Cyprus-Forum.com

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004777

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: FURTHER CONCERNS OF EU DIPLOMATS IN
ANKARA REGARDING OCT. 3 START DATE AND TURKISH APPROACH

REF: A. ANKARA 4716
¶B. PARIS 5471
¶C. ANKARA 4619

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).

1, (C) Summary: A range of EU diplomats in Ankara has
expressed concern to us not only about Turkey's road to the
Oct. 3 harmonization start date but also about the
willingness of Turks to adapt to EU standards of religious
freedom and tolerance and rule of law. End summary.

¶2. (C) Further to reftels (A-B), we have followed up with UK
and Danish DCMs and Dutch Polcounselor to gauge EU
assessments of how solid the Oct. 3 date is for the start of
Turkey's harmonization process.

¶3. (S) UK Deputy Head of Mission (strictly protect -- he
asked not to be quoted), normally relentlessly upbeat about
Turkey's candidacy and UK support, expressed deep concern to
us Aug. 12 about whether the Oct. 3 start date will hold. He
sees the French using the early August de Villepin and Chirac
statements as a bargaining chip to seek broader language on
the open-endedness of Turkey's accession process at the
late-Aug./early Sept. COREPER and Gymnich meetings to discuss
the framework negotiation document. He is concerned that the
French are also signaling these intentions to the Greeks and
Greek Cypriots to encourage the former to push for stiffer
language in the Aegean paragraph and the latter for stiffer
language in the Cyprus paragraph. He also sees the Danes as
wavering.

¶4. (S) Compounding the challenge is the absence of people to
consult with at FCO and throughout Europe in mid-August and
the consequent difficulty of tracking French maneuvers and
developing a counter-strategy, he noted. Any change to the
current language on open-endedness will bring a sharp
reaction by the Turks. However, even if the UK in its
presidency could in the end persuade the GOT to swallow such
language, any change to the Aegean and Cyprus paragraphs will
overload the circuits and the Turks will refuse to show up in
Luxembourg on Oct. 3, he opined. The UK in its presidency
will find it difficult to deflect a concerted approach to
load up the framework document since the argument that the
Turks would balk will only encourage the French and others to
persist.

¶5. (S) Looking at the issue from another angle, UK DHM
affirmed that his Embassy and London prefer to see PM Erdogan
and especially FonMin Gul as committed to the EU. At the
same time he acknowledged that Gul, Erdogan advisor Cuneyd
Zapsu, and other favorite British interlocutors could be
consummate barbarian handlers and that it would be prudent to
pay more attention to the radical Islamist strands in Gul's
background.

¶6. (S) Moreover, Turkish ministries are unprepared to begin
screening and harmonization, he noted. He also admitted that
Erdogan's failure to visit any EU capital from Dec. 17 until
his July 21-22 visit to London, his five month delay in
appointing a chief negotiator (and then his appointment of a
minister who, "while considered cuddly in EU capitals," has
no clout in the Turkish Cabinet), his refusal to let Gul play
an active lobbying role since Dec. 17, and the resignation of
EU Secretariat SecGen Murat Sungar (ref C) raise questions
whether the AKP government is using the EU process to pursue
a hidden agenda. He agreed that religious intolerance in
Turkey is a problem that will only become bigger in the
accession negotiation context.

¶7. (C) Danish DCM and Dutch Polcounselor both expressed
concern to us Aug. 11 and 12 that the AKP government's
approach to the EU is alienating some EU member states.
Dutch Polcounselor added that the GOT's behavior has killed
the willingness of Commission bureaucrats to tip off the
Turks about how to overcome legal or procedural roadblocks in
Commission deliberations. They both noted that Erdogan's
behavior at Brussels on Dec. 17 and the Turks' refusal to
share the text of their declaration of non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus even with the UK presidency have also
created a negative impression, although Danish DCM opined
that in the end the Turkish government's language on
non-recognition should have been mild enough to have calmed
most EU nerves. Danish DCM confirmed, however, that the
French have circulated a non-paper to EU member states (ref
B) questioning whether accession negotiations can start if
Turkey is unwilling to recognize all 25 member states.
¶8. (C) Contrary to the view of Dutch Polcounselor (and UK
PolChief) that the European Court of Justice has ruled that
both goods and services are covered under Customs Union
agreements, and thus that Turkey will have to allow Republic
of Cyprus flagged vessels access to ports and airports,
Danish DCM, a legal expert on EU goods and services
regulations, averred that the Turks can tie up the issue for
years by working Customs Union dispute-settlement procedures.

¶9. (C) Aug. 11 Turkey,s chief EU negotiator Babacan
announced a series of high-level Turkish visits to EU
capitals to explain Turkey,s approach to (1) the extension
protocol, including its Cyprus non-recognition declaration,
and (2) the negotiation process. UK PolChief previously told
us the Turks will target, inter alia, Paris, the Hague and
Vienna (ref A). Dutch PolCounselor told us MFA U/S Tuygan
will arrive in the Hague Aug. 18. However, Dutch
PolCounselor is concerned that the Turkish initiative may be
too late to influence the Aug,. 25 COREPER, given his view
that most EU capitals will have already decided on their
COREPER strategies.

¶10. (C) Both our Danish and Dutch interlocutors emphasized
that Turkey's lack of religious tolerance or religious
freedom will be a serious, perhaps the most serious, barrier
to EU entry. Neither thinks the Turks are going to be
willing to change for a long time. Danish DCM confirmed our
impression that the German DCM and press counselor, two of
the more active EU diplomats here, share this assessment that
Turkey is seriously retrograde in religious tolerance. Dutch
PolCounselor added that the Turkish attitude toward rule of
law, even among MFA bureaucrats who should know better, is
equally disturbing. His MFA interlocutors treat rule of law
as a criterion to be checked off rather than as an essential
pre-condition.

¶11. (C) Comment: With the exception of the Dutch Ambassador,
departing after six years here, EU Ambassadors remain
publicly upbeat about Turkey's progress. Since Dec. 17,
however, the most active EU DCMs and Counselors have become
much more pessimistic about the willingness of Turkish
authorities to understand and adapt to EU realities. End
comment.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05ANKARA4777.html

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14. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman said he
anticipates short and medium term problems with Cyprus in the
context of Turkey's EU accession process. Cyprus-related
text in the Negotiating Framework is "already unbearable" for
Turkey, Bilman added. He predicted any further changes will
jeopardize Turkish parliamentary ratification of the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol, not just with the opposition,
but also among ruling AKP MPs. Apakan added that an EU
counter-declaration abut Cyprus recognition would, in effect,
become part of the acquis. Bryza encouraged the GOT to
demonstrate restraint in responding to the EU
counter-declaration.

