Cyprus-Forum.com

[jahitty]

Does anyone know if any more cyprus cables have been released, any idea on where to find them?

[bill cobbett]

Yes, have a look at this from Cyprus News Report...

http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node/4282

...which gives a wikileaks link at http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09NICOSIA301.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000754

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SW FI
SUBJECT: SWEDES' CYPRUS MUSINGS: CHANNEL THEIR INTEREST
PRODUCTIVELY

REF: NICOSIA 729

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Our UK counterparts share our skepticism
about the timing of Sweden's emerging proposal on Cyprus. A
formal proposal at this stage runs the risk of backfiring and
allowing President Papadopoulos and the other candidates in
the presidential race to shift to the international community
the onus for a solution, as well as the blame for the lack of
progress under the UN-brokered July 8 agreement. A fresh
proposal now may also further irritate divisions within the
EU over Turkey's accession negotiations, which for now appear
to be on track. That said, there are measures in the
near-term which could encourage progress under the July 8
process, and lay the groundwork for a strong push to reach an
overall Cyprus settlement following the February 2008
presidential elections. End Summary.

PROPOSED SWEDISH INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

¶2. (C) UK Deputy High Commissioner Rob Fenn was well aware
of Swedish FM Bildt,s desire to engage more actively on the
Cyprus issue, but in our September 13 meeting with him, he
was surprised to learn of some of the ideas being considered
by the Swedes, e.g., replacing SRSG Moller. Like us, the UK
High Commission is frustrated by the lack of progress since
former U/SYG Gambari brokered the July 8, 2006 agreement
between President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader
Talat, and lack of results from their first meeting in 14
months on September 5. Fenn noted that this heated
presidential campaign period is not the time to launch major
new proposals. The Swedish initiative to bring together
"like-minded" countries would likely play to Papadopoulos's
political advantage, as well as highlight divisions within
the EU over Turkey. Fenn expected that Turkey would soon
open at least one or possibly two more chapters of the Acquis
in its accession negotiations, and that the upcoming EU
review of Turkey's progress did not pose any imminent threat
to keeping those negotiations on track.

¶3. (C) Despite serious concerns about the outlines of the
Swedish proposal, the UK does want to keep FM Bildt engaged
and active on the Cyprus issue, given his strong support for
Turkey's accession negotiations and his stature within the
EU. A "brainstorming breakfast" on the margins of UNGA
meetings might be useful. It could encourage the UNSYG to
make a statement following his meeting with President
Papadopoulos (and again following his separate meeting with
Talat) noting the lack of progress and the need for both
leaders to get serious about producing meaningful results
within the July 8 framework. A brainstorming session could
also look ahead to February 2008 and consider options for
engaging the victor of the tight three-way presidential race
to reinvigorate negotiations for a final settlement to the
Cyprus issue.

¶4. (C) Fenn advised us that the Brits were having an
internal debate on whether or not to use the roll-over of
UNFICYP's mandate in December to exert pressure on
Papadopoulos. We told him that any attempt to fiddle with
the mandate now would certainly backfire and hand
Papadopoulos a huge political gift, which would let him run
against the international community instead of talking with
the electorate about their future. If efforts or initiatives
to re-energize negotiations after presidential elections
faltered next spring, then the next roll-over in June could
be the right time to get serious about considering
substantive changes to UNFICYP's mandate.

NEAR-TERM MEASURES


¶5. (C) In our view, there are opportunities to encourage
progress on the Cyprus issue in the near-term, including:

-- a proposed meeting between U/S Burns and President
Papadopoulos on the margins of UNGA;

-- a statement from the UNSYG following each of his meetings
with Papadopoulos and Talat, exhorting them to make good and
produce results from their July 8, 2006 agreement; we see
such statements as aimed at not letting Talat squirm out of
his July 8 commitments, while not letting the legalistic
Papadopoulos suggest that the process has carved-in-stone
rules which Talat is violating;

-- a forward-looking "brainstorming session" on the margins

NICOSIA 00000754 002 OF 002


of UNGA, urging both parties to "find a way forward" in the
process, while contemplating possibilities for re-energizing
negotiations following February presidential elections.

COMMENT: THE TIME WILL BE RIPE - BUT NOT NOW

¶6. (C) The Swedes, interest, ideas, and activism on Cyprus
are admirable, but their timing is off. Contrary to their
current views, the time for meaningful, substantive progress
on the Cyprus will be especially ripe after the February
presidential elections. Elements of any initiatives -- old
or new -- would vary depending on which of the three
candidates ends up as the winner. A UN assessment mission, a
report and/or recommendations to the UN Security Council, a
new SRSG, or possible changes to UNFICYP,s mandate in June
2008 are only some of the ideas which Sweden, the U.S., the
UK, and other like-minded countries might consider when the
local "givens" become clear.

¶7. (C) The current lack of progress on the July 8 process is
putting pressure on Papadopoulos and the other two candidates
to proffer their own ideas on the way ahead and differentiate
themselves in this tight race. Each of them must now explain
to voters how they would achieve a solution to the Cyprus
issue, though by nature, they would prefer to shift the blame
to Ankara, foreign interference, the U.S., and UK.
Meanwhile, Talat apparently has neither the interest nor the
support from Ankara to make bold or modest moves on the July
8 process until after the elections at least. For the time
being, our proposed near-term measures represent the best way
to lay the foundation for a renewed push on the Cyprus issue
next spring.
SCHLICHER

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/09/07NICOSIA754.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003098

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCE EU FI TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FINNISH PM URGES PROGRESS ON CYPRUS, REFORM

REF: ANKARA 2053

Classified by Polcouns Janice G. Weiner; reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Visiting Ankara in the run-up to Finland's EU
term presidency, Finnish PM Vanhanen told PM Erdogan May 17
that the EU is united on the need for Turkey to open its
ports to Greek Cypriot shipping. Vanhanen said Finland will
continue its policy of supporting the accession of all EU
candidates that meet membership criteria, and praised
Turkey's role as an example of democracy in a troubled
region. Erdogan pledged to continue the GOT's EU-related
reforms, but said Turkey cannot take any steps on Cyprus
until progress is made in alleviating the isolation of the
"TRNC." He did not offer any new initiatives to address the
problems of Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast. End
Summary.

¶2. (U) Vanhanen held a one-on-one and a larger meeting with
Erdogan and made courtesy calls on President Sezer and
Parliamentary Speaker Arinc. Other GOT leaders, including FM
Gul and Economy Minister and EU negotiator Babacan, attended
a dinner in Vanhanen's honor. The Finnish DCM gave us a
readout of the Vanhanen-Erdogan meetings.

-----------------------------------
Finland to Continue "Fair" Approach
-----------------------------------

¶3. (C) Erdogan told Vanhanen he is confident Finland will be
supportive of Turkey as EU term president. He recalled that
Turkey became an EU candidate in 1999 under a Finnish
presidency. He averred that some EU states are putting
obstacles in Turkey's path, and thanked Vanhanen for
Finland's "more open minded" approach. Erdogan assured
Vanhanen that the GOT continues to place a high priority on
EU accession, and rejected claims that Turkey has lost
interest in the EU reform process. He noted that the GOT in
April announced a new package of reforms (reftel). Vanhanen
assured Erdogan that Finland will continue its fair, logical
approach to EU enlargement -- any country given candidate
status should be allowed to become a member once it meets the
criteria.

