Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

wow some ref...even if both sides said yes, turkey could have overridden the ref...kinda makes a mockery of the ref...

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002026

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS ENDGAME

U) Classified by A/DCM Scot Marciel, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: Assuming an April 24 approval by both
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Turkey's AKP government is poised
to play out its Cyprus endgame with the military, President
Sezer, and the Parliament. In a stormy April 5 meeting of
Turkey's National Security Council (NSC), the military and
President Sezer expressed deep concern about whether the EU
will follow through on Verheugen's promises to make a Cyprus
agreement primary law. The UK is working with the EU to
prepare a concrete response to Turkish concerns. If primary
law concerns are met, the AKP government parliamentary
majority appears sufficient to approve the agreement despite
possible defections among nationalistic deputies. President
Sezer must approve the agreement; there is a danger he may
not approve absent further guarantees on making the agreement
primary law. The GOT hopes for a clear message of financial
support from the April 15 pre-donors conference to answer
concerns about displaced Turkish Cypriots. Turkish public
opinion on the agreement is generally positive, but there is
a reservoir of permanent opposition. End Summary.


¶2. (C) Despite AKP's big win in the March 28 municipal
elections, Erdogan faces the tough political challenge of
gaining Turkish acceptance of the draft Cyprus settlement.
This is a challenge with immediate ramifications for the
strength of his prime ministership and leadership of the
party. He has undertaken -- and was unambiguously stuck with
full responsibility by the military in the April 5 NSC
meeting -- to sell the settlement to his AKP parliamentary
group and to work for acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots.


NSC Stormy Over Primary Law


¶3. (C) After Burgenstock, Turkey's National Security Council
(NSC) discussed Cyprus on April 1 and again on April 5. The
NSC statement following the April 5 meeting was pointed,
declaring that the agreement does not meet all Turkey's
demands, "although it has some positive points." The
statement laid responsibility for implementing the agreement,
including making it primary law, squarely on the AKP
government.


¶4. (C) On April 6, MFA U/S Ziyal told UK Ambassador
Westmacott that the April 5 meeting was difficult and stormy,
according to what Westmacott relayed to Ambassador Edelman.
Although the military's earlier redlines had been met and
they could not point to deficiencies in the agreement,
military reps on the NSC expressed deep concern over whether
the EU would follow through on Verheugen's promises to make
the agreement primary law. Westmacott told Ambassador
Edelman that London is working with the EU to prepare
something more concrete to meet Turkish concerns; Westmacott
sees no need for specific USG action at this point.


¶5. (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DDG Eguz
corroborated Ziyal's account of the April 5 meeting. Eguz
said both President Sezer and the military focused on the
primary law issue, and also the fate of TCs who will be
displaced by the agreement. Like Ziyal, Eguz expressed
serious concern about the primary law issue. Eguz thinks it
"self-evident" that the Greek Parliament will approve making
the agreement primary law if the GCs have passed the
referendum. However, he emphasized that some in the NSC
deeply mistrust Verheugen's guarantees and want to see an
"irreversible" act toward making the agreement primary law.


¶6. (C) On the issue of displaced TCs, Eguz said the GOT
needs a clear message of financial support from the April 15
pre-donors' conference.


Parliament


¶7. (C) If the agreement passes both referenda and primary
law concerns are met, AKP's solid parliamentary majority (367
of 550 deputies) currently appears sufficient to approve the
agreement. Approval will require a simple majority of those
present. Abstentions will in effect count as votes against.
DDG Eguz expects the agreement to go to Parliament April 25
or 26.


¶8. (C) AKP vice chairman for policy Dengir Firat told us
April 2 that AKP will not adopt a group decision requiring
parliamentarians to vote in favor. PM Erdogan remains
personally opposed to that approach and will instead seek to
"convince" parliamentarians. In this regard Erdogan is in
firm control of the party and is willing to expend enormous
political capital to secure a settlement. Most AKP
parliamentarians know little about the details of the
agreement and look to Erdogan for leadership. According to
Firat, AKP will prevent deputies opposed to the agreement
from speaking out against it or campaigning against it either
in Turkey or on the island. Main opposition CHP, drubbed in
Turkey's March 28 municipal elections, is unlikely to mount
an effective opposition campaign outside of its own 175
deputies.
¶9. (C) Nevertheless, Firat conceded there may well be
defections from AKP, mostly among parliamentarians with roots
in the ultra-nationalist MHP. Firat professes not to be
worried that this will cut significantly into AKP's majority.
Ex-parliamentarian Hasim Hasimi and prominent anti-Cyprus
solution columnist and professor Hasan Unal both estimate the
number of MHP-origin AKP deputies at more than 50.


¶10. (C) Hasimi doubts that many will defect in the face of
strong leadership from Erdogan. If Erdogan requires an open
vote similar to the October 7 vote on Turkish troop
deployment to Iraq, AKP parliamentarians will have to look
the PM in the eye and openly oppose one of the biggest
efforts of his political career. Still, Unal points out that
MHP's ten-plus percent showing in the March 28 elections
shows MHP might again enter Parliament in a future general
election. He speculated, with some wishful thinking, that
MHP-oriented deputies might seek to defect and form an MHP
parliamentary group if they want to defy Erdogan.