¶15. (C) Apakan and Bilman expressed appreciation for U.S.
measures for Turkish Cypriots and asked that those efforts
continue.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05ANKARA5223.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006036

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: THE ANNAN PLAN AND UNTYING THE CYPRUS KNOT:
ANKARA PERSPECTIVES

REF: NICOSIA 1585

(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) In the aftermath of October 3, there may be an
opportunity for us to make a renewed push toward a Cyprus
settlement. Though we hesitate to express even guarded
optimism, we do believe that the time has come for us to take
a hard look at alternative ways forward. We applaud Embassy
Nicosia for its efforts (reftel) to stimulate debate on this
question. Recognizing Embassy Nicosia is best placed to
judge how to influence the Cypriots, we offer the points
below as a contribution to what we hope becomes a vigorous
review of USG Cyprus policy.

¶2. (C) Reftel proposes that the USG cease public endorsement
of the Annan Plan and stop calling on Greek Cypriots to set
forth their objections to it with clarity and finality. We
appreciate Embassy Nicosia's points about the difficulty in
framing the debate with the Greek Cypriot press and Greek
Cypriot hardliners and defer to Nicosia on how to manage that
internal debate.

¶3. (C) However, we believe ceasing public references to the
Annan Plan could undercut the UN and invite confusion and
discouragement among the wider set of actors on the Cyprus
issue:

-- The UN is still publicly anchoring its efforts in the
Annan Plan and the need for Greek Cypriots to state their
objections to it. This proposed approach would open a gap
between the U.S. and the UN -- a first. As stymied as the
SYG's Good Offices Mission is, it is currently the only
realistic vehicle for overall settlement.

-- The GOT, facing over 60% domestic opposition to the Plan
in late 2003, spent political capital, torqued around public
opinion, and went on to help bring Turkish Cypriots to yes.
Changing our stance now would confuse and anger the GOT and
the Turkish public, weaken the hand of pro-solution forces
here, and leave the field to conspiracy theories about the
reasons for our changed public stance. It also risks
damaging support here for Turkey's EU process, since a number
of vocal critics see the Negotiating Framework as already
having given away the Cyprus store. If we want to lobby
Turkey for support for a renewed round of concessions, which
we believe would ultimately be desirable, this would not
help.

-- We are concerned about how the EU and member states would
take our new public lack of support for the Plan. At least,
it would be confusing; coming after Turkey's October 3
opening of EU accession talks, some in the EU would interpret
this as tacit endorsement of a greater (perhaps exclusive) EU
role in settlement.

-- Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly supported the Annan Plan
in 2004. Reftel offers no judgment about what effect ceasing
public endorsement of the Plan would have on them.

-- We believe that supporting the Plan in private while
ceasing support in public is not a sustainable public
diplomacy approach with the audiences with which we have to
deal. From our point of view, it is more useful to have a
consistent message that we can transmit to all parties
concerned.

¶4. (C) We believe reftel's public diplomacy concerns can be
addressed without ceasing public support for the Annan Plan:

-- As far as we can tell, there is unanimous agreement in the
USG that the Plan inevitably will be changed. We are aware
of no USG public statement to the contrary. As reftel
suggests, the USG should publicly state that there will need
to be meaningful changes to Annan to accommodate Greek
Cypriot concerns -- with the caveat that the Plan will have
to be re-opened to changes by both sides, not just one.

-- We agree that we can cease using "uniquely balanced"
rhetoric to describe the Plan. Most of the Plan's basic
concepts have been considered in one form or another for
decades and all appear open to adjustments to the details.

-- We agree it is unhelpful to debate whether the Plan is "a
basis," "point of departure" or "point of reference." Under
any construction, we should stress that the SYG needs to know
what Greek Cypriots want, and his assessment is that the
Greek Cypriots have not adequately set that forth.

¶5. (C) All this is preliminary to what we hope will be a
collective effort to see whether the post-October 3 period
offers a window to move forward constructively with all
parties on Cyprus. Mission Turkey looks forward to
participating actively in this discussion.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ANKARA6036.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006251

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN
TURKEY'S PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 6229

¶B. 2003 ANKARA 6303

(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Although EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn
recently urged Turkey to ratify the Ankara Agreement
extension protcol as soon as possible (ref A), the GOT still
has made no decision on when to send the protocol to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The GOT, initially
intent on sending Turkey's declaration of non-recognition of
the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) for ratification with the
protocol, now appears to be re-thinking that strategy.
Regardless, the protocol faces a tough TGNA fight. No one is
yet predicting defeat, but the battle lines are still not
fully drawn, and at least some of PM Erdogan's ruling AK
party MPs will defect and vote against it. Erdogan can
minimize defections by insisting on an open TGNA vote. End
Summary.

GOT Undecided About When to Submit Protocol
-------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Despite Rehn's strong urgings to PM Erdogan and FM
Gul, the GOT has not yet decided when to submit the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol (extending the Customs Union to
all 25 members, including the ROC) to the TGNA for
ratification. FM Gul told reporters on October 11 that
ratification of the protocol is not "an urgent issue." Asked
about ratification October 13, Chief EU negotiator Babacan
told reporters, "necessary steps will be taken when the time
comes." Main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) Vice
Chair for Foreign Relations Onur Oymen tells us his party
favors delaying ratification because the Turkish public is
currently angry over EU Cyprus-related demands on Turkey;
Oymen says delay will calm the debate.

¶3. (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman told
visiting EUR/SE Director on October 12 that Gul's statement
reflects the difficult position the GOT is in on the
protocol. Asked whether the GOT will await European
Parliament (EP) approval before submitting it to the TGNA,
Bilman said the "idea has surfaced." He added that the GOT
faces a "chicken and egg" problem, since the EP is awaiting
word from Turkey on whether Turkey's declaration of
non-recognition of Cyprus will be submitted for ratification
together with the protocol.

Will Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration Be Submitted?
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶4. (C) When we had spoken to him on October 7, Bilman had
assumed without question that the non-recognition declaration
would be submitted with the protocol for TGNA ratification,
adding that otherwise the protocol would not pass. MFA DDG
for economic relations with the EU Yenel told EUR/SE Director
the same thing October 11, though he acknowledged the EU did
not want the non-recognition declaration attached. However,
the GOT may be changing its approach. Asked the same
question in his October 12 meeting with EUR/SE Director,
Bilman (the MFA's Cyprus authority) said the GOT is now
examining "all options."

¶5. (C) Bilman speculated the TGNA could add its own
declaration. CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Oymen told us he
proposes that the TGNA add its own reservation specifying
that the protocol would not be implemented as to Cyprus until
there is an overall settlement.

Worries About Defections Among Ruling Party MPs
--------------------------------------------- -

¶6. (U) Ratification of the protocol requires a majority of
MPs present during the vote. Of 550 MPs, Erdogan and Gul's
ruling AK party has 355; main opposition CHP 155; Motherland
Party (ANAP) 21; other parties and independents 15; four
seats are vacant.

¶7. (C) Bilman, a frequent participant in high-level Cyprus
meetings, has told us privately for weeks that PM Erdogan and
FM Gul are deeply worried about defections among their own
AKP MPs when the protocol comes up for ratification. Bilman
reiterated those concerns October 12.

