Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000385

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY OBJECTS TO CYPRUS BID FOR MEMBERSHIP IN
SOMALI PIRACY GROUP: NO PAY, NO PLAY

Classified By: Pol Mil Counselor Anthony Godfrey for reason
1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) On March 16, Basat Ozturk, MFA Deputy Director
General for Maritime and Aviation Affairs, contacted us to
encourage the USG to oppose including Cyprus in the Contact
Group on Somali Piracy (CGSP). Ozturk, acting on
instructions, said that he had been informed that the GOC
sought, at the current meeting of the CGSP in Cairo, to gain
membership in the Group without making a significant
contribution to anti-piracy efforts. Ozturk pointed out that
when the Contact Group was formed, a key criteria for joining
was the ability to make an important, concrete contribution
to the Group's work. Cyprus did not have the capability to
make a significant military contribution, Ozturk insisted.

¶2. (C) Ozturk said that in addition to Cyprus, Panama,
Malaysia and Singapore were seeking to gain membership in the
Group. Of these countries, only Malaysia was capable of
providing a significant contribution, Ozturk asserted. He
warned against allowing states to join the group simply
because theirs was a frequent flag of convenience, and
speculated that if the Group took that step, it would quickly
become unwieldy and ineffective.

¶3. (C) Returning to his objections to Cyprus' membership,
Ozturk pointed out that since Cyprus was a contributor to
Operation Atalanta (the EU's anti-piracy effort in the Gulf
of Aden), it already had an opportunity to take part in
anti-piracy activities. Moreover, since the EU was
represented at the Contact Group, Cyprus' views were already
being represented. If Cyprus was to be granted its own seat
at the table without making the significant contribution
required of other members, it would amount to "double
representation with no taxation." Ozturk said that he was
under instructions to raise this issue with the UK Embassy
and that Turkey's Embassies in Washington and London would
raise this matter directly as well.

Comment
-------

¶4. (C) Turkey's objections to Cyprus joining the Contact
Group have less to do with Cyprus not being required to ante
up the way Turkey was required to and more to do with
long-standing Turkey - Greece - Cyprus issues. Nevertheless,
should Cyprus be given membership in the CGSP, it is almost
certain that Turkey will cease its active membership, taking
the frigate and two helicopters now deployed in the Gulf of
Aden with it.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ANKARA385.html

[boomerang]

¶4. (C) Deputy U/S Berk discussed Cyprus and Somali Piracy.
On Cyprus, he said that Turkey wants to support the
negotiation process in a constructive way, and ideally would
like to solve the problem this year, although it knows that
might not be the timetable others are working on. He said he
is worried, however, about the Oram case in the EU and its
negative impact on the ongoing negotiation process, and feels
it could severely hurt progress made up until now. Regarding
the renewal of UNFICYP, he said that Turkey would prefer that
this take place under the Russian presidency, rather than the
Turkish presidency. Turkey will have to vote against the
resolution either way on principle, but under the Russian
presidency, it could do so quietly as only a matter of
standard policy -- as long as the renewal resolution largely
repeats the text of previous resolutions. However, he
warned, should the resolution either be brought up during the
Turkish presidency or be significantly changed from previous
resolutions, Turkish public opinion would force a more vocal
stand against the resolution.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09ANKARA717.html

[boomerang]

stringing the turks along...

S E C R E T ANKARA 000890


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2039
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR TU GR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES AEGEAN ISSUES WITH FM DAVUTOGLU

REF: A. STATE 61209
¶B. ANKARA 855 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (S) Ambassador raised the Aegean demarche (ref a) with
FONMIN Davutoglu late June 23, noting specifically the need
to end the overflights of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, and the
commitment made in writing to maintain promises GEN Craddock
gave TGS. Davutoglu pushed back initially, arguing that the
sovereignty of these "rocks" were in question "like Kardak"
(referring to the infamous 1996 Aegean incident) and the
Greeks were cherry-picking specific issues to spin the U.S.
up rather than dealing with the whole Aegean complex in a
comprehensive manner. Ambassador said regardless of Greek
tactics, he doubted the sovereignty argument of the Turks:
the islands were inhabited, and making arguments about
sovereignty by overflights of fighter aircraft at low
altitude was not proper. Davutoglu argued that Greeks
overfly Turkey more than Turks do Greece. Even so, the
Ambassador retorted, the Greeks do not couple their
overflights, deliberate or not, with claims of sovereignty
over Turkish territory. At that point, Davutoglu changed his
demeanor and said that, frankly, he had ordered and was
waiting for a review of all overflights by Turkish aircraft
in the Aegean.

¶2. (S) Davutoglu then launched into an extended critique of
his relations with Greek FONMIN Dora Bakioyannis, saying he
liked her a great deal but that she both went after
individual complaints (see above) rather than targeting
comprehensive solutions, and would not take bold steps. He
had suggested that he travel to the Republic of Cyprus and
she to northern Cyprus to jointly declare that Greece and
Turkey were 100 percent behind a solution. She (not
unexpectedly) turned him down. He then described at length
talks he had had with her on the Patriarchate and Halki.
When he pointed out that the Turks had allowed the Synod of
the Patriarchate a few years ago to include three non-Turkish
citizens, "despite the Lausanne Treaty", she had replied that
the assumption in Greece was that the Turks were not aware of
the three,s presence.

¶3. (S) Comment: We need to keep pressing the Turks on the
overflights, while maintaining our parallel approach with the
Greeks to avoid provoking the Turks in the first place and
seek more comprehensive negotiations and solutions. That
latter sells well with the Turks and allows us to at least
make the points about the overflights without a big fight.
End Comment.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09ANKARA890.html

[boomerang]

here we see turkey out of her depths, in fact drowning, in her EU vocation...someone quick throw them a life jacket...

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000972

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EU STRATEGY: END OR MEANS?

