara. He flatly
denied that the GOT has offered to compensate the "TRNC" for
the loss of the sale. Levent Bilman, MFA DDG for Northeast
Mediterranean Affairs, also told us separately that the GOT
played no role in the matter; he said he had not been aware
of the issue until we told him.
¶2. (SBU) Solakoglu also said he had not heard about the issue
until we raised it prior to our appointment, at which time he
searched for information on the Internet. He showed us a
copy of an article by Hasan Ercakica, "TRNC" presidential
spokesperson, from the June 26 edition of Yeniduzen, in which
Ercakica argues that the planned exportation was a political
ploy designed to give the impression that the "TRNC" is not
economically isolated and thereby pressure Turkey to open its
ports to Greek Cypriot shipping. Solakoglu said the article
is a good indication that the Turkish Cypriots blocked the
deal on their own, and "if you want to know about it you
should talk to them." Solakoglu offered that he agrees with
the Turkish Cypriot decision; the export deal, he said, was a
"political trap" that would have undermined the efforts of
Turkish Cypriots to end their economic isolation without
bringing any substantial benefits.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06ANKARA3821.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004077

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY UN
SUBJECT: TURKS POSITIVE ON GAMBARI BREAKTHROUGH; STILL
CAUTIOUS ON PORTS

REF: NICOSIA 1088

Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Turks have welcomed the weekend
breakthrough by D/SYG Gambari, and they have taken on board,
gradually, the need to use the weekend agreement as a
springboard for further actions. The GOT stressed with
Ambassador and visiting EUR DAS Bryza the need for some
measure to reduce Turkish Cypriot (TC) isolation. This, they
hope, would give them sufficient political cover to open at
least some ports and avoid a fall EU accession train wreck.
End summary.

¶2. (C) The progress that D/SYG Gambari achieved July 9 with
Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulous and "TRNC" leader Talat
(reftel), and EUR DAS Matt Bryza's visit to Ankara afforded
us ample opportunity to talk to the Turks. Even before the
weekend, in separate meetings with D/US Apakan and the Cyprus
desk, we sensed a shift away from "we can,t" and toward a
more constructive attitude than we have seen of late.

¶3. (U) Publicly, the GOT has welcomed the weekend
breakthrough. Responding to a question, MFA spokesman Namik
Tan stated:

"We regard the meeting of the two leaders in Cyprus as a
positive step. We believe that the technical committees ...
will contribute to an atmosphere of confidence between the
two sides. We think the consultations on issues related to a
comprehensive solution should be taken up on the basis of the
UNSYG,s Comprehensive Solution Plan (Annan Plan). We share
and support the views and elements mentioned in the statement
of 'TRNC President' Mr. Talat in his press conference
following the above mentioned meeting."

¶4. (C) In the few days since the meeting on the island, GOT
views have evolved gradually. They state in private, as in
public, that they are fully supportive of the UN process, of
Gambari, and of Talat's forward-leaning posture. Apakan told
the Ambassador over the weekend that, in fact, the GOT hardly
needed to lean on Talat; he was forward-leaning of his own
accord.

¶5. (C) Apakan,s initial response, per British Ambassador
Westmacott, was that the progress now meant the Turks had
more space and could sit pat. Westmacott responded that
exactly the opposite was true: the Turks needed to take the
opening to get a step ahead and show their goodwill. When
Bryza met with Apakan later that same day, Apakan's thinking
had evolved to an understanding that the weekend agreement
puts Cyprus back in the UN framework, precisely what the
Turks want. "Annan Plan" may no longer be the operative
term, but as long as it forms the basis, the Turks appear
grudgingly to have agreed to look past language. Now Turkey
was seeking to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, a
point all Bryza's contacts -- at MFA, the NSC, and at the
PM's -- singled out as their most important short-term goal.

¶6. (C) Bryza pressed Apakan, other MFA officials, NSC SecGen
Ambasador Alpogan and PM advisor Ahmet Davutoglu to be
forward-leaning and produce a gesture to keep Turkey one step
ahead. Bryza recognized that the Turks need something to
ease the TCs' isolation and give them the domestic political
cover to open at least some ports, thus avoiding a fall train
wreck in their EU accession negotiations. Outgoing NSC
SecGen Alpogan appeared the most forthcoming, but of those
who wield real policy influence, Davutoglu appeared
receptive, and Apakan gradually gained ground.

¶7. (C) The general outline exists -) de-isolation of the
TCs, opening of Turkish ports to Cypriot shipping. There is,
however, little consensus within the GOT on (1) what would
constitute sufficient easing of TC isolation, and even less
consensus on (2) what easing of TC isolation would open the
door for the Turks to do. Possibilities discussed for easing
TC isolation include:

--Direct flights, possibly charter, to Ercan airport. Apakan
referred to direct charter flights from the UK, though
Westmacott indicated that was tangled in bureaucracy. MFA
officials mentioned charter tourist flights from Israel, or
even cargo flights.