¶8. (C) According to Bilman, Gul returned from an October 2
meeting with all AKP MPs "a changed man," wondering whether
he could push the protocol through without "breaking the
party." According to Bilman, Gul received a "warning" from
AKP MPs that further Turkish concessions on Cyprus without
any move from the Greek Cypriots risks a split in AKP.
Publicly, in an October 7 television interview, Gul predicted
the extension protocol would pass -- but refused to give a
"guarantee."

No One Predicting Defeat -- Yet
-------------------------------

¶9. (C) MPs from AKP's different factions, as well as MPs
from other parties, academics and journalists have given us
mixed predictions about how tough a fight the protocol will
face in the TGNA. None of our interlocutors, even those
opposed to the protocol, has yet predicted the protocol will
be defeated, but the real battle lines will be drawn only
after the MFA submits the protocol to the TGNA. All expect
tough debate, spurred by main opposition CHP. An
extra-parliamentary so-called Cyprus "National Experts
Group," which includes former PM Ecevit and Rauf Denktash,
has already turned up the heat with an October 9 letter to
all MPs urging a "no" vote on the protocol.

¶10. (C) Everyone expects defections among AKP MPs,
particularly nationalist MPs, but estimates vary. Some MPs
and other contacts predict easy ratification, with fewer than
a dozen defections; others anticipate significant defections;
some go so far as to predict the vote could provoke an AK
party split. Submitting the protocol for ratification
without also submitting Turkey's declaration on
non-recognition of Cyprus, contacts stress, will increase the
number of defections.

¶11. (C) A small group of dissident CHP MPs -- five to 10 --
will probably defy party leader Baykal and vote yes. The
newly-formed ANAP parliamentary group (septel) has not
announced its position; we expect at least some of its 21 MPs
will vote in favor.

¶12. (C) Some AK MPs and others with whom we spoke understand
that rejection of the protocol would deal a near-fatal blow
to Turkey's EU aspirations. The AKP Vice Chair of the TGNA
Foreign Affairs Committee told us that despite his misgivings
about the protocol, he is loathe to vote against it and end
Turkey's EU aspirations. CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair
Oymen is a notable exception; he thinks Turkey's EU candidacy
can survive TGNA rejection of the protocol -- unless, in his
words, the EU is seeking an "excuse" to exclude Turkey.

Watch How the TGNA Vote is Taken
--------------------------------

¶13. (U) The manner in which the TGNA vote is conducted will
influence the number of AKP defections. TGNA ratification
votes are normally open; however, if more than half the MPs
present agree, the vote can be secret. The March 2003 vote
that defeated a motion to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey
en route to Iraq was a secret vote, allowing MPs to defy
AKP's stated support for the measure with impunity.

¶14. (C) AKP leaders must also have to decide whether or not
to make a parliamentary "group decision" to impose party
discipline and require AK MPs to vote yes. AKP did not take
a group decision in the March 2003 vote. AKP is still
undecided on a group decision on the protocol vote.

¶15. (C) Erdogan, who avoids group decisions because of his
professed support for internal party democracy, could
accomplish the same objective by making his wishes known and
having an open vote. Defiant AKP MPs would face Erdogan's
wrath. Erdogan employed this tactic in the October 2003 TGNA
vote over sending Turkish troops to Iraq (reftel), which
resulted in overwhelming approval.

¶16. (C) Comment: Debate on the extension protocol is not
yet fully joined, and intervening events in the EU and on
Cyprus could affect the outcome. In any event, PM Erdogan
will have to expend significant domestic political capital to
gain TGNA approval. Given how crucial the EU accession
process is to Erdogan's government, and how crucial the
protocol is to the EU, he will do so. However, his price
will be upping the ante with the EU on future Cyprus-related
issues. End Comment.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ANKARA6251.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006351

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY GR EU
SUBJECT: SUSTAINING INTERCHANGE WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

REF: A. NICOSIA 1617

¶B. ATHENS 2647
¶C. BRUSSELS 3756

(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In line with Embassies Nicosia and Athens
ideas for a post-October 3 way forward on Cyprus, Embassy
Ankara offers two suggestions: initiating a sustained
interchange with Turkish Cypriot authorities in areas of
unassailable U.S. interest; and offering financing assistance
for companies seeking to develop projects on non-Greek
Cypriot land or infrastructure in the north. We hesitate to
predict that either of these would even begin to untie the
Cyprus knot, but they could in small measure contribute to
furthering the existing USG policy goals of ending Turkish
Cypriot isolation, bolstering pro-solution forces in Turkey
and the north, and continuing support for Turkey,s EU
accession. "TRNC President" Talat,s October 28 visit to
Washington could present a good opportunity to launch these
initiatives. With October 3 behind us, the first crucial
year in Turkey's EU accession process before us, and the UK
and perhaps Russia considering new approaches to Cyprus,
Talat's visit is a golden opportunity. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Athens and Nicosia have offered their views on the
current Cyprus situation (refs A and B). We too see this
issue as stalemated. Perhaps post October 3, we have a small
window in which to start to make some progress. It strikes
us as worth a try.

¶3. (C) In the aftermath of the April 2004 Cyprus referenda,
the USG embarked on a policy of ending Turkish Cypriot
isolation. The Turks genuinely and publicly appreciate USG
efforts to date. Our efforts have done little to ease the
sense here that Turkish Cypriots remain isolated and that
Turkey has received little concrete reward for the political
capital it spent on seeking settlement in 2004. Absent a
signal of flexibility from the ROC, this limits Turkey's room
for maneuver on Cyprus and contributes to the stalemate in
overall settlement efforts.

¶4. (C) "TRNC President" Talat's visit to Washington and
October 28 meeting with Secretary Rice is the USG's latest
and most high-profile effort to reach out to Turkish
Cypriots. In line with our policy of engagement, the USG
could use Talat's visit as an opportunity to initiate
regular, sustained Washington-based interchange with Turkish
Cypriots.

¶5. (C) One possibility would be for the Secretary, during
her October 28 meeting with Talat, to offer to begin regular
contact with "TRNC" authorities in areas of unassailable U.S.
interest, with an eye toward capacity building and training.
Such areas include law enforcement, counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, anti-terror finance, anti-money laundering,
aviation safety, and maritime search and rescue.

¶6. (C) If this seems a useful approach, the Department could
work to foster contacts between "TRNC" authorities and the
FBI, DHS, Treasury, and the Coast Guard, and through the
Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in
Budapest. A companion idea would be for the USG to
systematize mid-level contact between "TRNC" and USG
authorities from outside the island by regular visits to the
north.

¶7. (C) As seen from Ankara, sustained interchange from the
U.S. could help ease Turkish Cypriot isolation; strengthen
the hand of pro-settlement forces in Ankara and northern
Cyprus; and furnish a road map for nations outside the EU to
reach out to Turkish Cypriots. It could also do what the EU
cannot (viz., the ROC-blocked trade and aid package to the
north, promised in 2004), helping start to pave the way for a
revival of the UN-brokered final settlement on Cyprus. And
it could accomplish this within the bounds of existing U.S.
policy, the ultimate goal of which is settlement.

