Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S JANUARY 24 CYPRUS PROPOSAL UNLIKELY TO
SOLVE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE


Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Ankara's EU diplomats view positively FM
Gul's January 24 proposal for mutual opening of Turkish and
northern Cypriot ports and airports but see little likelihood
the proposal will solve the issue of Turkey's Customs Union
obligations. The GOT is indicating it will not open its
ports and airports without some EU gesture for Turkish
Cypriots. We need to ensure that the discussion of these
EU-related issues continues -- preferably for a long time --
so that other items on the accession agenda and the UN's
mediation efforts can make progress. End Summary.

Domestic Reaction Positive
--------------------------

¶2. (U) Turkish domestic reaction to FM Gul's January 24
proposal calling for mutual opening of Turkish, Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ports and airports was
overwhelmingly positive. Press commentary, reinforced by PM
Erdogan's remarks January 31, has emphasized Turkey's
positive approach on Cyprus, as contrasted with Greek Cypriot
intransigence. EU nay-sayer and main opposition Republican
People's Party (CHP) leader Baykal's criticism of the
proposal as a declaration of intent to make concessions got
little resonance.

¶3. (C) Reaction in Ankara to the Department Spokesman's
statement on the proposal was positive. Journalists from
mainstream Vatan and pro-government Islamist-oriented Yeni
Safak newspapers expressed surprise and pleasure to Embassy
IO at what they saw as a forward-leaning U.S. position.
Turkey's leading all-news TV channel NTV ran a headline
touting "Full U.S. Support for Turkey's Proposal." According
to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman, FM Gul
"appreciated" the statement.

Proposal Reflects Turkish Domestic Politics
-------------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Mutual opening of ports and airports, the heart of
the proposal, reflects several things. One is the GOT
position that equates the EU's outstanding pledge to ease
Turkish Cypriot isolation with Turkey's obligation to
implement the Customs Union by opening ports and airports.
Domestic political factors buttress this position: Turkey
sees opening ports and airports as a "concession" that,
without some EU gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, would result
in a firestorm of criticism of PM Erdogan's government,
including from within his own Justice and Development Party
(AKP). Obtaining a quid pro quo for the Turkish Cypriots,
the government believes, is essential to creating a situation
in which Turkey can meet its Customs Union obligations and,
more importantly, keep on track the barely initiated EU
accession negotiations started last October.

EU Diplomats See No Break in Impasse
------------------------------------

¶5. (C) While EU diplomats in Ankara see the proposal as a
positive step, none expect it to resolve the issue of
Turkey's implementation of its Customs Union obligations. At
most, they think it may buy the GOT time, delaying a showdown
over implementation until late 2006 or early 2007.

¶6. (C) EU diplomats here, even the UK and others sympathetic
to Turkey, describe the crux of the matter: the EU views
Turkey's obligation as contractual and binding, while it
views the EU's commitment toward Turkish Cypriots as
political and subject to consensus. UK FS Straw nudged
closer to the Turkish position when, in January 25 remarks in
Istanbul, he said "These are separate tracks but they must
both work."

¶7. (C) None of our EU contacts predicts the proposal will
affect the impasse over trade and aid for Turkish Cypriots or
result in any other EU move toward Turkish Cypriots. They
emphasize the EU's natural tendency to side with affected
member states. One EU contact referred to a Cyprus impasse

ANKARA 00000391 002 OF 003


as still "the perfect pretext" for the EU's Turkey-skeptics
to block accession.

¶8. (C) The one hope EU diplomats here see is that flexible
and persistent Turkish diplomacy, coupled with heavy-handed
ROC intransigence, may eventually lead member states to
increase pressure on the ROC. The German Ambassador
suggested that FM Gul's initiative may change the psychology
in Europe; FS Straw's comments had reminded nations that
Turkey does not bear all the onus for the Cyprus stalemate.
Turkey's initiative may also lead governments to view Greek
Cypriot obstreperousness more critically. And some may
recognize, the German Ambassador indicated, that the EU
should resist Greek Cypriot efforts to enmesh the EU too
deeply in issues that should be dealt with by the UN in the
context of overall settlement negotiations.