--The opening of Famagusta port, which Bryza explored, under
some form of joint UN/EU oversight, with customs duties going
straight to Brussels. The specific modalities were not
discussed, but interlocutors were moderately receptive and
this is on the Turkish radar screen.


ANKARA 00004077 002 OF 002


--Resurrecting the EU trade regulation in some form.
Westmacott indicated the UK was sounding out contacts in
Brussels on this, but also noted that, were the EU to
succeed, the Turks would need to be prepared to accept
language that, two years ago, they would not have swallowed.
Turkish contacts stressed that an EU trade regulation would
both give them sufficient domestic cover, and restore EU
credibility here on the ground.

¶8. (C) The Turkish response to any of these solutions would,
Bryza emphasized, need to be the opening of ports. If events
were to be sequenced, the Turks could consider "temporarily"
opening ports for a set period (perhaps two years), provided
the trade regulation is forthcoming. Westmacott endorsed
this approach as well with the Turks. He also noted that he
was using all available channels to send PM Erdogan the
message to stop boxing himself in with uncompromising public
language. (Note: Erdogan has repeatedly stated -- albeit
not since this past weekend -- that the GOT can do nothing
else until TC isolation ends. End note.)

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06ANKARA4077.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN IN CYPRUS: DO NO HARM

REF: NICOSIA 1099

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of Turkish PM Erdogan's
visit to Turkish Cyprus July 20 in separate conversations
July 14 with PM Foreign Affairs Advisor Davutoglu, MFA U/S
Tuygen, Deputy U/S and lead Cyprus negotiator Apakan, and FM
Gul. Ambassador said that we regard Gambari's progress
earlier this month as very significant and positive. It
opens new possibilities for moving forward on various Cyprus
fronts. We believe it is important that the effort succeed.
Erdogan's visit therefore comes at an important and sensitive
time. Ambassador urged that Erdogan find ways strongly to
express support for Gambari's initiative and for Talat. A
forthcoming gesture toward the Greek Cypriots, even a
relatively small one, would be very timely and could help
Turkey in European public opinion. While we understand the
domestic political backdrop for Erdogan, the less harsh
rhetoric there is, especially on trade and ports, the smaller
will the prospects for undermining what Gambari has achieved
or alienating Europeans who may see Gambari's efforts as a
possible way out of the trade/ports conundrum.

¶2. (C) Ambassador also noted that EUR DAS Matt Bryza would
be in Cyprus in coming days and promised to try to give a
readout and any suggestions on key messages prior to
Erdogan's departure.

¶3. (C) The Turks stressed Turkey's strong support for
Gambari and Talat. They said that Erdogan would give strong
backing to both. Gul said he had encouraged Gambari when he
visited Ankara earlier this month. Davutoglu observed that
Erdogan will have to reiterate his policy on trade and ports;
failure to do so would be read as weakness. Ambassador urged
again that the reiterations be as few as possible and that
Erdogan find ways to also be and appear to be conciliatory.
Apakan told Ambassador that he had gotten the message about a
forthcoming gesture from others and that Turkey is
considering this. He claimed that Erdogan will be measured
in his public remarks.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06ANKARA4133.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004329

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO NORTHERN CYPRUS:
DOMESTIC SUCCESS; DID ANYONE ELSE HEAR?

REF: A. NICOSIA 1099
¶B. ANKARA 4133

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Turkish PM Erdogan trekked to the "TRNC" July 19 with
a heavyweight delegation (six ministers and 20
parliamentarians) for a three-day visit to mark the 32nd
anniversary of the Turks' 1974 intervention. This first
visit of a Turkish PM to the island in eight years was
intended, per Turkish MFA Cyprus department head Huseyin
Muftuoglu, to send several messages:

--to Turkish Cypriots (TCs) to ensure them that whatever
happens, Turkey will stand by them;

--to Greek Cypriots (GCs), to let them know Turkey continues
to support a UN-brokered solution and will support TC efforts
in this regard; and

--to the EU, to emphasize that it should make good on its
promise to end TC isolation.

¶2. (C) Erdogan personally helped design the trip, Muftuoglu
stated, to reach out as effectively as possible to the most
aggrieved TCs. He signaled this by the length of the trip,
the seniority of the delegation and locations chosen to
visit. It was underscored by the PM's roadtrip (2-1/2 hours
by car each way) to Karpas, an impoverished area at the tip
of the "dagger", and by the ribbon cutting for a road from
Nicosia (Lefkosa) to Guzelyurt, which, under the Annan Plan,
would have reverted in part to the GCs. The PM further
emphasized Turkey's continued economic support by signing an
agreement for renewed economic assistance for 2007-2009 in
the amount of $360 million/year in aid.

¶3. (C) In his speeches, the Turkish PM underscored continued
support for a UN final settlement process. The watch words
continued to be bizonal, bicommunal and political equality.
In a television interview, Muftuoglu said, Erdogan agreed
that the earlier GC 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan meant
that it was legally null and void. The PM had added,
however, that any new solution would have to proceed from a
very similar basis.