Sezer Might Not Approve Absent Steps on Primary Law


¶11. (C) If Parliament approves, President Sezer has to sign
or reject the agreement by April 29. Sezer's focus thus far
has been the primary law issue. DDG Eguz worries there is a
"real danger" Sezer may not approve the agreement absent some
further "irreversible" step from the Council on the primary
law issue.


¶12. (C) If Sezer approves the agreement, prospects for a
successful court challenge appear weak: under Article 90 of
Turkey's Constitution, "international agreements" cannot be
challenged on a constitutional basis.


Public Opinion


¶13. (U) In the immediate aftermath of Burgenstock, most
Turkish media portrayed the agreement as meeting Turkey's
essential demands. Some media went even further, gloating
about a Turkish "victory" over the Greek Cypriots. Even
nationalist Turkiye newspaper's April 2 headline trumpeted
"The World Sees Cyprus Talks in Switzerland as a Victory for
the Turks." Subsequent media coverage has been more sober,
pointing out both pluses and minuses of the plan for Turkey.


¶14. (U) Turkish public opinion, which a few weeks ago was
negative on the Annan Plan, was swinging around in favor of
an Annan Plan-based solution before the agreement. Poll
numbers on an Annan Plan-based solution have climbed steadily
over the last four months. A November 2003 poll showed 16%
for, 53% against, 30% undecided; by January, the numbers were
up to 23% for, 39% against, 38% undecided. By March, polls
showed 47% of the public in favor of an Annan Plan-based
solution, 38% against, 14% undecided. However, the same
March poll yielded a contradictory result when respondents
were asked about the GOT handling of Cyprus policy: while
57% of AK's supporters approved, only 38% of the overall
public approved, versus 49% disapproval and 13% undecided.


¶15. (C) AKP is currently Turkey's best-organized party, and
the rank and file, like its parliamentarians, will follow
Erdogan's lead. However, Firat estimates that AKP's Cyprus
stance cost it 5%-6% in the municipal elections. Unal
attributes MHP's increased voting percentage (10.47% in
March, compared to 8.36% in November 2003 general elections)
to AKP's MHP-origin voters defecting over displeasure about
Cyprus.


Denktash's "No" Campaign


¶16. (C) Rauf Denktash is in the middle of a "no" campaign in
Turkey, including a vintage stem-winder speech to a friendly
audience in Bursa and meetings with President Sezer and PM
Erdogan. The campaign has aroused those already opposed to
any agreement, but we see no evidence thus far that Denktash
has made inroads beyond that. Our MFA contacts are not
worried the Denktash campaign will undo Ankara's internal
consensus.


Comment


¶17. (C) EU action along the lines of the April 2 paper Ziyal
passed to Ambassador Edelman (e-mailed to the Department and
Embassy Nicosia April 7) is now more important than ever to
keeping Ankara's internal consensus together. The April 5
NSC meeting reveals the fissure that could develop -- the AK
government on one side, the military and President on the
other -- if this concern goes unmet.


¶18. (C) In this regard, Erdogan must (1) manage the
calculated public ambivalence of the Turkish military; (2)
blunt the effect of Denktash's anti-settlement media
campaign; (3) keep careful tabs on the thinking of narrowly
legalistic President Sezer; and (4) control the temptation
for major AK figures like Parliamentary Speaker Arinc and
Deputy PM Sener to use the Cyprus issue for their own
political ambitions. However, sharing Erdogan's
self-confidence, AKP contacts, from Firat to various other
deputies, are convinced Erdogan will have no trouble
convincing his parliamentary group to support ratification of
an affirmative TC referendum; we will be making the rounds of
our party contacts to gauge the effectiveness of Erdogan's
forcefully delivered April 6 parliamentary group speech and
the pro-settlement booklet AKP circulated to its deputies.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2026.html

[boomerang]

how could erdogan even suggest endorsing the agreement when it could have been derailed back in turkey?...

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002224

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA BRIEFS UNSC AMBASSADORS ON CYPRUS


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Turkish MFA Deputy U/S briefed UNSC member state
ambassadors on April 19 about possible UNSC action over the
next several days. Ilkin explained that the SYG will issue a
report, and the agreement will go to the UNSC to endorse the
Foundation Agreement and authorize a UN peacekeeping force.
He emphasized the agreement's "delicate balance" and urged
that UNSC members not tilt it in favor of GCs. He predicted
the GCs will press for increases to UN peacekeeping force
levels from the 3000 maximum he said UN security adviser
Hutter recommended after Turkish-Greek security talks. This,
he said, would change the UN force from a peacekeeping force
to a "peace enforcement" force. Ilkin also notes that the
GCs would like to seek chapter 2 or 7 references, whereas
chapter 6 would be the most appropriate justification for UN
action.


¶2. (C) Ilkin noted that PM Erdogan will meet PM Karamanlis
in Sarajevo on April 21. In light of Karamanlis' April 15
statement, which did not clearly support of GC "yes," Ilkin
doubted the two PMs will agree on a joint statement
supporting a "yes" vote. If they cannot support a "yes," he
hoped they could at least emphasize commitment to implement
the agreement if it is approved.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2224.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002283

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TURKISH CONCERNS WITH DRAFT CYPRUS
UNSCR

REF: A. ANKARA 2231
¶B. NICOSIA 687


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin called Ambassador Edelman on
April 21 to express continuing Turkish concerns about the
effect of the current draft Cyprus UNSCR. Ilkin expressed
three concerns; MFA Cyprus Department Head Bilman expressed
the same concerns in a separate call to poloff.


