Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002360

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA REQUESTS U.S. ACTION AT UN, U.S. HELP
FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 27 meeting with DCM, Turkish
MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin requested that the U.S. push the UNSC
for a Presidential Statement placing blame on the Greek
Cypriots for failure to reach a Cyprus settlement. He also
asked that the U.S. make concrete gestures toward Turkish
Cypriots. End Summary.


April 28 UN SYG Briefing


¶2. (C) Ilkin noted that the SYG will brief the UNSC April
28, although it is not clear whether there will be a UNSC
debate. Ilkin pointed out that after Cyprus negotiations in
Copenhagen and the Hague, the UNSC issued Presidential
Statements blaming the Turkish Cypriot side. This time,
Turkey wants the UNSC to show "evenhandedness" and issue the
same type of statement directed at the Greek Cypriots. The
Turks want the U.S. to work in the UNSC to get a statement
including the "realities" of what happened and the same kind
of assessment of blame as previous statements. Turkey also
hoped there might be an informal UNSC discussion which would
provide an opportunity for the GOT to express its view.


¶3. (C) Ilkin, stressed that the Turks want to get something
tangible on the record blaming the Greek Cypriots or their
leadership while the memories of the referendum and events
leading up to it are still fresh. Ilkin worries that
memories will be short and the window for getting this on the
record will close.


¶4. (C) In a follow-up conversation, Cyprus Department Head
Bilman hoped a statement would include the fact that Turkish
Cypriots said yes to the UN plan, while the Greek Cypriots
said no; and a declaration that there is now a new situation
on the island and the Turkish Cypriots' isolation should end.




¶5. (C) Ilkin said the Turks hope to use the statement to
garner EU support for lifting the embargo on the "TRNC" and
taking other measures to support Turkish Cypriots.


U.S. Gesture to Turkish Cypriots


¶6. (C) Ilkin requested that the U.S. make "even a small
gesture" toward Turkish Cypriots. The Turks think this will
encourage other countries to follow. Ilkin said that this
would also "influence our modalities" of dealing with the
Greek Cypriots. (Bilman later explained this means
improvements in the lot of Turkish Cypriots might enable the
Turks to reach out to Greek Cypriots.) Ilkin added that he
is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC", but rather a
symbolic but concrete gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, e.g.,
in the area of transportation. Ilkin said that the EU's new
regulation on the Green Line would be the first indication of
the EU attitude toward Turkish Cypriots after the referendum.


¶7. (C) DCM responded that the U.S. is actively considering
and discussing ways to ameliorate the Turkish Cypriots'
situation. However, many of the issues involved are
technical and require careful consideration. The U.S. is
also engaged with the EU in this effort, including a
just-concluded visit by PDAS Ries to Brussels. At the UN,
the U.S. is already working to have the SYG's report reflect
settlement efforts by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. DCM told
Ilkin that the real prize for Turkey is getting a date to
begin accession negotiations in December, and it needs to
keep its strategy focused on that objective.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2360.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001870

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014
TAGS: PREL EAID CY TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/CYPRUS: DEVELOPING THE EU'S POST-REFERENDA
APPROACH

Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) April 28 COREPER discussion on defining the Green
Line for the European Union focused on the extent to which
the Green Line is a barrier and to what extent it will be a
border. Roughly speaking, our contacts report that the Greek
Cypriots would like a barrier without the political
characteristics of a border; the Commission and other Council
members have been more open to the mix of barrier and border,
with those in favor of rewarding Turkish Cypriots advocating
a minimal barrier to the passage of people, goods, &
services. Under EU procedures, the Commission would have the
authority to develop implementing procedures for the Green
Line; with COREPER still in session April 28 at the time of
this writing, Greece is threatening to veto any COREPER
decision not giving the Council oversight of the final
dispositions of the Green Line (and thus a Greek Cypriot
voice to define the political parameters).