-------------------
EU United on Cyprus
-------------------

¶4. (C) Vanhanen told Erdogan the EU states are united on the
need for Turkey to ratify and implement the Ankara Protocol,
which requires Turkey to open its ports to Greek Cypriot
shipping. He said Turkey is obliged to do so as a Customs
Union member, and this obligation cannot be linked to any
other issues. Vanhanen noted that the EU will release its
annual progress report on Turkey in October or November. The
report will address the Protocol issue, and this could harm
Turkey's candidacy if there are no new developments. The
report will also focus on human rights issues such as freedom
of religion, freedom of expression, cultural rights, the
draft anti-terror law, and civil-military relations.

¶5. (C) Erdogan said Cyprus remains a "sensitive issue" for
Turkey. He reiterated standard Turkish complaints about the
continued isolation of the "TRNC," despite the fact that
Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan Plan. The GOT,
he said, took the political risk of backing the Annan Plan,
but has nothing to show for it. The EU took in the Greek
Cypriots, but has not taken any meaningful steps regarding
the "TRNC." All parties involved need to work toward a
comprehensive solution that is just and fair. Erdogan
stressed that Turkey cannot open its ports to Greek Cypriot
shipping before progress is made in alleviating the isolation
of the "TRNC."

--------------------------------
No New Initiatives for Southeast
--------------------------------


ANKARA 00003098 002 OF 002


¶6. (C) Vanhanen asked Erdogan whether he had a plan for
addressing the chronic problems of Turkey's predominantly
Kurdish southeast. Erdogan did not offer any new
initiatives, instead outlining what he said were his
government's accomplishments in the region. Erdogan said the
GOT under his leadership has undertaken extensive
improvements in the education, transportation, and water
infrastructure in the region. He averred that the situation
in the southeast is far better than outsiders have been led
to believe by the propaganda of the terrorist Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK). Erdogan said the Kurds are one among
36 ethnic groups in Turkey. They are represented in
goverment -- a number of MPs, for example, are Kurdish.
Erdogan said "ethnic nationalism" is not tolerated, because
all Turks have one nationality. Nevertheless, he said, there
is no official discrimination based on ethnicity.

-------------------------
Alliance of Civilizations
-------------------------

¶7. (U) Erdogan touted Turkey's role in the Middle East as an
example of democracy and rule of law. He noted that Turkey
and Spain are co-sponsors of the Alliance of Civilizations.
Turkey lives in a troubled neighborhood where democracy and
human rights are in short supply. Turkey is in a position to
help improve the situation, which is why the GOT supports the
Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative. Vanhanen
said he appreciates Turkey's efforts to promote a dialogue
between cultures, and noted that Finland has decided to join
the Friends of the Alliance of Civilizations.



Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/05/06ANKARA3098.html

[boomerang]

UNCLAS HELSINKI 000110

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND: REACTION TO TURKISH INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

REF: SECSTATE 16987

¶1. (SBU) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to officials from
the MFA's Southeast Europe and EU Affairs offices. The Finns
expressed disappointment with the rapidity of the Cypriot
government's rejection of the Jan. 24 Turkish proposal;
however, the GoF was not surprised by the Cypriot rejection
and expects further posturing from both sides. Upcoming
Cypriot elections (May) probably influenced the decision
since many politicians are adopting a hard line toward
Turkish initiatives in hopes of bolstering their public
support. The GoF will continue to work with and through the
EU to encourage both sides to resume dialogue as soon as
possible.

¶2. (SBU) The Finns opined that Turkey's initiative was
helpful as a basis for further discussion and as an attempt
to jump-start the stalled process; however, there was nothing
new or groundbreaking in the Turkish proposal, only a
restatement of existing Turkish obligations. Referring to
the statement by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn (a
Finn), the Finnish officials said that by signing the Ankara
Protocol in 2005, Turkey had made commitments to the EU and
all its Member States, including Cyprus, and was expected to
meet them fully. In particular, Turkey was already obligated
to open ports to Cyprus and to take immediate and concrete
steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community.
From this perspective, the Turkish proposal, while welcome,
was not as substantive as it could be. An indication of
Turkey's willingness to clarify and implement reasonable
regulations governing assistance and aid programs to the
Turkish Cypriots was an important next step.

¶3. (SBU) Finally, when asked what the U.S. could do to
facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue,
the Finnish officials said that the U.S. could play an
important role in the UN Security Council. Russia was
blocking Security Council endorsement of the UNSYG
recommendations for a comprehensive settlement. American
efforts to encourage Moscow to drop its opposition to an
official endorsement would be helpful.
HYATT

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/02/06HELSINKI110.html

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000194

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL EAID ASEC GR TU CY
SUBJECT: EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGIONAL STRATEGIC
INITIATIVE (RSI) CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING, FEBRUARY 24,
2009

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Meeting in Nicosia February 24, U.S. Ambassadors and
interagency representatives covering the Eastern
Mediterranean RSI region discussed ways to strengthen
counterterrorism efforts in an environment characterized by
new migration waves from the Middle East to Europe, the
aftermath of the Israeli operation in Gaza, best practices
developed to date for countering violent extremism, and the
potential for new developments in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process and the international community's relationship
to Syria. Participants agreed on the desirability of
bundling regional projects--including current proposals for
U.S. law enforcement training in a
number of Eastern Med countries--in order both to
maximize the return on our investment and to build a
stronger regional base for combating transnational
threats. Participants also discussed the most effective ways
to reach populations at risk of radicalization as well as
other audiences, with an emphasis on thinking through
messaging strategies in advance of potential changes in the
international context. End Summary.

The Migration Challenge in the Region
-------------------------------------

¶2. (C) The meeting, hosted by Ambassador Urbancic and Embassy
Nicosia, was attended by U.S. Embassies Athens, Sofia,
Ankara, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Cairo, the Consulate General
in Jerusalem, interagency representatives from State (S/CT,
DS, and INR), Justice, DHS, Treasury, USAID, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and DOD COCOMs (SOCOM,
CENTCOM, and EUCOM), as well as UK FCO Counterterrorism
Director Robert Chatterton Dixon. Embassy Damascus was
unable to attend. S/CT Coordinator Dailey launched the
discussion by noting the importance of thinking regionally or
sub-regionally to identify problems and possible solutions.
Several Ambassadors quickly provided an example: the
cross-cutting problem of illegal migration. Ambassador
Speckhard (Greece) stressed the importance of a multinational
solution, incorporating all countries on the migration route
in an effort to manage flows and identify terrorists. He
noted that Greece had been particularly hard hit, with over
140,000 illegal migrants in 2008, many of whom came from
conflict zones in the Middle East and transited Turkey before
entering Greece. He called for creating a searchable
biometric database of known terrorists that could be put in
the hands of borderofficials, stressing that the EU should be
more active of support of EU front line states.