¶2. (C) First, the draft still lacks reference to the
Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. Ilkin and Bilman both
stressed that this poses serious problems for the Turkish
military. These concerns can be met by changing the first
phrase of the preamble to read "Reaffirming relevant UNSCRs
and treaties on Cyprus." Cyprus Department Head Bilman
argued this is standard UN language for Cyprus-related
matters.


¶3. (C) Second, Paragraph 7 of the draft preamble contains
reference to "appropriate action" which the Turks believe
exceeds the UN mandate established by the Annan Plan and
represents -- in their view -- an effort to sneak the entire
resolution under Chapter Seven in another guise.


¶4. (C) Third, the provision in draft paragraph 10(a)
allowing the UNSC committee to request "whatever further
information it may consider necessary" should be dropped.
Ambassador Edelman pointed out to Ilkin that this only
applied to embargo provisions; Ilkin replied that the wording
is overly broad. Bilman said the broadness of this provision
invited manipulation and encroached on the responsibilities
given to the Monitoring Committee established by the Annan
Plan.


¶5. (C) Comment: We support the UNSC effort to make
reasonable efforts to bring the GCs to "yes" on the
referendum. However, without these fixes, our UNSC push may
overload the circuits in Ankara and disrupt the balance -- in
any event tenuous -- the MFA and GOT have established with
the military, the President, the bureaucracy, and Parliament.
We should make sure the effort to get a GC "yes" does not
endanger the Turkish "yes," especially in light of Embassy
Nicosia's assessment that the draft UNSCR will probably fall
short of what AKEL needs to support a "yes" (ref B). Two
"nos" will leave us in a much worse post-referendum position
than a "yes/no." End Comment.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2283.html

[boomerang]

the turkish market seems to be well dependant on cyprus and the EU...

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002324

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE


STATE FOR E, EUR/SE, AND EB/IFD/OMA
TREASURY FOR OASIA - MMILLS AND RADKINS
NSC FOR MBRYZA AND TMCKIBBEN


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MARKET SWINGS OVER CYPRUS REFERENDUM,
GREENSPAN COMMENTS


THIS IS A JOINT EMBASSY ANKARA-CONGEN ISTANBUL CABLE.
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.


¶1. (SBU) Summary: Turkish financial markets were flat today
in the final day of trading before Saturday's referendum in
Cyprus. The relative calm came
after a week in which the IMKB-100 bounced up and down as
sentiment shifted on prospects for a favorable outcome to the
vote. A strong rally late last week
and early this week was followed by profit-taking and
nervousness on April 20 and 21 as many foreign investors
closed their positions. One leading analyst here estimates
that as much as 800 million USD may have left the country
this week though a Central Bank official put it at 500
milion. As a result, the lira continued to weaken through
the week, breaking through the 1.39 million per USD level in
early trading today, before easing to 1.382 at the close.
Many analysts attribute the lira weakness against the dollar
this week as much to anticipation of an upcoming Federal
Reserve rate hike in the U.S. as to Cyprus worries.
Meanwhile, this week's economic indicators have painted a
mixed picture of the Turkish economy, with strong capacity
utilization figures and tourism results sparking optimism,
but an expanding current account deficit raising concerns
about the worsening trade balance. The Central Bank is
waiting until after this weekend,s referendum to decide
whether to reduce foreign exchange purchase auctions and,
apparently, whether to reduce interest rates. End Summary.


¶2. (SBU) Markets Yo-Yo: The markets rallied by a strong 3.11
percent on Friday, April 16, and another 3.46 percent on
April 19 to flirt with the 20,000 level
as sentiment waxed positive on Cyprus. As investors perceived
an increase in tensions over the referendum the IMKB 100
stock exchange gave back half of
those gains in mid-week to close yesterday at 19,279, just
above its April 16 level. The market firmed slightly today,
increasing to 19,431.5, in moderate
trading as investors finalized their positions in advance of
tomorrow's national holiday and the Saturday referendum.
Interest rates also moved upward slightly during the week.
The Turkish Treasury sold 2.187 quadrillion (1.6 billion USD)
in three month bills at an auction on Tuesday, meeting its
sale target but at a higher than
expected yield. By the close today, the benchmark bond was
trading at 22.81, compared with 22.36 at Monday,s close and
below 22 earlier in the month. With Cyprus concern
compounded by the parity movements that saw the dollar
strengthen on rumors of a Federal Reserve rate hike, the
Turkish lira weakened throughout the week, reaching 1.395
million in morning trading on April 22, before easing to
1.382 million at the close. Much of the weakening against
the dollar arose from the dollar,s rally against Euro: the
TL,s decline against the Euro was much more muted. Against
the Euro, the TL fell only from 1.625 at the end of last week
close to 1.642 at today,s close.


¶3. (SBU) Market analysts tell econoffs that recent volatility
was predictable in the run-up to the Cyprus referendum,
though Fed Chairman Greenspan,s comments--causing increased
expectations of higher U.S. interest rates later this
year--added to the impact on Turkey. Over the past week
equity investors tested the 20,000 level, which the market
approached on Monday, and then moved to take profits.
Baturalp Candemir of HC Istanbul, a leading brokerage, echoed
other Istanbul analysts in noting that the market has
essentially priced in a yes/no outcome in Saturday's vote and
implicitly removal of Cyprus as an
obstacle to securing a negotiation date from the EU this
December. Tevfik Aksoy of Deutsche Bank said only if the
outcome does not reflect the North-yes/South-no outcome will
the markets be volatile on Monday, though a
higher-than-expected yes vote in the South, even if below 50
percent, might cause a modest rally. According to Candemir,
the Friday-Monday (April 16-19) rally led many foreigners to
decide to close their positions and take their profits on
Tuesday and Wednesday.