¶2. (C) The debate on disbursement modalities for the EU's
package for northern Cyprus has yet to be engaged. The
Council has endorsed the Commission's disbursement of a 259
million euro assistance purse in the north. On the other
hand, because the previous package was predicated on a Cyprus
settlement, the Commission has now been tasked with coming up
with a new financial instrument to define the disbursement.
This new financial instrument will need to be approved by the
Council at 25 and the European Parliament. The Commission
prefers an approach including a Commission office in northern
Cyprus, and disbursement with a maximum degree of autonomy
from the Republic of Cyprus. But discussions on the
Commission's approach in the Council are expected to be
difficult, given Republic of Cyprus involvement. Separately,
RELEX Commissioner Patten told us April 27 that the money
will certainly be spent, although the modalities remain to be
decided. Patten also predicted that Turkey would get a
positive Commission "avis" to open accession talks in
December. End summary.

-------------------
The new Green Line:
Border and Barrier?
-------------------

¶3. (C) A senior Commission official on April 28 reviewed the
Cyprus Green Line discussion in the COREPER (The EU's highest
sitting Brussels body: the Committee of Permanent
Representatives). The COREPER is still meeting at the time
of this writing. Our interlocutor told us that the focus of
COREPER's discussion is defining the terms upon which EU
rules would be promulgated and implemented in relation to the
Green Line. The assumption before the failure of the
referendum was that this discussion would focus on validating
the Annan Plan's approach to the Green Line; since April 24,
the debate has shifted to the extent to which the Republic of
Cyprus gets in-put into the Commission's drafting of the
rules governing the Green Line.

¶4. (C) The COREPER discussion is now focused on the
parameters of the Green Line as a demarcation of the EU's
frontier with an area in which the acquis communitaire (EU
law & regulation) do not apply. The crux of the matter for
the EU is the status of the Green Line. The UK has proposed
changes to the Green Line rules that would make the
demarcation more permeable and its dispositions more
favorable to the Turks. The Greek Cypriot position is that
the Green Line must not be a border (for this would imply
recognition of "TRNC" sovereignty) but must remain a barrier.
For those seeking to reward the Turkish Cypriots for their
support of reunification, the Green Line must take on some
characteristics of a border while losing its aspect of a
barrier to the free flow of people, goods, and services.
This is a tricky mix.

¶5. (C) Our contact reported that Enlargement Commissioner
Verheugen is happy with the UK proposed changes to the Green
Line rules, but believes that the EU could go further in the
direction of the Turkish Cypriots. We understand that this
is unlikely, and that the preferred position of the
Commission is now to leave current rules in place or else
limit discussion to the immediate question of free passage of
persons, thus "splitting" the legislation.

¶6. (C) Typically, the Commission would then be tasked with
drafting the implementing rules for the passage of goods and
services without the interference of the member states. In
this case, however, we have been told that Greece at COREPER
is holding out for a Republic of Cyprus voice approving
whatever the Commission drafts. The Commission opposes this,
but the decision on this issue rests with COREPER ambassadors
working on the basis of consensus (which until May 1st
includes Greece but excludes Cyprus).

---------------------
Carrots for the North
---------------------

¶7. While the 259 million euro Commission package for Cyprus
has been blessed by the Council, the modalities for
disbursement remain open. Though even Papadopoulos is on the
record that it is appropriate that the money be spent in
Northern Cyprus, there is a major difference of approach
between Commission and Council (including Cyprus). The
Commission wants to be able to disburse independently of
Cyprus authority. Verheugen spoke to the European Parliament
on April 27, stating that the Commission would now have to
establish an office in Northern Cyprus, as the financial
package for assistance would be too great to manage through
the UN. Verheugen's Cyprus Adviser (strictly protect) told
us April 28 that Verheugen hasn't really formulated an
approach yet, but simply doesn't want Cypriot control over
his policy process in the "TRNC". In his remarks to
Parliament, Verheugen rejected allegations that an office in
northern Cyprus would imply recognition of the Northern
Cypriot government, comparing the Cypriot case with Taiwan,
where the Commission has effective cooperation without formal
recognition of Taiwan.

¶7. Verheguen's challenge is that Cypriot President
Papadopoulos wants a hand in deciding how the money will be
spent in the north, and according to Verheugen's Cyprus
adviser, once the Commission develops its new financial
instrument for use in northern Cyprus, both the Council (by
consensus at 25) and the European Parliament through its
standard budgetary approval process will have to endorse
whatever Verheugen proposes. This virtually guarantees that
Republic of Cyprus redlines will be asserted and protected in
the Council.