REF: A. ANKARA 341
¶B. ANKARA 298

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Boasting a major economy and an established
democracy, Turkey is unlike any other country that has
previously sought EU membership. Accordingly, Ankara has
faced a unique set of challenges since launching its EU
accession negotiations, many of its own making. The ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002
largely due to support from the pro-EU, pro-reform business
community and urban middle class. Since 2005, however, the
AKP-led GOT has lost focus -- distracted by contentious
nation-wide local elections and other challenges to its
reform efforts. The Turkish bureaucracy has slowly chipped
away at technical accession requirements which has allowed
for the opening of 11 acquis chapters. Having eliminated all
the low-hanging fruit, it is now a make or break point for
Turkey's EU ambitions. GOT leadership must throw its weight
behind controversial judicial and constitutional reforms as
well as demonstrate a commitment to fulfilling the Ankara
Protocol by opening its ports to EU-member Cyprus if Turkey
is to avoid suspension of its EU bid this fall. Despite
Ankara's own failings, the GOT contends the EU has not lived
up to its end of the bargain, by allowing Sarkozy and others
to hijack the EU platform and by failing to end the isolation
of Turkish Cypriots. Given this paradigm, many here suggest
Turkey may ultimately choose to stop the EU process short of
membership, thereby benefiting from the reform process but
avoiding surrendering its sovereignty to an increasingly
fractured, consensus-based EU apparatus. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Turkey has faced a unique set of problems -- many of
its own making -- since launching EU accession negotiations
in October 2005. For the EU, Turkey represents an
unprecedented ideological, demographic, and economic
challenge. Religious concerns aside, Turkey's population
would be second in magnitude only to Germany and represents
roughly 75 percent of the combined total of the last 12
countries to become members. Turkey's GDP is over 50 percent
of that same group and $200 billion more than its largest
single economy, Poland. In addition to standard acquis
requirements, Turkey has separate provisions laid out in the
2005 Ankara Protocol reflecting the GOT's refusal to open
Turkish ports to Cypriot vessels as mandated under the
European Customs Union. This has resulted in the freezing of
eight acquis chapters and the prohibition of any chapter
being closed. Cyprus, France, Germany, and Austria are
holding an additional ten additional chapters in unofficial
abeyance as a reflection of their own domestic concerns.
Despite these external challenges, Turkey's focus on its
candidacy primarily waxes and wanes depending on its own
political climate.

--------------------------------------
Turkey's EU Attention Deficit Disorder
--------------------------------------

¶3. (C) The Islamist-rooted AKP came to power in 2002 largely
due its pro-EU, pro-reform platform, which appealed to
Turkey's secular business community and urban middle class.
During its first three years in office, the AKP-led GOT
worked hard to institute the political and economic changes
required by the Copenhagen criteria to officially begin
accession negotiations in 2005. In the years following,
however, the AKP faced a series of domestic distractions
including contentious nation-wide local elections and other
challenges to its reform efforts, most notably a failed party
closure case instituted by "Kemalists" claiming that the AKP
was attempting to Islamicize the secular state. (Arguably,
these Kemalists, so called due to their identification with
founder of the modern Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
and his policies, also viewed the AKP equally as a challenge
to their entrenched and lucrative positions and perks.) The
Turkish bureaucracy's progress on the technical level has
allowed the EU to open 11 politically-benign chapters since
¶2005. Having exhausted all the low hanging fruit and facing
two years without another nation-wide election, the
administration must now decide if it is willing to expend the
political capital necessary to take on the controversial
reforms required to keep Turkey's already sluggish EU
momentum from coming to a screeching halt later this year
when the EU reviews Turkey's progress with a special eye to
the Ankara Protocol.

------------------------
Misnomer of Negotiations
------------------------

¶4. (C) European Commission and EU-member nation officials
have conveyed to us that one of the greatest impediments to
Turkey's success is the failure of Turkish officials and the
public to understand that the accession process is not a
negotiation, and that the acquis is to be adopted as
prescribed. One European diplomat lamented that many GOT
officials view it as a competition; whenever a chapter is
opened, Turkey behaves as if it somehow "pulled one over" on
Brussels. Furthermore, as the Ankara Protocol has prevented
the closure of chapters, the political focus is only on
opening new ones. GOT officials are so focused on the act of
checking the box that the requirements themselves are
frequently overlooked. This has also effectively halted
political support for working toward meeting benchmarks in
chapters that are already open.

¶5. (C) European Commission officials here have frequently
noted that the GOT has a fondness for justifying new
legislation as necessary for EU harmonization without
checking with the EU as to whether the law actually achieves
that goal. A UK diplomat explained that the Turkish
Parliament had pushed through public procurement legislation
without consulting the European Commission delegation. The
subsequent law in no way complied with EU standards or met
the requirements for opening Chapter 5 (public procurement).
Still, politicians are now reluctant to go back and clean up
their mess. She added that the Turkish Parliament is
dangerously close to repeating the same mistake with its
draft labor law required to open Chapter 19 (social policy
and employment).

-----------------
A Failure to Sell
-----------------

¶6. (C) Turkish leaders have done a poor job of educating the
Turkish public on the EU and the accession process.
Politicians rarely discuss EU merits in their comments to the
Turkish people, but instead choose to repeat one of three
populist themes: Europe needs Turkey; Turkey will not accept
anything short of full membership; and the GOT is making
reforms for the sake of Turkey, not the EU. Accordingly,
Turkish public opinion for the EU reflects this less than
complimentary tone. Polling numbers have shown a drop in the
percentage of Turks who think EU membership is a good thing
from 55 percent in Autumn 2005 to 42 percent in Autumn 2008.
(NOTE: By Turkish standards, these are still very high
polling numbers. END NOTE) The same poll demonstrated that
the percentage of Turks believing that EU membership would
benefit Turkey fell from 62 percent in Spring 2007 to 48
percent in Autumn 2008. This reflects a backlash against
European leaders who are perceived as using the prospect of
Turkish membership as a means of creating a "pan-European
identity," overall public ignorance of the issues, and
growing level of Turkish disinterest.

