Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: CY TU PREL MOPS MARR
SUBJECT: USG SHIP VISIT TO CYPRUS: WEIGHING THE COST

REF: A. NICOSIA 0304

¶B. 2004 ANKARA 6615
¶C. IIR 689801035

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: A USN ship visit to the Republic of Cyprus
(ROC) at this time (ref A) would have a negative impact in
Turkey. The Turks, including the military, will interpret a
visit now (post-April 24 referendum) as support for
Papadopoulos and a slap at the Turkish Cypriots. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) Reftel provides Embassy Nicosia's analysis of the
impact of a ship visit to the ROC on Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. We provide below our view of the likely impact in
Turkey of a USN ship visit to the Republic of Cyprus.

What to Expect in Turkey
------------------------

¶3. (C) Turks in general have the perception that the Turkish
Cypriots have received almost no benefit from voting for
reunification and a solution this past April. They see Greek
Cypriots, on the other hand, as having paid no price for
having voting against it. They view any U.S. or EU actions
on Cyprus through that prism.

¶4. (C) A USN ship visit would likely redirect toward the
U.S. Turkish ire currently aimed mostly at the EU. After our
recent trade delegation to the north, which engendered
significant good will, there is broad recognition we have
tried to pursue a positive course. A ship visit to the south
will wipe that out, and will be perceived as a USG slap in
the Turkish Cypriots' face.

-- This perception will be exacerbated by the Turks'
long-standing objection to Greek Cypriot "closure" of the
north's ports.

-- Our Cyprus policy has been a welcome exception to the
recent wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey (ref B); a ship
visit would put that at risk.

-- Albeit wrongly, Turks will perceive the visit as support
for Papadopoulos. Any Greek Cypriot gloating over the visit
will receive prominent media coverage here, to our detriment.

-- A ship visit would also revive popular speculation and
conspiracy theories about the U.S. desire for bases on Cyprus
at a time when they had finally died down.

-- Ref C suggests that a ship visit to Cyprus could also
damage navy-to-navy relations.

¶5. (C) The only potential ameliorating factor could be
portraying the visit as the continuation of a normal pattern
of visits. Unfortunately, as we understand the
circumstances, there has been no port call to the ROC by any
significant USN ship since September 11, 2001. The visit of
a seagoing tug and a few off-shore submarines do not create
the necessary patterns. This would prevent us from employing
this counter argument.

Marmaris Maritime Festival
--------------------------

¶6. (C) We understand that one option that has been under
consideration would be to have the ship participating in the
Marmaris International Maritime Festival conduct a follow-on
visit to Cyprus. This would be problematical. The Turks
deny entry to aircraft whose previous or subsequent
destination is the Republic of Cyprus. They will likely have
the same policy with a USN vessel, necessitating at minimum
an intervening port. The Turks will view as USG deception a
subsequent visit to Cyprus by a USN vessel that previously
participated in the Festival, regardless of any intervening
port.
¶7. (C) Comment: Our summary judgment is that a ship visit
to the Republic of Cyprus at this time will have a
significant negative impact in Turkey. End Comment.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ANKARA1076.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002721

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2015
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KENNEDY DISCUSSES CYPRUS IN ANKARA, MAY 3

REF: NICOSIA 0728

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958 reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In May 3 meetings with Turkish MFA and NSC
officials, Turkish parliamentarians, and press, DAS Kennedy
emphasized that the Greek Cypriots need to lay out their
objections to the Annan Plan with clarity and finality. At
the same time, Turkey must search for ways to promote overall
Cyprus settlement. MFA officials said restrictions on
UNFICYP will soon be lifted, Ledra Street and Zodhia will be
opened soon, but Strovilia will have to wait "for another
day." The GOT is concerned about Greek Cypriot court actions
in property cases (reftel). Kennedy urged that the Turkish
Cypriots not reject EU aid if de-linked from trade, and
consider opening Famagusta under some auspices if there were
a carefully structured proposal. NSC SecGen Alpogan said the
NSC aims to recommend to the GOT that Turkey launch a
proposal to get the parties back to the negotiating table.
End Summary.

Kennedy: Lack of Settlement A Problem in the Long Run
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶2. (C) U/S Tuygan told Kennedy Turkey is prepared to move
forward on Cyprus if the Greek Cypriots spell out their
objections to the Annan Plan. Kennedy replied that the Greek
Cypriot idea of expressing "areas of concern" does not appear
capable of producing the clarity and finality the SYG
requires. Tuygan said an "extraneous issue like Cyprus"
should not cloud Turkish/EU relations. Kennedy agreed, but
reminded Tuygan of the importance of signing the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol before October 3 and that, in
the long run, lack of a Cyprus settlement would sour
Turkish/EU relations. Kennedy and Ambassador Edelman both
assessed as positive the possible role of EU Cyprus special
advisor Blomberg as long as the UN kept the negotiating lead.

UNFICYP, Demining, Missing Persons
----------------------------------

¶3. (C) DAS Kennedy encouraged Deputy U/S Apakan to move
ahead on proposed lifting of restrictions on UNFICYP and on
returning Strovilia to the military status quo prior to 2000.
The U.S. will work in the UN to get Turkey the credit it
deserves for these improvements. Apakan replied Turkey is
taking steps to remove the UNFICYP restrictions, including at
the Dherinia crossing point. In light of this, Turkey wants
references to restrictions excised from the UNSCR text and
hopes the report will reflect Turkey's positive moves.

