Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002330

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: CY GR PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CABINET CHIEF ATACANLI ON CYPRUS,
GREATER MIDDLE EAST


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: On April 21, President Sezer's Cabinet
Chief (also Senior Foreign Policy Adviser and Spokesman)
Atacanli told Ambassador that Sezer remains concerned with
making a Cyprus agreement primary EU law, and with
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements. In
the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" in the referendum,
Atacanli urged concrete steps to help TCs and "in the other
direction" for the GCs. Ambassador urged restraint in GOT
statements in the event of a "yes/no." Ambassador explained
that Turkey is not a "target" of the Greater Middle East
Initiative (GME); it is up to Turkey to decide the role it
wishes to play. Atacanli emphasized the need for close
U.S.-Turkey consultation as GME moves forward. End Summary.




President Sezer's Concerns on Cyprus


¶2. (C) On Cyprus, Ambassador Edelman emphasized that
President Bush and Secretary Powell have been deeply engaged
with all parties and a number of other leaders. The U.S.
shares President Sezer's core concern that the agreement
have some mechanism to prevent it from being picked apart in
the European Court of Justice. The Ambassador asked
Atacanli's insights on what President Sezer thinks necessary
for the agreement to be legally secure and whether Sezer has
other concerns about the agreement.


¶3. (C) Atacanli acknowledged different viewpoints within the
GOT on "modalities" of a Cyprus settlement but, with the
referendum three days away, claimed the GOT is "past that
stage." Atacanli said Sezer is concerned about
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements.
This could open a Pandora's Box if property disputes escalate
to threaten peace and stability. Atacanli said there is
still a valid question whether efforts to provide primary law
guarantees are sufficient and this remains very important.
He noted that in reaching the agreement, TCs accepted much GC
legislation, some of it "anti-Turkish" (NFI), he added.


¶4. (C) (FYI: We note that, in an April 20 meeting with
Ambassador Edelman, MFA U/S Ziyal said Sezer has given the
MFA "no clue" about his views on the agreement. Ziyal noted
with concern that Sezer's office has not replied to a recent
MFA invitation to discuss the legal aspects of the agreement;
this is the first time Sezer's office has not responded to
the MFA on a Cyprus-related matter. End FYI.)


Thinking Ahead to "Yes/No"


¶5. (C) In the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" to the
referendum, Atacanli urged concrete positive steps toward the
TCs and steps "in the other direction" for the GCs. He
worries that GCs will withstand initial pressure after a "no"
and that pressure from the international community will fade
after a few months. The Ambassador noted EU High Rep
Solana's recent statements when meeting with Secretary Powell
as an example that the EU and others are beginning to think
about next steps in the event of a "yes/no."


¶6. (C) The Ambassador also encouraged the GOT to react
publicly with restraint in the event of a TC "yes" and GC
"no." The Ambassador advised letting the EU carry the burden
of strong criticism, in order not to take the focus off GC
rejection of the agreement. Atacanli said he understood the
point of modulating GOT reaction in the event of a GC "no."


Greater Middle East


¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that some parts of President
Sezer's April 13 speech at the Istanbul War Academies
appeared to be partially directed at Secretary Powell's
later-corrected comment that Turkey is an "Islamic republic."
Atacanli interrupted to remark that the Sezer's comments
were directed at others as well. The Ambassador reiterated
that there is no change in the long-standing U.S. view of
Turkey as a secular democratic republic.


¶8. (C) Noting that Sezer's speech rejected the idea of
Turkey as a GME "target," Ambassador Edelman emphasized the
USG does not consider Turkey a target. It is up to Turkey to
decide what role it wishes to play in GME. The Ambassador
laid out regional economic, educational and political reforms
that GME aims to support. Turkey offers a powerful example
of a successful Muslim-majority nation integrating into
international institutions.