¶4. (C) MP Murat Mercan, from Erdogan's governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP), traveled as part of the official
delegation, and offered us a similar assessment of the visit.
He reiterated that Turkey would not open its ports and
airports to the Greek Cypriots until TC isolation is eased.
Muftuoglu stressed that Erdogan truly believes the TCs have
been left out in the cold; he is equally sincere that once
isolation is lifted, Turkey would open ports and airports to
GCs simultaneously. The TC populace as a whole - even
Denktas supporters - believe Erdogan is on the right path, as
does public opinion in Turkey across the political spectrum.
EU support numbers in Turkey will go up, Muftuoglu concluded,
if the EU makes good on its trade promises to the TCs; for
Turks and TCs, it is a matter of trust. TCs believe they
were deceived.

¶5. (C) Comment: These are the messages Ankara hoped to
deliver at home and abroad. The question is whether - and
how - these messages were heard by the GOC and in Brussels.
Erdogan may have delivered his message in a conciliatory
manner, but he has effectively shored up domestic support and
locked arms with Talat, making it even more difficult for the
PM to ease back unless TC isolation eases.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06ANKARA4329.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004729

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA DAS SEES CYPRUS TECHNICAL TALKS GOING
NOWHERE FAST

REF: A. NICOSIA 1367

¶B. NICOSIA 1345

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Summary: In an August 11 meeting, a pessimistic
Turkish MFA Cyprus DAS equivalent Levent Bilman told us that
he saw little chance for progress on the island at present,
even on the technical talks. While Bilman is not a
decisionmaker, his views are a barometer of how more senior
MFA officials may be approaching the issue. End summary.

2.(C) According to Bilman, Turkish Cypriot (TC) and Greek
Cypriot (GC) advisers talked three times recently (August 1,
3 and with UN rep Moller; there had been a Talat-Moller
meeting as well. The Papadapolous-Talat meeting had not
occurred as planned on August 10.

3.(C) In Bilman,s view, absent an imposed structure and time
deadlines, little will happen. In the aftermath of the Annan
plan, he said, the GCs had declined third party involvement,
arbitration and "suffocating" deadlines -- all of which he
described as essential for forward movement. Even to get
Talat and Papadopolous to sign the two papers in early July
had taken an intervention from SYG Annan in New York, he
added.

4.(C) The technical committees -- set to discuss ten issues
-- were to begin technical talks, per Bilman, as soon as the
parties had exchanged lists on July 31. They exchanged their
lists: The TC paper stated that there must be a UN solution
and restated the basic parameters (bicommunal, bizonal,
federal). The GC paper, according to Bilman, listed nine
broad areas, similar to what they had presented at
Burgenstock. No technical talks have started, however. The
stalemate, Bilman claimed, resulted from GC insistence that
discussions on substantive issues start simultaneously.
That, he stressed, was not the deal.

5.(C) With respect to Moller, Bilman said the TCs (and Turks)
do not see him as constructive. Rather than moving the
process forward (a la DeSoto, who put to good use creative
diplomacy and the SYG's backing, and even like Gambari during
his latest visit), Bilman characterized Moller as pushing the
TCs unhelpfully to sell GC ideas to Talat. Bilman personally
believes that Moller must go; he has too much baggage.

6.(C) Bilman described Talat as increasingly alienated from
Moller and irritated by the GCs. Talat and the TCs remain
committed to a solution, Bilman stated, but the GC attitude
is helping solidify the status quo. The TCs do not want an
indefinite process; they want a timeline and progress. He
claimed the GOT was not attempting to influence Talat; it was
his game. The GCs, for their part, had proposed examining
the facts on the island and the federal systems of the world.


7.(C) On the issue of "community" versus "side", Bilman
stated emphatically that the TCs had moved past that barrier;
the "community" language was done with in 1975. The TCs are
a side or a party and won't be degraded to the level of
"community" versus the "President of the Republic," he
stated. This language was revived in the Papadapolous/Annan
Paris decree. (Note: The language that so annoyed the Turks
and TCs. End note.)

8.(C) With respect to Famagusta/Varosha, Bilman explained the
context in which it originally had been discussed in
Luxembourg. Talat adviser Pertev had stated at one point
that the GCs could have Varosha if the TCs could open all
ports including Ercan airport. His GC counterpart responded
that to accept such a position would amount to political
suicide.

9.(C) The idea of technical talks, Bilman reiterated, was to
take care of everyday, practical issues on the island; not
get into final settlement issues. When there had been a
murder in the south, the suspect escaped to the north and
Talat had begged for some information so they could jail him.
The response was that the GCs couldn't deliver any
information because they did not recognize the legitimacy of
the "government" in the north; the TCs had to release the
man. With respect to sharing information on avian flu (AI),
the GCs sent a fax message to the Turkish MFA with regard to
AI on Cyprus and declined to discuss the issue with the
"illegal regime". Those are the technical issues, Bilman
said, on which the GCs decline to engage. Instead they
propose that the property issue, which Bilman described as
the core of a Cyprus settlement, be discussed as part of
technical talks.