¶4. (SBU) Emrah Eksi, of the Central Bank Markets Deparment
echoed Aksoy in putting greater importance on the Greenspan
comments and the newly-increased expectation of higher U.S.
interest rates than on Cyprus in explaining the sell-off in
Turkish markets Tuesday and Wednesday. Aksoy noted that the
Greenspan comments hit the broader class of Emerging Market
Debt, not just Turkish bonds.


¶5. (SBU) Candemir estimated that the outflow this week
totalled 800 million USD, and cited it rather than Turkey's
worsening current account deficit as the major reason for the
Turkish lira's depreciation this week to 1.382
million/dollar. The Central Bank,s Eksi, on the other hand,
told econoff only about $500 million left the market this
week, and placed less emphasis than Candemir on the impact of
foreigners leaving the market. Aksoy said the foreigners
pulling out were mostly at the short end of the yield curve
or in equities, rather than longer-dated fixed income
instruments.


¶6. (SBU) Candemir argued that the current account issue has
been evident since last fall, but that the Turkish lira
remained strong in the face of continued inflows of portfolio
investment from abroad. Only once the foreigners began to
sell, he argued, did the rate begin to weaken. The effect
was compounded by the movement of Turkish banks to reduce the
open positions
they had established in recent months. Candemir suggested
that an added reason for the foreign exodus from the market
is the fact that there is "no good news on the horizon for
the next several months." With both Cyprus and diminishing
inflation priced in by the market, no further decline in
interest rates or lira appreciation is on the horizon. He
thus forsees a sluggish period in the market, which may last
until the NATO summit again focuses world attention on Turkey.


¶7. (SBU) Good News/Bad News: While February's burgeoning
trade deficit (up to nearly 2.4 billion USD) and the 12-month
cumulative deficit of 24 billion USD raised concerns about
the sustainability of Turkey's current account deficit, there
was good news on the tourism front. January to March
arrivals were up by nearly 43 percent from last year,
reaching 1.924 million. While the base year effect played a
large role, given that tourism slowed in the run up to last
year's Iraq war, the increase showed the sector is clearly on
the road to recovery and that this year's target of 11.5
billion in tourism revenue is within reach.


¶8. (SBU) Central Bank Wait-and-See: Despite the fall of the
lira this week, the Central Bank continued its foreign
exchange purchase auctions. Eksi told Econoff the Bank
purchased $40 million at auction yesterday and another $40
million at auction today, plus an additional $30 million
outside the auction. According the Eksi, the Bank wants to
avoid constantly altering its FX buying policy, and prefers
to await the results of the referendum before deciding
whether to ease off on the purchases. With the summer
tourism FX inflow season beginning, the Bank wants to avoid
cutting back on purchases only to resume a high level of
purchases shortly therafter as tourism FX inflows pick up.
Aksoy noted that the markets were unhappy with frequent
changes in the Central Bank,s FX purchase levels.


¶9. (SBU) Aksoy also revised his predictions of a coming
interest rate cut this week, expecting the cut to come later
in the year and for a lesser amount. Whereas many analysts
had been expecting a rate cut after the IMF Seventh Review
board vote, the Bank appears to have preferred to wait out
the pre-referendum volatility before making a decision.
Aksoy told econoff that the weakened lira and signs of strong
growth are likely to contribute to Central Bank caution about
a rate cut.

ARNETT
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2324.html

[boomerang]

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002330

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: CY GR PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CABINET CHIEF ATACANLI ON CYPRUS,
GREATER MIDDLE EAST


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: On April 21, President Sezer's Cabinet
Chief (also Senior Foreign Policy Adviser and Spokesman)
Atacanli told Ambassador that Sezer remains concerned with
making a Cyprus agreement primary EU law, and with
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements. In
the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" in the referendum,
Atacanli urged concrete steps to help TCs and "in the other
direction" for the GCs. Ambassador urged restraint in GOT
statements in the event of a "yes/no." Ambassador explained
that Turkey is not a "target" of the Greater Middle East
Initiative (GME); it is up to Turkey to decide the role it
wishes to play. Atacanli emphasized the need for close
U.S.-Turkey consultation as GME moves forward. End Summary.




President Sezer's Concerns on Cyprus


¶2. (C) On Cyprus, Ambassador Edelman emphasized that
President Bush and Secretary Powell have been deeply engaged
with all parties and a number of other leaders. The U.S.
shares President Sezer's core concern that the agreement
have some mechanism to prevent it from being picked apart in
the European Court of Justice. The Ambassador asked
Atacanli's insights on what President Sezer thinks necessary
for the agreement to be legally secure and whether Sezer has
other concerns about the agreement.


¶3. (C) Atacanli acknowledged different viewpoints within the
GOT on "modalities" of a Cyprus settlement but, with the
referendum three days away, claimed the GOT is "past that
stage." Atacanli said Sezer is concerned about
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements.
This could open a Pandora's Box if property disputes escalate
to threaten peace and stability. Atacanli said there is
still a valid question whether efforts to provide primary law
guarantees are sufficient and this remains very important.
He noted that in reaching the agreement, TCs accepted much GC
legislation, some of it "anti-Turkish" (NFI), he added.