¶9. (C) Atacanli acknowledged the Secretary's correction of
his comment but added that Sezer had come under fire for not
responding quickly to the misstatement. The secular nature
of the Turkish state is the single most important issue for
Sezer. On GME, Atacanli emphasized the need for close
consultation between the U.S. and Turkey. He said Sezer's
remarks were intended to state for the record the importance
of keeping regional developments "under control." Atacanli
said he would convey the Ambassador's explanation to Sezer.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2330.html

[boomerang]

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000362

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2014
TAGS: CY IZ PGOV PINS PREL TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH DSHOD BASBUG, JANUARY 19, 2004

REF: A) STATE 012103 B) STATE 010120


(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN. REASONS:1.5(B) AND (D)


¶1. (S) AMBASSADOR HOSTED TGS DEPUTY CHIEF GENERAL ILKER BASBUG TO DISCUSS THE PM'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S., NORTHERN IRAQ AND CYPRUS ON JANUARY 19. BASBUG WAS SUFFERING FROM A PROLONGED HEAD COLD AND EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT HIS JANUARY 16 (FIRST OF ITS KIND) OPEN PRESS CONFERENCE WAS BEHIND HIM. AMBASSADOR THANKED BASBUG FOR HIS HANDLING OF THE TROOP ROTATION ISSUE AND THE U.S. USE OF INCIRLIK AIR BASE FOR THAT PURPOSE DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE. BASBUG
NOTED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD ONLY REQUESTED TROOP ROTATION OUT OF IRAQ NOT IN. IN REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTATION EARLIER ON JANUARY 19 HE HAD NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD REQUESTED RIGHTS FOR "DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT." AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT SO FAR OUR REQUESTS HAVE ONLY BEEN FOR
REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ.


¶2. (S) GENERAL BASBUG NOTED THAT VCJCS GENERAL PACE HAD INDICATED THAT THE TGS MIGHT EXPECT A GROUP TO VISIT AND DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PKK IN EARLY JANUARY. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WASHINGTON COLLEAGUES WERE WORKING HARD ON THE ISSUE AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS LONG-STANDING TURKISH CONCERN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HE DREW GENERAL BASBUG'S ATTENTION
TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S.G. HAD DESIGNATED KONGRA-GEL AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LAST WEEK. BASBUG NOTED HE WAS AWARE OF, AND PLEASED BY, THE DESIGNATION. HE EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE WITH THE FAILURE OF EU COUNTRIES TO MOVE FORWARD ON DESIGNATING KADEK.


¶3. (S) BASBUG MOVED QUICKLY TO A DISCUSSION OF IRAQI
FEDERALISM WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED IN HIS JANUARY 16 PRESS CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED A TURKISH VIEW THAT FEDERATION WAS NOT A DESIRABLE OUTCOME IN IRAQ, BUT THAT IF FEDERALISM WAS NECESSARY IT SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE ETHNICALLY OR RELIGIOUSLY BASED. IF IRAQ WENT DOWN THAT PATH HE FEARED THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE 'BLOODY.' AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT U.S. SHARED THE VIEW THAT ANY FEDERATION SHOULD BE BASED ON GEOGRAPHIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS.
BASBUG AGREED BUT SAID, "IT IS A VERY TRICKY ISSUE BECAUSE ETHNIC AND GEOGRAPHIC LINES TEND TO OVERLAP A LITTLE IN IRAQ." BASBUG ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD CONCLUDED THAT SOME SORT OF FEDERATION WAS DESIRABLE.


¶4. (S) AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT
IRAQIS NEEDED TO WORK OUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM THAT THEY WOULD ALL HAVE TO LIVE UNDER. GIVEN KURDISH DEMANDS AND THE REALITIES THAT EXISTED IT WAS HARD TO SEE AN OUTCOME THAT DID NOT INVOLVE SOME KIND OF FEDERATIVE ARRANGEMENT. BASBUG RELUCTANTLY CONCEDED THE
POINT BUT NONETHELESS SAID THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED MIGHT HAVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD THREATEN TURKEY'S INTERESTS. BASBUG SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED
THAT TENSIONS WOULD INCREASE AS THE MARCH MILESTONE FOR A TRANSITIONAL FUNDAMENTAL LAW APPROACHED. AMBASSADOR CAREFULLY REVIEWED POINTS IN REF B ON KIRKUK AND RESPONSIBILITY THAT ALL PARTIES HAD TO MAINTAIN CALM. BASBUG SAID HE APPRECIATED U.S.G. ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN REF B POINTS AND UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL SIDES NEEDED TO ACT RESPONSIBLY.