¶4. (C) Apakan predicted that Ledra Street and the Zodhia
crossing will be opened "in due time," but Strovilia is "a
different case." Acting DDG Bilman added that "Stoivilia
will have to wait." Kennedy told both Apakan and National
Security Council Secretary General Alpogan she hoped Turkey
will move soon on Strovilia. Alpogan called Strovilia "a
minor issue" and said the U.S. should not push on it, this
only encouraged Greek Cypriot intransigence. Kennedy pointed
out the issue was of primary interest to UN, not the Greek
Cypriots or the U.S.; in any event, it is in Turkey's and the
Turkish Cypriots' interest to resolve it.

¶5. (C) Apakan also told Kennedy Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots are ready to sign the mine clearing protocol and
have so informed UNFICYP. The Turkish Cypriots will request
that the final exchange of letters on the demining protocol
refer to the prior letter exchange between Talat and the
UNSYG. Kennedy welcomed the news and said the U.S. would
take this up with DPKO.

¶6. (C) On missing persons, Apakan complained the Greek
Cypriots are trying to take the issue to the COE (NFI);
Turkey hopes the UN role will be reinforced. Bilman claimed
this is the only forum where both Greek and Turkish Cypriot
missing persons are discussed, and accused the Greek Cypriots
of trying to "kill" the committee. Kennedy undertook to look
into the matter.

Greek Cypriot Property Cases
----------------------------

¶7. (C) Apakan and National Security Council Secretary
General Alpogan expressed concern over recent actions by
Greek Cypriot courts against Turkish Cypriots living in Greek
Cypriot homes. Apakan said these measures threaten
bizonality. The MFA is seeking legal advice about to what
extent the EU has authority in the north, where the EU aquis
are suspended.

EU Trade/Aid
------------

¶8. (C) Kennedy told both Apakan and Alpogan the U.S. will
continue to press the EU on trade and aid for the north, but
added she is not optimistic about the prospects. The Turkish
Cypriots may need to accept de-linking the two; EU Commission
staff is running out of money and the aid package is the only
potential source of funding. Apakan said Turkey did not like
the idea of de-linking; in the event the aid portion were
approved, the EU would forget about direct trade.

¶9. (C) Kennedy suggested to both Apakan and Alpogan that a
compromise involving opening the Famagusta port under some
auspices might be a "first step" toward direct trade. Apakan
noted the Luxembourg Presidency proposed to open it under EU
administration and this would leave it open to Greek Cypriot
interference. Kennedy granted that any such proposal must be
carefully structured, but reiterated this could be a viable
first step in trade. Apakan expressed concern about the
timing of the proposal; Alpogan merely said "we'll see."

NSC Readying Proposal to Get Parties Back to the Table
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶10. (C) Alpogan expressed deep skepticism that Papadopoulos
would make the compromises necessary for overall settlement,
and worried that the Greek Cypriot public is becoming more
opposed to settlement. Alpogan said he is putting the
finishing touches on an "in-house" Cyprus study recommending
that Turkey take actions to reaffirm "the moral high ground"
it reached after the 2004 referendum. Alpogan declared that
Turkey needs "to come forward with ideas" for settlement
within an Annan Plan framework and invite the parties back to
the negotiating table. Alpogan said this is an NSC project,
not a joint project with the MFA, and expressed uncertainty
that the MFA would agree with the approach.

¶11. (C) Kennedy said this is a wise approach that could help
Turkey recapture momentum. She said the U.S. is ready to
coordinate with Turkey if Turkey can share specifics with us.

¶12. (C) Comment: Alpogan's forward-leaning proposal will
get a cold reception from the MFA and the military, who are
still both mired in the "Turkey has already done its part"
mentality. End Comment.

¶13. (U) DAS Kennedy has cleared this message.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/05/05ANKARA2721.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION
DECLARATION

REF: A. ANKARA 427

¶B. ANKARA 879
¶C. ANKARA 1856
¶D. ANKARA 3558
¶E. BRUSSELS 2533
¶F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS

(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is determined to issue a written
declaration that extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten
new EU members does not constitute recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus (ROC). Domestic criticism that it does
constitute recognition is pushing the Turks toward tougher
non-recognition language, posing the risk that member states
or the Commission will question whether Turkey has fulfilled
the EU requirement to extend the Agreement. This could
possibly block the opening of negotiations. As of July 5,
the Turks had not shared their proposed non-recognition
declaration text with anyone, not even the UK. We urged the
MFA to do so, and to use the most moderate language possible.
Turkey and some member states are also at odds about the
modalities for extending the Agreement. End Summary.


Turks Firm On Written Declaration
---------------------------------

¶2. (C) The Turkish MFA continues to firmly state that Turkey
will soon extend the Ankara Agreement to the ten new members,
including the ROC. The MFA is equally firm that Turkey will
issue a written declaration that their extending the Ankara
Agreement to the 10 new EU members does not constitute
recognition of the ROC (refs a, b, c, d).