GOT in No Mood For Further Cyprus Concessions
---------------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Additional flexibility will, it appears, be difficult
for the GOT. PM Erdogan and his AKP government reject the
idea of further unilateral concessions on Cyprus. In a
January 26 meeting with Erdogan, UK FS Straw urged the PM to
consider more gestures, including troop withdrawals, to win
Turkey credit in the EU.

¶10. (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, Erdogan was
"unbending." Erdogan replied that Turkey is already "ten
steps ahead" of the Greek Cypriots and further concessions
would be perceived as weakness. Claiming the EU has not kept
promises to Turkey about Cyprus, Erdogan asked Straw
rhetorically if the EU would put in writing the benefits
Turkey would get in exchange for further concessions.
Erdogan pointedly noted that he had to contend with domestic
politics. When Straw urged Erdogan to bring the protocol
extending the Customs Union to new member states, including
the ROC, to Turkey's parliament for ratification, Erdogan
replied that the European Parliament had not yet ratified it.
Erdogan's public comments January 31 echoed these points.

¶11. (C) According to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG
Bilman, FM Gul also rejected Straw's pitch for further
Turkish gestures in their January 26 meeting. According to
Bilman, Gul handed Straw a list of previous Turkish
initiatives on Cyprus and said Turkey was suffering from
concessions "fatigue." Erdogan advisor Omer Celik likewise
ruled out unilateral moves on Cyprus, including opening port
and airports, in our January 26 meeting with him.

Turkish Diplomatic Efforts Continue
-----------------------------------

¶12. (C) Immediately after Gul's January 24 rollout of the
proposal, Turkish diplomats demarched a number of foreign
capitals and urged support. Gul personally called at least a
couple of his EU colleagues. According to DDG Bilman, the
MFA focused on EU, P-5 and OIC countries.

¶13. (C) The MFA is preparing a demarche in response to the
Greek Cypriot January 25 aide memoire detailing the ROC's
"utter rejection" of the Turkish proposal. The MFA's current
goal is to prevent the EU from adopting a common position
rejecting the Turkish proposal.

¶14. (C) An EU statement of outright rejection is unlikely.
UK PolChief Miller and FirstSec Barnes predict that the UK,
having expressed support for the proposal, will not allow a
negative statement by the EU Presidency. They expect either
a bland statement noting the proposal or no statement at all.
Although Austria is a notorious Turkey-skeptic, Austrian DCM
Steiner rules out any Presidency statement absent consensus.
A German diplomat predicts the EU will be influenced by the
UN's reaction to the proposal.

¶15. (C) Bilman says Turkey will continue to push the
proposal "for some time" despite the ROC rejection. He
emphasizes the proposal is not "take it or leave it," noting
that part of the proposal envisions a high-level conference
to "finalize" it.

ANKARA 00000391 003 OF 003



¶16. (C) Comment: Turkey has rolled out Gul's initiative
well and gotten more positive commentary than seemed likely
six weeks ago in the wake of Orhan Pamuk's trial. It needs
to continue to be active and to promote its flexibility,
including on Cyprus and non-Cyprus issues. Our diplomacy
should aim to support Turkey's efforts, encourage the EU to
find ways to be responsive, and urge the EU to avoid imposing
a premature Cyprus litmus test that would usurp the UN's
proper role in mediating a settlement of the dispute. If the
discussion about fulfillment of Turkey's Cyprus-related
Customs Union obligations can be dragged out while the UN
re-starts its efforts and Turkey's broader accession process
has a chance to gain steam, it can only be helpful. For now,
the USG objective should be to help persuade the EU and the
UN to take the initiative as a basis for further discussion.
End Comment.
WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06ANKARA391.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU CY EU
SUBJECT: NO JOY IN ANKARA OVER EU AID FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS


Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: FM Gul, MFA working levels and Turkish
opposition politicians believe that the EU's de-coupling of
trade and aid for Turkish Cypriots forecloses any possibility
the EU will approve direct trade with the "TRNC," a top
Turkish priority. They are also unhappy with the degree of
Greek Cypriot control over the aid and what they view as its
small amount, although the GOT is unlikely to press Turkish
Cypriots to reject the aid. Far from being the gesture to
Turkish Cypriots the GOT needs to open its ports and airports
to the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), the aid issue may further
polarize the sides and is a disappointment in Ankara. End
Summary.