¶5. (S) ON CYPRUS, BASBUG MAINTAINED THAT PRESS STORIES ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TGS AND MFA ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED. CERTAINLY THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE TWO THAT REFLECTED THEIR DIFFERENT FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES BUT THE EFFORT WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO REACH A CONSENSUS IN A THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL WAY. HE AGREED THAT A "JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION" TO CYPRUS
WAS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AND THAT THE MAY 1 CYPRUS EU ACCESSION WOULD MAKE EVERYTHING MORE DIFFICULT. HE SAID THE TGS HAD TWO DIFFICULTIES. THE FIRST WAS THE COMMITMENT TO A REFERENDUM. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING TO WHICH PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS HAD NOT AGREED. THE SECOND WAS THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW, IF NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED, THE UN SYG WOULD DEFINE "FINALIZING THE PLAN WITHOUT REOPENING THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES OR ESSENTIAL TRADE-OFFS" AS HE HAD REPORTED TO THE UNSC. TURKEY'S CONCERNS (MORE BIZONALITY, THE PERCENTAGE OF GREEK CYPRIOTS RETURNING TO THE NORTH, THE NUMBER AND TIMETABLE FOR TURKISH TROOPS) DID NOT IN THE TGS VIEW REOPEN BASIC PRINCIPLES BUT HOW COULD THEY KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE UN SYG WOULD AGREE?


¶6. (S) AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IT WAS PRECISELY PAPADOPOULOS' RETICENCE ON A REFERENDUM THAT GAVE TURKEY AN OPENING TO GET ITSELF OUT OF A CORNER AND IMPROVE ITS CASE FOR A DATE TO BEGIN EU ACCESSION TALKS. BASBUG REJOINED THAT "IN THEORY YOU ARE RIGHT, BUT THE TRAP FOR TURKEY IS THAT IF WE ACCEPT HE MIGHT DO SO AS WELL. HE WOULD THEN BLOCK ANY CHANGES IN THE ANNAN III TEXT AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL BE FORCED TO A REFERENDUM ON A TEXT THAT WAS ALREADY DEEMED UNACCEPTABLE TO TURKEY." AMBASSADOR URGED THAT PM ERDOGAN RAISE HIS CONCERNS ABOUT HOW THE UN SYG WOULD HANDLE THE NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY IN THE MEETING IN DAVOS ON JANUARY 24. HE NOTED THAT POLITICAL WILL CLEARLY WOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT TURKISH POSITION CAME OUT OF THE JANUARY 23 NSC
MEETING BUT ALSO ON THE COMMITMENT CONVEYED TO THE UN SYG BY THE PM ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US.


¶7. (S) BASBUG SAID THE TGS WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT THE
TIMELINE THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD HOPED TO WORK OUT THE TURKISH POSITION AND DISCUSS IT WITH THE U.S. AND THE U.K. BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO KOFFI ANNAN. TURKEY WAS LOOKING FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN REACHING A SETTLEMENT. AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT U.S.G. WAS PREPARED TO "WORK WITH THE UNSYG AT WHATEVER LEVEL NECESSARY TO FACILITATE FAIR AND REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS TO ANNAN III" BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE
TRADE-OFFS. BASBUG SAID HE APPRECIATED AMBASSADOR'S
DISCUSSION WITH HIM OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE PM'S VISIT. HE ASKED, AS HE DEPARTED, WHETHER AMBASSADOR HAD SHARED THESE POINTS WITH ANYONE ELSE. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT HE HAD COVERED THEM EXTENSIVELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GUL AND WOULD DO SO LATER WITH MFA U/SECRETARY ZIYAL.