¶4. (C) (FYI: We note that, in an April 20 meeting with
Ambassador Edelman, MFA U/S Ziyal said Sezer has given the
MFA "no clue" about his views on the agreement. Ziyal noted
with concern that Sezer's office has not replied to a recent
MFA invitation to discuss the legal aspects of the agreement;
this is the first time Sezer's office has not responded to
the MFA on a Cyprus-related matter. End FYI.)


Thinking Ahead to "Yes/No"


¶5. (C) In the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" to the
referendum, Atacanli urged concrete positive steps toward the
TCs and steps "in the other direction" for the GCs. He
worries that GCs will withstand initial pressure after a "no"
and that pressure from the international community will fade
after a few months. The Ambassador noted EU High Rep
Solana's recent statements when meeting with Secretary Powell
as an example that the EU and others are beginning to think
about next steps in the event of a "yes/no."


¶6. (C) The Ambassador also encouraged the GOT to react
publicly with restraint in the event of a TC "yes" and GC
"no." The Ambassador advised letting the EU carry the burden
of strong criticism, in order not to take the focus off GC
rejection of the agreement. Atacanli said he understood the
point of modulating GOT reaction in the event of a GC "no."


Greater Middle East


¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that some parts of President
Sezer's April 13 speech at the Istanbul War Academies
appeared to be partially directed at Secretary Powell's
later-corrected comment that Turkey is an "Islamic republic."
Atacanli interrupted to remark that the Sezer's comments
were directed at others as well. The Ambassador reiterated
that there is no change in the long-standing U.S. view of
Turkey as a secular democratic republic.


¶8. (C) Noting that Sezer's speech rejected the idea of
Turkey as a GME "target," Ambassador Edelman emphasized the
USG does not consider Turkey a target. It is up to Turkey to
decide what role it wishes to play in GME. The Ambassador
laid out regional economic, educational and political reforms
that GME aims to support. Turkey offers a powerful example
of a successful Muslim-majority nation integrating into
international institutions.


¶9. (C) Atacanli acknowledged the Secretary's correction of
his comment but added that Sezer had come under fire for not
responding quickly to the misstatement. The secular nature
of the Turkish state is the single most important issue for
Sezer. On GME, Atacanli emphasized the need for close
consultation between the U.S. and Turkey. He said Sezer's
remarks were intended to state for the record the importance
of keeping regional developments "under control." Atacanli
said he would convey the Ambassador's explanation to Sezer.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2330.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002403

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014
TAGS: CY ECON ETRD EU PREL TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS NEXT STEPS: GOT POINTS DELIVERED


REF: A. STATE 93859
¶B. ANKARA 2362


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


¶1. (C) We delivered ref A points to Turkish MFA Cyprus
Department Head Bilman April 28. He undertook to convey them
to all other MFA officials involved on Cyprus before SRSG
DeSoto's arrival in Ankara. In addition to meetings with MFA
officials, DeSoto will meet with PM Erdogan and FM Gul.


¶2. (C) Bilman expressed appreciation for U.S. opposition to
renegotiation of the SYG's Plan and noted Spokesman Boucher's
April 26 statements on that point. However, the GOT remains
concerned about the effect of continuing Greek Cypriot
efforts to create the expectation of renewed negotiations.
Bilman asked that the USG continue to reiterate opposition to
renegotiation of the SYG's Plan.


¶3. (C) On the April 28 UNSC Presidential Statement, Bilman
said Turkey seeks addition of a phrase calling for Turkish
Cypriots to be integrated into the international community
(he added he was not talking about recognition of the "TRNC").


¶4. (C) In addition to reftel points on the Turks' public
approach, we told Bilman and Northeastern Mediterranean
Affairs DDG Eguz that the GOT should avoid statements
implying that that the SYG's Plan was no longer valid (see,
e.g., ref B). Instead, the GOT should emphasize its
continued "yes" to the SYG's Plan as it is.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2403.html

[boomerang]

and all were surprised at the ref outcome...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002664

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2029
TAGS: PREL MOPS GR CY TU PINR
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY WANTED YES/NO CYPRUS OUTCOME

REF: ANKARA 2204


(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


¶1. (C) Summary: The Turkish General Staff is appreciative of
US and UK assistance in forging a balanced although
problematic Cyprus plan. TGS wanted the yes/no outcome from
the referenda, although it has no clear idea of where to go
from here. The Turkish military worries that Cyprus might
use its EU membership (or be used by others) to block
Turkey's accession. End Summary.


¶2. (C) TGS wanted a positive vote on the Annan Plan in
northern Cyprus and a negative vote in the south, according
to TGS/J5 Greece/Cyprus Chief RADM Mucahit Sislioglu (please
protect). He told PolMilCouns May 10 that while the Turkish
military was satisfied with the security provisions of the
plan, there were problems with other parts of the plan and
implementing it would have been "difficult." The biggest
worry for TGS was the cost (both financial and in human
terms) of relocating Turkish Cypriots displaced by land
returns. However, TGS did not oppose the plan because
relocations were mainly a matter for the government and not
the military to handle, and because TGS calculated that Greek
Cypriots would reject the plan. In fact, Sislioglu said he
told Prime Minister Erdogan in Switzerland in the final days
of the negotiation that the security provisions would likely
increase the no vote in the south by 20% and increase the yes
vote in the north by 15%. Nonetheless, Erdogan and Foreign
Minister Gul hoped that the plan would pass on both sides of
the island.