¶7. (C) Ankara has done an even worse job of selling its EU
aspirations in Europe. For years, Turkish ambassadors in
Brussels viewed their mission as strictly bilateral and had
no desire to engage the EU or European Parliament. The MFA
has only recently begun to alter this mindset. Over the last
two years, the GOT has encouraged dialogue between the
European and Turkish Parliaments, although a majority of the
engagement efforts have originated in the private sector.
Turkish businessmen's associations such as TUSIAD and TUSKON
and Turkish think tanks brought over 300 European Parliament
members to Turkey on private funded programs in 2008. In the
beginning of 2009, however, the GOT took steps to enhance its
high-level engagement ahead of what many believe is a "make
or break" year. Immediately after naming AKP Vice Chairman
Egemen Bagis to replace then-Foreign Minister Ali Babacan as
State Minister for EU Affairs and lead EU negotiator (a move
long advocated by the EU), PM Erdogan visited Brussels,
January 18-20, for the first time in five years. Both
Erdogan and President Gul have subsequently made several
trips there to advocate for Turkey's EU membership -- with
mixed reviews.

----------------------
Not All Turkey's Fault
----------------------

¶8. (C) Some European officials here readily point out that
Ankara alone cannot be blamed for the slow down in Turkey's
accession process. The EU has consistently sent negative and
mixed messages which have dampened Turkish enthusiasm. One
Swedish diplomat noted that the EU has failed to explain to
Turkey that France does not speak for the organization nor do
all members share its or Germany's views. This duplicity
reinforces a "vicious cycle" of European criticism followed
by Turkish inaction, she noted. More importantly, most Turks
believe the Ankara Protocol has provided Cyprus with an
unfair weapon against Turkey in its ongoing bilateral
dispute. While Turkey has not complied and opened its ports,
the EU has not done enough to end the isolation of Northern
Cypriots, something which is also called for in the Ankara
Protocol. As a result, many Turks have come to view
EU-justified reform efforts as futile so long as Cyprus can
effectively halt the process with its one vote. (NOTE: While
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will ease many internal EU
disputes and allow for greater discussion of issues related
to enlargement, European officials tell us that decisions
related to new membership will still require consensus. END
NOTE)

----------------------
All Politics Are Local
----------------------

¶9. (C) Turkey's skeptical attitude toward the EU reflects a
larger insecurity about its place in Europe and a perceived
lack of European will to accept Turkey as European. Turks
commonly refer to this fear as the "Sevres Syndrome" in
reference to the 1920 treaty in which France, the UK, Italy,
and Greece carved up the former Ottoman Empire. At best,
Turks perceive a general lack of European political will to
incorporate Turkey's large economy and population. At worst,
the public fears that this hesitance is due to religious and
ethnic prejudices. Regardless, the process of subjecting the
substantive spectrum of Turkish governance to European
scrutiny touches upon many domestic sensitivities and calls
for a level of humility not commonly found here.
Politicians, nevertheless, are keenly aware that EU
membership has different meanings to different constituency
groups and alter their message accordingly.

¶10. (C) While being a vocal EU proponent may not win votes in
Turkey, politicians understand being an outright opponent
will lose them. Each constituency group, however, views EU
accession through the guise of its own domestic agenda. The
Islamists, closely associated with the ruling AKP, see the EU
as a proxy for reforming a secularist system that has
traditionally suppressed Islamic parties and their
supporters, namely changing party closure laws as required by
the Venice Commission and eliminating headscarf prohibitions.
On the alternative end of the political spectrum, the
secular social and political elite Kemalists, represented by
the leading opposition party CHP, desire an inseverable
tether for Turkey to Europe that would guarantee its westward
orientation. The Kemalists are torn between achieving their
goal of a European Turkey and, on the other hand, complying
with EU reforms that grant greater social and political
freedoms to the Islamists, who they believe have the agenda
of turning Turkey into a sharia state. In addition, many of
the required EU judicial and constitutional reforms
simultaneously touch upon core political redlines of the
Kemalists and Islamists and have met with resistance from
both sides. To the Turkish business community, regardless of
political affiliation, the EU represents economic
opportunities.

¶11. (C) The urban middle class sees EU membership as economic
security and easier travel to Europe -- as one journalist
described it, "a European-style life." Having once voted for
AKP due to its pro-EU, pro-reform platform, this group
abandoned the party in the March nationwide municipal and
local elections. For the nationalists, EU membership is, on
one hand, the ultimate validation of Ataturk's modernization
and Westernization project, but on the other, a surrender of
autonomy and the subjugation of Turkish needs to greater
European concerns. The average Turk, however, knows little
of the EU other than what is said by politicians.
Accordingly, Turkish media coverage of critical statements
coming from European capitals represents much of the Turkish
street's exposure to Brussels. In a recent nation-wide poll
on intolerance, respondents selected the EU over Israel,
terrorists, and the U.S. as the greatest threat to global
security. Fatigued by the onslaught of sound bites from
Sarkozy and Merkel, and the seemingly endless demands for
controversial and laborious reforms, the average Turk has
grown ambivalent to the accession process.

--------------
Whither Turkey
--------------

¶12. (C) Contrary to popular perception, however, Turkey's EU
efforts have not completely stalled since 2005. Beginning in
2008, the GOT implemented a series of actions addressing
several controversial human rights issues including Article
301, the Foundations Law, and state-owned Turkish Radio and
Television (TRT) Kurdish language broadcasting, in addition
to passing a much welcomed National Program for the Adoption
of the Acquis and naming a new lead EU negotiator. One UK
diplomat noted several steps that have done much to win
European hears and minds, such as making May 1 an official
holiday and allowing peaceful labor protests, the uneventful
celebration of Nevruz, PM Erdogan and President Gul's trips
to Brussels, and the nascent steps to normalize relations
with Armenia.

¶13. (C) On the heels of a weak Czech presidency, Ankara is
optimistic that their EU luck will improve with the
back-to-back pro-Turkey Swedish and Spanish terms.
Nevertheless, Turkey faces a difficult six months ahead. The
GOT has yet to institute significant judicial and
constitutional reforms (both of which touch upon hard-fast
secularist red lines) ahead of the parliament's summer
recess. Without a significant push in those areas and
without opening its ports to Cyprus, Turkey faces the
possible suspension of its accession talks in the late-fall
following the annual progress report.