¶8. (S) COMMENT: BASBUG WAS, AS USUAL, QUIET, THOUGHTFUL
AND UNDERSTATED. NONETHELESS HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH
DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WAS CLEAR. WHEN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER CYPRUS OR IRAQ WAS THE MORE IMPORTANT CHALLENGE FOR THE TGS HE REPLIED "BOTH ARE IMPORTANT" BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT THE LONG-TERM REPERCUSSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WERE PROBABLY MORE SIGNIFICANT. END COMMENT.


EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA362.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000301

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ
DECISION

REF: A. 08 NICOSIA 985
¶B. MACRIS-NETOS APRIL 28 E-MAIL
¶C. PANICO-FITZPATRICK APRIL 30 E-MAIL
¶D. MONTREAL 128

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)

¶1. (C) Summary: "The European Court of Justice (ECJ) broke
our hands and legs with the Orams decision," Turkish Cypriot
leader Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador on May 4. A
demoralized Talat complained that the April 28 ECJ ruling
(Ref B) had strengthened the Greek Cypriot (G/C) negotiating
position that the original, legal owner has the ultimate
right to enjoy the property as he chooses. Talat argued that
the decision blindly had ignored the need to find a political
solution at the negotiating table, not in the courts. He
feared that Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias would
now be loath to make concessions on his position on property,
fearing a backlash from his own populace and fractious
government. The T/C leader confided to the Ambassador that
he was still evaluating his next steps, but warned he could
not continue with the negotiations "as if nothing had
happened." The Ambassador urged Talat to stay engaged,
adding it would be a huge mistake not to continue with the
present UN-brokered talks. He also told Talat that he would
urge the Greek Cypriots to redouble their efforts to find a
political, not legal, solution to the property question. End
Summary.

"EU threw a bomb in the negotiating room"
-----------------------------------------

¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the landmark Orams decision, the
Ambassador met Talat to gauge the T/C leader's bearing and
ping him on next steps. A downbeat Talat allowed that the
long-feared April 28 ECJ ruling was "very damaging." Its
provision effectively allowing thousands of Greek Cypriot
property owners to seize the non-Cyprus-based assets of EU
citizens who own property in the north with "TRNC" title
deeds had strengthened the G/C negotiating position on
property, which calls for the original owners to use the
property as they see fit. The ruling would undermine the
fundamental Turkish Cypriot (T/C) demand for a mixed property
regime (return, exchange, and compensation) crucial to
prevent the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community
from being swamped by a flood of Greek Cypriot returnees.
Talat also predicted that the UK High Court -- which still
must issue a decision, based partially on the ECJ input --
would ultimately rule in favor of the Greek Cypriot plaintiff
Apostolides, although he hoped it might postpone the decision.

¶3. (C) The T/C leader expressed anger that EU member states
showed little concern for the political repercussions the
case would have on the negotiations. Further, the ECJ had
ignored the intervention of the European Commission, which
had tried to highlight the political fallout to the peace
process a solely law-based decision might generate. The EU,
Talat griped, "had thrown a bomb in the negotiating room."
He also expressed anger at the British government over the
process that had led to the Orams verdict -- despite
high-ranking UK officials, including the High Commissioner in
Nicosia, having announced that the Cyprus problem could only
be solved through the present negotiating process.

"ECJ will make Christofias even more intransigent on property"
--------------------------------------------- -----------------

¶4. (C) The ECJ decision, Talat said, would make Christofias
"even more intransigent." He feared the G/C leader would not
be able to show the flexibility needed to hammer out a
property regime acceptable to T/Cs, i.e., one that contained
a mix of return, exchange, and compensation. Talat said that
Christofias and his team were already gloating that the
rights of the original property owner had been vindicated.
Hereafter, the G/Cs would simply table proposals in line with
the Orams ruling.