¶3. (C) Ambassador Urbancic (Cyprus) added that Cyprus
shared the same migration problems. He said that although
the numbers were lower, the risk was exacerbated by the lack
of border enforcement against illegal aliens who enter Cyprus
in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots and then cross
the Green Line, the UN- patrolled buffer zone, into the
Republic of Cyprus and the EU. Noting that half of the
people who take the ferry from Syria to Turkish
Cypriot-administered northern Cyprus do not go back -- not to
mention those who arrive in the north on small boats --
Urbancic warned that this "back door" to Europe was almost
totally open. Embassy Sofia DCM Karagiannis said Bulgaria
was increasingly facing illegal migration challenges as well,
and that while the country had not received funding from the
EU to address migration, it had imported EU requirements that
made enforcement more difficult.


Building Capacity of Law Enforcement
------------------------------------

¶4. (S) Ambassador Dailey announced that he expected
larger budgets for a number of counterterrorism programs,
including Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), countering
terrorist finance, TIP-PISCES, and RSI. The PISCES increase
would expand the software program to supplement the current
name-based records with biometric information. A number of
participants stressed the importance of biometric information
to make any database effective. Dailey noted that S/CT would
soon be traveling to Jordan in connection with a conference
on this subject, and said he would be in touch with other
Eastern Med posts about the possibility of expanding the
PISCES program geographically. DOD participants described
ongoing efforts to make PISCES compatible with other
intelligence-derived bio databases, and expressed hope that
this would open the door to law enforcement doing real-time

NICOSIA 00000194 002 OF 003


checks of suspect individuals against this data in the field.
DHS DAS Warrick described the Passenger Name Record (PNR)
and related initiatives to identify air travelers, and U.S.
efforts with the EU and Turkey to improve cooperation.

¶5. (C) A number of Eastern Med embassies have recently
submitted overlapping requests for law enforcement
training, much of it with DS/ATA. Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria,
Jordan, and Lebanon, among others, share problems related to
illegal migration and/or limited local capacity. Ambassador
Speckhard noted that Greece faces the threat of both
transnational terrorist networks who could make use of the
migration waves and an increasingly violent home-grown
terrorist presence. Both categories are anti-American and
they could potentially cooperate with each other. Those
posts with current ATA programs spoke favorably of their
effectiveness, and ConGen Jerusalem added that it hoped to
expand the programs beyond the Palestinian Authority's
Presidential Guard. Ambassador Sison (Lebanon) said there is
political will in Lebanon to tackle certain Sunni extremist
groups, as has been recently demonstrated, even if there is
none for taking on Hizballah or certain Palestinian
rejectionist groups. She also cited section 1207 and INL
funding for community policing of the Nahr al-Bared
Palestinian refugee camp once it re-opens as an example of
feasible ways to conduct counterterrorism and countering
violent extremism (CVE) training in Lebanon. Amman DCM
Mandel noted the extensive regional law enforcement training
taking place in Jordan, and the Jordanians' active approach
and willingness to expand training in a number of
counterterrorism areas.

¶6. (C) Ambassador Dailey pointed to the Nicosia, ATA-funded
law enforcement training proposal as an example of
effectively drawing together multiple countries in the
region, and all participants agreed on the value of bundling
such proposals into regional or sub-regional packages.
Ambassador Speckhard noted that posts may be able to develop
a strategy for framing training programs when presenting them
to host governments, in order to help senior leadership
understand the goals of the programs and undertake
institutional reforms to make the training stick. DS/ATA
Deputy Director Tibbetts welcomed the idea. DOJ OPDAT
Director Berman briefed on plans for a model two-year program
to bring together a group of officials from Eastern
Mediterranean countries for counter-terrorism training and
exercises.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
----------------------------------

¶7. (S) S/CT Strategic Communications Officer Goldman
briefed the group on best practices and current programs for
CVE, including addressing the grievances terrorists exploit.
Several Embassies and ConGen Jerusalem expressed interest in
expanded CVE work. USAID's Cairo-based OMEP Director Barth
stressed the importance of understanding "routes to terror,"
including alienation, and how to deal with them by reaching
out to youth and facilitating social networks. S/CT
officials cited the new women's organization Sisters Against
Violent Extremism
(SAVE) as a promising example. RADM Tillotson (CENTCOM)
offered a preview of the conclusions of the Joint Strategic
Assessment Team (JSAT), noting that they would have a strong
focus on CVE -- including understanding causes and
synchronizing efforts -- as well as strengthening partner
nations' counterterrorism laws and capacity building.
Tillotson also stressed the importance of interagency
cooperation in measuring the success of CVE efforts, while
NCTC Admiral Maguire said work was ongoing within the
Administration on CVE and messaging for dealing with
different environments. Ambassador Dailey asked participants
to think through potential messaging strategies in the event
the situation in the Middle East shifted, including if there
was progress on the peace process or a change in U.S.
relations with Syria.

Prospects in the Middle East
----------------------------

¶8. (C) Middle Eastern posts briefed on the situation
following the Israeli operation in Gaza, with Tel Aviv
PolCouns Sievers saying the two options in Gaza were the
Egyptian-negotiated cease-fire, including stopping the
smuggling of weapons and re-opening of the border crossing
with Egypt, or Israel returning to Gaza to destroy the Hamas
regime. A consensus of participants believed that Hamas had
lost popularity in Gaza, but it was unclear what alternatives
existed because no one would want to rule Gaza, including
Fatah, if the scenario made it look like the Israelis had

NICOSIA 00000194 003 OF 003


installed Fatah in power, according to the ConGen Jerusalem
representative. Ambassador Sison said that Hizballah
remained strong in Lebanon, and was viewed as the
"resistance" rather than a terrorist organization by more
than just the country's one-third Shia
population. Sison noted that key Lebanese leaders are
interested in overturning the past precedent of not
policing Palestinian refugee camps and in shutting down the
existing armed Palestinian military bases in Lebanon (the
latter being suspected conduits for smuggling to Hizballah).
These moves would be in U.S. interests as well -- and the
re-opening of Nahr al-Bared could be a step in that
direction. Several participants stressed the role of Iran as
primary financial backer of Hizballah and other extremist
groups, although Sison noted that Iran's "train-the-trainer"
efforts had significantly improved Hizballah's capacity to
administer its own affairs.


Kongra Gel (PKK)
----------------

¶9. (S) Ambassador Dailey told participants that S/CT Deputy
Coordinator Schlicher would soon travel to key capitals to
share declassified information about PKK financial networks.
Ankara PolCouns O'Grady said this would be welcomed by
Turkey, which is concerned that European capitals are turning
a blind eye to the PKK's funding and criminal acts. O'Grady
reviewed the elements of Turkey's approach to the Kurdish
region, and said upcoming local elections would be an
indication of how well the ruling party's efforts have
succeeded there.

Next Steps
----------

¶10. (S) Participants agreed on the following steps coming out
of the meeting:

-- Move ahead with bundling regional law enforcement
training proposals, especially those already submitted by
several posts. Consider options for a DS/ATA assessment
team, likely to visit Cyprus in the summer, to also conduct
an assessment in Greece on the same trip. Look for
opportunities to do multi-country training sessions.
Embassies will negotiate with host countries on receptiveness.

-- Coordination between S/CT, Embassy Athens and other
relevant posts about options for expanding the PISCES progam.

-- Look for further opportunities for CVE efforts,
including putting the SAVE organization in contact with Greek
Foreign Ministry organizers of a planned women against
terrorism conference.

-- Ensure strong interagency participation in an upcoming
June 3-5 conference in Istanbul on sharing best practices for
preventing terrorist travel in the region. Participants will
include Eastern Med countries, the EU, and others, with input
to be sought from posts.