¶14. (C) In June, EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn
encouraged Turkey to take bold measures to avoid suspension
of talks, specifically opening its ports to Cyprus, making
progress in the reunification talks, recognizing the status
of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, and opening Halki
Seminary. While European diplomats have qualified that
Rehn's statement was intended to motivate Ankara to take
action on all fronts, many Turks have interpreted his
comments as a list of equally weighted options. Furthermore,
some GOT officials have conveyed to us assurances from
Brussels that the fall progress report will not lead to a
derailment of talks. GOT officials have increasingly begun
to imply that Halki will open in the near future, a move many
interpret as a stop gap measure to buy Turkey time. (NOTE:
Regardless of the political will, some in the administration
are arguing that opening Halki will require legislative
action. END NOTE)

-------
Comment
-------

¶15. (C) Boasting a major economy and an established
democracy, Turkey is unlike any other country that has
previously sought EU membership. Accordingly, the accession
process offers different returns, most benefiting Ankara's
internal needs rather than economic development or political
cohesion. Turkey's membership in the European Customs Union
already affords a high level of economic integration
including EU visa waivers for Turkish truck drivers, artists,
and (soon) journalists. Given that Turkey's "immigration
threat" to the EU stems predominantly from third country
nationals, it is not inconceivable that at some point
business and tourism visas may follow suit. If all Turkey's
interests (domestic reform, economic access, and ease of
travel) are met through existing associations and the acquis
harmonization process, full membership may not offer much to
Turkey. Depending on the party in power at the time, many
here believe Turkey may ultimately choose to stop the process
short of membership, thereby avoiding surrendering its
sovereignty to what they see as an increasingly fractured,
consensus-based EU apparatus.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ANKARA972.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001018

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE
TRANSITION PERIOD

REF: NICOSIA 456

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons: 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA Undersecretary Apakan told DAS Bryza
and the Ambassador July 13 that Turkey:
-- continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process;
-- is committed to a solution if there is a referendum;
-- views the guarantee system as "vital";
-- insists on genuine bizonality;
-- believes any solution must entail a significant transition
government that could last as long as 36 months. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) In a July 13 meeting with DAS Bryza and the
Ambassador, MFA Undersecretary Apakan underscored that Turkey
continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process "to the
end of this year" and that this would be reiterated to
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in bilateral discussions. Talat
had arrived in Ankara earlier that day. Apakan said that
Turkey would also support a solution if there is a
referendum. He added, however, that the "vital" system of
Treaties of Guarantee must remain in place. The MFA could
not bring a "wrong solution" to the GOT, let alone to the
Parliament. The guarantee system would be Turkey's only bond
to the island when both sides become an EU country. Apakan
then went into detail on the somewhat mumbo-jumbo but very
serious Turkish position of principle about maintaining the
Hellenic-Turkic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the
guarantees being the final part of the "Lausanne System"
to secure Turkish rights, establish links to the Turkish
community, and protect Turkish rights (presumably to high sea
access).

¶3. (C) Apakan said that the post-settlement Cyprus must also
be "genuinely" bizonal, which means that the process by which
it emerges is important (reflecting Turkey's view that the
new constituent state will not be a continuation of the
Republic of Cyprus). Therefore, a transition period is
needed. This period would allow Turkey to withdraw its
troops and hand over territory. This transition government
would led jointly by ROC President Christofias and Turkish
Cypriot leader Talat. Ushering in a "real peace" requires
going step by step, he said, as laid out in the Annan Plan.
The economy needs to be balanced and harmonized. The
transition period could be 36 months or 20 months, as
proposed in Annan, but possibly shorter.

¶4. (C) Increasingly animated, Apakan asserted that he was
not trying to "create difficulties," but believed strongly
that a well-planned transition would smooth out potential
problems. It was not a new idea. We could check previous UN
documents. The island would need to find new homes for those
persons who would be required to move. If there were no new
residences, the resettlement could not take place. DAS Bryza
questioned whether sorting out these transitional
arrangements would take considerable time, and asked if this
means an additional new round of negotiations on a set of
governance issues for a new political entity, keeping in mind
that negotiations on governance issues for a new constituent
state had already proven lengthy and difficult. Negotiating
a whole new set of governance provisions seemed incompatible
with Apakan's expressed desire to secure a Cyprus agreement
by the end of 2009. Apakan replied flatly that "if there is
no transition, there is no settlement." This had been told
to Talat. If both sides say "yes" to a referendum on
December 10, then Talat and Christofias could govern the
settlement -- as Cypriots. But they need time.

¶5. (C) DAS Bryza said we understand that the Turkish Cypriot
goal remains a new constituent state with a distinct and new
international personality, and that Talat seems to have full
room to negotiate except for the guarantees. Apakan replied
that territory and guarantees must be considered at the very
end of the negotiations, so that the proposed power-sharing
arrangement could be seen. This has been true since the
1980s, he said. He added that a new EU Protocol is needed to
replace Protocol 10, to ensure the new constituent state will
enjoy derogations from EU law to protect Turkish Cypriot
interests in ensuring the new state is bizonal. We also need
a meaningful answer to the question of what happens if the
referendums fail, he noted. What would be the role of the
Turkish Cypriots? Bryza noted that the U.S. was working with
its European allies to plan for a successful outcome of the
negotiations. Apakan expressed Turkey desire for a reference
to UNSYG Kofi Annan's 28 May 2004 report on Cyprus, which
outlined the whole talks and the Annan Plan's fate -- which

the UNSC had failed to adopt. DAS Bryza pointed out that
this report had been vetoed by the Russians. He urged that
Ankara help change the Russian view. "They want a lot from
you," he said. Apakan emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots
felt cheated by the EU and must not be cheated by the U.N. as
well. The USG is a leading country, with the U.K., he said.
"You can find a way."