"I can't continue to negotiatie as if nothing has changed."
--------------------------------------------- --------------

¶5. (C) Talat told the Ambassador he was still evaluating his
next steps in light of the ruling, although he repeatedly
acknowledged that negotiations were the only manner of
reuniting the divided island. He bluntly stated he could not
continue as if nothing had happened, however. Talat said he
had spoken by telephone with UNSG Special Adviser Alexander
Downer, who is away the island until May 18. Downer had
expressed sympathy and, according to Talat, understood the
damage done to the process by Orams. (Note: T/C lead
negotiator Ozdil Nami canceled an April 30 meeting with his
G/C counterpart George Iacovou, claiming that the Turkish
Cypriots needed to develop a new policy post-Orams. Talat
and Christofias did meet on May 5, but instead of discussing
economic issues as planned, they focused on the repercussions
of the Orams case and on an overview of the work done so far
in their talks. Septel will report Nami's readout of the May
5 leaders meeting.)

¶6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, Talat said the five
political parties represented in the T/C "parliament" were
"suspect" regarding the negotiations. Right-wing parties
such as UBP (currently forming a "government") wanted to
suspend or end the present process entirely. While the left
wanted to continue, all had lost faith in the negotiations.

"Keep Moving Forward!"
----------------------

¶7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the setback the Turkish
Cypriots had suffered but underscored the U.S. belief that
the negotiating process must continue; he urged Talat to
"keep moving forward." The Ambassador promised Talat that he
would deliver the same message to the Greek Cypriots and
would urge the UN and the UK to do the same. Talat
acknowledged the fundamental need for negotiations, but would
not comment on his immediate strategy.

¶8. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the call to press
Talat on a civil aviation matter that potentially threatens
the safety of American citizens, raising the International
Civil Aviation Organization's recent recommendation (Ref D)
to establish a communications link between Larnaca and Ercan
Airports' air traffic control centers in hopes of preventing
cross-chatter and reducing the possibility of mid-air
collisions. Talat was skeptical of the compromise plan. He
claimed that the proposed routing of communications via
Eurocontrol and Ankara would effectively imply that northern
Cyprus was a "province" of Turkey.

¶9. (C) Comment: While Talat is clearly demoralized, we do
not think he will leave the talks given a dearth of other
positive options (our May 5 meeting with Nami bears this
out.) Given that Ankara supports the present round of
negotiations, Talat likely will take no action more drastic
than a tactical protest maneuver, largely to calm his own
public. We cannot discount the T/C leader's fear, however,
that the Orams decision has limited Christofias's flexibility
to deal on property; G/C hard-liners will protest loudly
against any regime that radically differs from the precedent
suggested by the ECJ ruling.
Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09NICOSIA301.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000305

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS TALKS AND THE ORAMS CASE: CRISIS
AVERTED,TALKS TO INTENSIFY

REF: A. NICOSIA 257
¶B. NICOSIA 301

Classified By: AMB F URBANCIC FOR REASON 1.5 B AND D

¶1. (C) Summary. On May 5, the first meeting between the Greek
Cypriot(GC) and Turkish Cypriot(TC) leaders since the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) made known its decision in
the Orams property case went well, according to Turkish
Cypriot (TC) lead negotiator Ozdil Nami. TC Leader Talat
stood up to domestic pressure to walk away from the talks,
but settlement skeptisism in the north continues grow. The
TCs are pushing for the talks to conclude by end-2009 and
proposed a timetable Republic of Cyprus (RoC) President
Christofias says he can meet, if his TC counterparts are
"more flexible." Talat and Christofias agreed to have their
negotiators meet more frequently to generate the increased
momentum called for in the April 30 UNSC presidential
statement. The talks were close to melt down prior to the May
5 Leaders meeting. If they had fallen apart, the only actor
in a position to save them would have been UNSA Alexander
Downer - currently in Australia until on/about May 18. There
will be more bumps on the road in these talks. Unless Downer
is present here much more time at least in June-July and from
September until the end, we believe:

1) It will be very difficult to finish the talks by years'
end; and

2) Some bump down the road could quash the talks irreparably
while Downer is away.

End Summary.