¶3. (C) Recalling TGS Chief Gen Ozkok's April 13 press
conference (reftel), Sislioglu said Ozkok had not wanted to
address the issue in public. Nonetheless, he was under
considerable pressure from "people" who wanted to know TGS's
position. Sislioglu said that he personally drafted Ozkok's
remarks which emphasized the negative aspects of the
agreement, but anticipated that the statement would prompt a
question about the positive aspects and prepared Ozkok for
it. He said he chose to emphasize the negative because the
public and the government needed to realize and prepare for
the difficulties that laid ahead in the event the plan was
adopted. At the same time, the positive security aspects of
the plan in the answer to the inevitable question would worry
the Greek Cypriots and reassure the Turkish Cypriots.


¶4. (C) Comment: Sislioglu, Ozkok and TGS Deputy Chief Basbug
were the only military officers who knew everything the
military was doing with the government and in the
negotiations. (Sislioglu lamented that his Cyprus staff
didn't have enough English to be useful, so he was "working
like a lieutenant," drafting papers, briefing the NSC, and
negotiating the security aspects of the agreement.) Last
April, there were as many "people" pressing for an
explanation of TGS's policy on Cyprus in the military as
outside it. Sislioglu admitted that Ozkok's words were
chosen carefully to send messages to several groups. These
included not only to the GOT and Greek Cypriots, but the
Turkish military as well. End comment.


¶5. (C) Sislioglu was complementary of the AK Party
government, noting that the negotiations turned out the way
they did largely due to the strong political decisions made
by the government. He noted that although the plan had
elements that the military did not like, it was the product
of a negotiation in which both sides had to compromise. He
agreed that the final product was a balanced agreement. He
expressed appreciation for the assistance of both the USG and
HMG; while Washington and London's help was not evident at
the beginning of the process, he said, it was quite clear in
Switzerland that both governments were working hard to be
helpful.


¶6. (C) Sislioglu was not sure of the way ahead. He worried
that as time goes on, anger at the GOC for opposing the plan
would fade and the diplomatic advantages Turkey and Turkish
Cypriots had gained from supporting it would evaporate.
Nicosia now had a stronger hand by virtue of its EU
membership and could cause problems for Turkey's EU
aspirations. For example, France might hide behind Cyprus to
keep Turkey from getting an accession negotiation date in
December, he feared.
¶7. (C) Comment: Sislioglu appeared to admire PM Erdogan and
his government's decisiveness on the Cyprus issue while being
critical of the government's acceptance of territorial
concessions. Although the military appears to have been
prepared to back the Annan Plan, it was with some reluctance.
We expect the military would resist any further concessions
if negotiations were reopened. End comment.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/05/04ANKARA2664.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004737

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: A FRUSTRATED "TRNC PM" TALAT MEETS FONMIN
GUL


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In four-hour meeting with Turkish FM Gul
August 18, "TRNC PM" Talat, accompanied by "FM" Serdar
Denktas, expressed great frustration with EU's lack of
concrete measures to help the Turkish Cypriots (TCs). Talat
appeared convinced that the EU's trade and aid proposals will
be blocked or significantly delayed. Talat asked the Turks
not to extend the Customs Union to the Republic of Cyprus
(ROC) absent reciprocal Greek Cypriot concessions. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) Jointly with UK embassy we obtained readout of Talat
visit from Turkish MFA Cyprus Department Head Bilman. It was
Ankara which had asked for the meeting, Bilman confirmed.
Talat and Gul exchanged ideas on a long list of issues
including the status of EU measures for the TCs, Turkish
extension of Customs Union to the ROC, GC claims in the ECHR,
and other issues. Bilman emphasized that throughout the
meeting Talat expressed great frustration at the EU's lack of
concrete action to support TCs.

EU Trade and Aid Proposals
--------------------------

¶3. (C) Bilman described Talat as pessimistic and frustrated
about what Talat feels is the lack of any concrete EU help to
the TCs. Talat is worried about the Council's September
decision on the EU's trade and aid proposals. Bilman said
Talat's consultations with EU on-island representatives
convince him both will be either blocked or significantly
delayed. According to Bilman, Talat considers direct trade
more important than the aid proposal.

Customs Union Extension
-----------------------

¶4. (C) Noting the Talat asked Gul not to extend the Customs
Union to the ROC absent some reciprocal GC move on trade
between the EU and the north or further openings for Turkish
and TC products in the ROC. He and Serdar argued that Turkey
should consider concessions on trade and free movement of
goods a two-way street.

ECHR Case on the Horizon
------------------------

¶5. (C) Bilman noted that in early September the ECHR will
decide on the admissibility of a Cyprus property case against
Turkey. The GOT hoped that payment of the Loizidou case plus
an approved Annan Plan would end such claims. Without the
Annan Plan mechanisms, now the legal issue is whether "TRNC"
mechanisms constitute an "adequate domestic remedy" for
plaintiffs. Turkey will argue they do and therefore the case
should be dismissed. However, Bilman worries that a contrary
ECHR decision will set precedent for a flood of claims
against Turkey, creating a significant political problem for
the GOT.