ANKARA 00004729 002 OF 002


10.(C) Comment: The Turks believe that Moller has had his
chance; they will no longer budge on this. Gambari, per
Bilman, is on vacation until the end of August. The Turks
know it is in their EU accession interest to get a UN process
moving; if is difficult to see the up side for them in
torpedoing technical talks. Whoever said what to whom on the
island, if they can't even get the technical talks up and
running, this is going nowhere fast. We need to find another
angle. End comment.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06ANKARA4729.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005333

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2021
TAGS: PREL TU EU CY US
SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TURKEY-EU TRAIN WRECK: CONSULTING IN
ANKARA

REF: A. ANKARA 5204 (EXDIS)
¶B. NICOSIA 1521
¶C. ANKARA 5268

lassified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 14 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This is a joint message from Embassies Ankara, Athens
and Nicosia.

¶2. (C) Summary: We are seeing increasing signs that Turkey
may indeed be headed for a train wreck in its relations with
the EU late this fall. Derailment would endanger Turkey's EU
accession bid, which the US has supported for decades. It
could seriously undermine Western interests here by feeding
the perception that the West is rejecting Turkey. It would
undermine our regional interests regarding Iran, Iraq and the
Middle East, as well as in promoting peaceful development in
Southeast Europe. To help forestall this, we urge a vigorous
US effort this fall. One component of this could be a
mission to the region led by USEU Ambassador Gray. End
summary.

¶3. (C) PM Erdogan has drawn a line in the sand on Cyprus; the
Turks will not open ports and airports to Greek Cypriot trade
(i.e., ratify and fulfill their Ankara Protocol commitments)
until the EU makes good on what the Turks see as its promise
to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation. In addition, Turkey is in
pre-election mode, with both presidential and parliamentary
elections scheduled for 2007. There are rumors that PM
Erdogan may be tempted to scrap the whole EU effort.

¶4. (C) Turkish Parliament convenes a special session
September 19 to take up a new package of EU-related reforms.
It will include the Foundations Law, the Ombudsman Law, a
harmonization package (the earlier rewriting of the Turkish
Penal Code in its entirety means relevent sections of
pre-existing legislation must be harmonized with it -- a
painstaking endeavor needed for full implementation), and
likely a re-write of Penal Code provisions relating to
freedom of speech (ref c). This may go some distance toward
giving Turkey's few EU friends ammunition to prevent a
breakdown in negotiations. But it may not be sufficient.

¶5. (C) If the parties are left to their own devices, the
situation could evolve in a way deeply disadvantagous to
Western interests in Turkey. The Finns are quietly working a
package that we should support (refs a and b). Turkish
public opinion, though, has soured on the EU and the West
generally, because of what Turks perceive as promises broken
and because they are increasingly skeptical that the EU will
ever let them in. This is mirrored in polling data, such as
the German Marshall Fund's (GMF) just-released Transatlantic
Trends, which sees Turks as increasingly cool to
relationships with the US and the EU, which they no longer
see as working to their benefit. Similarly, the GMF report
noted that the percentage of Europeans who see eventual
Turkish membership as a positive has slipped.

¶6. (C) This is an opportune time for active US diplomacy to
keep Turkey's EU effort on track, reflecting the longstanding
priority we have given to the issue. It will take place at
the highest levels -- when the Secretary sees FM Gul on the
margins of UNGA and when the President meets PM Erdogan in
early October. These Turkish leaders have an obligation to
strongly and actively reaffirm their commitment to the EU,
the West and the US, and to defend those relationships
against critics here. We suggest that the Secretary also
consider using UNGA meetings with European allies to
challenge them to consider carefully the kind of Turkey-EU
relationship they want, and the serious consequences of a
breakdown of negotiations.

¶7. (C) We believe another form of direct diplomacy could reap
real dividends. One central problem concerns misperceptions:
GOT misperceptions about Brussels and individual EU members
and their intentions, matched, we suspect, by EU
misperceptions on just how far Turkey is prepared to go to
maintain its active candidacy. To help us rekindle a
constructive debate here on EU accession issues and to
reinforce the right kinds of approaches to Turkey's EU
accession that the Greek and Cypriot governments say they
support, we propose that USEU Ambassador Boyden Gray consider
visiting the region this fall. If Ambassador Gray were
accompanied by one or several EU member state counterparts,
the effort could be doubly useful.

¶8. (C) Talks in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus could be billed as
educational, but would offer an opportunity to make our key
points on Turkey's EU accession and public diplomacy to
counter negative attitudes here and potentially also with

ANKARA 00005333 002 OF 002


Europeans. Such a visit could be a vehicle for refocusing
European audiences on the strategic, political, and economic
benefits of EU expansion and Turkey's inclusion in that
process. It could provide a useful forum to demonstrate to
the Turks that EU member states are serious on Cyprus -- and
to listen to the concerns of Turks, Greeks and Cypriots. (We
would not, however, envision any EU ambassadorial delegation
trying to mediate on Cyprus issues.)