¶6. (C) DAS Bryza said he had asked Christofias to consider
not holding a referendum in the Greek Cypriot community,
because so many G/C's now seem inclined to vote "ohi" (no),
regardless of the actual content on the settlement agreement,
and instead allow himself to be judged by Cypriot voters in
the next election for the settlement that emerges.
Christofias did not support that idea, and said he was
confident of a "yes" vote. Apakan noted that if AKEL and
DESY both support the referendum, then it would pass.

¶7. (C) Apakan said he was in favor of a speeded up process.
He said Ankara supports arbitration and wants "a calendar."
Bryza said there may be a point at the end of negotiations
when some mechanism may be needed to bridge final
differences. Such a mechanism should not apply pressure, but
should instead provide creative ideas. During Bryza's visit,
DISY Leader Anastasiades had proposed the appointment of a US
envoy who could lead a team of wise people who could generate
such deadlock-breaking ideas. Apakan gave no comment but
said the ultimate settlement must entail genuine
power-sharing and equality. This is the reason there has not
been a settlement to date, he said: the Greek Cypriots "don't
like to share." Bryza said the Greek Cypriots are looking
to the Annan Plan more than they admit in public, and that
Christofias has been making an effort to ensure that Turkish
Cypriot interests are protected.

¶8. (C) Apakan asked if the USG would appoint a Cyprus
Coordinator. Bryza was noncommittal but commented that he
liked the idea of an envoy who could provide ideas to the
negotiators during the endgame. Bryza said he had found the
mood on Cyprus more positive during his visit the previous
week to the island, largely because of the opening of
Yesilirmak (Limnitis) crossing. In addition, the Greek
Cypriots feel an incentive to negotiate seriously, as they
look ahead to Talat's election next April.

¶9. (C) COMMENT: Apakan has been appointed as Turkey's
permanent representative to the United Nations, and is not
expected to remain in his current position past mid-August.
Accordingly, he may have seen this as his parting shot on the
Cyprus issue and felt compelled to emphasize that getting to
"yes" would not be as simple as agreement on the design of a
united Cyprus -- but must build in a transitional framework
as well. He also seemed intent on flagging for us that
Ankara believes the negotiations need to wrap up within this
calendar year, contrary to some projections that extent well
into 2010. Negotiating a transitional government and
wrapping up negotiations by 2009 are probably incompatible
goals.

¶10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ANKARA1018.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001568

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA "FORWARD-LOOKING" ON CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 1455
¶B. NICOSIA 656

Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel J. O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,
d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 23 the Turkish MFA hosted an
internal marathon session devoted to Cyprus that was
refreshingly critical of Turkish policy over the past decade,
reaffirmed that the status quo is unacceptable and resolved
that Ankara must "find ways to break the deadlocks" that
threaten the negotiations. The MFA cautioned us not to read
too much into the session, whose attendance was deliberately
packed to dilute the influence of UN Permanent Envoy Apakan,
who remains determined to have a voice in Cyprus policy.
Ankara still hopes to encourage greater USG involvement in
the talks. The MFA also is "cautiously optimistic" that the
European Court of Human Rights will rule November 16 that the
Turkish Cypriot Property Commission is an acceptable remedy
for Greek Cypriot property claims in the north. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) On October 27 MFA's Deputy Director General for Cyprus
and Greece, Kerim Uras, provided us a readout of the marathon
session focused on Cyprus that took place at the MFA October
¶23. Uras noted that almost a dozen ambassadors had been
brought back for the meeting, and that most of the upper
level of the MFA also had attended, essentially "paralyzing"
the MFA decision-making structure for almost 24 hours. FM
Davutoglu and Minister for EU Affairs Bagis joined the
meeting at 10 p.m., and it continued until 4 a.m. on October
24, Uras said. Despite the momentous trappings of this
event, he cautioned that we should not read too much into
this meeting. It had been scheduled at the behest of UN
Permanent Envoy Ertugrul Apakan, who is intent on keeping
involved in the Cyprus issue. To blunt Apakan's influence,
the MFA leadership packed the meeting with additional
attendees. The result was a logistical headache but a
surprisingly useful exchange of blunt views, according to
Uras.

¶3. (C) Highpoints of the session include:

-- an assessment that Ankara needs to encourage the USG to
take a closer interest in the Cyprus talks. The MFA has the
sense that the USG feels it got "burned" in 2004, so
therefore prefers to leave the negotiating to Cypriots alone.
However, this gives the Greek Cypriot side too much room to
maneuver. Closer interest from the USG would "make a huge
difference."

-- strong criticism of Turkish policy on Cyprus over last the
ten years, where it now finds Greek Cypriots inside the EU
and the Turkish Cypriots at a severe disadvantage. "How did
we get in this position?" was the dominant lament, Uras said,
noting that the clear implication was that hardliners such as
Apakan had steered the policy into the corner where Ankara
now finds itself.

-- a consensus that opening up the Green Line has had an
unfortunate, albeit revealing, effect. The Turkish Cypriot
community is convinced that most Greek Cypriots are "racist"
and loathe the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots have a
deliberate policy of never buying anything in the north, even
bringing their own lunches. According to "TRNC" records,
some 40 percent of G/Cs have never visited the north at all.

-- a recognition that too many Turkish Cypriot concessions
will make a deal too hard to sell in the north during a
referendum. Unlike 2004, Turkish Cypriots will be far more
skeptical about what is being offered, and a majority "yes"
vote cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, Ankara needs to
move carefully.

-- a major focus on November 16 when the European Court of
Human Rights will rule on whether the Turkish Cypriot
Property Commission is an acceptable remedy for Greek Cypriot
property claims. Uras projected that this court decision
will have a significant impact on the talks, and that this is
why the Greek Cypriot side has moved slowly on this issue.
He said Ankara is now "cautiously optimistic" that the court
will rule in Turkey's favor. The court has seen that this
Commission has been active since April 2006, already has
distributed 26 million pounds, and has settled 77 claims (out
of 422 that were submitted). Uras said the Commission
recently reached a settlement with a single Greek Cypriot
property owner for 12 million pounds, freeing up 45 pieces of
land in the north.