FM Gul: De-Coupling "Unacceptable"
----------------------------------

¶2. (C) Departing for Doha on February 25, FM Gul expressed
surprise at COREPER's aid decision and told reporters
de-coupling trade and aid provisions was "unacceptable." Gul
pointed out that Turkish aid to the "TRNC" was several times
the 139 million Euro package. According to MFA Northeastern
Mediterranean Affairs DDG Bilman, Gul later privately called
EU term President Austrian FM Plassnik from Doha to express
his displeasure over the de-coupling.

MFA: Provision "Kills" Direct Trade
------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Bilman reiterated what he has told us for months --
de-coupling "kills" any possibility that the EU will approve
direct trade with the "TRNC," which has been a top Turkish
priority since the failed 2004 referendum on the island.
Bilman pointed to FM Plassnik's February 27 statement that
"we have honored our commitment as the EU to the Turkish
Cypriot community" as evidence that the EU believes it has
done the necessary (and what is doable) and will now not feel
obligated to move on the trade regulation.

¶4. (C) Predictably, Bilman also criticized both Greek
Cypriot control over the aid and the amount, which he called
"peanuts" in comparison to Turkey's annual $450 million
support for the "TRNC." Bilman, the MFA's in-house Cyprus
technical expert, assessed EU approval of the regulation as a
net negative development for Turkey because trade now appears
out of the picture.

¶5. (C) Main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) MP
Inal Batu, a member of parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee
and a former Turkish Ambassador to the "TRNC," told us the
aid provision is a "setback." Batu, too, is critical of the
de-coupling, Greek Cypriot control and the small amount of
funding. Turkish media coverage has also been overwhelmingly
negative, much of it focusing on perceived continued
isolation of Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey Unlikely to Press "TRNC" to Reject
-----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) The MFA has in the past threatened to press the
"TRNC" to reject EU aid de-coupled from trade or controlled
by the Greek Cypriots. According to CHP MP Batu, the GOT
should follow through on its threat.

¶7. (C) However, in his February 25 statement, Gul said
accepting or rejecting the aid is a decision for the "TRNC."
UK Ambassador Westmacott has been urging the MFA not to push
the "TRNC" to reject the aid. Bilman predicted to us the GOT
will not press the "TRNC" to reject the aid because "it will
be blocked anyway" by the Greek Cypriots.

¶8. (C) Comment: The aid issue is almost unanimously viewed
in Ankara as a disappointment and another broken EU promise,
not the gesture that will give the GOT the political cover to
open its ports and airports to the ROC. EU assertions that
this is a step forward -- and that this fulfills what GOT
officials view as EU promises to Turkish Cypriots -- will get
a chilly reception here. End Comment.
WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06ANKARA1002.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY UNFICYP EU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA CAUTIOUS ABOUT CYPRUS TECHNICAL TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 294

(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The Turkish MFA is approaching cautiously
the idea of UN brokered technical-level talks (reftel),
wanting to avoid topics the GOT considers final settlement
issues. MFA officials welcome the talks cautiously for what
they are and recognize the importance of face-to-face
discussions, but do not want these technical talks to become
a substitute for an Annan-Plan based approach to overall
settlement. End Summary.

MFA: Talks Limited to "Matters that Affect Daily Lives"
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶2. (U) As of the end of the day on March 3, the Turkish
Government had yet to make any public statement about the
talks.

¶3. (C) When we called on MFA Cyprus Department Head Huseyin
Muftuoglu March 3, Muftuoglu claimed the idea for technical
talks had actually originated from the Turkish Cypriot side.
He stated that the GOT supports face-to-face meetings between
GOC and Turkish Cypriot officials, whatever the level, and
that the Turks will not limit Talat's room for maneuver. He
emphasized the talks should be limited to "matters that
affect the daily lives" of people on the island; avoid issues
like Varosha and demilitarization that should be left to
final settlement; and must not become a substitute for
comprehensive settlement talks. The GOT does not, Muftuoglu
said, view this as the beginning of a bottom-up process:
these are technical talks.

¶4. (C) We pointed out that the talks are taking place under
UN aegis, and between Turkish and Greek Cypriot
representatives, two key Turkish goals. We told Muftuoglu
that Turkey should do everything possible to make sure
Turkish Cypriot representatives are, and are seen as,
empowered to negotiate and conclude agreements, and to
demonstrate that Turkey is doing nothing to block progress.
We assured him the U.S. continues to view the UN forum and
the Annan Plan as the basis for final settlement.