¶9. (SBU) A visit this fall would be optimal -- definitely
prior to the EU's December ministerial. The planned October
24 release of the EU's progress report on Turkey, which we
understand could slip, it also a key data point. Debate in
Europe and here will sharpen at that time.

¶10. (C) If Turkey-EU negotiations reach a de facto or de jure
suspension, they may never be revived, and we will all have
lost an enormous opportunity to influence this strategic ally
in ways beneficial to our long-term interests. We hope that
USEU Ambasasdor Gray might be prepared to help us out.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06ANKARA5333.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY UN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-CYPRUS-EU - EUR DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH
TURKISH D/US APAKAN


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a 75-minute meeting with EUR DAS Matt
Bryza September 11, Turkish MFA D/US (U/S equivalent) and GOT
Cyprus pointman Ertugrul Apakan animatedly described the
latest state of play from Ankara's point of view. Apakan
stressed Turkey's preference for a comprehensive, UN-based
settlement, explained its discomfort with "mini-packages",
but stressed that the Turks are studying closely the recent
Finnish proposal and "aren't saying no." Apakan and Bryza
discussed the possibility of exploring legal challenges to
the European Court's 1995 decision against issuing EU
certificates of origin for Turkish Cypriot-produced goods as
a way to open up trade to northern Cyprus. According to
Apakan, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat is prepared to start
technical talks immediately, without a leaders' meeting as a
prerequisite. End summary.

¶2. (C) Apakan focused on Turkey's and Talat's preference for
a comprehensive settlement. Rumors we hear about Turkey
intervening with Talat to rein in the Turkish Cypriots "are
not true," he stated. Talat is well aware of GOT views but
is in charge of his own negotiations; Apakan said he talks
with the Turkish Cypriot leader only at critical junctures.
Right now, both Turkey and Talat want talks to start without
a prior meeting between Talat and Papadopoulos, which the GOT
views as key to preventing the derailment of Turkey's EU
membership ambitions. It is easier to work within the
context of an overall settlement, which allows for trade-offs
-- security for the TCs, for example, and property for the
GCs -- than with small packages. Apakan referenced the Annan
Plan and the way in which friends of the UNSYG had
contributed a balance of issues, all of which fit
symmetrically into the general matrix.

¶3. (C) Papadopoulos, Apakan stated, says the time is not ripe
to re-engage on comprehensive settlement issues; for Turkey
and the TCs, each and every time is ripe. There should be a
leaders' meetings to set a framework, and ensure that both
technical committee meetings and substantive working group
meetings follow a specific timeline. In July, the GOT had
encouraged both Gambari and Talat. In the interim, all that
had emerged were papers. Talat and Papadopoulos simply need
to announce a start and reiterate that the ultimate objective
is a comprehensive settlement. The process gains legitimacy
through gaining the imprimatur of the two leaders. Talat
remains Papadopoulos' appropriate counterpart.

¶4. (C) Apakan made it clear that Turkey has its eye on the EU
progress report which is slated to come out October 24 but
may slip. In that regard, they are looking hard at the
Finnish proposal, which contains some elements that would not
make the Turks happy. Apakan stressed, however, that Ankara
would not say no, would study it, view at it as a point of
departure, and would be willing to discuss the details. He
reiterated the importance of direct trade, opening Ercan
airport -- even for charter flights, which would help the
tourist industry -- and ending the isolation of the TCs. So
far they had seen nothing on paper; the ideas had been
delivered orally. He noted Ankara's difficulty in deviating
from its focus on a comprehensive settlement. The challenge
of mini-packages, he explained, is that they usually do not
provide enough room for maneuver for substitutions and
balances.

¶5. (C) Examining the run-up to the Republic of Cyprus' May
2004 EU accession, Apakan focused on legal obligations he
believed the GoC had undertaken. Under the Treaty of
Accession, the GOC had a responsibility to work toward a
comprehensive settlement once it became an EU member. This
was, he stated, also referred to in December 2002 EU Summit
conclusions. He cited Protocol 10 to the effect that the
entrance of the GC side into the EU would not damage the TC
side, and maintained the GCs had undertaken obligations not
to create discrimination against the TCs in terms of economic
development. The spirit of the statements was clear, Apakan
stated.

¶6. (C) Protocol 10 has been forgotten, Apakan lamented.
Protocol 3, which the UK Government concluded, states that
the Treaty of Establishment prevails: Greece, Turkey, the UK
and the two sides on the island gave birth to the RoC. As a
result, any settlement that replaces the 1960 "birth" should
emanate from those five parties. Bryza noted that in the
most recent UNSC UNFICYP renewal debate, the Greeks had
attempted to change the language from "sides" to
"communities". The USG would not agree to that because it
would undermine the Treaty of Guarantee, the second of three
founding treaties (the third is the Treaty of Alliance).
Bryza recounted how he told the Greek Ambassador to the

ANKARA 00005436 002 OF 003


United States that if Nicosia or Athens wished to renegotiate
or nullify the Treaty of Guarantee, they should say so and
pursue tis goal through direct negotiations.