¶3. (C) Given continuing domestic criticism that it does
constitute recognition, we see little chance Turkey can be
persuaded otherwise. Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs
A/DDG Bilman called the idea of no declaration "impossible."
He claims he is getting "hate letters" over Turkey's
commitment to extend the Agreement to the ROC. Bilman
likewise dismissed the idea of an oral declaration, saying it
will have "no meaning." UK Embassy PolChief Miller says a
minority of member states hope for an oral declaration.

¶4. (C) Bilman says the Turks are looking for "legal
certainty" that extending the Agreement cannot be construed
as recognition. The MFA has consulted with several
international lawyers (not Turks, according to Bilman) about
what language will guarantee that. European Commission
Ankara Political Head Dawson and Miller think the Turks are
wrong on the law, saying that Commission and UK lawyers agree
that recognition cannot occur without Turkey actively
intending it. However, according to Dawson, the Turks
continue to believe they can be "tricked" into recognition.

¶5. (C) Despite earlier statements, it now appears the Turks
are prepared to live without EU acknowledgment of their
non-recognition declaration. Bilman acknowledged this was
Turkey's "original position," but said he was not sure "if
this (EU acknowledgment) will happen." He then dropped the
point.

Turks, EU Have Not Discussed Specific Language
--------------------------------------------- -

¶6. (C) Bilman, Miller and Dawson confirm Turkey has so far
not shared its proposed text with the Commission, nor even
with the UK, its strongest EU supporter. Miller tells us the
UK has asked to see the text before the Turks give it to the
Commission, but had not seen it as of July 5. Dawson said
the Commission has not discussed specific language because it
does not want to encourage a Turkish declaration, and because
the Turks are reluctant to share the text. UK Ambassador
Westmacott has spoken to MFA U/S Tuygan and Deputy U/S Apakan
regarding the text. They promised his ideas will be taken
into account. We urged Bilman to consider at least sharing
the text with the UK; he said he would consider this but was
non-committal.

¶7. (C) Acknowledging this is an issue for Turkey and the EU
to resolve, we also urged A/DDG Bilman to use moderate
language in the declaration, the minimum possible to achieve
Turkey's aims. Bilman replied that several EU diplomats here
have urged the same thing, but none has told him what
language would be acceptable or unacceptable. Per ref e, we
suggested that, as a starting point, stating that the
protocol does not change Turkey's position would be
preferable to stating that Turkey does not recognize the ROC
and only recognizes the "TRNC."

¶8. (C) Bilman recalled that upon signing the EU Constitution
Treaty, Turkey sent a letter to EU High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana referring to -- but
not reiterating -- the MFA's May 1, 2004 statement regarding
"Southern Cypriot Greek Administration's Accession to the
EU." The May 1 statement said, in part, "Greek Cypriots" do
not represent Turkish Cypriots, do not have authority over
the whole island, and cannot be accepted as the legal
government representing all the island (we have e-mailed a
copy to the Department, USEU and Embassy London). Bilman
hinted that the coming Turkish declaration might again refer
to, but not reiterate, the May 2004 statement. However, even
such a reference could be a problem -- Dawson also recalled
the May 1 statement, terming it "not particularly
encouraging."

¶9. (C) Whatever the language of the non-recognition
declaration, the Turks will have to be careful. While
domestic criticism pushes them toward tougher, legally
bulletproof text, both Miller and Dawson warn that extreme
language will fuel doubts by members states about Turkey's
intent to implement the extension protocol, or raise
questions about the credibility of Turkey's ostensible
agreement. In effect, it would call into question whether
Turkey has fulfilled the requirements for the opening of
negotiations. The worst case, according to Dawson, would be
if the Commission legal service comes to such a conclusion.


Letter Exchange v. Signing
--------------------------

¶10. (C) The Turks and some member states are also not in
agreement on the modalities of how Turkey will extend the
Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, including the ROC.
The Turkish MFA wants a low-key exchange of letters to avoid
inflaming domestic opponents; they want to avoid a
high-publicity signing ceremony. However, according to UK
PolChief Miller, the letter exchange idea "won't fly in
Brussels." Although the Commission itself is neutral on this
point, Dawson also notes signing is important to some member
states. Some member states will not agree to a letter
exchange, pointing out the December Summit conclusions
require Turkey to "sign." In addition, Turkish refusal to
sign could furnish another cause for some member states to
question Turkey's commitment to implement the protocol.

¶11. (C) There is a middle ground: Turkey could sign the
extension protocol without a ceremony. Miller said the FCO
proposed this to MFA Deputy U/S for European Affairs Bozkir
during his July 1 visit to London, but Bozkir still insisted
on a letter exchange.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05ANKARA3890.html

[CBBB]

I think you should find another hobby, you will go screwy reading all those diplomatic cables!

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004125

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY, UK PRESIDENCY AGREE ON ANKARA AGREEMENT
EXTENSION PROTOCOL MODALITY

REF: A. ANKARA 3890

¶B. 14 JULY 2005 BLAHA E-MAILS
¶C. ANKARA 1856

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: According to the UK Embassy. the GOT and
the UK Presidency agreed July 15 on the modality by which
Turkey will sign the Ankara Agreement extension protocol.
The UK will announce the agreement on modality at the July 18
GAERC and expects the signing process to begin shortly
thereafter. The text of the declaration the GOT will issue
that its signature does not constitute recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) remains unknown, and could trigger a
sharp reaction from the EU if it is not moderate. End
Summary.