-- Engage with EU counterparts on the PKK, including during
the upcoming Schlicher trip.

-- Continue to work on turning the multi-country DOJ program
into a reality, dealing with country arrangements, site, and
other issues.

-- Synchronize CENTCOM JSAT assessment with priorities of
National Intelligence Program (NIP).

-- Resolve outstanding DS security issues related to VIP
visits to the region, including possible DS re-engagement in
Gaza.

-- Engage the Government of Turkey to encourage their
acceptance of an Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger
Name Record system.

¶11. (SBU) Athens volunteered to host the next RSI meeting.
Ambassador Dailey proposed including a short time early in
the next RSI meeting for separate smaller-group discussions
focused on the northern and southern halves of the Eastern
Med region.


¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/CT Ambassador Dailey.

Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/03/09NICOSIA194.html

[boomerang]

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 000249

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP PREL CVIS ECON ENRG PTER PGOV TU CY GR
SUBJECT: SENATOR DURBIN DISCUSSES CYPRUS, TURKEY, VISA
WAIVER, AND ENERGY WITH FM BAKOYANNIS, PARLIAMENT HEAD
SIOUFAS

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a cordial and very substantive
discussion during his visit to Athens, Senator Richard Durbin
told Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis about his impressions
of the chances for a settlement of the Cyprus issue following
his visit to Nicosia and underscored the new administration's
desire to have strong relations with Greece. Bakoyannis said
Greece was keenly interested in a Cyprus settlement, but she
wondered whether the Turkish "Deep State" shared this
interest. On Turkey's EU prospects, Bakoyannis expressed
similar perplexity about Turkish intentions, but said Greece
remained steadfast both in supporting Turkey's EU candidacy
-- as long as it met all criteria -- and in insisting that
the EU not move the goalposts on Turkey. Bakoyannis also
noted Athens' disappointment that its overtures toward Ankara
had not resulted in improved relations and complained about
Turkey's outstanding threat on casus belli, Turkish
overflights of Greek islands in the Aegean, and Turkey's
long-standing refusal to allow the reopening of the Halki
Orthodox seminary. In response to Bakoyannis' question about
progress on the Visa Waiver Program for Greece, Ambassador
noted that we have been waiting for the GOG to return to us
comments on the agreement on criminal data sharing (PCSC),
which the Greeks had had since October. Bakoyannis promised
a text by February 20 but warned the U.S. could not expect to
get everything it wanted in the agreement.

¶2. (SBU) In his meeting with Parliament President Sioufas,
Senator Durbin provided an overview of his visit to Cyprus,
discussed the new administration's economic stimulus plan,
and stressed the importance of Turkey re-opening the Halki
seminary. Sioufas updated the Senator on the Greek
Parliament's ratification of Albania's and Croatia's NATO
accession protocols, Greek efforts to encourage both sides to
find a solution to the Cyprus issue, and recent developments
in Greece's development of energy supplies. END SUMMARY.

STRONG U.S./GREECE TIES
-----------------------

¶3. (SBU) This was Senator Durbin's first meeting with FM
Bakoyannis. The Senator said the purpose of his Athens visit
was to report on his trip to Cyprus and to see "friends of
the U.S." He was excited about the election to the
Presidency of his fellow Senator from Illinois, and though
the Senator stressed that the CODEL was not an official
delegation, they were "official friends" of President Obama
and wanted to come to Greece early in the new administration
to show that bilateral relations were strong. Mr. Alexi
Giannoulias, the Illinois State Treasurer, who was
accompanying the CODEL at his own expense, reiterated that we
looked forward to good relations and wanted to send a strong
message of U.S. willingness to help on the Cyprus issue.
Bakoyannis extended her congratulations on the President's
election and noted that there were high expectations but also
many global problems. The United States could count on
Greece's friendship, and she said Greece's relationship with
the U.S. was amongst its best, based on common values, common
interests, and the support of the Greek diaspora in the U.S.

CYPRUS
------

¶4. (SBU) Bakoyannis said Greece was keenly interested in
solving the Cyprus issue and had encouraged both the Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to work hard. The incentives
were high, particularly for the Turkish Cypriots, who would
become full-fledged members of the EU. It was important,
however, to understand the fundamental differences between
the two sides. She argued that while the Greek Cypriots were
totally independent of Athens, the Turkish Cypriots were not
independent and were greatly influenced by Ankara. She asked
rhetorically whether the Turks were really interested now in
a solution or were using the process as a bargaining chip for
EU accession. She said the Turks told her they were
interested, but she was unsure what to believe. At the same
time, there was the question of who would ultimately decide
on Turkish cooperation, the GOT or the "Deep State" (the term
sometimes used to refer to the forces within the Turkish
General Staff who supposedly represent the real seat of power
in Turkey).

¶5. (SBU) Senator Durbin said the CODEL had asked Turkish
Cypriot "President" Talat directly whether he could act

ATHENS 00000249 002 OF 004


independently. Talat had responded that Ankara had the power
to stop him from negotiating but thus far had not done so.
Bakoyannis said Talat had been a good negotiating partner for
Cypriot President Christofias, and she believed that if
Ankara left Talat alone, an agreement would happen. She
emphasized at the same time that any agreement had to be
viable from the point of view of the EU. It would not work
if every time the Cypriot representative in Brussels needed
to make a statement or take a decision, there had to be
political negotiations back in Cyprus. Also, the question of
security guarantees had to be dealt with. Bakoyannis said
the old guarantees dating from the 1960s (which had justified
the Turkish invasion in 1974) were now "old fashioned" and
"dangerous." Rights of outside countries to intervene were a
recipe for disaster; the EU was the only guarantor any party
should need.

TURKEY
------

¶6. (SBU) In response to the Senator's question whether Turkey
-- especially the "Deep State" -- was truly interested in EU
membership, Bakoyannis said she had the impression the Deep
State, which was Kemalist and secular, did not want the EU
interfering in Turkish internal affairs, especially on issues
of democracy and human rights. On the other hand, the Muslim
party, which portrayed itself as a modern, European,
democratic party interested in EU membership, nevertheless
hewed to some Muslim policies, particularly in international
affairs. Despite these ambiguities on the Turkish side,
Bakoyannis said Greece's position was clear: Turkey must meet
all the accession criteria; there could be no changing of the
rules for Turkey. At the same time, Greece stressed to the
EU that its position must be consistent: the EU could not
say, "Turkey, you met all the accession criteria, but we
still don't want you because you're a Muslim country or too
large." She said she did not expect Turkish accession for
about 15 years and, by then, the world would likely look
considerably different and opposition to Turkish accession
might lessen. In the meantime, the EU had to be transparent
on the accession issue. The Turks also needed to open their
ports to Cypriot vessels. Restricting their entry, she
argued made no sense for Turkey, which will depend on Cyprus'
vote to enter the EU.