-------------------
Wary on Sovereignty
-------------------

¶8. Our Council and Commission interlocutors continue to
express extreme wariness about offering the "TRNC" any of the
accoutrements of sovereignty. "TRNC President" Denktash is
still in power, and one key Solana advisor told us April 24
that the worst case development for the EU would be a "TRNC"
candidacy for accession. The EU's legal experts rule out
such a possibility, however, since all EU members recognized
the indivisible borders of the united Cyprus through the
Accession Treaty, which governs the terms of their political
union with each other. Indeed, Enlargement Director Matthias
Ruete, speaking to EUR/PDAS Ries on April 26 said that the
accession treaty of union precluded recognition of the "TRNC"
by EU members.

-------------------------
RELEX Commissioner Patten
-------------------------

¶9. Speaking informally at a NGO social event April 27, RELEX
Commissioner Chris Patten told us the Commission is still
trying to figure out how to spend money in Northern Cyprus.
Patten expects the Commission to open an office to oversee EU
assistance. (Patten didn't even bother to mention Greek
Cypriot opposition to this prospect.) While there will be
legal hurdles to managing the process, Patten was confident
the Commission would find a way, he said.

¶10. Patten doubted the Greek Cypriots could openly oppose
any efforts to disburse money in the north, noting that they
were "on their heels" diplomatically after their blatant
efforts to stifle opposing views on the referendum. (Note:
Other Council and Commission interlocutors share this view.
End note.) Despite expected opposition from Greek and
Cypriot parliamentarians, Patten was confident the Commission
would easily gain Parliamentary approval for spending in
Northern Cyprus; he expressed no opinion about whether such
funding could be directed through "TRNC" entities, which we
have heard is the crux of the current debate inside the
Council.

¶11. Finally, on Turkey's accession bid, Patten told us the
Commission has no other option but to give a positive avis to
begin accession negotiations based on Turkey's technical
merits. Still, he said the political climate in Europe is
not receptive to Turkey's candidacy. He viewed the
opposition of conservative parties in Germany and Spain as
the most serious obstacles to Turkish admission. (Comment:
Patten's inclusion of the Spanish opposition among the
nay-sayers is a new one for us. EU insiders generally
include France, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands as the
core group of Euro Turcophobes. Patten's inclusion of the
Spanish opposition is particularly odd given that its ability
to influence the decision on Turkey is extremely limited, so
far as we are aware. End comment.)
Schnabel

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04BRUSSELS1870.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001871

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR/PDAS RIES MEETING WITH MATTHIAS RUETE


Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (C) On April 26 EUR/PDAS Charlie Ries met in Brussels
with EU Commission Enlargement Director Matthias Ruete, who
is responsible in the Commission for Turkey's accession bid.
Ries emphasized the US view that Turkey should not be
punished for southern Cyprus' rejection of the Annan Plan.
He encouraged Ruete and the Commission to look at creative
ways of recognizing northern Cyprus' yes vote, and
underscored the US view that Turkey has shown it is willing
to do the heavy lifting required to fulfill its end of the
accession bargain with the EU; it is up to the EU to offer
Turkey a date in December. Ruete responded that the Cyprus
vote created a "dichotomy between the political situation and
the legal reality" of the division of Cyprus and Turkey's
accession quest. Ruete also warned that EU member state
political debate about whether Turkey should join the EU is
not over. He noted public comments in France by governing
party officials that "Turkey is not ready". He also asked
that the US deliver a strong message to German opposition
leader Angelika Merkel that her anti-Turkish position is not
helpful. End comment.

------------
Atmospherics
And Context
------------

¶2. (C) On April 26, EUR/PDAS Charlie Ries met with Matthias
Ruete, Director, Enlargement Directorate for Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, to review Ries' March 31 meetings in
Ankara with Turkish government and political leaders on
Turkish efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. Ries
underscored continued strong US support of Turkey's accession
bid, and reminded Ruete that the EU should not let Greek
Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan prejudice Turkey's
accession bid, particularly given Ankara's excellent progress
on the Copenhagen Criteria. In the aftermath of the decisive
vote in the "TRNC" in favor of the Annan Plan, now is the
time to reward Turkey for progress, not punish it.