Agreement on Modality
----------------------

¶2. (C) The last roadblock to Turkish extension of the Ankara
Agreement to the ten new EU members was the modality by which
it would occur. UK PolChief Miller and MFA Northeast
Mediterranean A/DDG Bilman both told us the GOT wanted an
exchange of letters without an actual signing in order to
blunt domestic criticism that a signature constitutes
recognition and to keep the event as low-key a possible. The
UK Presidency was firm that the enough members states would
insist that the December Summit conclusions require an actual
signature to make the GOT's proposal non-viable.

¶3. (C) According to Miller, following July 14 meetings in
Ankara between Turkish MFA officials and FCO Med/Europe
Director Chilcott, the two sides came to a compromise
agreement that the GOT will sign the protocol (the text was
agreed to in March - see ref C) through an exchange of
letters. FM Gul personally approved the modality July 15.
The UK EU PermRep (and perhaps a Commission official) will
sign the protocol and send it with a cover letter to Turkey;
the Turkish PermRep will send back the protocol with his
signature as well, attaching a GOT declaration that the
signature does not constitute recognition of the ROC.

¶4. (C) The UK will announce the agreed mechanism at the July
18 GAERC. Miller told us the UK will finesse the timing so
that the letter exchange commences after the GAERC. The UK
wants the GOT declaration to become public only after the
GAERC in order to avoid the GAERC getting wrapped up in a
discussion of it.

Now, the Other Shoe: Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶5. (C) While agreement on the modality clears the way for
the GOT to sign the protocol, the accompanying Turkish
non-recognition declaration poses the next problem. Domestic
criticism is pushing the GOT toward tough non-recognition
language that could cause members states to question whether
the GOT intends to implement the protocol, or even whether
the GOT's signature has meaning (ref A).

¶6. (C) The GOT still has not shared its proposed declaration
text with anyone, not even the UK. Miller told us that
during the July 18 meetings, MFA Europe Deputy U/S Bozkir
told the UK the MFA Cyprus Department is keeping the text so
close-hold that although he has seen it, even he does not
have a copy.

¶7. (C) Turkish MFA officials assure the UK -- and us -- that
the declaration text will contain no surprises, "nothing that
has not already been said." They say it will contain
positive elements, including expression of the GOT's
willingness to find a comprehensive Cyprus solution.
Nevertheless, they continue to hint it will refer to the
GOT's May 2004 statement upon the accession of the ten new
members, including the ROC, a statement that Commission
officials here view negatively.

¶8. (C) Depending on the language of the GOT declaration,
Miller tells us the UK Presidency may be compelled to issue a
counter-declaration. The Turkish MFA is worried the ROC
could use a counter-declaration to argue "back door
recognition" by Turkey.

Negotiation Framework for Turkey
--------------------------------

¶9. (C) The GOT and UK also discussed on July 14 Cyprus and
Aegean-related portions of the Negotiation Framework for
Turkey. Among other things, Bilman said the MFA argued that
saying that Turkey should "support...steps to contribute to a
favorable environment for comprehensive (Cyprus) settlement"
turn Cyprus settlement into a condition for membership and
place all the onus on Turkey, paving the way for endless
Greek Cypriot demands. FM Gul will have difficulty defending
the Framework text, the MFA asserted.
¶10. (C) Chilcott told the MFA officials they are misreading
the text and overplaying concerns. He reminded the Turks the
Framework is a list of EU demands on a candidate, not a
Turkish document. Chilcott warned the MFA not to expect any
improvement in the text; indeed, the UK will have to expend
effort to prevent the text from becoming too much tougher.

FM Gul Feels Disillusioned, Isolated on EU
------------------------------------------

¶11. (C) Miller told us that FM Gul was downbeat on the EU
during a July 13 plane ride from London to Ankara with UK
Ambassador Westmacott. Gul claimed he is disillusioned with
the EU process and what he views as excessive EU demands on
Turkey. Bozkir told Westmacott July 14 that Gul feels
isolated in the cabinet on EU issues, implying he is the only
one doing the heavy political lifting. Bozkir pointed noted
that PM Erdogan has not attended an EU-related meeting since
the December EU Summit.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05ANKARA4125.html

[boomerang]

O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004296

SIPDIS

EMBASSIES BAKU AND TBILISI PLEASE PASS DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: STEP BY STEP TOWARD TURKISH SIGNING OF
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE ANKARA AGREEMENT


(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The UK Embassy hopes UK lobbying will have
steered the Turkish government to sign the additional
protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the July 27
Blair-Erdogan meeting in London. At the same time, the UK
has been pressing Turkish authorities to issue Turkey's
expected reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus in a way which will not throw commencement of Turkey's
harmonization process off the October 3 start date. Turkish
MFA EU general directorate assures us the text will
faithfully reflect UK recommendations. However, enough
elements remain uncertain that the UK is taking nothing for
granted. End summary.

¶2. (C) UK Embassy polchief affirmed to us July 26 that her
government hopes the Turkish government will sign the
additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the
July 27 Blair-Erdogan meeting in London.