¶7. (SBU) On Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, Bakoyannis
said there had been some improvement, such as PM Karamanlis'
visit to Ankara a year ago -- the first time in 49 years that
a Greek prime minister had gone to Turkey. But relations had
not improved as much as they had expected, and Bakoyannis
cited several outstanding irritants, such as the casus belli
the Turkish parliament had proclaimed when Greece ratified
the Law of the Sea treaty. Turkish provocations in the
Aegean, which had been increasing lately, were another
irritant. Turkish refusal to allow the opening of the Halki
Seminary was another. Four U.S. presidents had pushed the
Turks to open the seminary but had failed. Bakoyannis said
she argued to the Turks that with the seminary open, the
Greek Ecumenical Patriarch (headquartered in Istanbul) would
become Turkey's best ambassador, demonstrating Turkey's
tolerance. The Turks argued back to Bakoyannis that if they
opened Halki, they would also have to open many more
problematic Muslim academies. Bakoyannis said she did not
believe their argument, however, and attributed the GOT
refusal to re-open Halki to Turkish intolerance of a
religious minority. In sum, Bakoyannis found the Turks
difficult to understand, and she said that while ruling New
Democracy and main opposition PASOK remained positive toward
Turkey's EU aspirations, the Greek public was running out of
patience.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM
------------------

¶8. (SBU) The Senator also asked about Greek domestic
terrorism, which had flared up since the riots began in
December. He inquired whether Greek terrorists were
"homegrown" and asked for the Foreign Minister's analysis and
advice. Bakoyannis, who lost her own husband to assassins of
the Greek terror group 17 November in 1989, said the recent
flare-up of violence had two causes. One was rebellion of
Greek students following the police shooting of the
15-year-old boy last December. The "children" in the streets

ATHENS 00000249 003 OF 004


were angry, a reaction compounded by the tremendous pressure
Greek students were under from their parents to perform well
in the latter stages of high school to be competitive to
enter Greek universities. The ND government, Bakoyannis
said, was trying to relieve the latter problem through
education reform. The second cause were the hardcore
terrorists and anarchists, which numbered approximately
600-700 and were aided by criminal elements. She said new
groups had emerged recently and were using gas bombs,
shooting cars and even a policeman. She said that, as in the
past, Greece would need the cooperation of its friends to
defeat these new terrorists. At the same time, the new crop
was "too messy" and much less disciplined than 17N to be
serious.

VISA WAIVER
-----------

¶9. (SBU) Bakoyannis asked about Greece's application for the
Visa Waiver Program. The Senator said he understood this was
an important issue for Greece and that he hoped to see Greece
in the program as soon as possible. Ambassador noted that
two of three necessary documents were finished but that we
were waiting for the GOG to get to us its comments on the
agreement on criminal data sharing (PCSC), which we had
passed to Greece in mid-October. Bakoyannis responded that
she would be getting the comments of the Ministry of Justice
on Friday and would make them available to us. She
underscored that the U.S. would not be able to get everything
it wanted in the agreement "or it won't make it through the
Greek Parliament." Additionally, Bakoyannis was not happy
that the older European participants in the VWP did not have
to sign such agreements. "I don't want Greece to be treated
differently." Ambassador assured her that Greece would
receive the same treatment as other VWP countries. As for
details of the agreement, Ambassador said "that's what
negotiations are for."

BAKOYANNIS MEETING PARTICIPANTS
-------------------------------

¶10. (SBU) Participants in the meeting included:

GREECE:

FM Dora Bakoyannis
Director of the FM's Cabinet Constantin Chalastanis
MFA Spokesman Giorgos Koumoutsakos
MFA A7 Directorate for North America head Ambassador
Chryssoula Aliferi

U.S.:

Senator Richard Durbin
Ambassador Speckhard
Michael Daly, Senator Durbin's Chief of Staff
Christopher Holmes, Senator Durbin's Foreign Policy Advisor
Alexi Giannoulias, Illinois State Treasurer
Endy Zemenides, State Treasurer's Staff
LCDR Joseph Furco, Navy Liaison
Carol Kalin, Embassy Press Officer
Jeffrey Hovenier, Embassy Control Officer
Paul Carter, Embassy notetaker

PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT SIOUFAS
----------------------------

¶11. (SBU) President of the Greek Parliament Dimitris Sioufas
opened his meeting with the Senator by stressing that Greece
and the United States had stood together in all of the
twentieth century's major conflicts and that our Alliance
continues to prosper. Sioufas had taken concrete steps to
contribute. As Parliament President, he oversaw
Parliamentary ratification on February 17 of Albania's and
Croatia's applications to enter NATO. He had also helped
secure ratification of EU consideration of Albania's
application for membership, as well as to move along the
ratification of the U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal
Assistance agreements.

¶12. (SBU) Sioufas emphasized the importance of U.S.-Greek
joint work on the Cyprus issue. He hoped the Senator would
convey to Turkish leaders the "need to give up intransigent

ATHENS 00000249 004 OF 004


positions on Cyprus." He also hoped that the Senator would
raise Halki and urge the Turkish leadership to allow it to be
reopened. "Halki is a potent religious symbol. Its
continuing closure would weaken the Ecumenical Patriarch's
influence within world Orthodoxy, opening the way to
increased Russian influence in the Church."

¶13. (SBU) Sioufas also emphasized his work on energy issues,
particularly during his previous post as Development
Minister. He noted that this work had resulted in last
November's ceremony linking the Turkish and Greek gas grids,
which put Greece in the position of being the first EU member
state to import Azerbaijani gas directly from the Caspian
region. He provided a short summary of his February 16
meeting with Azerbaijani President Aliyev, which he termed
"positive." He noted, however, that Aliyev had repeatedly
referred to problems obtaining a transit agreement with
Turkey. Sioufas emphasized that true energy diversity had to
include renewables, an "important part of Greece's future."
Over the very long term, Sioufas saw nuclear fusion as being
a game changer, but its time was not here yet.

¶14. (SBU) Senator Durbin thanked Sioufas for his cordial
welcome and noted that NATO's origin lay with the Truman
Doctrine, designed to keep Greece and Turkey free. Durbin
provided a quick overview of his work supporting the stimulus
package just passed by Congress, noting the package's
emphasis on renewable energy. In this regard, he praised
Sioufas for his work on improving Greece's energy diversity.
The Senator also told Sioufas about his visit to Cyprus and
how encouraging it was that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
"are talking." He agreed with Sioufas on the importance of
re-opening Halki seminary.

¶15. (U) CODEL Durbin departed post prior to clearing this
cable.
SPECKHARD

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000681

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PREL CY GR CYPRUS
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT PRESIDENT GETS BOOST FROM PM ON HANDLING
OF CYPRUS ISSUE


Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In Athens March 7-9 on one of his frequent
working visits, Cypriot President Papadopoulos met top party
leaders and GoG officials, including PM Karamanlis, and got a
boost for his handling of the Cyprus issue. In a joint press
conference, PM Karamanlis praised the February 28 UNSYG
Annan-Papadopoulos meeting in Paris as a step toward eventual
resumption of negotiations and reiterated that Turkey must
meet its EU obligations. Press coverage was universally
positive with the theme that the ball was now in Turkey's
court. Papadopoulos was once more able to command Greek
support in his efforts to place the onus on Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots. END SUMMARY.

