O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000373
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2030
TAGS: PREL CY TU MARR
SUBJECT: TURKS MULLING NATO/EU PROBLEM BUT NOT YET READY
FOR COMPROMISE
REF: 04 ANKARA 6402
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Our recent conversations with MFA and TGS
officials reveal that some thought is being given to how to
resolve the impasse created by Turkey's strict interpretation
of NAC decisions that excludes from Berlin Plus-related
discussions those EU members who are not parties to a NATO
security agreement nor members in PfP. While officials
working on alliance matters understand the negative impact
Turkey's position is having on NATO-EU relations, their
seniors are still putting more weight on the Cyprus issue.
Ankara's disappointment that the EU has not lived up to its
expectations to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
and the GOT's displeasure at Nicosia's attempt to use the EU
to force Turkey's recognition of Cyprus will need to
dissipate further before the GOT will be ready to consider
compromises. End Summary.
¶2. (C) The DCM raised the NATO-EU impasse over the
participation of Cyprus and Malta when he called on the new
MFA Director General for International Security Affairs Tomur
Bayer on Jan. 18. Bayer, who has long experience working on
NATO affairs, asserted that the wording of the North Atlantic
Council decisions setting out the conditions for non-alliance
members to participate in discussions of Berlin-Plus issues
were carefully considered and came the day after the EU
issued its own decisions on the subject. Thus, allies
understood and intended the differences between the NATO and
EU decisions. That said, Bayer conceded that NATO-EU
relations were suffering, weakening the transatlantic
relationship and risking duplication of EU and NATO efforts.
Therefore, "we want to find a way to deepen NATO-EU
relations," he said. The problem was being considered "at a
technical level" Bayer continued. MFA was consulting with
"other authorities" (read: the military) and would likely
have to consult with ministers. At this stage, it was not
possible to give an indication of what Turkey might be
willing to do or when it might do it.
¶3. (C) The DCM acknowledged that relevant NATO and EU
documents were not totally in agreement. That said, the
continued impasse only served those who wanted greater
divisions between NATO and the EU. The Berlin Plus
arrangements were designed for a specific set of activities.
For issues unrelated to Berlin-Plus, Turkey should find a way
to permit cooperation between the two institutions. Bayer
took the point, but recalled that on issues like Dafur and
the Ukraine, certain statements (not further defined) from
European Commission officials made compromise difficult. The
DCM concluded by noting that as Turkey thinks about ways to
resolve this issue the USG stood ready to assist in the
brainstorming.
¶4. (C) Earlier conversations with other MFA officials suggest
that brainstorming is occurring among NATO policy officials.
Judging by his comments to visiting EUR DAS Kennedy on
January 12, Deputy Undersecretary Ahmet Uzumcu, formerly
Turkey's permrep to NATO, is also contributing to the process
despite neither NATO nor Cyprus being in his new portfolio.
Uzumcu said the MFA would probably come up with some
progress, but it would be less than expectations. In fact,
NATO Department Head Alper Coskun told PolMilCouns on January
10 that his department was gaining little traction in moving
this issue with senior officials who are still smarting about
Nicosia's efforts against a Cyprus settlement. He and his
staff were trying to come up with some creative ideas to get
around the opposition, lamenting that suggestions from
Europeans to date had been no more than "just let the
Cypriots participate." He thought some more time would be
needed to dissipate the anger felt toward Cyprus over its
refusal to approve the settlement on the island last Spring.
The same is evidently true in the military -- on January 13
TGS/J5 LtGen Aydogan Babaoglu told the DCM, "the NAC decided
the matter; we are happy with that."
¶5. (C) Comment: Unfortunately, progress on Cyprus is
unlikely to contribute towards resolving the NATO/EU problem.
Turkish MFA thinking on Cyprus is unable to get around the
political obstacles posed by the perceived lack of positive
international response to Turkish Cypriot approval of the
April referendum. MFA Deputy U/S Apakan, whose portfolio
includes Cyprus, told DAS Kennedy January 12 that the GOT is
exchanging internal views on next steps to try to get the
settlement process re-started, but cannot see how it could
accept less than the Annan Plan as voted on April 24. MFA
Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs acting DDG Bilman
consistently tells us that perceived lack of measures to
ameliorate Turkish Cypriots' isolation undermines
pro-settlement sentiment in the GOT and the bureaucracy and
prevents Turkey from offering further concessions.
¶6. (C) Comment cont.: The way the EU and Turkey are
interacting adds to the problem. The EU members feel
aggrieved at Turkey's stonewalling on Cyprus at its December
summit. Similarly, the EU's handling of the Cyprus issue at
the summit rekindled Ankara's resentment of Nicosia's
blocking of a Cyprus settlement and of the EU for not doing
enough to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. For now,
many in Ankara see barring Cyprus from NATO/EU activities as
one of the few sticks it has to use against the ROC. With
time, this may pass. However, the extremely legalistic GOT
would be more likely to concede Cypriot participation in an
activity that clearly was not covered by Berlin Plus and that
would not require the discussion of classified information.
Anything more, we fear, would require changing the NAC
decisions, something Turkey is unlikely to consider in the
current environment. End comment.
EDELMAN
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/01/05ANKARA373.html