UK Also Urging Constructive Approach
------------------------------------

¶5. (C) We spoke separately with the UK Ambassador, who has
also approached the MFA, encouraging the GOT to be seen as
constructive on the talks and do nothing to alienate the UN.
However, Muftuoglu's boss, DDG Bilman, before leaving with FM
Gul for Madrid, expressed considerable dismay about the
February 28 joint statement about the talks and declined to
discuss the issue in detail with the UK Cyprus watcher.

¶6. (C) Comment: It is positive that the GOT wants credit to
go to the TCs for tabling the idea of technical talks first.
However, the GOT is wary of anything that appears to shift
the focus away from the months-long Greek Cypriot refusal to
clearly state their proposed changes to the Annan Plan. The
MFA worries that failure to reach agreement in technical
areas, or refusal to expand the talks to areas like Varosha
and demilitarization, risks shifting to the TCs and Turks the
aura of intransigence they believe is currently upon the
Greek Cypriots. End Summary.
WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ANKARA1104.html

[boomerang]

Cyprus
------

¶6. (C) Tuygan summarized the GoT's recent efforts on Cyprus.
Turkey has tried hard. All it hears in response is that the
Greek Cypriots are a member of the EU and Turkey must live up
to its obligations to open its ports and airports. We need,
he stressed, to work together to avoid deadlock, which could
come by late summer/early fall. The GoT is willing to work
on ideas. It is hard to understand what is wrong with the
essence of FM Gul's January 24 proposal in which, tacitly,
the reciprocal opening of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ports
and airports - either of which, on its own, could be
construed as moving toward recognition - would not imply
recognition.

¶7. (C) Fried noted his appreciation for the GoT's desire to
work on different approaches. Of course, Turkey must meet
its obligations to the EU, but we need to work together to
help find ways to make it possible, taking advantage
especially of pro-settlement forces in the north. The USG
internal redlines continue to be that any settlement for
reunification must be a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We
are familiar with GOC President Papadapolous' style. Tuygan
(please protect), stated firmly, but off the record, that,
even with respect to Cyprus, Turkey could not play the rabbit
while the lion of Iran was out there.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ANKARA1651.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY UNFICYP
SUBJECT: URGING A POSITIVE TURKISH APPROACH TO CYPRUS
TECHNICAL TALKS

REF: A. STATE 42725

¶B. 16 MARCH 2006 LIBBY/BLAHA E-MAIL

Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: DCM urged MFA Deputy U/S Apakan on March 24
to set a positive agenda for upcoming technical talks between
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and to develop a good working
relationship with SRSG Moeller (refs A and B). Apakan blamed
Moeller for what he termed the "professional mistake" of the
February joint press statement about the talks, but claimed
the Turkish side has no problems with him. The Turkish side
is still nervous that the technical talks will eclipse Annan
Plan-based overall settlement efforts. DCM pointed out that
with overall settlement efforts stalled, the technical talks
are Turkey's best opportunity to regain momentum on Cyprus.
End Summary.

U.S. Concerns About Turkey's Lost Momentum
------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) DCM stated that Turkey and the U.S. share the same
priority goal: that Cyprus not derail Turkish EU accession.
The U.S. is pleased with the UN willingness to sponsor
technical talks and Turkey should be as well, since they
would take place under UN aegis between Turkish and Greek
Cypriot leaders.

¶3. (C) Apakan agreed the technical talks proposal is
positive. Apakan claimed Turkey had not overreacted to what
it viewed as a series of negative recent developments: the
February 22 attempted entry to a Turkish port of a Greek
Cypriot ship; the EU financial regulation; the February 28
joint press statement. Apakan called the press statement a
"professional mistake." Apakan blamed the statement on
Moeller but Gambari's letter clarifying the statement had
been helpful.

¶4. (C) DCM expressed concern that Turkey has lost momentum
on Cyprus. The technical talks are potentially advantageous
for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, who do not have to agree to
discuss topics they feel are inappropriate. SRSG Moeller is
here to stay and Turkey would do well to develop good working
contact with him. Turkey's recent complaining about Moeller
has been counterproductive.