¶6. (C) Comment: There may be a growing gap between Ankara
and Talat, operationally and politically. Bilman told us
Talat's recent letter to SYG Annan was "news to us" and noted
pointedly that Talat does not tell Ankara about his on-island
meetings with GCs. The Customs Union problem, which Turkey
must solve in order to get a date to begin accession talks in
December, suggests a deeper fault line: unlike Talat, Ankara
must balance frustration at the slow pace of EU measures for
the TCs against its EU aspirations. End comment.

EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/08/04ANKARA4737.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005195

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: GROWING TURKISH GOVERNMENT FRUSTRATION OVER LACK
OF MEASURES FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS

REF: A. ANKARA 5180

¶B. ANKARA 5115
¶C. ANKARA 5029
¶D. ANKARA 4921
¶E. ANKARA 4886

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: GOT frustration at the perceived lack of
measures to ease Turkish Cypriots' isolation is growing. GOT
interlocutors at all levels have expressed this frustration
to us in recent meetings; Secretary Powell will hear much the
same if he meets with FM Gul at UNGA. For now, the EU is the
primary target of GOT irritation; however, criticism could
soon focus on the U.S. To prevent this from becoming an
irritant, we need to demonstrate concrete progress toward
ending TC isolation, even if it is not as dramatic or as
rapid as the Turks would like. End Summary.

GOT Frustration at All Levels
-----------------------------

¶2. (C) GOT interlocutors at all levels have recently
expressed frustration to us at the perceived lack of measures
to end TCs' isolation. The EU has been the primary target,
but some interlocutors cast their criticism at a larger
circle:

-- In a September 13 meeting with the Ambassador, MFA Deputy
U/S Ilkin told the Ambassador PM Erdogan and FM Gul feel the
TCs has been put "on the back burner" (ref a);

-- In a September 8 meeting with the Ambassador, TGS DCHOD
Basbug called the lack of measures for the TCs "worrisome"
(ref b);

-- In a September 1 meeting with the Ambassador, FM Gul
expressed strong discomfort at the lack of EU measures for
TCs (ref c);

-- In an August 30 meeting, MFA Cyprus Department Head Bilman
was pessimistic that the EU would be able to overcome GC
obstruction of trade and aid measures for the TCs (ref d);

-- On August 26, MFA Maritime and Aviation Affairs DDG
Gokdenizler expressed impatience at perceived lack of
movement on direct flights between the U.S. and the north
(ref e);

-- On August 18, TGS J-5 Cyprus/Greece Section Chief RADM
Sislioglu told Pol/Mil Counselor Turkey is disappointed over
the lack of "international" response to the TCs' approval of
the April referendum.

More Trouble on the Horizon
---------------------------

¶3. (C) Two events on the horizon will sharpen Turkish
frustration. Before December, in order to get a date to
begin EU accession negotiations, the GOT will have extend
Customs Union recognition to the ROC. The Turks hope for a
GC concession, particularly on measures for TCs, to provide
political cover for recognition. Absent a concession, those
within the GOT who push for recognition will come under fire
from a broad coalition of nationalists for failure to gain
benefits for the TCs in return.

¶4. (C) Our GOT contacts are also focused on Greek Cypriot
property compensation cases in the ECHR. The GOT hoped the
issue would be put to rest with one-time compensation in the
Loizidou case coupled with Annan Plan settlement. ECHR
admission of another case will prompt renewed criticism of
the Loizidou settlement, fears of massive compensation
claims, and wider debate about what Turkey and TCs have
gained in exchange for their pro-settlement stance.

U.S. Not Yet the Focus of Criticism -- But We Could Be
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶5. (C) Thus far, the EU, not the U.S. is the primary focus
of Turkish criticism, both privately and in the media. Most
of our GOT contacts, like FM Gul, acknowledge U.S. efforts.
However, we expect pointed criticism of the U.S. in the near
future if there is a continued perception that the U.S. has
not meaningfully reached out to TCs. As GCs continue to
block and delay EU measures, Turkish hopes will shift to
measures from the U.S., over which the ROC has no veto.
While they recognize that the U.S. cannot provide TCs the
same tangible economic benefits as the EU, the Turks will
look to us to provide symbolic leadership that they assert
will encourage others to follow suit.

All Concrete Measures Help
--------------------------

¶6. (C) Direct flights are Turkey's highest priority and the
GOT will react positively to concrete steps to that end --
for example, TSA inspection of Ercan airport. Concrete
measures in other areas also help: in his September 13
meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy U/S Ilkin appeared to
welcome the prospect of a FAS visit to the north.

¶7. (C) When we take concrete steps, we should make sure the
GOT and Turkish media are aware. Where progress is slow, we
need to explain the difficulties, manage GOT expectations,
and make sure the GOT does not misjudge our political will.
We should make clear to the EU and capitals that reaching out
to the TCs, including bilaterally, promotes their integration
into Europe and overall Cyprus settlement. Even if U.S.
measures for TCs are not as dramatic or as rapid as the Turks
want, our ability to demonstrate concrete progress will
prevent the issue from becoming a bilateral irritant,
preserve pro-settlement sentiment in Ankara, and create the
right atmosphere for Ankara to take more steps toward Cyprus
settlement.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/09/04ANKARA5195.html

[boomerang]

the turks are definetely shifty and got caught... ...F1 rings a bell?...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005734

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY CANCELS EU/OIC FORUM OVER CYPRUS DISPUTE


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: On September 30, in a dispute with the EU
over designation of the Turkish Cypriot observer delegation,
Turkey canceled the October 4-5 EU-OIC Joint Forum in
Istanbul. The Turkish MFA and the Dutch EU Presidency each
claim the other turned down reasonable compromises and
ignored the problem until it was too late. EU diplomats in
Ankara say the episode will not directly affect Turkey's
December bid for a date to begin accession negotiations but
has given ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics. It has also
strained relations between the Turks and the Dutch Embassy
here. In this incident, Ankara's frustration with the EU
trumped what should have been its better judgment. End
Summary.