¶3. (C) The UK aims to use the July 27 meeting to gain clarity
on how Turkey proposes to reaffirm its non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus and to dissuade Erdogan from any language
that some in the EU could consider too harsh, especially any
language that would interpret the additional protocol as
giving Turkey the right to deny entry to its ports and
airfields for Cypriot vessels. The UK has been advising the
Turkish authorities, both in the MFA and at the political
level (FM Gul), that it is not proper for Turkey to comment
in its declaration on how it intends to implement the
additional protocol; if Turkey intends to interpret the
protocol in any restrictive manner, it should make its
intentions known subsequently through the EU Commission's
legal mechanisms.

¶4. (C) A complicating element is Erdogan's attitude, polchief
added. There is some concern in London that Erdogan, who,
despite continual travel, has not visited any EU country
since the December 2004 EU summit, is not focused on the
delicacy of the issue or even on Turkey's EU candidacy in
general. Erdogan has indicated that he intends to use his
meeting with Blair to talk about "more important" issues such
as Iraq, terrorism, and anti-Muslim sentiment. UK Ambassador
told Charge July 25 that he was waiting to see whether Gul
would arrange for him to fly with the PM to London in order
to be able to brief Erdogan on the need for prudence.

¶5. (C) If a satisfactory signing appears to be in the offing,
the procedure would be for the UK permrep to the EU, on
behalf of the EU, to sign a copy of the additional protocol
and present it to the Turkish permrep in Brussels. The
Turkish permrep would then sign and return the protocol,
along with a Turkish declaration that its signature does not
constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

¶6. (C) UK polchief acknowledged that the UK will be taking a
risk in signing the additional protocol before it knows the
content of the Turkish non-recognition declaration. However,
this is the deal the UK has worked out with Turkey, and in
any event it might be better not to be presented beforehand
with a Turkish text which could put the UK in an awkward
position. In any event, the Cypriots are pressing for a
COREPER meeting immediately after the signing to issue a
counter-declaration, but the UK has deflected this pressure,
polchief said. Instead, depending on the tone and content of
the Turkish declaration, the UK may issue a statement
reaffirming that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state
and the only internationally-recognized authority on the
island. The UK would then suggest a COREPER meeting for
sometime in mid-August.

¶7. (C) Turkish MFA EU general directorate DDG Turkmen averred
to us late July 26 that the Turkish non-recognition statement
takes into account the UK recommendations and should be
reasonable enough in tone to satisfy both Turkish legal
exigencies and EU opinion. In outlining the text to us,
another excellent contact of ours also asserted that the
Turkish statement will be concise and leave room enough for
both Turkish public opinion and the EU to live with it.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05ANKARA4296.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004486

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: AKP GOVERNMENT SIGNS ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL, REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS


(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: By its July 29 signing of an additional
protocol extending the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement to
the EU's 10 newest members, Turkey appeared to have fulfilled
the remaining pre-condition for an Oct. 3 start to accession
negotiations. However, the ability of the UK as EU
Presidency to hold down EU member states' reaction to an
attached Turkish declaration that does not recognize the
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey's determination not to open its
ports to Greek Cypriot vessels absent a lifting of the Greek
Cypriot embargo on northern Cyprus is unclear at this stage.
End summary.

¶2. (U) In signing an additional protocol ("Adaptation
Protocol") to the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement July 29,
Turkey's AKP government extended the Agreement's reach to the
EU's 10 newest members, including the Republic of Cyprus.

¶3. (U) At the same time, the AKP government issued a six-part
declaration (text below, para re-affirming long-standing
Turkish positions that: (1) Turkey will continue to support
the UNSYG's efforts toward a comprehensive Cyprus settlement
leading to a new bi-zonal partnership state; (2) the Republic
of Cyprus referred to in the protocol is not the partnership
state founded in 1960; (3) the Greek Cypriot authorities'
legal and administrative authority extends only over the
territory south of the buffer zone, Turkey will continue to
consider that the Greek Cypriots have no authority over the
Turkish Cypriot people, and Turkey will treat the Greek
Cypriot authorities' actions according to these two
considerations; (4) Turkey's signature, ratification, and
implementation of the protocol does not signify recognition
in any manner of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the
protocol and Turkey's rights and obligations under the 1960
Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment continue;
(5) Turkey's relationship with the "TRNC" remains unchanged.

¶4. (C) Discussing the Turkish declaration on the margins of
an Aug. 1 meeting with EUR DAS Bryza, a visibly nervous
deputy U/S Apakan, the MFA's Cyprus wallah, said Turkey had
been obliged to issue the declaration but had striven to be
as nuanced and non-confrontational as possible. Neither he
nor DG (A/S equivalent) for the Americas Alpar could gauge
what the EU reaction might be, but instead both wrapped
themselves in wishful thinking that the EU would not react
harshly or even issue a comment supplementary to the UK
Presidency's July 29 response that the EU recognizes only the
Republic of Cyprus.

¶5. (C) Asked how the EU might react to exclusion of Cypriot
vessels from Turkish ports, Apakan argued that the Customs
Union does not cover transportation or other services, i.e.,
Turkish trucks are restricted in their transport of goods to
EU markets. Therefore, the EU should not balk. Furthermore,
the Greek Cypriots have restricted Turkish Cypriot commerce
since 1963. The Greek Cypriots claim to represent the whole
island and the EU recognizes the Greek Cypriots as the
Republic of Cyprus. How can the EU permit an embargo on one
of its parts, Apakan asked. In any event, Greek Cypriot
goods can enter Turkey. And if the Greek Cypriots end their
embargo on the north, then, he opined, the Turkish government
might well reconsider its position on port access. In this
regard, Turkey's end-May proposal to open all ports in Cyprus
to all goods was a reflection of Turkey's constructive
willingness to find a solution.