------------------
Responding to the
Cyprus Referenda..
------------------

¶3. (C) Ruete responded that Greek Cypriot rejection of the
Annan Plan was a heavy blow to supporters of a date for
Turkish accession talks. The GOT had shown that it could do
the heavy lifting in very difficult political areas; but
irrespective of who is to blame for the failure of the Annan
Plan, Turkey is most likely to pay a price. With the failure
of the Annan Plan, there is now "a dichotomy between the
political situation and the legal reality" of the division of
Cyprus. Under the Accession treaty, Ruete said, "all of
Cyprus enters the EU, and Turkey doesn't recognize Cyprus";
these are realities that now block Turkey's path towards
accession. It remained to be seen how the EU could address
them.

¶4. (C) Ries suggested that the EU look at creative ways of
politically recognizing Turkish Cypriot good will in the
referendum. Ruete dismissed any parallel with the Hallstein
doctrine (governing recognition of East Germany up until the
1970s). Ruete noted that even if EU members were inclined to
recognize "TRNC", the reality was that the twenty-five EU
members had just signed and ratified an accession treaty
recognizing Cyprus as the legitimate government of the whole
island. For this reason, Ruete said, there are no meaningful
parallels with Taiwan. The EU is locked into recognition of
the Republic of Cyprus alone. The bottom line for Ruete was
that "the Republic of Cyprus has a capacity to be a nuisance
which is enormous," with the legal tools at its disposal to
back up its position.

¶5. (C) The rejection of the Annan Plan in the south was a
bad thing; there was no question about this, in Ruete's eyes.
But Cyprus' accession to the EU still brought positive
elements for citizens of the "TRNC". For instance, Turkish
citizens in the north are in most cases "Cypriot/EU citizens"
under the terms of accession. The challenge now for the EU,
and the Commission, was defining the future of the Green
Line. It could go two ways: either it could become "a real
border" or, Ruete suggested as his preferred alternative, "it
could become more permeable; this is what I've heard from the
north". Ruete speculated that while Cyprus would not take
the first step in developing a formal bilateral relationship
with Turkey, it would be easier for Turkey to recognize the
south; this would be a clever step on the part of the Turks,
he said, and might lead to some progress.

------------------
The "Turkey in EU"
debate is not Over
------------------

¶6. (C) Ruete (strictly protect throughout) noted that the
context of Turkey's accession bid was "evolving rapidly",
with pressure growing in the European Parliament for a
factual analysis of the costs and benefits of Turkish
accession. The key, said Ruete, was to move off an emotional
debate on the subject and on to a discussion "why Turkey
should join the EU." The political debate in Europe is not
won. Ries mentioned that he was getting on a train to
promote the Turkish case in the Netherlands on April 27;
Ruete asked for a read-out of Ries' discussions in The Hague,
which Ries promised to provide.

¶7. (C) Ruete asked that the US ensure that German opposition
leader Angelika Merkel hear a clear message from the US on
why she shouldn't oppose Turkish accession; Ries said he
would make sure that Washington was aware of the need to do
this. On France, Ruete said that "Chirac's party is making
increasingly anti-Turkish comments" with the message that
"Turkey's not ready" to join the EU. Ruete offered that this
message might moderate after the EU parliamentary elections
this summer. Nonetheless, the Layla Zana case was "playing
very loudly" in the French press. The argument is that "a
country with political prisoners can't be an EU member."
Ruete had heard that the GOT was working the Layla Zana case,
and he would be glad if something were done, but he had heard
this before. He wanted to see results.

¶8. (U) EUR/PDAS Ries did not have a chance to see this cable
prior to departing post.

Schnabel

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04BRUSSELS1871.html

[Kikapu]

Boomer, nice posting.

A question however. What's with the date on the articles being..... 04/28/2014 ?

[repulsewarrior]

me too, thank-you; most educational.

[boomerang]

CYPRUS
------

¶4. (C) Our British contact stressed that the Conclusions say
"absolutely nothing that has not been said before." He noted
that drafters had argued all through the night of March
25-26, only concluding their negotiations at 6 a.m. this
morning. While the final version says the Summit "welcomes
the Commission's continued willingness to offer assistance
for a speedy solution within the framework of the acquis,"
our contact said the Greek delegation had argued "endlessly"
for tougher language that would stress that any settlement
must conform to the acquis, or that no EU citizen could be
treated differently than another. He said that after the
negotiations the Greeks were irritated by the British
insistence on sticking strictly to old texts, while the Turks
were annoyed the Conclusions included any reference at all to
the "acquis." "The Turks should be pleased there is nothing
new in the text, and that it is not worse," he added. We
also note that the Conclusions include a sentence saying the
Summit "welcomes the Commission's offer to organize a
high-level international conference in Brussels on 15 April
to prepare a donors conference."