¶8. (C) In the context of Talat's visit, the USG could also
consider offering OPIC or TDA financing for projects in the
north not involving Greek Cypriot land or infrastructure.
This would, in small measure, contribute to closing the
economic gap between the two sides of the island, preparing
the ground for eventual reunification.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05ANKARA6351.html

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O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006897

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR CPLANTIER
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2010
TAGS: ECIN PREL PGOV EU TU EU
SUBJECT: BABACAN: NO PLANS TO SEND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO
PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 6561
¶B. COPENHAGEN 1803

Classified By: CHARGE NANCY MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of Economy and EU negotiator Ali
Babacan explained that the GOT had deliberately not created a
new structure to handle the EU process so as to keep all
ministries engaged. The GOT has no plans yet to submit the
Ankara Protocol Extension to parliament. Babacan reiterated
Turkey,s inability to make new concessions on Cyprus and was
focused on marketing Turkey,s image to the European public.
End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- -------
No Plans to Submit Additional Protocol to Parliament
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶2. (C ) In his first meeting with Charge since October 3,
Minister of Economy and Chief Turkish EU negotiator Ali
Babacan focused almost entirely on EU issues. (His office now
sports both EU and Turkish flags.) In reply to the CDA,s
question, he said that despite Enlargement Commissioner Olli
Rehn's comments that the Protocol should go to parliament,
the GOT had no specific plan to submit the Ankara Protocol
Extension for parliamentary ratification. In part, this was
due to parliament,s heavy agenda, especially the budget, but
also because there is nothing specific in EU documents
requiring parliamentary approval. (Comment: Most of our
contacts emphasize the AKP government,s concerns about
domestic political fallout. End Comment.).

-----------------------------
Cyprus: Restated GOT position
-----------------------------

¶3. (C ) Babacan,s only comment on the recently-issued EU
Commission Progress Report was that the GOT was fine with it
except for the parts about Cyprus. Babacan echoed other GOT
officials that Turkey cannot make any additional concessions
on Cyprus until the Greek Cypriots do more. On opening ports
and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes, he restated
the Turkish offer that all ports and airports*including in
Northern Cyprus*be opened to EU countries and Turkey
traffic. At the end of the meeting, Babacan said the two
most important areas in which the U.S. could help Turkey were
Cyprus and the PKK.

-------------------------------
PKK: Erdogan-Rasmussen Incident
-------------------------------

¶4. (C ) Babacan said if the U.S. were seen to be doing
something tangible against PKK, there would be a dramatic
improvement in public perception of the U.S. in Turkey. He
said he had spoken to Olli Rehn about his statements
supporting Danish PM Rasmussen,s action with regard to a Roj
TV correspondent during Erdogan,s visit to Denmark (ref B).
According to Babacan, Rehn had made the comments after having
spoken to Rasmussen but not to Erdogan. Note: Though he said
he told Rehn he should have spoken to Erdogan first,
Babacan,s manner suggested he did not want to belabor the
issue. End Note.

---------------------------------------------
Interministerial Approach to Accession Process
---------------------------------------------

¶5. (SBU) Babacan preferred to refer to the "Accession
Process" rather than "Negotiations," reserving the latter
word for the individual discussions of each chapter rather
than the overall process. He described how the GOT will
handle the three pillars of the accession process: 1) the
political pillar, 2) compliance with the acquis, and 3) the
communications and civil society pillar. On the political
pillar, there was a supervisory committee chaired by DPM and
Fonmin Gul, and including Babacan, the Minister of Interior
and the Minister of Justice.

¶6. (SBU) On complying with the acquis, he had the lead but
would have the active participation of all relevant
ministries. He explained the GOT decision not to set up a
separate EU negotiating agency. According to Babacan, the
idea was to keep all the line ministries fully engaged. He
said he is telling his ministerial colleagues that they are
all responsible for the EU process and claimed he was trying
to keep a low profile. He said he insisted ministries send
"responsible authorities" such as Under Secretaries to the
Brussels chapter screenings, and not just Ministerial
officials responsible for EU affairs. Claiming the process
is already working well, he said this approach will make it
harder at first but in the long run will work better.

------------------------------------------
Marketing Turkey to European Public Opinion
------------------------------------------

¶7. (SBU) On the civil society/communications pillar, the
GOT has established a committee composed of Foreign Minister
Gul, Babacan and Minister of State Beshir Atalay, who was
included because he has responsibility for an existing fund
for the promotion of Turkey,s image abroad. Babacan seemed
very much aware of the importance of marketing Turkey to
western Europeans, noting that one of his majors in his MBA
program at Northwestern was marketing. He said the GOT is
beginning to brainstorm on public relations ideas with
private sector PR experts and will eventually outsource much
of the campaign to the private sector: "With my private
sector experience, I know that Governments are not good at
this." The public relations campaign will be differentiated
for different EU countries and regions and the GOT is placing
a particular importance on expanding student exchange
programs. Whereas there are now 17,000 exchanges (two-way
flow, not a stock) per annum, Babacan said the GOT plans to
increase this number to 100,000 by 2008: "A 15-year old in
France today will probably be voting on Turkey,s EU
accession."

------
Comment
------

¶8. (C) The next EU/Turkey/Cyprus flashpoint will be when the
EU reviews Customs Union implementation, including the Ankara
Protocol Extension status and the ports/airports issue, in
¶2006. It is not surprising, on the one hand, that Babacan
reiterated the GOT party line on the most
politically-sensitive issue (Cyprus), since he is more of an
implementer than a political heavyweight. As one of the
GOT,s most internationally-aware and business-oriented
ministers, Babacan seemed to understand the need for extra
effort on marketing Turkey to European public opinion, and
painted a credible rationale for the GOT decision to draw on
interministerial teams to handle chapter negotiations.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05ANKARA6897.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY FACES OBSTACLES ON PATH TO EU MEMBERSHIP

REF: ANKARA 6763

Classified by Acting DCM James Moore; reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) Summary: Now that Turkey has begun EU accession talks,
it faces the difficult prospect of meeting EU requirements
regarding Cyprus, minority rights, religious freedom,
civil-military relations, and freedom of expression. This
will require Turkey to open debate on sensitive topics and
change longstanding state policy and ideology, while at the
same time implementing difficult, EU-driven economic reforms.
The challenge may be further complicated by the strength of
Turkish nationalism. The GOT will also have to alter its
practice of delaying reform until shortly before a looming
deadline. End Summary.

¶2. (U) The GOT over the past four years has adopted a vast
array of legislative reforms in pursuit of Turkey's EU
candidacy. While the reforms are impressive on paper, the EU
and other observers have often noted that implementation of
the changes has lagged. Nevertheless, the EU in December
2004 determined that Turkey "sufficiently fulfills" the
Copenhagen political criteria in order to begin accession
talks, which started in October.

¶3. (C) Now that the accession process has begun, the GOT will
need to enact far more profound changes to advance toward
membership. Turkey will have to open debate on a long list
of taboos -- on issues such as minority rights, religious
pluralism, and civil-military relations -- and change some of
the fundamental concepts dating to the founding of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923. "Changing laws is not enough,"
said Sema Kilicer, political officer at the European
Commission Representation to Turkey. "Unless Turkey can
re-define citizens' rights in a more liberal way, it will not
make it. Now things are going to start getting tough."