¶6. (U) In a statement following Turkey's signing, FonMin Gul
reiterated that, by signing the additional protocol, the
Turkish government considers it has fulfilled all
pre-conditions for accession negotiations to begin Oct. 3.
However, Gul added that the AKP government will submit the
protocol for parliamentary approval after Parliament
reconvenes Oct. 1, thus appearing to signal the EU that
Turkey has "options" if the negotiations do not start on Oct.
¶3. Turkish press broadly reported EU Enlargement Commissioner
Rehn's Aug. 1 statement that no obstacles remain to opening
accession negotiations Oct. 3. However, they have begun to
pick up reports quoting French PM de Villepin saying that
Turkey will have to recognize the Republic of Cyprus before
talks can begin Oct. 3 and that the start date could
otherwise be delayed. The de Villepin statement is likely
further to goad those in Turkey, e.g., CHP on the left and
MHP on the right, who have accused the AKP government of
selling out national interests by signing the additional
protocol.


¶7. (U) Text of "Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus" (MFA English
version):

¶1. Turkey remains committed to finding a political
settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated
its resolve in this regard. Accordingly, Turkey will
continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General
towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead
to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State. A
just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to
peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.

¶2. The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not
the original partnership State established in 1960.

¶3. Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot
authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction
only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is
currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish
Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them
accordingly.

¶4. Turkey declares that signature, ratification and
implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the
Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights and obligations
emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of
Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.

¶5. Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unchanged by
becoming a party to the Protocol.

¶6. Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of
Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged. Turkey expresses its
readiness to establish relations with the new partnership
State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement
in Cyprus.


MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05ANKARA4486.html

[boomerang]

Eye-to-Eye on Cyprus and EU Accession
-------------------------------------

¶2. (S) The Prime Minister voiced gratitude for the support
President Bush demonstrated during their June meeting in
Washington for easing the isolation of northern Cyprus and for
achieving a comprehensive settlement under the Annan Plan.
He lamented that the Greek Cypriot side continues to obstruct any
movement toward a settlement and that UN Special Cyprus Rep
Prendergast's recent visit had been fruitless. Erdogan expressed
appreciation for the current trip to northern Cyprus by a
seven-member staff delegation from the U.S. Congress.
He wondered aloud if there were any possibility of "TRNC
President" Talat being invited to Washington, which he said
would be a wake-up call for Greek Cypriots. He also urged USG
consideration of direct commercial flights to
northern Cyprus.

¶3. (S) Charge emphasized Washington's continuing commitment
to a Cyprus settlement and its determination to ease the isolation of
northern Cyprus. She underscored US assistance to
northern Cyprus via the Cyprus Partnership for Economic
Growth (CyPEG) package, as well as support for academic exchanges and
the visits of political and commercial delegations to the north.
Charge congratulated Erdogan for his courage and vision in
supporting a Cyprus settlement and in moving forward on the
process of EU accession.

¶4. (S) Erdogan recalled EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie
Rehn's recent statement to the effect that Ankara had kept
its word on EU accession and now the EU should do the
same. Charge assured Erdogan that the U.S. would continue to
talk with Europeans discretely to encourage their support
for Turkey's EU membership bid.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05ANKARA4658.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004716

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EU
SUBJECT: REACTION TO TURKISH DECLARATION OF NON-RECOGNITION
OF CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 4486

¶B. PARIS 5307
¶C. PARIS 5350

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's July 29 declaration that is does
not recognize the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (ref A) has raised
little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara: it is what
most expected, and not as extreme as some feared. Turkish
media cautiously welcomed the protocol and non-recognition
declaration. Turkish reaction to French PM de Villepin's
August 2 statement implying accession negotiations cannot go
forward absent recognition (refs B and C) has been
restrained. EU diplomats here, including the UK, expect
Cyprus-related objections to be resolved before October 3,
but worry about attempts by the French and others to make
textual changes to the negotiating framework for Turkey.
After October 3, demands that Turkey open ports and airports
to the ROC will become a serious issue. End Summary.


Turkish Declaration Raises Little Controversy
---------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Turkey's July 29 declaration that extension of the
Customs Union does not constitute recognition of the ROC has
raised little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara. The
declaration was along the lines most expected and not as
extreme as some feared. The French DCM claims that the
declaration is a "new element" that calls into question
Turkey's will to implement the protocol, but this flies in
the face of the fact that the declaration was
widely-discussed beforehand -- and in the face of her own
apparent surprise at PM de Villepin's reaction to it.

¶3. (C) In the end, no one, not even term President and
Turkey supporter UK, saw the declaration text before its
release. MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs A/DDG Bilman
would not even let junior diplomats in his own department
work on it. However, UK Ambassador Westmacott held extended
discussions with Bilman and his boss, Deputy U/S Apakan, and
made specific recommendations on the text.