¶7. (C) apadopoulos, Bryza noted, is an exacting contracts
lawyer. He agreed that the GC President's legalistic
arguments run counter to the spirit of the documents. Bryza
also focused on the 1995 decision to suspend the issuance of
certificates of origin. (Note: Cyprus DDG Bilman later told
us that, since the 2004 referendum, the EU accepts documents
issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. End
note.) Apakan added that the 1995 decision did not speak to
the embargo -- it focused solely on the stamp on the
certificate of origin and phyto-sanitary document. Nothing
in the RoC's EU accession should empower them to enhance
their power over the TCs, Apakan concluded. That was the
purpose of Protocol 10.

¶8. (C) Bryza explained that during his meeting with D/UNSYG
Gambari the previous week, Gambari had reiterated that the
main goal was a comprehensive settlement. That meshed with
USG policy. Gambari had requested that Talat be encouraged
to proceed with technical talks (or simultaneously with
substantive talks) even before a meeting between the island's
two leaders, because Gambari believed he could convince UNSYG
Annan to appoint a new DeSoto if/if technical talks are
ongoing. A USG goal, Bryza continued, was to get some
comprehensive process moving now to help give Turkey some
cover in October with the EU.

¶9. (C) Apakan responded that there was no need to encourage
Talat, who remains intent on moving ahead. The GCs say that
the technical talks must proceed concurrently with the
substantive working groups and that everything should be
studied indefinitely. According to Apakan, Papadopoulos'
list was organized not according to any UN principles, but
more in line with EU harmonization. To his knowledge, an
initial meeting between Talat and Papadopoulos was not a
precondition to starting other talks. Talat merely says that
it would be preferable, but not necessary, to have a leaders'
meeting first. Bryza said he would take that message back to
Gambari to try to bridge the communications gap.

¶10. (C) Bryza explained that he had been examining legal
angles, and believed there were arguments to be made in a
European court to the effect that no binding legal decision
states that shipping to Famagusta port is illegal. Apakan
interjected that all embargoes date from 1963-64 and
constituted a unilateral action by the GCs; there was no EU
or UN decision. UNSCRs 540 and 541 refer to the recognition
issue but not to an embargo. Apakan added that, as the GOT
had been assured repeatedly by a number of EU governments in
the attempt to get Turkey to open its ports and airports to
the GOC, lifting the embargo would not constitute
recognition. "We're not focused on getting the "TRNC"
recognition," Apakan stated, "We're seeking a settlement."

¶11. (C) Adding two additional points, Apakan professed
innocence with respect to Talat's presentation of the
winner's cup at the Istanbul Formula One race. Neither the
GOT nor Talat knew in advance, he claimed. It was not an
attempt to gain political benefit. On Lebanon and UNIFIL,
Apakan made the point that Turkey did not want to see the RoC
gain political or legal bonuses as a forward mounting base
for UNIFIL. Turkey understood UNFICYP would play a support
role, but wanted to ensure that this was not exploited.

¶12. (C) On the Finnish package, Bryza made clear the United
States was trying to assist the EU effort. Everyone knows
Famagusta-Varosha will re-surface, despite the Turkish side
having rejected the proposal in 2004. We recognize that for
Turkey, an eventual Varosha handover to the GCs must be part
of a final settlement. We would support the Finnish effort
not by offering alternative packages, but by trying to think
of a small number of additional elements that might plus the
package up sufficiently to make it acceptable to all sides.
We know Ercan is important to the TCs; property is important
to the GCs. One possibility would be to consider a form of
moratorium on development of certain properties in the north.
Apakan cautioned that the TCs would view a property
"moratorium" as an additional embargo, then noted that
perhaps something could be arranged with the new property
adjudication regime in the north: during the period when
cases are under Commission scrutiny, nothing can happen to
them. Bryza proposed exploring with the Finns later this
month the possibility of add-ons if their current package
proves too small and gets stuck, as Bryza suspects will be
the case. Apakan agreed. "We can't commit to a package,"
Apakan stated, "We don't have the authority, but we want and
need to be positive." He added that "in some ways, your

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mini-package relects the Turkish approach better than our
curent official position" but concluded that at this stage
of negotiations, Turkey would first focus on studying the
Finnish proposal.

¶13. (C) Apakan phoned us the following day to propose that,
if Bryza will be in New York during UNGA, that they continue
their discussions there.