Papadopoulos Gets Boost From PM
-------------------------------

¶2. (U) Cypriot President Papadopoulos, visiting Athens
March 7-9, met with the top Greek leadership, including PM
Karamanlis, President Papoulias and FM Bakoyannis, and got
strong statements of support for his handling of the Cyprus
issue and, implicitly, for his interpretation of his meeting
with the UNSYG. In a joint press conference after their
meeting, PM Karamanlis welcomed as an "extremely important
development" the February 28 meeting between UNSYG Annan and
Papadopoulos, a result of which was their proposal for
technical talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The PM
also stressed the need to create the proper conditions for a
resumption of talks "without constricting timelines" and
warned that "we do not have the luxury of another failure."
Karamanlis praised Cyprus for "once again" proving that it is
interested in a "just, lasting and viable" solution to the
problem.

¶3. (U) For his part, Papadopoulos, in answering a press
conference question, took a swipe at the U.S. interest in
direct trade with Cyprus. In so doing he rejected the
argument that such trade could help ease the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots or equalize the economic imbalance between
the two sides.

¶4. (U) The visit attracted very positive and fairly
extensive press coverage, with reports emphasizing
Papadopoulos and Karamanlis agreeing that the ball is now in
Turkey's court and highlighting the need for Turkey to
implement the Ankara Protocol -- i.e., open its airports and
seaports to Greek Cypriot vessels.

Message to Papadopoulos
-----------------------

¶5. (C) In a March 8 meeting and in subsequent
conversations, MFA spokesman Koumoutsakos confirmed to poloff
that the private GoG message to President Papadopoulos was to
push to re-start negotiations. Asked if Greece worried that
Turkey's EU accession process might be in jeopardy if
negotiations do not resume, Koumoutsakos responded that it
was first and foremost Turkey's responsibility to honor its
EU obligations. However, he did admit that the GoG was
concerned that there was not a more positive environment
regarding a resumption of talks, even though publicly the GoG
was touting the February 28 Paris meeting as an important
step in this direction. Being able to indicate such
progress, he went on, would help the atmosphere within the EU
vis-a-vis Turkey when the Commission issues its avis in the
fall.

¶6. (C) Koumoutsakos rejected the notion that the GoG just
blindly supported whatever Papadopoulos proposed, saying that
former FM Molyviatis had been very active in moderating
Papadopoulos' behavior in the run-up to Turkey's October 3 EU
accession invitation. He added that this was in line with
the GoG's continued desire to keep its relations with Turkey
and the Cyprus issue on two different tracks.

¶7. (C) British Ambassador Gass told us that in his own
conversations, MFA Cyprus Director George Papadopoulos (no
relation) had told him that there was "understandable
euphoria" in Athens regarding the Annan-Papadopoulos meeting.
George Papadopoulos explained that President Papadopoulos'
idea for two parallel tracks -- one on
technical issues (health, the environment) and another more
substantial track that would deal with sensitive issues
(returns, for example) -- had essentially breathed new life
into efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

Annan Plan
----------

¶8. (C) Ambassador met briefly with EU Enlargement
Commissioner Ollie Rehn, on the margins of Rehn's March 9
speech sponsored by ELIAMEP, one of Greece's premier foreign
policy thinktanks. Ambassador recalled that the European
Commission had decided in 2004 that the Annan Plan was not
inconsistent with the EU acquis. Lately, Ambassador said,
Nicosia had been making repeated assertions that its
accession to the EU in 2004 totally changed the circumstances
for reunification (and thereby calling into question the
Annan Plan's conformity with the acquis.) Ambassador noted
that, in fact, nothing had changed, and he continued to make
this point from time to time. Rehn took the point and said
he would similarly look for ways to recall that in its final
form the Annan Plan had been found to be not inconsistent
with EU norms. (Comment: Recently, FM Bakoyannis declared
the Annan Plan "history," but in the context that it had been
rejected in its current form by a large majority of Greek
Cypriots, not because it might be inconsistent with the EU
acquis or unable to serve as a framework for a solution. End
Comment.)

¶9. (C) COMMENT: Papadopoulos used his February 28 meeting
with Annan to leverage endorsement from PM Karamanlis and
others here for his efforts to portray himself as truly
interested in resuming talks under UN auspices, as well as to
place the onus on Turkey/Turkish Cypriots to respond to the
technical talks offer.
Ries

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/03/06ATHENS681.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 035309

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUN
SUBJECT: ENGAGING EU COMMISSIONER FOR ENLARGEMENT OLLI
REHN IN HELSINKI

REF: HELSINKI 70

Classified By: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY DANIEL FRIED
FOR REASONS: 1.4 (b) AND (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 3.

¶2. (C) EUR/ERA appreciates Embassy Helsinki,s initiative in
reaching out to EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn as
reported in Helsinki 70, and encourages future meetings
whenever Rehn visits Helsinki. EU Commissioners can provide
valuable insights into issues of deep interest to the Bureau
and the Department. This cable provides guidance on key
issues in Rehn,s EU Enlargement portfolio.

¶3. (C) Action Request: The Department requests that Embassy
Helsinki schedule a meeting with Olli Rehn on his next visit
to Helsinki to discuss issues relating to EU enlargement.
Post may refer to the following guidance in engaging Rehn on
next possible occasion:

----------
BACKGROUND
----------

TURKEY/CYPRUS

¶4. (SBU) The Finnish EU Presidency brokered a compromise over
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the
Ankara Agreement that helped keep Turkey,s EU accession
process alive. But the affair has drastically narrowed the
scope for progress in the negotiations and soured an already
poisonous atmosphere surrounding those talks. Under the
pressure of national elections, nationalism is on the rise in
Turkey. Turkey insists that only when the EU lives up to
commitments made prior to Cyprus, accession to lift the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots ) notably through
implementation of aid and trade regulations ) will it allow
Greek Cypriot vessels access to Turkish ports as it is
required to do for ships of all EU members.

¶5. (SBU) The EU approved ,259 million in aid to the Turkish
Cypriot community in fall 2006. Implementation of funded
projects has met with both practical and political obstacles;
it remains to be seen whether all available funds can be
contracted by the 2009 deadline. Although the January 22-23
EU Council called for work to resume on the Commission,s
direct trade regulation for the Turkish Cypriots, it is
unclear if the German EU Presidency will be able or willing
to outmaneuver the Greek Cypriots. Movement on trade and aid
could have beneficial spillover effects for a permanent
Cyprus settlement process under UN auspices, which will
almost certainly have to precede Turkey,s entry into the EU.

WESTERN BALKANS

¶6. (SBU) With the opportunity to resolve Kosovo,s status
this year, the international community is well positioned to
assist the Western Balkans move beyond the conflict of the
1990s and firmly on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration.
We need to focus on our objectives of regional stability and
economic prosperity for all the countries of southeast Europe
and of the region as a whole. At Thessaloniki in 2003, the EU
Council declared that the Balkans, future was within Europe,
but countries in the region have no clear sense of what that
means. 2006 was essentially a lost year for EU enlargement
in the Western Balkans; only Croatia got &closer to
Europe,8 by completing several chapters of the acquis
communautaire.

¶7. (C) Elsewhere in the Western Balkans, EU discussions on
integration have offered little reason for optimism. With
full membership seemingly a distant prospect, successive EU
presidencies have focused on a consolation prize ) travel
liberalization ) but that too has proven elusive. The
current modest objective of visa facilitation is largely
confined to containing planned increases in visa fees. Such
damage limitation does little to make travel easier; on the
contrary, the Western Balkans now face visa requirements for
travel to new EU members Bulgaria and Romania.