¶4. (U) Turkish media cautiously welcomed the protocol
signing and the non-recognition declaration. Cuneyt Ulsever,
a columnist for "Hurriyet" who has been highly critical of
the Erdogan government in recent weeks, wrote that the
government "should be congratulated" on the move. Oktay
Eksi, another "Hurriyet" columnist with strong links to the
Turkish secular establishment, welcomed the signing as
another step toward EU membership talks, but expressed
concerns about EU reaction to Turkey,s declaration and the
long-term implications of the protocol for Turkish Cypriots.
The pro-Government Islamist "Yeni Safak" hailed the start of
the "countdown to EU negotiations," highlighting the Prime
Minister,s comments that Turkey is "rolling up its sleeves"
for an EU process that will be "as delicate as knitting
lace." The paper also reported Foreign Minister Gul,s claim
that Turkey had "fulfilled its commitment of December 17" and
his assertion that there are "no more obstacles" in Turkey,s
path to accession talks. A sour note was sounded by the
leftist-nationalist "Cumhuriyet" which stressed that the
protocol had been signed "despite every warning." The paper
raised the possibility of an EU counter-declaration and
predicted that Cyprus could veto Turkey,s accession talks
despite the Government's action. All media noted the
criticism of opposition party leaders to the signing of the
protocol, but with the exception of "Cumhuriyet," major
dailies gave the naysayers short shrift.

¶5. (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, FM Gul was pleased
by the Turkish media reaction.

Restrained Reaction to de Villepin Statement
--------------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Turkish reaction to PM de Villepin's August 2
statement that opening negotiations is not "conceivable"
absent Turkish recognition of the ROC has been restrained.
PM Erdogan said he was "saddened" by the news, but he and PM
Gul have both avoided extreme rhetoric. We will encourage
Turkish officials to continue along these lines and avoid
giving ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics before October 3.

¶7. (C) Our EU contacts here ascribe de Villepin's statement
to French domestic politics instead of a serious intention to
block the October 3 opening of negotiations absent Turkish
recognition of the ROC. Miller and the Danish DCM both
expect ostensible French Cyprus-related objections to be
resolved after the August 25 COREPER and September 1-2
Gymnich meetings.

¶8. (C) In the wake of the extension protocol, the
non-recognition declaration, and de Villepin's statement,
Turkish MFA U/S Tuygan told the UK that the MFA is
considering a swing through selected EU capitals (possibly
including Paris, Vienna and the Hague) by either him or FM
Gul. Timing is a question mark; Ankara and EU capitals are
in an August vacation lull.

Next Steps
----------

¶9. (C) The UK is preparing a draft counter-declaration for
discussion at the August 25 COREPER. According to PolChief
Miller, the declaration will welcome Turkish signing of the
extension protocol; note the unilateral nature of the Turkish
non-recognition declaration; and note that the ROC has
acceded to the EU. It may also include a statement that the
members states look forward to implementation of the
extension protocol.

¶10. (C) EU diplomats here expect the ROC to push the EU to
require Turkey to open its ports and airports to the ROC
before October 3, but do not anticipate this will succeed.
However, port and airports will become a deadly serious issue
after October 3. The Turks fiercely oppose this,
particularly when "TRNC" port and airports remain closed to
EU trade. Unilateral Turkish concession on this score will
spark a firestorm of domestic criticism. Miller hopes the EU
can give the GOT a Cyprus-related political concession to
serve as a fig leaf for opening ports and airports.

¶11. (C) Contradictory statements from GOT officials make it
unclear whether the GOT intends to submit the extension
protocol for parliamentary ratification. If the GOT does
decide to submit the protocol, parliament can ratify by
simple majority. We expect that, if the GOT does submit the
protocol to parliament, it will not do so before October 3;
Miller agrees. PM Erdogan's AKP has 355 of 550 deputies, but
the numerical advantage could be weakened in the event of
more controversy between Turkey and the EU on issues like
ports and airports or the content of Turkey's negotiating
framework.

Concerns About the Negotiating Framework
----------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Although he expects Cyprus issues will not in the
end block the October 3 opening of negotiations, the
well-connected Danish DCM is worried there is not enough time
before October 3 to resolve anticipated French, Austrian,
Greek and ROC demands for changes to the negotiating
framework text. UK PolChief Miller calls this "doable"
before October 3 but admits the UK is nervous about France.
The UK Embassy expects that the French will use what they
will portray as a concession in dropping Cyprus-related
objections to push for a tougher text. Miller told us the
French have not yet proposed specific textual changes, but
she anticipates the French will seek to expand language on
the open-ended nature of negotiations, a hot-button issue for
the Turks.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05ANKARA4716.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004767

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2015
TAGS: EU PGOV PREL TU EU
SUBJECT: DRAFT GENERAL EU POSITION FOR THE ACCESSION
NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY.

(U) Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Charles O.
Blaha, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) ON August 10, the Danish DCM (strictly protect)
passed us the below document, dated July 19, from the
European Council General Secretariat to the EU Permanent
Representatives' Committee.

¶2. (C) Begin text:

¶1. The Enlargement Group, at its meetings on 5 and 12
July 2005, examined the draft General EU Position
(negotiating framework) for the accession negotiations with
Turkey, as submitted by the Commission (doc. 10690/05 ELARG
35).