Early Problems
--------------

¶2. (U) That Cyprus would be a problem for the Forum was
clear as early as August, when the Turkish MFA invited the
"TRNC Ambassador" to a briefing on Forum preparations. The
Dutch, as EU President, participated in the briefing but then
made a public statement that their participation did not
signify recognition of the "TRNC." When the Turks later sent
out invitations to the Forum, they did not send one to the
Republic of Cyprus; the Dutch stepped in and asked the Turks
to invite all EU member states via the Presidency.

¶3. (C) Although Turkey does not recognize the ROC, the Turks
accepted ROC participation in the Forum. They expected the
EU to adopt the same stance toward the "TRNC," which Turkey
invited under its OIC observer designation as the "Turkish
Cypriot State." The EU was willing to have TC observers, but
not designated as the "Turkish Cypriot State." Ironically,
according to Dutch DCM Bekkers, OIC contacts told the Dutch
the OIC was indifferent to the TCs' designation.

Each Blames the Other for Delay, Refusing Compromise
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶4. (C) The Turkish MFA and the Dutch Embassy both claim they
raised the issue with the other side during September,
including at the two FonMins' meeting on the margins of UNGA.
According to UK Political Chief Sharma, the UK also warned
the Turks early on that the designation was going to be a
problem. The Dutch and the Turks both claim they clearly
indicated they would not back off, but that the other side
said there would be no problem. Both sides accused the other
of refusing to deal with the issue until it was too late.

¶5. (C) The EU Presidency refused Turkey's offer that the TCs
would use their OIC designation and that EU members or FM Gul
would open the Forum with a statement that this did not imply
recognition. EU diplomats here tell us that other EU
members, including the French, backed that approach, but the
GCs shot it down. The Turks refused several EU Presidency
proposals for alternate designations of the TCs, or to
postpone the Forum until the sides could find a solution.

¶6. (C) The Turkish MFA blames the Greek Cypriots and the
Dutch Presidency for the incident. MFA Cyprus Department
Head Bilman called us in October 4 to express Turkish
displeasure and give us the MFA's version of events. On the
other side, Dutch DCM Bekkers attributed the incident to
Turkish misperception that the EU would back down. Bekkers
told us a majority of EU members objected to the "Turkish
Cypriot State" designation, not just the Greek Cypriots and
the Greeks. According to Bekkers, the Dutch told the Turks
this, but the Turks remain unconvinced. The truth may be
closer to the middle: according to UK Political Chief
Sharma, some countries went along with the Greek Cypriots not
on principle, but to preserve EU solidarity.

Strained Dutch/Turkish Relations in Ankara
------------------------------------------

¶7. (C) All EU diplomats we have talked to here doubt this
incident will directly affect Turkey's EU bid. However,
Dutch DCM Bekkers thinks that, like the controversy
surrounding PM Erdogan's gambit to criminalize adultery, this
gives ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics. "Things like this
cost Turkey one extra year in the accession process per
incident," he added. Bekkers and other EU diplomats we have
talked to here worry that the Turks still do not understand
the EU.

¶8. (C) Publicly, the MFA and the Dutch are trying to play
down the incident. The MFA has not expressed the bitterness
toward the Dutch in public that Cyprus Department Head Bilman
expressed to us privately. Bekkers says the Dutch want to
put the incident behind them and claims it has had no effect
on his Embassy's relations with the Turks. Sharma and Bilman
disagree, both saying the affair has strained the
Dutch/Turkish relationship in Ankara. Communication between
the two sides broke down; neither Bekkers nor Bilman
understands why the other side acted as it did. Bilman
worries about what the incident augurs for EU-related
matters. He asked rhetorically what is in store for the near
future if the Greek Cypriots managed to derail the Forum over
what he called a "non-issue."

Frustration Trumps Ankara's Better Judgment
-------------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Comment: In this case, Ankara's frustration with the
EU, including EU failure to deliver on steps to end the TCs'
isolation, trumped what should have been its better judgment.
Bilman tried to justify Turkey's stance by saying that
Turkey could not give any more "concessions" in light of GC
intransigence on trade and aid for the TCs. In this regard,
PM Erdogan and FM Gul are under increasing fire from domestic
critics for allegedly selling out core Turkish interests.
Some EU embassies are concerned at what they see as too
hard-line a Dutch approach in this context.

¶10. (C) Comment (cont'd): However, the name plate was (as
Bilman himself noted) a "non-issue" that would have given the
TCs nothing. Moreover, the GOT's stance cuts against its
assertion that it is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC."
The echo of this incident will fade. However, the poor
communication between the GOT and Dutch Presidency (which
continues in Ankara through June 2005 due to lack of a
Luxembourg representation here) does not bode well for
avoidance of miscommunication or missteps in the months to
come. End Comment.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/10/04ANKARA5734.html