---------------------------------
Turkey Faces Obstacles on EU Path
---------------------------------

¶4. (C) Turkey will be able to set its own pace -- the
accession process will take 10 years at a minimum. But the
GOT will have to make sustained, steady progress to overcome
a unique set of obstacles. Consistent EU pressure brought
Turkey to the start of accession talks -- just as IMF
pressure has led GOT economic reforms -- but Turkey will have
to create its own momentum to complete the process of fully
complying with the political criteria and adopting the
80,000-page EU acquis. As it does so, the following factors
are likely to prove particularly troublesome:

-- Cyprus: The unanimous approval of the EU Council will be
required to open and close each of the 33 acquis chapters.
This will effectively give Cyprus 66 opportunities to freeze
the process. The EU in 2006 will review Turkey's compliance
with the Customs Union. EU officials have made clear to the
Turks that full compliance requires allowing Greek Cypriot
vessels access to Turkish ports, something GOT contacts say
is out of the question unless the EU moves first to alleviate
the isolation of the "TRNC." Ultimately, the EU will not
allow Turkey to accede until it recognizes Cyprus, and the
GOT will not grant recognition until there is a full Cyprus
resolution.

-- Minority Rights: Despite the reforms, the GOT continues to
cling to a restrictive, anachronistic concept of
"minorities." At the founding of the Republic, Ataturk
established a unitary "Turkish" identity. Based on its
interpretation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the state
recognizes the existence of only three minorities -- Greek
Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews.
The open expression of any other identity outside the
mainstream is considered a threat to national unity. As an
example, shortly before the EU released its Progress Report
November 9, Justice Minister Cicek warned that the GOT would
issue a protest if the report referred to Alevis as a
minority (it did not). As long as Turkey maintains a
definition of minority completely at odds with the Western
concept, it will not be able to meet EU requirements on

ANKARA 00006930 002 OF 003


minority rights. GOT officials sometimes argue that the
Turkish concept of minority rights is consistent with that of
France; EU contacts say there is some truth to that, but note
that France was an EU member long before the Copenhagen
Criteria were established in 1993.

-- Religious Freedom: For the same reasons, the state also
considers religious pluralism a threat to national unity.
The EU is pressing Turkey to expand freedoms for religious
minorities, while avoiding the issue of Turkish state control
over Islam. Many pious Turkish Muslims resent official
restrictions on Islam, such as the ban on Islamic headscarves
in universities. The Islam-oriented ruling AK Party has made
little headway in addressing these issues, and is loath to
expand freedoms for religious minorities without delivering
on issues important to its Islamic political base. The
recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights
upholding the headscarf ban underscored this dilemma.

-- Civil-Military Relations: The EU is calling for the
Turkish military to withdraw from the political sphere; the
November Progress Report calls attention to recent speeches
by leaders of the armed forces on political matters. As
noted reftel, no elected Turkish government can force
military leaders to cease the practice of commenting on
political matters. The political role of the armed forces is
a firm tradition in Turkey, supported by the vast majority of
Turks. Military leaders will have to be persuaded to phase
out their political influence. "This one will take time,"
said Koksal Toptan, AK MP and chairman of the parliamentary
Justice Committee. "There are some things we cannot change
as quickly as they can write in Brussels."

-- Nationalism: Turkish nationalism runs deep and wide. It
has blended with every other ideology in Turkey -- socialism,
Islamism, etc. It is well represented in every significant
political party. At some level, all Turks are nationalists.
Hardcore nationalists are already opposed to EU membership,
which they see as a ploy by Western powers intent on
weakening and dividing Turkey. The accession process, which
a Polish official reportedly described as "humiliating," will
provide numerous opportunities for nationalists to win people
over to their cause. When the EU insists on further reform
in sensitive areas such as minority rights and religious
freedom, nationalists will cite this as evidence of a plot to
create divisions in Turkish society. EU economic
requirements will force dramatic changes, such as a major
reduction in the number of agricultural workers, who
currently constitute a third of the workforce. These
changes, painful in the short term, will create a pool of
disaffected workers vulnerable to an anti-EU message. Of
course, this challenge is not unique to Turkey. Nationalism
is also strong in many of the 10 states that joined the EU in
¶2004. But those countries had recently emerged from behind
the Iron Curtain and were eager to re-join Europe. They
could blame communism, which was forced on them, for their
deficiencies, and thereby save face. Turkey's history is
different, and Turkish nationalism may therefore prove to be
a greater handicap.

-- Freedom of Expression: Free speech is the fundamental tie
that binds all other human rights problems in Turkey. Anyone
making controversial statements on the issues listed above
risks prosecution. EU-related reforms have done little to
expand freedom of expression. It remains illegal to "insult"
the Government, the state or its institutions, Ataturk, or
"Turkish identity." The GOT has amended the law so that
speech intended to "criticize" but not "insult" is no longer
prohibited. However, the law does not define the concept of
"insult," so prosecutors continue to open cases against those
who contradict the official view on sensitive topics, as
demonstrated by the case against Orhan Pamuk. Moreover,
defamation laws provide greater protection to public
officials than to ordinary citizens, a fact that PM Erdogan
has exploited by repeatedly suing political cartoonists whose
work he found offensive. GOT officials claim to support
freedom of expression in principle, but are very rarely
prepared to defend the right of citizens to speak out on
sensitive topics.


ANKARA 00006930 003 OF 003


-- Negotiating Tactics: The Turks have a tendency to
negotiate by inflexibly maintaining their position,
compromising only at the last moment. This has been Turkey's
approach to the EU process to date; the GOT has often given
in to EU pressure and enacted reforms shortly before an EU
Summit or Progress Report. "That's the way we work," laughed
Kaya Turkmen, MFA DDG for EU Affairs. Turkmen told us he has
warned colleagues that this approach will no longer serve
Turkey now that accession talks have begun. The European
Commission, he said, will set benchmarks on a wide range of
acquis requirements and task the GOT with developing a valid
plan for compliance. There will be no deadlines to force
action. The GOT will have to make gradual, steady progress
without outside political pressure. The Commission will set
requirements, and will generally not engage in the kind of
political haggling the GOT is accustomed to. "We shouldn't
call it a negotiation really," said Kilicer. "We should call
it 'cut, copy, and paste.'"

---------------------------------------
Comment: Political Pressure to Continue
---------------------------------------

¶5. (C) In a perfect world, Turkey's EU candidacy would now
drop below the radar screen, allowing the European Commission
and the Turkish bureaucracy to work through these issues
without political pressure. But that is highly unlikely.
The accession process will force Turks to confront all of the
sensitive subjects they prefer to avoid. This will
inevitably cause public controversy, and when it does, those
opposed to Turkey's EU candidacy -- both in Turkey and Europe
-- will turn up the heat.


MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05ANKARA6930.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY FACES OBSTACLES ON PATH TO EU MEMBERSHIP

REF: ANKARA 6763

Classified by Acting DCM James Moore; reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (C) Summary: Now that Turkey has begun EU accession talks,
it faces the difficult prospect of meeting EU requirements
regarding Cyprus, minority rights, religious freedom,
civil-military relations, and freedom of expression. This
will require Turkey to open debate on sensitive topics and
change longstanding state policy and ideology, while at the
same time implementing difficult, EU-driven economic reforms.
The challenge may be further complicated by the strength of
Turkish nationalism. The GOT will also have to alter its
practice of delaying reform until shortly before a looming
deadline. End Summary.

¶2. (U) The GOT over the past four years has adopted a vast
array of legislative reforms in pursuit of Turkey's EU
candidacy. While the reforms are impressive on paper, the EU
and other observers have often noted that implementation of
the changes has lagged. Nevertheless, the EU in December
2004 determined that Turkey "sufficiently fulfills" the
Copenhagen political criteria in order to begin accession
talks, which started in October.

¶3. (C) Now that the accession process has begun, the GOT will
need to enact far more profound changes to advance toward
membership. Turkey will have to open debate on a long list
of taboos -- on issues such as minority rights, religious
pluralism, and civil-military relations -- and change some of
the fundamental concepts dating to the founding of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923. "Changing laws is not enough,"
said Sema Kilicer, political officer at the European
Commission Representation to Turkey. "Unless Turkey can
re-define citizens' rights in a more liberal way, it will not
make it. Now things are going to start getting tough."

---------------------------------
Turkey Faces Obstacles on EU Path
---------------------------------

¶4. (C) Turkey will be able to set its own pace -- the
accession process will take 10 years at a minimum. But the
GOT will have to make sustained, steady progress to overcome
a unique set of obstacles. Consistent EU pressure brought
Turkey to the start of accession talks -- just as IMF
pressure has led GOT economic reforms -- but Turkey will have
to create its own momentum to complete the process of fully
complying with the political criteria and adopting the
80,000-page EU acquis. As it does so, the following factors
are likely to prove particularly troublesome:

-- Cyprus: The unanimous approval of the EU Council will be
required to open and close each of the 33 acquis chapters.
This will effectively give Cyprus 66 opportunities to freeze
the process. The EU in 2006 will review Turkey's compliance
with the Customs Union. EU officials have made clear to the
Turks that full compliance requires allowing Greek Cypriot
vessels access to Turkish ports, something GOT contacts say
is out of the question unless the EU moves first to alleviate
the isolation of the "TRNC." Ultimately, the EU will not
allow Turkey to accede until it recognizes Cyprus, and the
GOT will not grant recognition until there is a full Cyprus
resolution.

-- Minority Rights: Despite the reforms, the GOT continues to
cling to a restrictive, anachronistic concept of
"minorities." At the founding of the Republic, Ataturk
established a unitary "Turkish" identity. Based on its
interpretation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the state
recognizes the existence of only three minorities -- Greek
Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews.
The open expression of any other identity outside the
mainstream is considered a threat to national unity. As an
example, shortly before the EU released its Progress Report
November 9, Justice Minister Cicek warned that the GOT would
issue a protest if the report referred to Alevis as a
minority (it did not). As long as Turkey maintains a
definition of minority completely at odds with the Western
concept, it will not be able to meet EU requirements on

ANKARA 00006930 002 OF 003


minority rights. GOT officials sometimes argue that the
Turkish concept of minority rights is consistent with that of
France; EU contacts say there is some truth to that, but note
that France was an EU member long before the Copenhagen
Criteria were established in 1993.

-- Religious Freedom: For the same reasons, the state also
considers religious pluralism a threat to national unity.
The EU is pressing Turkey to expand freedoms for religious
minorities, while avoiding the issue of Turkish state control
over Islam. Many pious Turkish Muslims resent official
restrictions on Islam, such as the ban on Islamic headscarves
in universities. The Islam-oriented ruling AK Party has made
little headway in addressing these issues, and is loath to
expand freedoms for religious minorities without delivering
on issues important to its Islamic political base. The
recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights
upholding the headscarf ban underscored this dilemma.

-- Civil-Military Relations: The EU is calling for the
Turkish military to withdraw from the political sphere; the
November Progress Report calls attention to recent speeches
by leaders of the armed forces on political matters. As
noted reftel, no elected Turkish government can force
military leaders to cease the practice of commenting on
political matters. The political role of the armed forces is
a firm tradition in Turkey, supported by the vast majority of
Turks. Military leaders will have to be persuaded to phase
out their political influence. "This one will take time,"
said Koksal Toptan, AK MP and chairman of the parliamentary
Justice Committee. "There are some things we cannot change
as quickly as they can write in Brussels."

-- Nationalism: Turkish nationalism runs deep and wide. It
has blended with every other ideology in Turkey -- socialism,
Islamism, etc. It is well represented in every significant
political party. At some level, all Turks are nationalists.
Hardcore nationalists are already opposed to EU membership,
which they see as a ploy by Western powers intent on
weakening and dividing Turkey. The accession process, which
a Polish official reportedly described as "humiliating," will
provide numerous opportunities for nationalists to win people
over to their cause. When the EU insists on further reform
in sensitive areas such as minority rights and religious
freedom, nationalists will cite this as evidence of a plot to
create divisions in Turkish society. EU economic
requirements will force dramatic changes, such as a major
reduction in the number of agricultural workers, who
currently constitute a third of the workforce. These
changes, painful in the short term, will create a pool of
disaffected workers vulnerable to an anti-EU message. Of
course, this challenge is not unique to Turkey. Nationalism
is also strong in many of the 10 states that joined the EU in
¶2004. But those countries had recently emerged from behind
the Iron Curtain and were eager to re-join Europe. They
could blame communism, which was forced on them, for their
deficiencies, and thereby save face. Turkey's history is
different, and Turkish nationalism may therefore prove to be
a greater handicap.

-- Freedom of Expression: Free speech is the fundamental tie
that binds all other human rights problems in Turkey. Anyone
making controversial statements on the issues listed above
risks prosecution. EU-related reforms have done little to
expand freedom of expression. It remains illegal to "insult"
the Government, the state or its institutions, Ataturk, or
"Turkish identity." The GOT has amended the law so that
speech intended to "criticize" but not "insult" is no longer
prohibited. However, the law does not define the concept of
"insult," so prosecutors continue to open cases against those
who contradict the official view on sensitive topics, as
demonstrated by the case against Orhan Pamuk. Moreover,
defamation laws provide greater protection to public
officials than to ordinary citizens, a fact that PM Erdogan
has exploited by repeatedly suing political cartoonists whose
work he found offensive. GOT officials claim to support
freedom of expression in principle, but are very rarely
prepared to defend the right of citizens to speak out on
sensitive topics.