STATE 00035309 002 OF 004


¶8. (SBU) The last significant obstacle for Bosnia to conclude
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU
stems from its failure to meet the EU criteria on police
reform. The U.S. supports EU pressure on Bosnia to create
more integrated, professional nationwide police structures.
However, the EU,s leverage on overall reforms will only
increase once Bosnia is in the Stabilization and Association
process. We will continue to support EU and Office of the
High Representative (OHR) efforts to forge a Bosnian
agreement that meets the EU,s police reform criteria, but
encourage the EU to demonstrate flexibility on what it deems
to meet these criteria.

¶9. (SBU) We support further EU-Serbian integration,
particularly in relation to a Kosovo decision. Constructive
integration entails engaging Serbia on war crimes issues.
SAA negotiations were suspended and membership in Partnership
for Peace (PfP) was denied due to Serbia,s non-cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely, the failure to arrest and transfer
to The Hague fugitive Ratko Mladic. In December, NATO
granted PfP membership to Serbia; the EU should consider the
impact that restarting SAA talks would have on a Kosovo
decision as well as ensuring that Serbia is mindful of its
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.

¶10. (SBU) Stability in Balkan countries is highly dependent
on their prospects for integration with Europe. We are not
asking for shortcuts to integration ) only for clear
indications that the Western Balkan countries will enter the
EU eventually, and that the timing depends on the pace of
their reforms. The EU needs to move beyond the current
standstill: it should provide a starting date for accession
talks with Macedonia; issue clear and realizable goals for
Bosnian police reform; and find a way to overcome the impasse
over SAA negotiations with the new Serbian government.

-----------------------------
Policy Background Information
-----------------------------

¶11. (SBU) The U.S. supports the EU enlargement process as a
means to promote peace, stability and reform in aspirant
countries and the region as a whole. Key U.S. policy points
are as follows:

REHN,S LEADERSHIP

-- We are preaching to the converted when we talk to you
about the importance of building on the EU,s greatest
achievement: extending the zone of peace, liberty and welfare
across the European continent.

-- You have been an articulate champion of the need for
further enlargement, for the good of existing members as well
as future ones.

-- We welcomed your February 26 speech in Berlin and its
emphasis on the EU membership perspective as the greatest
transformative force in Europe.

-- As you indicated in the speech, the dynamic economic
growth resulting from enlargement is also the greatest
assurance that Europe will be a force to be reckoned with
throughout the 21st century.

-- How can the U.S. help overcome some EU countries,
nervousness about further enlargement?

TURKEY/CYPRUS

-- Although the Finnish Presidency-brokered compromise over
Turkey,s non-compliance with the Additional Protocol to the
Ankara Agreement helped keep Turkey,s EU accession process
on track, the EU should take special care in the current
political environment that it sends positive signals to
Turkey regarding its EU accession prospects.

-- It is important that EU live up to its obligations to lift
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The October
agreement to disburse ,38.1 million of ,259 million in
aid was a good start, but the EU must now face down Greek
Cypriot opposition to implement the 24 projects that are
already funded, such as university scholarships, and
accelerate the disbursal process for the remainder to avoid
losing credibility and momentum.

STATE 00035309 003 OF 004


-- Most importantly, the EU should take rapid steps to
approve the Direct Trade Regulation for the Turkish Cypriot
community. This regulation must not contain conditions, such
as a return of Varosha, that pre-judge a permanent settlement
on Cyprus.

-- The United States, overarching objective in Cyprus is to
help foster a comprehensive settlement that reunifies the
island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We actively
support the efforts of the United Nations to reconcile
differences and find common ground for a settlement. The EU
can play a positive role by making progress on aid and trade
to the Turkish Cypriot community; doing so will have positive
effects on a permanent settlement.

WESTERN BALKANS

Back to a Regional Focus on Integration

-- The EU integration process is the most important factor
for stabilizing the Balkans. Back-sliding, refugee flows,
emigration, and violence remain real possibilities if EU does
not decisively move toward integration. Security missions
are a band-aid, not a cure.

-- Technical debates about elements of a Kosovo status
settlement have overwhelmed planning for the prosperity and
stability of the region as a whole. We should get back to a
focus on regional stabilization, and Euro-Atlantic
integration as the prime catalyst.

-- The institutional changes encouraged by the integration
process can lay the foundation for increased investment and
job creation. They also provide structures for modern
administration and regional cooperation needed to combat
organized crime.

-- Nationalism and criminality disguised as nationalism have
been root causes of instability in the region. Through
integration, nationalism can be curtailed substantially by
improving economic conditions and, to a lesser extent by
rendering borders less important.

A Need for Clarity, and Momentum

-- 2006 was largely a lost year for bolstering EU enlargement
hopes in the Western Balkans, except in Croatia, which
successfully concluded some chapters in accession
negotiations.

-- EU policy on enlargement vis-~-vis the Balkans needs to be
made clear and made clear soon.

Serbia

-- EU talks with Serbia on a SAA have been suspended for a
year, making membership prospects more distant at a critical
time in the region.

-- NATO granted Serbia PfP membership. Similarly, the EU
should look for an opportunity to resume SAA negotiations
with Serbia, within a timeframe conducive to a Kosovo
settlement, while ensuring that Serbia cooperates with the
ICTY.

-- Your previous public statements on SAA for Serbia have
been particularly constructive. We support further
statements clarifying the EU,s engagement strategy with
Serbia, such as through the SAA process.

Bosnia

-- Achieving an SAA will be a landmark achievement for Bosnia
and should help drive additional reforms. We will continue
to support EU and OHR efforts to forge an agreement among
Bosnians that meets the EU criteria on police reform.

-- In light of the SAA,s importance as an engine for
achieving broader and more rapid economic and political
reform, we encourage the EU to demonstrate maximum
flexibility in determining whether Bosnia has met these
criteria.

Macedonia


STATE 00035309 004 OF 004


-- Macedonia was granted candidate status in December 2005,
but there is no starting date for accession talks and no
plans for setting one.

-- Macedonia has made impressive economic reforms and is
working to re-establish a productive government-opposition
dialogue. The EU can and should plan to start accession
talks.

Moving Forward

-- Without clarity that all of southeast Europe is moving
toward Euro-Atlantic structures, nationalism, demagoguery,
crime and their toxic progeny will continue to thrive in the
region.

-- The U.S. is not asking for a short-cut to EU membership.
But every country should have a sense that it is on track for
EU (and NATO) membership, and the timing depends on each
country's progress.
RICE

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/03/07STATE35309.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000429

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID CY GR TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEED TO BUILD MOMENTUM ON
CYPRUS

Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reason 1.5 (b/d).