¶4. (C) Uras said the session's conclusion was that Ankara is
not happy with the status quo, and needs to be "flexible and
forward-looking," and that it must "find ways to break the
deadlocks" that threaten the talks. He said the meeting had
underscored that Turkey's EU bid serves as the context for
its interest in seeing the Cyprus Problem resolved. We
pressed him on whether the session had discussed options in
the event the talks fail. Uras said it had not.

¶5. (C) Uras had been far more downbeat the previous week,
complaining that ROC President Christofias's UNGA speech had
advocated "autonomous regions" instead of "constituent
states" -- a substantial weakening of the negotiating
premise. Uras also had suggested that Christofias no longer
appears serious about the talks, and may be looking ahead to
the April 2010 elections, which "PM" Eroglu is expected to
win. Eroglu does not even speak English. He is also on
record as favoring the status quo, so could not possibly be a
credible negotiator. Uras predicted the Greek Cypriots would
choose that moment to withdraw from the negotiations, blaming
the Turkish Cypriots.

¶6. (C) Uras suggested that the USG should inform the Greek
Cypriots that it will not oppose recognitions by other
countries of the "TRNC" in the event of the talks collapsing.
We were firm that would not happen. Uras continued that if
the talks fail Ankara "probably" would encourage its friends
to establish embassies in north Nicosia, but doubts that any
-- even Azerbaijan -- would have courage to do so. All
would fear the consequences of alienating the EU, he said.

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09ANKARA1568.html

[boomerang]

and how many times they have to be told one wonders...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001586

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: STANDSTILL LOOMS FOR TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION BID

REF: ANKARA 1568

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is on track to open the Environment
Chapter under the Swedish EU presidency, but has run out of
"easy" technical chapters to open after the beginning of 2010
and could face a standstill in its EU accession bid. Ankara
already has abandoned its previous policy of trying to open
two chapters per presidency. The flagging momentum has much
to do with the eight chapters officially frozen and nine
unofficially suspended because of the ongoing Cyprus Problem.
The Turkish Government appears to have no firm course of
action beyond the next couple of months, although its
rhetoric remains resolute and upbeat. The EU Progress
Report's focus on Cyprus may be prescient since restoring the
momentum to Turkey's EU bid may well depend on a successful
outcome in the Nicosia negotiations. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Internally and externally, Turkey's 12th EU progress
report was received with positive reviews. The Turkish EU
Secretariat said it appreciated the report's recognition of
the appointment of an EU negotiator, the democratic opening
initiative, the existence of a functioning market economy,
and Turkish-Armenian reconciliation efforts. Both the EU
Secretariat and the MFA, however, criticized the report's
portrayal of the Cyprus issue.

Status of Key Chapters
----------------------

¶3. (SBU) Despite making some progress on most chapters,
Turkey is finding it difficult to make headway on its EU
accession bid with 8 chapters officially frozen because of
the ongoing Cyprus Problem. In addition, Ankara faces
political obstacles to making constitutional reforms. Seval
Isik, Director of Accession Policy for the Turkish Secretary
General for EU Affairs, privately commented to us that Turkey
can only realistically work on opening one of four technical
chapters during the Spanish or Belgium presidencies: Public
Procurement; Food Safety, Veterinary, and Phytosanitary
Policy; Social Policy and Employment; and Competition Policy.
Both the Turkish EU Secretariat and the Swedish Embassy told
us they expect Turkey to open the Environment Chapter in
December and that they will try to make progress -- although
they are doubtful significant progress will be made -- on the
Energy, and Education and Culture chapters. Regarding the
Competition Policy Chapter, Isik commented that this chapter
is hard to adopt because state aid laws would need to be
implemented.

¶4. (SBU) The situation in Cyprus continues to be a major
obstacle to implementing reforms. The Turkish EU
Secretariat, EU Commission, and Swedish Embassy all agree
that Turkey must actively try to solve the Cyprus Problem to
allow Ankara to move on the blocked chapters. Swedish
Embassy DCM Urban Andersson commented that his government
does not think anything will be done on the Ankara Additional
Protocol by year's end and that it seems both sides are
hardening their positions. The situation is probably going
to worsen with Turkey's objection over the European
Parliament's claims this week that Turkey has hindered
EU-NATO cooperation by objecting to extending EU-NATO
strategic cooperation beyond the "Berlin Plus" arrangements
over its concerns related to Cyprus, thus paving the way for
less security for EU personnel.

¶5. (SBU) Andersson commented that the political will might
not exist in Turkey to make these difficult, sensitive
political reforms, particularly because there is an internal
divide within the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)
over these issues. Some AKP members do not think EU
accession will happen, he said, and so doubt the value of
making make painful, unpopular reforms that are likely to be
politically costly. However, Andersson indicated he
personally thought the EU could do more to make progress on
the Energy, and Foreign Security and Defense Diplomacy
chapters to faciliate the process for Turkey-- because it is
in the EU's interest. The EU would benefit, he said, from an
alternative gas route through Turkey and the advantages
inherent in enhanced EU-NATO cooperation.


ANKARA 00001586 002 OF 002


Turkey's Haphazard Reform Plan
------------------------------

¶6. (SBU) According to our EU interlocutors, Turkey is now
approaching the EU process in 12 month intervals, rather than
its previous policy of trying to open two chapters per
presidency. Yet Turkey will be lucky if it can open one
chapter per presidency, they say, because all of the "easy"
chapters have already been opened. Although Ankara often
gives the impression it is entitled to preferential
treatment, EU officials warn that there are no exceptions to
EU accession requirements. Despite Turkey's difficult road
with the remaining chapters, the Turkish government is trying
to bolster its EU General Secretariat (EUGS) by reorganizing
it into three directorates -- civil and culture,
implementation, and politics -- and by increasing its staff.
The EUGS is planning to hire 64 new experts in December and
100 more deputy experts in 2010. Deputy Head of EUGS Burak
Erdenir also publicly commented that the Prime Minister had
personally approved a move by the EUGS's newly-created
communications unit in early October to launch a
comprehensive communications strategy to promote Turkey's EU
accession aspirations.