ANKARA 00006930 003 OF 003


-- Negotiating Tactics: The Turks have a tendency to
negotiate by inflexibly maintaining their position,
compromising only at the last moment. This has been Turkey's
approach to the EU process to date; the GOT has often given
in to EU pressure and enacted reforms shortly before an EU
Summit or Progress Report. "That's the way we work," laughed
Kaya Turkmen, MFA DDG for EU Affairs. Turkmen told us he has
warned colleagues that this approach will no longer serve
Turkey now that accession talks have begun. The European
Commission, he said, will set benchmarks on a wide range of
acquis requirements and task the GOT with developing a valid
plan for compliance. There will be no deadlines to force
action. The GOT will have to make gradual, steady progress
without outside political pressure. The Commission will set
requirements, and will generally not engage in the kind of
political haggling the GOT is accustomed to. "We shouldn't
call it a negotiation really," said Kilicer. "We should call
it 'cut, copy, and paste.'"

---------------------------------------
Comment: Political Pressure to Continue
---------------------------------------

¶5. (C) In a perfect world, Turkey's EU candidacy would now
drop below the radar screen, allowing the European Commission
and the Turkish bureaucracy to work through these issues
without political pressure. But that is highly unlikely.
The accession process will force Turks to confront all of the
sensitive subjects they prefer to avoid. This will
inevitably cause public controversy, and when it does, those
opposed to Turkey's EU candidacy -- both in Turkey and Europe
-- will turn up the heat.


MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05ANKARA6930.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 007631

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR - A/S FRIED AND DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EU UN
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA PREPARING CYPRUS PROPOSAL FOR PRIME
TIME

REF: A. ANKARA 7096

¶B. STATE 225096

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Apakan previewed
with Ambassador December 27 the current MFA draft aimed at
opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriots as part
of a negotiable package that would make such a move feasible
here. MFA is working this at the behest of FM Gul, who
realizes the risk of an EU accession negotiation train wreck
in 2006, absent movement on Cyprus. Ambassador urged the
Turks to be realistic about what can be achieved, narrow
their focus, frame the proposal specifically as a process
aimed at helping Turkey fulfill its EU obligations, and
recruit EU allies by better addressing EU concerns in other
areas. This MFA draft is a further refinement of FM Gul's
May 30 proposal for mutual opening of Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot ports and airports. End summary.

¶2. (C) Apakan followed up the MFA's early December discussion
on Cyprus with the embassy and Turkish Ambassador Logoglu's
meeting with EUR A/S Fried (reftels). He emphasized that FM
Gul realizes Turkey cannot "sit idle" on Cyprus lest it risk
an EU accession negotiation train wreck, and previewed with
Ambassador MFA's current working draft proposal on how to
move forward on Cyprus. The goal, Apakan explained, is to
open ports and airports both in Turkey and in the "TRNC" in
order to fulfill Turkey's obligations to the EU on the Ankara
Protocol extension, as well as the EU's "obligation" to end
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. The paradigm has
changed, Apakan insisted; this is about pragmatic steps, not
about recognition. Turkey is looking for ideas, Apakan
stressed. The government realizes the focus must be on the
opening of Turkish ports, which is why this is item number
one in the draft. The paper itself is not intended as a
"take it or leave it" proposition, he added; they are open to
suggestions and changes. The draft, which Apakan showed us,
tracks closely with what we have reported earlier. Main
points include:

--opening of Turkish sea and airports to Greek Cypriot
vessels and planes;

--opening of Turkish Cypriot ports, with monitoring by the
IMO and others;

--opening of Turkish Cypriot airport, with monitoring by the
ICAO and others;

--extension of Customs Union benefits to Turkish Cypriots;

--inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in international sporting and
cultural events;

--all the above with no prejudice to parties' existing
political positions (i.e., no recognition implied);

--UNSYG to arrange a March 2006 meeting of all parties (Greek
and Turkish Cypriots, Turks, Greeks, with observers from EU
Commission and "interested parties", i.e., U.S. and UK) to
work out the arrangements;

--agreement on a comprehensive settlement by the end of 2006;
and

--UNSYG-arranged mechanism to monitor implemention.

¶3. (C) Ambassador referred to A/S Fried's meeting with the
Turkish ambassador, but said Washington had not yet provided
guidance. Noting that he had no instructions from
Washington, Ambassador offered the following personal
comments. First, he saw three sets of elements at work: (1)
The EU's requirements on Cyprus and how to work with them in
a way that does not box Turkey in with respect to its
accession negotiations; (2) the issue of a long term
settlement and how best to position the parties for progress
there; and (3) how Cyprus issues relate to other items in the
EU accession process.

¶4. (C) For any Turkish effort on Cyprus to succeed, it needed
to be realistic. A proposal that the Greek Cypriots could
shred might leave Turkey worse off than it is now. The kind
of proposal most likely to achieve results, Ambassador
suggested, would be the shortest, simplest, and most narrowly
focused. Turkey should carefully consier the need for
extraneous or secondary elements, such as participation at
sporting events or even the issue of a long term settlement,


which may not be critical for resolving the Customs
Union/ports/airports problem. In addition, Ambassador noted
that:

--To the extent the GOT feels obligated to refer to the UN,
it might simply refer to the UN's role and obligations in
connection with the Annan plan. Ambassador was skeptical the
EU would agree to a UN role in mediating fulfillment of
Customs Union obligations, but acknowledged this is up to the
EU.

--If Turkey wants this to work, it must attract other EU
allies, in addition to the UK, which often finds itself a
lone voice, by making the package as attractive and
reasonable as possible.

--Turkey may also want to consider calling its effort a
process, rather than a plan, and one aimed more clearly at
helping Turkey fulfill its obligations to the EU.

--The Cyprus issue is one of the toughest, if not the
toughest, that Turkey will encounter during its accession
negotiations. One way to gain allies is to move ahead as
quickly as possible on other, perhaps easier issues. The
terrible headlines of the past few weeks almost ensure,
Ambassador stressed, that other EU members make no argument
to the Greek Cypriots; they may cause EU members to give the
Turkish proposal the thumbs down. The effect on the EU of
the Pamuk trial and other freedom of expression cases is, he
added, devastating. Turkey must show its EU friends that it
is headed in the right direction and frame its case so that
Cyprus can be managed in a practical way.

¶5. (C) Apakan responded that the intent of the paper is to
launch a process and engender broad discussion, such as
occurred with all parties prior to the 2004 referendum. The
MFA will show the draft paper to UK Ambassador Westmacott
and hopes to work closely with both the UK Embassy and us as
this process moves forward. Apakan said it is still a work
in progress; the Ambassador's comments were helpful, and
Turkey would welcome further U.S. thinking. FM Gul will
speak to EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and, in an
effort to gather a group of like-minded countries, Turkey is
in the process of contacting other EU partners to let them
know that they are putting meat on the bones of Gul's May 30
proposal on Cyprus. Apakan was less optimistic on the notion
of carving off the EU requirement of opening ports and
airports from the UN settlement process. The EU, he said,
"has no acquis" on Cyprus settlement and is uncomfortable
dealing with Cyprus issues in the absence of the UN.