¶2. Delegations welcomed the document proposed by the
Commission and considered that it was in line with the
conclusions of the European Council in December 2004 and June
¶2005. Furthermore, the document remained very close to the
negotiating framework already agreed for Croatia. The
majority of delegations considered the document to be
rigorous and balanced, which should be adopted without any
significant changes.

¶3. Some delegations, however, highlighted the need to
take greater account of the specific situation and
characteristics of Turkey as indicated in the European
Council conclusions of December 2004, as well as the Union's
capacity to absorb Turkey, in accordance with the 1993
Copenhagen European Council conclusions. In this light, three
delegations (AT/FR/CY) expressed a general scrutiny
reservation on the text; the Cypriot delegation also entered
a general reservation pending the signature by Turkey of the
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement.

¶4. Further to the discussions at both meetings of the
Group, and without prejudice to future comments by
delegations, two categories of issues were identified as
follows:

¶5. Issues of a more political nature

- Paragraph 3 (see doc. 10690/05): One delegation (CY),
supported by a couple of other delegations (GR/IRL),
requested replacing the words "in Turkey" with "by Turkey" at
the beginning of the paragraph where reference is made to "a
serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms ..." (suspension clause). It was noted that similar
language ("by a Member State") is used in the Treaties
(Article 7 of the Treaty establishing the EU) and in the
draft Constitution. However, several delegations opposed this
change, recalling that the language "in Turkey" was used in
the European Council conclusions of December 2004, as well as
in the negotiating framework for Croatia, and insisted that
the current text should therefore be maintained.
A similar point was also made on the last sentence of
paragraph 2 as regards the monitoring by the Commission of
the implementation of the reform process, notably with regard
to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights,
where one delegation (CY) suggested adding "wherever Turkey
exercises effective control..."

- Paragraph 4, second bullet point: As regards good
neighbourly relations and the resolution of outstanding
border disputes, one delegation (GR) reserved the right to
suggest changes to this bullet point.

- Paragraph 4, third (and fourth) bullet points: One
delegation (CY) reserved the right to suggest changes to the
paragraph on Cyprus. With regard to the implementation of the
Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the Commission
stated that this would form part of the benchmarking process,
as indicated in paragraph 18 of the negotiating framework,
although it was too early to say what the concrete benchmarks
would be or in which chapters they might be used. Other
issues On a point raised by one delegation (MT) to refer to
the implementation by Turkey of the six pieces of
legislation, identified by the Commission, in a manner
consistent with democratic principles, it was noted that a
general reference could be made in the opening
statement attached to the negotiating framework.

¶6. Other issues

- One delegation (CY) suggested adding a reference in the
body of the text to the Intergovernmental Conference, using
the exact language of paragraph 23 of the December 2004
European Council conclusions to the effect that the
negotiations will be conducted "... in an Intergovernmental
Conference with the participation of all Member States...".

- Paragraph 2: One delegation (CY) asked for the
insertion of a reference to the "full and speedy
implementation of the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights". The Commission questioned the need to
highlight this specific aspect given that the formulation
used in the text "including relevant European case law" was
broad enough and also covered ECHR judgments.

- Paragraph 2: As regards the reporting obligation of the
Commission on the implementation of the reform process, one
delegation (GR) asked for the insertion of a phrase at the
end of the last sentence which would read as follows:
"addressing all points of concern identified in the
Commission's Recommendation for Turkey and in its annual
Regular Reports". The Commission felt that more general
language would be preferable and proposed that the end of the
last sentence could read: "progress will continue to be
closely monitored by the Commission, which is invited to
continue to report regularly to the Council on Turkey's
compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria".

- Paragraph 4: One delegation (GR) requested the addition of
the word "political" in the first sentence of the paragraph
where there is a reference to "a framework of economic and
social convergence". The Commission was reluctant, however,
to change the text as this would mean a deviation from the
negotiating framework with Croatia.

- Paragraph 5: One delegation (CY) asked for a reference
indicating the need for Turkey to change its policy
towards Cyprus' membership of international organisations and
mechanisms.

- Annex with Preliminary indicative list of Chapter
headings: Two delegations (FIN/DK) asked for the deletion of
the footnote. However, one delegation (AT) felt it should
remain.

¶7. Finally, delegations raised a number of questions
regarding the negotiating procedures, and in particular
benchmarking See relevant non-paper of the Commission on this
issue of 14.02.2005, issued as meeting document 6/05 of the
Enlargement Group. (paragraph 18). The Commission provided
clarifications on many of the issues raised, such as impact
assessments of Turkey's membership on the Union and its
policies, as well as the issue of a functioning market
economy as a benchmark for relevant chapters. Furthermore it
was noted that benchmarks would be precise and differ
depending on the chapter, and would be updated as necessary.

¶8. In this light, the file is submitted to the
consideration of the Permanent Representatives' Committee,
which is invited, in particular, to:

- establish whether, subject to the reserves and
outstanding issues identified above, there is agreement on
the text;

- note that the Presidency will give Ministers an
opportunity to raise their concerns about the general
negotiating framework at the Gymnich meeting on 1-2 September
2005;

- consider the timetable leading to the adoption of the
general negotiating framework in view of the opening of
accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. End
text.
MCELDOWNEY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05ANKARA4767.html