Turkish Concerns About the Annan Plan
-------------------------------------

¶5. (C) Apakan insisted Turkey has "no problem" with Moeller
and that Talat had put off meeting with Moeller only due to
health reasons. However, Apakan said there needs to be
clarity that the Annan Plan remains the only basis for
settlement. If the Annan Plan is scrapped, it would be
impossible to recoup the UN's energy for another final
settlement effort. Apakan claimed P-5 member Russia was
attempting to get rid of the Plan.

¶6. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DDG Bilman added
that it would be difficult to get domestic consensus in
Turkey for another settlement plan should the Annan Plan be
scrapped. Bilman, who was in the bureaucratic trenches
during intense 2004 negotiations, said getting consensus on
the Annan Plan had been an enormous and politically costly
effort. Bilman said he is in contact with Moeller and Turkey
is prepared to work with him. However, Moeller should be
careful to understand the need for Turkey's agreement in
order t move forward, not just the P-5's, and should do
nothing to let Papadopoulos off the hook on the Annan Plan.

¶7. (C) DCM assured Apakan that the Plan is still on the
table, but with overall settlement efforts stalled, the
technical talks are the best chance for movement on the UN
front. Turkey should make a public statement of support for
the talks and seek ways to take more constructive steps with
the UN. Turkey needs to shift the focus, publicly take the
initiative, and set a positive agenda for the talks. Apakan
said Turkey would take a positive approach.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

ANKARA 00001655 002 OF 002



MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ANKARA1655.html

[boomerang]

(C)On Cyprus, Bryza said the U.S. was working to reduce
the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. The U.S. was also supporting
efforts by UNSYG Annan to rejuvenate Cyprus settlement
talks. Bryza reassured Gul that the U.S. supported the
launch of technical talks on the 10 specific items agreed between
the Turkish Cypriots and the UNSYG. But he also called on Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to agree on a common agenda, which might
include the elements discussed by Annan and Republic of Cyprus
President Papadopoulos in Paris. Bryza described U.S.
efforts to work with the European Commission to help Turkey
fulfill its obligations to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships.
Bryza reiterated U.S. support for FM Gul,s comprehensive proposal on
opening all ports on Cyprus and in Turkey as a worthy long-term goal,
but cautioned that achieving it required interim steps. Perhaps the
most promising option was the "Famagusta-Varosha" proposal, rejected by
both sides during Luxembourg,s EU Presidency, but possibly containing
the nucleus of a way forward. (Note: According to this proposal,
Famagusta port would open for trade with Turkish Cypriots, but be
administered by the UN and/or EU. In exchange, the village of Varosha
would return to Greek Cypriot jurisdiction. End note.)

¶12. (C) Minister Gul responded that he would consider the
Famagusta-Varosha proposal. But Turkey had taken "so many steps" on
Cyprus, having reversed Ankara,s previous policy and ultimately
supporting the Annan Plan and received little in return.
He lamented that Papadopolos had openly advocated ejection of
the Annan Plan, but had suffered no cost. Papadopoulos therefore had
no incentive to compromise. If Papadopoulos simply rejected the entire
Annan Plan, it would be impossible to move toward a comprehensive
settlement. DAS Bryza agreed that the structure of the Annan Plan
needed to form the starting point of settlement negotiations,
but recommended that the Turkish side agree to stop referring
to the "Annan Plan" by name. Bryza hoped that Papadopolos would outline
his objections to the Annan Plan with clarity and specificity, in
priority order, and in writing, as UNSYG Annan had requested in his
post-referendum report.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06ANKARA2042.html

[boomerang]

EU United on Cyprus
-------------------

¶4. (C) Vanhanen told Erdogan the EU states are united on the
need for Turkey to ratify and implement the Ankara Protocol,
which requires Turkey to open its ports to Greek Cypriot
shipping. He said Turkey is obliged to do so as a Customs
Union member, and this obligation cannot be linked to any
other issues. Vanhanen noted that the EU will release its
annual progress report on Turkey in October or November. The
report will address the Protocol issue, and this could harm
Turkey's candidacy if there are no new developments. The
report will also focus on human rights issues such as freedom
of religion, freedom of expression, cultural rights, the
draft anti-terror law, and civil-military relations.