¶14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06ANKARA5436.html

[boomerang]

(C) The disconnect is real. Turkey and the EU have made
it over previous hurdles by dint of last minute negotiations
and perseverance. The near miss on the opening and closing
of the supposedly uncontroversial Science and Research
Chapter at the EU's June ministerial is just the latest
example. These past eleventh hour deals may have given the
Turks false confidence that they can make it over this next
hurde as well without offering some form of compromise on
opening ports and airports to the ROC. We will continue to
give the Turks the message that, with both parties having
drawn their lines in the sand, absent some movement, they
need to prepare themselves for a different reality.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06ANKARA5463.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY
SUBJECT: ON A KNIFE'S EDGE: TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION PROCESS

REF: ANKARA 5976

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The next two months are critical for Turkey's
EU accession. The obstacles remain formidable. Should the
EU and Turkey fail to arrive at a modus vivendi over Cypru,
the result could well be a de facto suspension of
negotiations. With the Turks in a nationalist, "it's us
against the world" mood and pre-election mode, that could
easily shift to rupture. This would be bad for Turkey,
Europe, the region, an eventual Cyprus settlement, and
U.S.-Turkish relations. Over the next eight weeks, USG high
level interlocutors will need to talk often and openly, both
in Turkey and in Europe to help prevent this rupture and to
preserve our own bona fides here. End summary.

¶2. (C) Turks have been in denial for months over the Cyprus
train wreck scenario, believing matters will be papered over
eventually as has happened at previous crisis points. This
one is different:

--The slow pace of political reforms in Turkey and freedom of
expression prosecutions appear to leave many unsure of how
serious the GOT is about pursuing its European vocation.

--Many here, from the man on the street to bureaucrats in
government who have long pushed for Turkey's EU membership,
seem convinced failure is inevitable. No matter which
legislative boulder they push up the hill, no matter how
comprehensive their adoption of the Acquis, they believe in
the end Europe will say no.

--The GOT upped the ante when PM Erdogan traveled to northern
Cyprus, declared Turkey would not abandon it or open its
ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots until the EU made
good on what the Turks see as its promise to lift the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (in reward for their April
2004 "yes" vote on the Annan Plan).

--Nationalist sentiment is running high. This results from
the PKK terrorism issue, the European parliament report on
Turkey, action by the French National Assembly to criminalize
denial of the 1915 Armenian "genocide," and the approach of
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007. Few issues
jangle nationalist nerves more than Cyprus.

--The military probably still formally supports EU accession
as the present day manifestation of Ataturk's
European/Western ambitions. But some fear also that EU dicta
to put the military under civilian control could lead to the
unraveling of Ataturk's secular society, especially at the
hands of PM Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government.

¶3. (C) In addition, this EU-Turkey round goes forward without
recently departed British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Peter
Westmacott. At each previous crisis point, the UK and
especially Westmacott were instrumental, in real time, in
drawing out the crux of the problem and finding a compromise.
The new UK ambassador will lack Westmacott's contacts and
experience in Turkey, and no other EU ambassador can play a
comparable role.

¶4. (C) Enter the Finns. They have done an admirable job of
listening and identifying a loose package of Cyprus-related
elements that could allow this process to continue to bump
forward. Despite the obvious benefits for Turkey, Ankara has
embraced the initiative with alacrity and distaste. With
skill and luck, though, the Finns may be able, at least
temporarily, to satisfy both Turkish demands (easing TC
isolation) and EU demands (that Turkey open ports/airports to
the ROC), while kicking other Cyprus issues down the road a
few years. It is significant that the Finns have implicitly
linked the two, a leap many in the EU appeared reluctant to
make. The issues remain thorny. If the Turks say "yes,
maybe" but are not seen as being sufficiently flexible or
aggressive in negotiating the details, it will count against
them. Even if the Turks work effectively and the Greek
Cypriots balk, it is not clear that will suffice to prevent
negotiations from stalling on more than a few acquis
chapters. This is a risk we need to persuade the Turks to
take, no matter how hard the sell.

¶5. (C) A rupture would serve no one's interest. It would
isolate Turkey from Europe and exacerbate growing nationalism
here. It could remove virtually any prospect of a
comprehensive Cyprus settlement anytime soon, as well as any
incentive to do something constructive on Armenia. It could
undermine Turkey's cooperation with us and the Europeans on
Iran -- cooperation that will be critical in future years.

ANKARA 00006037 002 OF 002


It could hurt us on Iraq. Bluntly put, it risks seriously

changing the Turkey equation for the Europeans and the West
generally, which means us.

¶6. (C) Our role -- behind the scenes, persistently, and at
high levels -- is to persuade and cajole the parties (Ankara,
Brussels and key European capitals) to support and work with
the Finnish package. In the absence of a fully capable UK
ambassador, the Germans will be key. They will want to
minimize problems for their EU presidency next year. We will
also need to nudge UN U/SYG Gambari to move forward with his
efforts to foster a process that could lead to renewed UN
settlement talks. And when the right time comes -- when all
parties have engaged but the December EU summit deadline is
looming -- we need to be prepared to offer up additional
practical suggestions that will help give all parties enough
to make the Finnish package work. We have consistently,
through many administrations, supported Turkey's EU vocation.
In the wake of PM Erdogan's October 2 meeting with President
Bush, where the President pledged our support, we need to
work hard to keep this on the rails.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06ANKARA6037.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU EU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY ON EU/CYPRUS: SEEKING A NARROWER,
NON-VAROSHA PACKAGE