¶6. (C) While the EU has never fulfilled its commitment to end
Turkish Cypriot isolation, Apakan acknowledged that the
situation is a new one that called for new tools. If the EU
considers Cyprus as an integral whole, it should not isolate
the north. Ambassador committed to following up when he sees
Ambassadorial colleagues in Washington, and provide further
feedback.

¶7. (C) Comment: Although Turkish officials and public
opinion always come back to the EU's failure to fulfill its
2004 promise to end Turkish Cypriot isolation, FM Gul and the
MFA appear seized with the urgency of producing something
positive and forward leaning on Cyprus that would allow
Turkey to fulfill its obligations to the EU and avoid an
accession negotiation train wreck, while giving them the
domestic cover needed on northern Cyprus. It is not clear
that Apakan really heard Ambassador's messages, but he had
the DDG for Cyprus in the room, with whom we will follow up
in the coming weeks.
WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05ANKARA7631.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS/EU - MEETING WITH TURKISH ACTING FM

REF: A. STATE 08233

¶B. ANKARA 07631

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action message. See paragraph 8.

¶2. (C) Summary: Ambassador and UK Ambassador Westmacott were
convoked January 18 by Turkish Acting FM Tuygan to discuss
Cyprus and related EU accession issues. Tuygan described in
familiar terms the elaboration of FM Gul,s proposals to deal
with the EU Customs Union ports/airports issue, ease the
isolation of Northern Cyprus and enable Turkey to meet its EU
Customs Union obligations. He said that Turkey,s UN
ambassador will meet with UNSYG Annan on Friday, January 20
to solicit support, and he appealed for an encouraging word
to Annan,s office about US and UK interest in the Turkish
initiative. Both the US and UK ambassadors welcomed the
Turkish initiative and undertook to relay the request to New
York. Westmacott did not address specifics in the Turkish
initiative, but urged packaging it in a strategic context )
that the status quo on Cyprus is bad for its people, the
region and the world. He and the US Ambassador also urged
careful marketing, including accompanying it with Turkish
moves on non-Cyprus issues, such as dropping freedom of
expression prosecutions and making a gesture on Cypriot
membership in international organizations. Regarding the
Turkish paper we had seen earlier (but that the Turks did not
discuss further), the Ambassador urged that the Turks
describe their ideas as pragmatic and flexible. Per ref a,
he suggested that one element might be Turkish ports in
exchange for Famagusta access. Tuygan said he wants to see
Turkey act on a variety of fronts, including the non-Cyprus
issues to which the Ambassadors referred, but urged that the
US and European responses to the Turkish initiative not focus
too much on the other things Turkey needs to do; such an
approach would empower those here who say the whole EU and
Cyprus diplomacy efforts are fruitless and should be
abandoned. Post recommends that USUN indicate to the
UNSYG,s office that the US welcomes the Turkish initiative
and is prepared to work with the UK, the UN, the EU and
others on it. End Summary.

¶3. (C) Tuygan said that Turkey believes the EU accession
process is proceeding well. Cyprus remains a problem which
FM Gul,s May 2005 initiative on ports/airports and trade had
been designed to move forward. Since there had been little
reaction, Turkey had decided to try again and to elaborate
Gul,s ideas in ways that might stimulate discussion and get
Cyprus out of its current dead end. Besides discussions in
late 2005 with the US and the UK, Turkey had briefed Russia,
China and France, and the reaction was by and large positive.
Turkey,s UN PermRep hopes to get some positive reaction
from UNSYG Annan (e.g., &workable8 or &useful8) that
might facilitate negotiations. Turkey is prepared to sit
down with the Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and
whomever else is interested and work out an arrangement. For
years, the US and UK had urged Turkey to take the high moral
ground on Cyprus. Despite the erosion of Turkey,s high
ground since the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, this
initiative was being put forth in that spirit, and Tuygan
appealed for support with Annan prior to the Friday meeting.

¶4. (C) Westmacott admitted that the EU had badly handled
Cyprus. The failure - for reasons largely not of Turkey,s
making - of the Cyprus settlement was bad for the EU, bad for
the EU,s important enlargement initiatives, bad for regional
security, and bad for the people of Cyprus. EU members need
to take more responsibility on Cyprus, without supplanting
the UN, and show greater resistance to the tactics of one
member (Cyprus). He urged that Turkey, in presenting its
initiative, describe this in a broader context, including why
the lack of movement on Cyprus is bad. The UN Good Offices
mission needs a breath of fresh life, and Turkey,s
initiative is a useful addition.

¶5. (C) Marketing the Turkish initiative in the EU will be
difficult, Westmacott indicated. The strategic vision would
be important. Positive words from the UNSYG will help. As
far as possible, Turkey should try to move ahead on
non-Cyprus issues on the accession agenda, including, e.g.,
the Pamuk/freedom of expression cases, the Halki Seminary,
and other items in the news recently, such as the Agca case
and alcohol bans. Turkey should also consider making a
gesture on Cypriot membership in international organizations
) such as the OECD on-line information initiative, an
international weather organization, etc. Turkey might even
drop its objection to Cypriot membership in Wassenaar and
call on Nicosia to stop blocking Turkey,s European Defense
Agency (EDA) bid. Even if Cyprus rejected the quid pro quo,

ANKARA 00000191 002 OF 002


Turkey would help itself with other Europeans.

¶6. (C) Ambassador endorsed, echoed Westmacott,s arguments,
and made the points in ref a. He recommended that the
Turkish proposals be as narrowly focused and have as many
flexibilities (e.g., in timing and phasing) as possible. He
specifically mentioned the Famagusta proposal contained in
ref a, to which Tuygan did not respond. He strongly urged
action on the non-Cyprus agenda of issues, including
especially freedom of expression, Halki and the various other
issues associated with the Ecumenical Patriarch, all of which
were the right thing to do and would help build support for
Turkish EU accession among skeptical European publics.
Ambassador also seconded Westmacott,s points on Cypriot
membership in international organizations and Wassenaar.
What is needed is (a) something to delay a derailment in the
accession process over Cyprus while the effort achieves a
cruising altitude and (b) Turkish steps on other fronts that
show Europeans that Turkey is indeed reforming and is good
and important for European security, values, etc. Turkey
might even consider this when staking its position on Iran
(also a topic of discussion with Tuygan) or activating its
diplomacy on Caspian gas to European markets.

¶7. (C) Tuygan did not disagree with any of the ambassadors,
suggestions and said flexibilities are built into Turkey,s
Cyprus initiative. He stressed that Turkey wants to, as PM
Erdogan has put it, stay one step ahead of the Greek
Cypriots, and this initiative is designed to do that. If the
EU accession process boils down to the one problem of opening
Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels,
especially now, then the process will stop before it even
gets started. The goal should be to prevent that.

¶8. (C) Action request: Post recommends that USUN find a way
to make the UNSYG,s office aware that the Turks have
consulted us and the UK on their initiative, that we welcome
it and support what it represents, and that a positive
reaction ) that avoids endorsement of the specifics put
forward by the Turks ) by the SYG will be helpful in getting
Cyprus out of its current dead end.
WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06ANKARA191.html