¶7. (C) Turkey has not set a date as a goal for completion of
significant reforms that are needed for movement on its EU
accession process. Isik commented that EU Affairs Minister
Bagis is continuing to meet with his European counterparts to
promote Turkey's initiatives on EU reforms. However, he
conceded that there is no plan for forward movement after the
technical chapters are opened. Turkish experts at a 26
October EU conference asserted that Turkey has made great
strides in its EU accession bid but that progress is still
slow and the public could become increasingly frustrated if a
date is not set for accession. The Swedes too are concerned
and privately noted that they fear that all reforms will
grind to a halt if the Cyprus talks collapse, particularly
since the Cyprus issue alone has led to blocks on eight
chapters. Regardless, Bagis repeatedly emphasized that the
EU and Turkey need to work hand in hand to get things done.

Comment
-------

¶8. (C) The EU and Turkey appear to be in sync in agreeing
that all of the "easy" chapters have been opened, with the
remaining reforms hinging on "political" movement on Cyprus
and key constitutional changes. The accession pace, never
rapid, appears set to slow down markedly in 2010, yet the
Turkish Government does not seem to have any firm course of
action beyond the next couple of months. The worst-case
scenario is a standstill which would place both Turkey and
its advocates inside the EU on the defensive. The EU
Progress Report's focus on Cyprus appears appropriate since
only a successful outcome in Nicosia may be able to provide
the necessary boost to Turkey's accession process.

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09ANKARA1586.html

[boomerang]

always asking others to do their dirty work...

(C) On Cyprus, Sinirlioglu warned that it is not only a
big problem now, but threatens to become a bigger problem.
He said he had told the EU Presidency in Stockholm last week
that the EU needs to be fair and just, instead of punishing
"the one who had done the right thing." (Note: This is a
reference to the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan. End
Note). He complained that some in the EU are using Cyprus as
an excuse. He also criticized the USG for not delivering on
its promises in 2004 to help lift the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots. The EU had promised the same thing in
writing -- and had even prepared the necessary regulation --
but had not followed through. The result was "unjust and
insulting." It was "cheating," Sinirlioglu said, and
something that still rankles with PM Erdogan.

¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu said Ankara had been prepared to go along
with the Finnish EU Presidency proposal in 2006 to open up a
Turkish port to the Greek Cypriots in return for lifting
restrictions on Ercan Airport, but the Greek Cypriots had not
been cooperative. Nevertheless, this proposal is "still on
the table." Turkey remains focused on a comprehensive
solution, which Turkish Cypriot leader Talat also wants.
However, Greek Cypriot leader Christofias appears determined
to "marginalize the talks." Christofias argues that this is
an internal problem of Cyprus -- but it is not. It is an
international problem, which Ankara is ready to deal with.
The two sides already have sorted out power-sharing. They
need to address property, after which the issue of guarantees
could be broached. Sinirlioglu emphasized that the USG also
should be involved. Christofias needs to bring about a
change of mood among the Greek Cypriots, otherwise a solution
will remain out of reach. "Therefore, we want to convince
you and the U.N. to do more."

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09ANKARA1625.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001747

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: EU TROIKA PRESSES ANKARA ON CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 1586
¶B. ANKARA 1568

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Turkey-EU Troika meeting on November 26
in Istanbul focused on Turkey's EU bid, but made reference to
Turkey's unwillingness to implement the Ankara Additional
Protocol. (The Swedish Embassy passed us their final report
on this meeting but emphasized that not all EU members had
received a copy and asked that the document be kept close
hold.) FM Davutoglu stressed that Turkey looks forward to
future cooperation with Spain and underlined Turkish efforts
on three major issues concerning Turkey's EU accession bid:
Cyprus negotiations, the National Unity Project (formerly
known as the Democratic Opening initiative), and
normalization of relations with Armenia. The EU, for its
part, touched on Turkey's relations with Greece, the Balkans,
South Caucuses, and Iran. Overall, the bulk of the
discussion concentrated on Turkey's EU aspirations. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The EU Troika was led by Swedish FM Carl Bildt, State
Secretary Diego Lopez Garrido (incoming Presidency),
Ambassador Marc Pierini (EU Commission), the Council
Secretariat, and team members. The Turkish delegation was
headed by FM Davutoglu and Minister of State for EU affairs
and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis. The Turkish delegation
said that Turkey is determined to fulfill the opening
benchmarks of Chapter 5 (Public procurement); Chapter 8
(Competition); Chapter 12 (Food safety, veterinary and
phytosanitary policy); and Chapter 19 (Social policy and
employment) in the near term. (Note: Turkey's timeframe is
most likely referring to the Spanish presidency, which begins
on January 1, or Belgium presidency. End Note) Turkey,
however, stressed that the lack of progress on Chapter 15
(Energy) was disappointing, as its opening is in the mutual
interest of both Turkey and the EU. Davutoglu stressed that
any decision taken by the December Council that would hamper
the accession process would have a negative impact on reform
efforts and Cyprus talks. (Note: On November 19 we met with
the Turkish EU Secretariat Director of Sectoral Policies,
Erol Saner, whose directorate is in charge of ushering
internal reforms on Chapter 25; Chapter 27 (Environment);
Chapter 21 (Trans-European networks); and Chapter 14
(Transport policy). Saner said that his office does not
expect that Chapter 15 will meet opening benchmarks anytime
soon because of Cypriot objections and is instead focusing on
other chapters. End note)

¶3. (C) Both the EU and Turkish delegations referred to the
Cyprus negotiations, acknowledging that ongoing talks have a
bearing -- whether directly or indirectly -- on Turkey's EU
accession aspirations. The EU Troika encouraged Turkey to
make progress on the Ankara Additional Protocol. Full,
non-discriminatory implementation of the Protocol was a
contractual obligation for Turkey and should be honored. The
EU regretted that Turkey had not fulfilled this obligation or
made any progress towards normalization of relations with
Cyprus. The Turkish delegation responded that Cyprus is a
separate issue from the accession negotiations and cannot be
a precondition. It repeated its well-known views on the
Direct Trade regulation and the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriot community, emphasizing that creating artificial
deadlines for the Additional Protocol implementation was not
helpful. Turkey, however, said it supported an island
negotiation process aimed at a solution comprising a
bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality as
defined by relevant Security Council resolutions, and
reaffirmed its support for the joint statement made by the
leaders of the two communities on May 23, 2008. The Turkish
side also stated a deal could be reached in the first months
of 2010 if the process speeds up.