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Apakan told
Ambassador that while Turkey will continue to work with the
Finns to find an acceptable Cyprus package that allows Turkey
to meet its legal obligations to the EU, including Varosha
will be next to impossible. The Turks would be more
comfortable with a smaller package that looks more
legalistically at its preexisting Customs Union obligations.
They realize time is short. The Turks would also like the
USG to push in New York to get the Gambari process off the
ground. End summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador met with MFA Deputy U/S Ertugrul Apakan
November 8 to underscore USG understanding that the EU mood
on Turkey is dark and frustration high after the proximity
talks that never happened. The Turks have a large mountain
to climb in the next five weeks. It will be crucial not to
aggravate already substantial doubt that some in the EU
harbor as to whether Turkey really wants to work this out.
Ambassador stressed that the GOT needs to do all it can to
reinforce Turkish interest in finding a solution.

¶3. (C) The USG is urging the Finns to re-engage, through
shuttle diplomacy or via inviting a series of senior people
for individual discussions. The Finns may be prepared to
invite experts to Helsinki as early as next week. When that
happens, Turkey should be ready with concrete proposals. The
Finns will also be looking to flesh out their initiative,
perhaps by putting it down in writing. Turkey can further
help itself by taking steps on other key issues, such as
Article 301, which the PM raised recently with NGOs. Other
possibilities could include taking action on Greek minority
issues, Halki, etc. Ambassador pointed to the recent Greek
parliament decision to fund construction of a mosque in
Athens. What Turkish officials say publicly on EU accession
and the Finnish effort would also be extremely important.

¶4. (C) Apakan responded that the GOT would continue its
"positive approach" to the EU and Cyprus. The official
response to the EU progress report would be low-key and
constructive. On Cyprus, they would maintain contact with
the Finns. FM Gul had spoken with Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn and they were in contact on the diplomatic level.

¶5. (C) On process, Apakan said the GOT had advised the Finns
from the outset to hold four party talks. Turkey's reasons
were at least two-fold: Greece is a guarantor power and its
political assurances are needed on any Cyprus-related
agreement. Without them, the Turks cannot agree with Greek
Cypriot President Papadopoulos. And for implementation,
Greece must give its "open blessing". Apakan enumerated the
openings already offered to the Greek Cypriots (GCs): they
can come to Turkey without a visa and purchase one at the
airport. Word had been given quietly to Turkish customs to
allow GC goods to enter. They are coming in via Athens to
the tune of $7-8 million. Turkish Cypriot (TC) vessels. he
noted, cannot take their goods to Greece.

¶6. (C) Apakan said the Turks would speak privately to the
Finns on what he termed the "political geometry" of Cyprus,
his shorthand for stating how difficult it is for Ankara to
mix a final settlement issue - Varosha - with either
confidence building measures or Customs Union (CU) issues.
Under the Luxembourg presidency, the TCs and GCs had
discussed a basket of issues; then Varosha was inserted. The
package failed. Varosha does not fall under any Turkish
obligation to the EU; it appears in no EU document and, for
the GOT, it is too hard. Speaking confidentially to the US
and not to the EU, Apakan said that Turkey's obligation to
the EU is to fulfill the additional protocol. The purpose of
that document is to extend the CU to all new EU members,
including the ROC. In fact, the CU only applies to
industrial and specified processed agricultural goods, not to
services, and it says nothing about ports, airports or
airspace.

¶7. (C) To move in the right direction, Apakan continued,
shuttle diplomacy is needed. The Turkish position is to find
a way to work within the scope of the CU. For example, a
small package that pairs the opening of Turkish ports and the
lifting of the isolation of the TCs would be both meaningful
and digestible in Turkey. The GOT would be criticized at
home, but it would be politically defensible. With respect
to airports, since there is nothing in the CU on either
airspace or airports, how can Turkey open airports if no
consideration is given to opening Ercan? The smaller the
equation, the easier it will be to deal with, he stated.

¶8. (C) As a last resort, Apakan added, Turkey could consider
arbitration. He acknowledged that it might be riskier for

ANKARA 00006391 002 OF 002


Turkey than for others. This would be, however, for a later
stage. In the meantime, the Turks would talk to the Finns
and other EU partners.

¶9. (C) One other important element would be to get the
Gambari process moving. The letters have not reached Talat
and Papadopoulos because the GCs had asked that they be
delayed. Apakan asked for USG intervention to get this
moving; the parties would adjust accordingly.

¶10. (C) Ambassador responded that the point of the Finnish
package was to allow Turkey to meet its legal requirements to
the EU while ensuring that Cyprus does not pose an undue
barrier to Turkey's ongoing accession negotiations. The
trick is to find a formula that is politically doable both in
Ankara and in Nicosia; no small feat. The USG is concerned
and wants to be helpful. Turkey needs to be active and
energetic in working with the Finns and trying to find a
solution.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06ANKARA6391.html