SUMMARY
- - - - -

¶1. (C) European Commission and Parliament officials agreed
with visiting DAS Bryza February 6-7 on the need to build on
the momentum created by Turkish FM Gul's recent proposal on
opening Turkish and Northern Cypriot ports. The EU officials
noted that Turkey could not open its ports to Cypriot vessels
without the political cover of movement toward ending
Northern Cypriot isolation. All agreed that a halt to
Turkey's EU accession negotiations could have serious
geostrategic consequences and negative effect on Turkey's
2007 national elections. END SUMMARY

¶2. (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza met with European Commission
Director General for Enlargement Michael Leigh, Commission
Unit Head for Turkey Christian Danielsson and advisor on
Turkey to Enlargement Commission Rehn, Jean-Christophe
Filori, February 6 and with Member of the European Parliament
(MEP) and EP Rapporteur on Turkey, Camiel Eurlings (Dutch,
Center-Right) February 7 to discuss Turkey and Cyprus.
Leigh, stressing that EU accession negotiations with Turkey
would proceed on their merits and not on political
considerations, emphasized the positive effects of the
negotiations. Once "taboo" subjects were now open for
discussion, with the EU and Turkey enjoying a more
sophisticated and higher level dialogue. Given pressure from
member states, the EU and Turkey are holding a series of
monthly seminars, including on issues such as human rights
and religious freedom. For their part, the Turks are taking
a practical approach. Leigh stressed that the process is
valuable and maintaining its momentum will be key to further
promoting reform in Turkey. In this light, the EU will
attempt to avoid the risk of Cyprus, possibly with other
member states, halting accession negotiations absent Turkish
implementation of the additional protocol.

¶3. (C) One way to avoid such blockage, Leigh explained, is
to convince Nicosia that direct trade with the north does not
imply recognition of the TRNC. Having the UN or another body
manage trade out of Famagusta is one option worth exploring
to allow a form of direct trade, while affording Greek
Cypriots a sense that they had not surrendered their claim of
sovereignty over the North. The Greek Cypriots, however,
continue to link Famagusta with their demand for a moratorium
on construction in the north and with a hand over of Varosha,
which the Turkish Cypriots reject. Still, by potentially
opening a debate on the Famagusta-Varosha issue, Ankara's
recent Cyprus proposal seems to reflect a new political
willingness by Ankara to fulfill its obligation to extend the
Additional Protocol (by opening Turkish ports to Greek
Cypriot ships). By so doing, Leigh continued, Turkey may
convey within the EU a sense of momentum on the difficult
port issue sufficient to allow the Commission to avoid
criticizing Ankara on this matter in its October progress
report.

¶4. (C) In any case, the EU recognizes the primacy of the
UN's role in forging an overall settlement. Commission Unit
Head for Turkey Danielsson emphasized the positive role
Athens has played on Cyprus, noting the U.S. might want to
continue to encourage Greece to play a helpful role in trying
to persuade Nicosia to be more reasonable. Danielsson
observed that there may be a window of opportunity for
progress after the Cypriot elections in May and before the
European Commission issues its annual monitoring report on
Turkey in October or early November. DAS Bryza agreed that
Greek FM Molyviatis has indeed been helpful, including with
the Greek aide memoire regarding the Gul initiative, which
points toward the Famagusta-Varosha proposal. DAS Bryza
added that the U.S. would continue to engage Athens on the
issue.

¶5. (C) Leigh noted that Turkish accession negotiations were
taking place within a wider context: public opinion in many
member states opposed Turkish accession, more parties are
calling for a closer examination of the EU's absorption
capacity (Leigh observed that this was generally perceived as
"code" for opposition to Turkish EU membership), and debate
was beginning over where Europe's borders are situated. The
Commission's tactic, Leigh added, is to try to keep
enlargement, particularly regarding Turkey, as part of a
larger debate on the future of Europe. Otherwise, many
people will focus on Turkey's differences with the EU rather
than on the EU's success in promoting reform and exporting
stability throughout southeastern Europe.

¶6. (C) Filori, in a separate meeting, acknowledged that no
Turkish government could be expected to open its ports absent
moves to diminish Northern Cypriot isolation. The key is to
avoid "the big clash that everyone foresees" by providing
Ankara the necessary political cover to implement the
Additional Protocol. According to Filori, the Commission
wants the Council to bless its financial aid package to the
north and provide additional tangible benefits to the Turkish
Cypriot population. Confidence-building measures could help
ease the sense of isolation as well, he added, stressing that
the EU recognizes the indispensable role of the UN in this
regard. That said, Filori added that Nicosia must acquiesce
to such measures and this "will be difficult, to say the
least."

¶7. (C) Filori reiterated Leigh's observations regarding
Greek Cypriot calls for the return of Varosha and a
moratorium on construction in the north. Bryza noted concern
over the possibility that Nicosia, sometime this year, would
send a ship as a provocation toward the Turkish coast with
Turkey preventing it from entering a Turkish port. Filori
predicted that, in this scenario, several member states would
support Nicosia and agree to suspend accession negotiations
with Turkey. Filori and Bryza agreed the U.S. and European
Commission should think through options for responding to
such a move by the Greek Cypriots.

¶8. (C) Dutch MEP and EP Rapporteur on Turkey Eurlings agreed
with DAS Bryza on the need to try to build on the momentum
created by the Gul proposal to avoid a possible stalemate on
accession negotiations. Eurlings also stressed that the U.S.
can continue to play a helpful role by quietly but firmly
persuading the Turkish leadership, "as a friend," to promote
further political and societal reforms. Erdogan and others,
Eurlings stressed, should drop their "fighting their way into
the EU" attitude and concentrate more on promoting reforms
such as opening the Halki Seminary and returning some
Christian churches to their religious communities. This, he
emphasized, would go a long way in helping shape a more
positive European public opinion about Turkey.

¶9. (C) Likewise, Eurlings underscored, Ankara must alter its
penal code, particularly articles 301 and 305, to allow fro
greater freedom of expression. Eurlings noted that even
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn (a usually calm Finn), became
very emotional when discussing Turkish "obstructionism" on
religious freedom and property rights with a Turkish
parliamentary delegation and GOT chief accession negotiator
Babacan in December. Eurlings cautioned that the end of 2006
could result in a crisis if Turkey does not implement the
Additional Protocol. He added that the end of 2007 could
bring an additional crisis if the EU determines that Turkey
has not demonstrated sufficient progress in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria on democracy and human rights under the
Association Framework Agreement.

¶10. (C) Focusing on religious tolerance, Eurlings stressed
the emerging consensus in the Netherlands on the need to
train imams in the Netherlands rather than allowing them
entry from abroad. He agreed with Bryza that a key challenge
would be to ensure that the trainers were themselves
moderate. Eurlings further agreed that Turkey's Directorate
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) could be a helpful partner in
imam training, provided that the Diyanet agreed to reduce its
efforts to exert political control over Turkish emigre
communities in Europe.

COMMENT
- - - -

¶11. (C) DAS Bryza's EU interlocutors appeared genuinely to
want to avoid the "train wreck" predicted by some in Brussels
regarding Turkish accession negotiations by discussing ways
to help promote Ankara sufficient political cover to begin to
implement the Additional Protocol. They recognized that
Gul's proposal indicates an increased willingness by Ankara
to try to generate some more positive thinking on how to
proceed toward a compromise. They also agreed that one way
to help provide Turkey with some political cover was to ease
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, through EU aid for the
region and via confidence-building measures. While Eurlings
observed that Papadopolous "always says no" to any proposal
aimed at promoting a settlement, the EU officials agreed with
DAS Bryza on the need to continue talking on how best to
convince Nicosia to engage in a practical discussion aimed at
ending the deadlock. All also agreed on the need to engage
the UN and maintain it as the primary conduit for settlement
talks.

¶12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. DAS Bryza's
energy-related meetings reported septel.
MCKINLEY

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/02/06BRUSSELS429.html