¶4. (C) FM Davutoglu said that the EU process and reforms will
continue, but warned that anti-Turkish statements issued by
some European leaders undermined support for the EU in
Turkey. Separately, Saner indicated that there is much
frustration within Turkey because a date has not been set for
accession, which has led to a loss in some public support.
To ease this issue, Saner said the Turkish government and the
EU Secretariat are preparing to launch a new initiative to

ANKARA 00001747 002 OF 002


energize its EU bid in January 2010. Saner said that the new
strategy includes the Turkish EU Secretariat's enlargement, a
revamped communications strategy, and logo. For example, he
said, the Secretariat should soon have a staff of 340 people,
most of them experts, whereas it started in 2001 with only 60
people.

¶5. (C) COMMENT: We gather from our Swedish colleagues that
the Troika made a sincere run at their Turkish hosts for
movement on the Ankara Protocol, but found little resonance.
Our soundings at the MFA have been similar. Although the EU
warns that Ankara should brace for increasing criticism from
the EU, sparked by the Greek Cypriots, at the EU Heads of
Government meeting December 10-11, the Turks remain
unimpressed and unmoved. The perception that the EU
accession process is already stalling is diminishing the EU's
credibility.
Silliman

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09ANKARA1747.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001781

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SUPPORT FOR "TRNC" CARRIES HIGH PRICE TAG

REF: A. ANKARA 1718
¶B. NICOSIA 363

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkey's financial aid to the "TRNC" is
roughly $600 million annually -- one third of the "TRNC"
budget. Ankara routinely grouses about what it perceives as
the Turkish Cypriots' lack of fiscal responsibility, but
would never consider turning off this funding tap and does
not view the potential savings of a Cyprus solution as a
relevant factor in the current negotiations. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) "TRNC Ambassador" Namik Korhan recently passed us a
copy of the 2010 "TRNC" annual budget, contained in fiscal
legislation currently being reviewed by the Turkish Grand
National Assembly. The budget gives a breakdown of revenues
and expenditures for the "TRNC" as follows:

(Note: These figures are in Turkish Lira. The current
exchange rate is 1.5 Turkish Lira per $1. End Note)

Expenses: 2,645,273,043 (up 3 percent from 2009)
--------

Personnel -- 999,810,806 (down 1.4 percent from 2009)
Social Security -- 45,361,506
Property and Services -- 171,678,012
Current Expenditures -- 1,152,842,719
Capital Expenditures -- 109,640,000
Capital Transfers -- 42,850,000
Loan Payments -- 5,540,000
Reserve Appropriations -- 117,550,000

Revenues: 2,504,144,000
--------

Local Income -- 1,302,961,500 (down 9.6 percent from 2009)
Price Stability Fund -- 264,362,900
Other Funds -- 37,095,600
Return on Capital Expenditures -- 4,724,000
Assistance from the Turkish Republic -- 305,000,000 (up 4
percent from 2009)
Credits from the Turkish Republic -- 590,000,000 (up 532
percent from 2009

Internal Sources: 141,129,043

¶3. (C) Our colleagues at Embassy Nicosia are in a better
position to decipher these categories, but from Ankara the
key columns are the credits and the assistance from Turkey:
altogether 895 million Turkish Lira (roughly $600 million).
This is a whopping 535 percent increase in Turkish assitance
compared to 2009, at least as far as the official "TRNC"
budget is concerned. In fact, Turkey kept dribbling
additional budgetary support to north Cyprus throughout 2009.
Korhan told us earlier that in April 2009 the new National
Unity Party (UBP) had come into office only to discover that
the "TRNC" coffers had been depleted by the previous
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) government during its
pre-election spending spree. UBP had to appeal to Ankara for
an immediate 600 million TL transfer, which the Turkish
Government reluctantly agreed to provide. Korhan seemed
nonchalant that a full third of the "TRNC" budget now relies
directly on assistance from Turkey.

¶4. (C) The MFA is decidedly less nonchalant but still
relatively resigned to this significant transfer of funds
from Ankara to Lefkosa. MFA Deputy Director for Cyprus Kerim
Uras told us Ankara regularly scolds the Turkish Cypriots
about their prolific spending. He noted as an example that
salaries for professors and instructors in northern Cyprus
are well above the norms in Turkey. Uras said Deputy Prime
Minister Cicek (whose portfolio includes Cyprus) in
particular has lashed out at the "TRNC's" lavish tendencies
-- asking why "TRNC" officials all have Mercedes, for example
-- but to no avail. The Turkish Cypriots know full well that
Ankara will continue to subsidize them, Uras said. The north
Cyprus government has passed legislation that drastically
reduces the wages of newly hired civil servants. This was

ANKARA 00001781 002 OF 002


done as a sop to Turkish demands to show fiscal rectitude.
The actual effect on the budget, however, will be close to
zero, at least for several years.

¶5. (C) COMMENT: Ankara may complain about the financial costs
of propping up the "TRNC" but it would never consider turning
off the tap. Cyprus is viewed as a fundamental national
cause, and therefore untouchable -- something the Turkish
Cypriots seem quick to exploit. Reducing this financial
drain in the event of a solution would certainly be a
sweetener for Ankara, but by itself is not something that
could serve as motivating factor during the talks.
Silliman

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09ANKARA1781.html