¶5. (C) Erdogan said Cyprus remains a "sensitive issue" for
Turkey. He reiterated standard Turkish complaints about the
continued isolation of the "TRNC," despite the fact that
Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan. The GOT,
he said, took the political risk of backing the Annan Plan,
but has nothing to show for it. The EU took in the Greek
Cypriots, but has not taken any meaningful steps regarding
the "TRNC." All parties involved need to work toward a
comprehensive solution that is just and fair. Erdogan
stressed that Turkey cannot open its ports to Greek Cypriot
shipping before progress is made in alleviating the isolation
of the "TRNC."

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06ANKARA3098.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003265

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2021
TAGS: PREL EU UN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY/EU - NO APPARENT MOVEMENT ON PORTS ISSUE

(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) A downbeat Turkish MFA Northeastern Mediterranean
Deputy Director General Bilman told us June 5 there has been
no progress on either opening Famagusta port or referral to
EU dispute resolution mechanisms of the ports/airports issue.
On Famagusta, the MFA appears to be relying on the UN and EU
to come up with a proposal. Bilman said, "The UN has done
nothing" on Famagusta, acknowledging the UN is reluctant to
get involved in what is an EU matter.

¶2. (C) Bilman said the MFA has not yet raised with Turkey's
political leadership the idea of referring the ports/airports
issue to either the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or
arbitration. The MFA has asked three international legal
experts for opinions on 1) the advantages and disadvantages
of this route; 2) which forum would be best for Turkey; and
3) the best way to proceed. Bilman expects their opinions by
the end of June.

¶3. (C) Bilman is not optimistic that Turkey will make a move
on ECJ or arbitration before this fall's implementation
review. He doubts that such a move would obtain either EU
unanimity or the agreement of Turkey's political leadership.
Moreover, Bilman said Turkey is getting increasing signals
from the EU that failure to open ports and airports could
result in a complete halt in negotiations, not just freezing
specific chapters. Bilman reiterated that Turkey will not
unilaterally open ports and airports to Cypriot vessels and
aircraft this year -- it is politically too hard with country
already in pre-election mode.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06ANKARA3265.html

[boomerang]

-------

¶7. (C) Gul said Cyprus did not come up in his meeting with
Bakoyannis, except in passing, in the EU context. With the
Ambassador, he echoed public remarks in Luxembourg
complaining about EU members' unwillingness to stand up to
Cyprus. Gul said he could understand Cypriot intransigence,
but strongly objected to what he views as EU member states
accepting it.

ANKARA 00003575 002 OF 002



¶8. (C) Ambassador reiterated U.S. interest and willingness
to work with all parties on ideas about how to prevent the
ports and trade issues between Turkey and Cyprus from
hindering Turkey's EU accession. Ambassador noted that the
European Commission and others have been thinking about the
possibility of a simple, temporary arrangement. Gul
expressed interest, but said the domestic politics here are
getting harder. He also made it clear that the details of
any such arrangement would be critical, as would the public
rhetoric surrounding it.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06ANKARA3575.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003657

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2021
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA ON FUNDING COMPENSATION FOR GREEK
CYPRIOT PROPERTY CASES IN THE "TRNC"

REF: 16 JUNE 2006 MORRISON/MELLINGER/LIBBY/BLAHA
E-MAILS

(U) Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

¶1. (C) Turkish MFA Cyprus Department Head Muftuoglu told us
June 20 the GOT "at the moment" has allocated no extra
funding for "TRNC" Property Commission compensation to Greek
Cypriots but is considering the question. Asked how much the
GOT would eventually allocate, Muftuoglu said the GOT does
not yet have a sufficiently clear picture of how many Greek
Cypriots may eventually apply to the Commission to be able to
arrive at a concrete figure. Muftuoglu claimed the GOT is
committed to making certain the Commission is seen as a
viable remedy for Greek Cypriot claimants.

¶2. (C) Muftuoglu took our points about the need to provide
credible compensation, especially in the first few cases,
which are certain to be high-profile. However, he worried
about early cases setting precedents for damage awards in
later cases and about nationalist reaction in Turkey to such
compensation. We noted that without credible compensation in
the first cases, the ECHR could find the Commission is not an
adequate remedy, which in the long run would prove more
costly for Turkey, economically and politically.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06ANKARA3657.html