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/03/04BRUSSELS1337.html

one can safely deduct the turks were shit scared of the aquis in 2004...and looking at it now nothing has changed...no wonder they loved the banana plan...

bottom line, poms should never be trusted...

[Kikapu]

CYPRUS
------

¶4. (C) Our British contact stressed that the Conclusions say
"absolutely nothing that has not been said before." He noted
that drafters had argued all through the night of March
25-26, only concluding their negotiations at 6 a.m. this
morning. While the final version says the Summit "welcomes
the Commission's continued willingness to offer assistance
for a speedy solution within the framework of the acquis,"
our contact said the Greek delegation had argued "endlessly"
for tougher language that would stress that any settlement
must conform to the acquis, or that no EU citizen could be
treated differently than another. He said that after the
negotiations the Greeks were irritated by the British
insistence on sticking strictly to old texts, while the Turks
were annoyed the Conclusions included any reference at all to
the "acquis." "The Turks should be pleased there is nothing
new in the text, and that it is not worse," he added. We
also note that the Conclusions include a sentence saying the
Summit "welcomes the Commission's offer to organize a
high-level international conference in Brussels on 15 April
to prepare a donors conference."

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/03/04BRUSSELS1337.html

one can safely deduct the turks were shit scared of the aquis in 2004...and looking at it now nothing has changed...no wonder they loved the banana plan...

bottom line, poms should never be trusted...

Bottom line is, Annan, Blair and Bush were all corrupted to the core and did their very best in trying to screw Cypriots, both GCs and the TCs alike, by giving Turkey everything she asked for, the Good, the Bad and the Ugly. It was a one shot deal however, that it had to be accomplished before the RoC became an EU member in 2004. Since then, all bets are off with such illegalities to be imposed in Cyprus post 2004, and now, Erdogan is left holding an empty bag of empty promises from the corrupted trio. If that wasn't bad enough, the failed plan of the corrupted trio left the RoC having political power over Turkey's future in the EU. For Erdogan and Turkey, this reality must be worse than death, a little island under it's occupation of the north who has managed to put himself in a situation where the RoC has managed to grab one of his/it's balls in one hand, and the the EU has grabbed the other at the same time in 2004, and both are squeezing them at will. Ouch! Lets not forget, that there will still be Turkey wanting to be in the EU long after the Erdogan's "Islamic Fundamentalist wagon" which is stuck in the 16th century Ottoman mentality has long come and gone.

[Viewpoint]

God what more do you want Erdogan has near enough told the EU to fuck off....and you still believe they want to enter the EU your again showing us your illness of believing your own shit.

[Hermes]

God what more do you want Erdogan has near enough told the EU to fuck off....and you still believe they want to enter the EU your again showing us your illness of believing your own shit.

You make the mistake of thinking Turkey's long-term interests coincide with those of Erdogan's. What happens once his neo-Ottoman/Islamist project leads Turkey nowhere? What then?

I'm sure it makes Turks feel better to tell the EU to "fuck off". Rather like a spurned suitor who claims he told the object of his affections to go to hell after being dumped by her.

Truth is Turkey is being told to go away and get its act together then come back when it's ready. Plenty of other countries are willing to join the EU in its place.

[Viewpoint]

God what more do you want Erdogan has near enough told the EU to fuck off....and you still believe they want to enter the EU your again showing us your illness of believing your own shit.

You make the mistake of thinking Turkey's long-term interests coincide with those of Erdogan's. What happens once his neo-Ottoman/Islamist project leads Turkey nowhere? What then?

I'm sure it makes Turks feel better to tell the EU to "fuck off". Rather like a spurned suitor who claims he told the object of his affections to go to hell after being dumped by her.

Truth is Turkey is being told to go away and get its act together then come back when it's ready. Plenty of other countries are willing to join the EU in its place.

The EU is falling apart Greece being the fist death with many more to follow how long do you think countries like Germany and France will bail you out?

You are delusional if you think Turkey is a EU country nor will it ever be a full member and they know that. Why do you think they can dictate what they want without any repercussions.