¶3. (C) A surprisingly upbeat Ozdil Nami told the DCM on May 5
that a meeting earlier in the day between the leaders and
their chief negotiators "went well" and that "the (Orams)
crisis is avoided for now." The Leaders' meeting was unusual
as no UN representative was present - just the leaders, their
chief negotiators and Christofias' interpreter (his
son-in-law to be). Nami said the leaders evaluated the Orams
decision and conducted an overview of the negotiations. The
problem now was less the substance of the discussions than
public opinion in the wake of Orams- sagging in the TC
Community and gloating among the GCs. While Talat could not
get Christofias to make a joint statement on the need to
settle property issues at the negotiating table rather than
through individual lawsuits (not wanting to "dilute" the ECJ
judgment), Nami believed Christofias did promise to make his
own statement to that effect. (Christofias told the press on
May 5 that the Orams decision "confirms the correctness of
the GC position" but also said that property issues will
continue to be discussed at the negotiations.)

Need to Manage Public Opinion, On Both Sides
-------------------------------------------

¶4. (C ) Talat asked Christofias to stop publicly claiming
Orams as a victory vindicating GC views on property, given
the growing settlement skepticism among the TC public (most
recently reflected by the hardline UBP victory in April 19
"parliamentary" elections). This was unhelpful, Nami said.
The TCs basically agreed with the GCs on individual ownership
rights (and had a functioning mechanism- the "property
commission" - that had already restituted land to several
GCs). The ECJ ruling is not about that, he said. It is about
the EU's right to have an RoC court ruling applied in the UK
- which is consistent with EU regulations. The TCs told
Christofias their problem is not the ECJ ruling. It was the
impact on public opinion. TCs are losing confidence in the
talks and do not trust that the GCs are making a good faith
effort at the negotiating table because they see GCs going
around the process via the courts. This was undermining the
talks. Christofias agreed that court cases and lawsuits were
not the way to move forward and responded that the ECJ
decision actually makes his life more difficult as well, as
GC hardliners will even more closely question any concessions
he makes to the TC side, GC expectations about the final
shape of a settlement may now be even more unrealistic, Nami
said.

Talks to "Intensify"
--------------------

¶5. (C) Nami reported that Christofias and Iacovou agreed to
TC pleas to "intensify" the rate of the talks in order to
re-establish momentum. Nami and Iacovou will meet May 6 and
three times the following week, and Nami hopes this means
that the leaders will also meet more frequently (the next
leaders meeting is scheduled for May 14). Talat told
Christofias his target is to finish a first reading of all
the issues by early June, review progress and narrow
differences through July, take August off, then start the
give and take in September with completion and referenda by
December, and that he wanted to agree on a framework to meet
that timeline. Christofias rejected any framework but agreed
to increase momentum and said this schedule was achievable
"if you (the TCs) show flexibility." Nami noted that
Christofias did not seem well prepared for the meeting (he
appeared not to have studied or been briefed on some
technical aspects of working level talks that required his
support - which he was reluctant to give - resulting in
taking the leaders' time going over the technical details).
Nami said it was clearly not just flexibility by both sides
that was needed, but also a greater GC willingness and
commitment to do the hard work, including their own internal
preparation for such meetings, needed to bring things
together.

Downer Needs to be Here
-----------------------

¶6. (C) Nami said the TCs used the April 30 United Nations
Security Council Presidential Statement (PRST) to support
their call for an "increase in the momentum of the
negotiations." That reference to the PRST language apparently
infuriated Christofias who railed against "foreign
interference", apparently naming certain individuals-which
ones Nami didn't say- and insisting he didn't care what
outsiders, say, do or want. Nami also told us he believed
that Downer needed to spend more time on island, and ideally
be resident here, to prod the parties along, and that he had
told Downer so when they spoke on May 4. "His presence
helps" Nami told us emphatically.

Eroglu On Side, So Far
----------------------

¶7. (C ) When asked about newly-elected "TRNC Prime Minister"
Dervis Eroglu's desire to have a representative in the
settlement negotiations, Nami said Talat had told Eroglu that
he, Talat, was and would remain in charge of the talks for
the TCs. There is a system for briefing the "government"
leadership on the talks, Nami explained, and it would be
used for Eroglu's benefit as it had been for his predecessor.
Eroglu is apparently willing to go along with this for now.
The briefing on the May 5 session will be something of a test
case. Nami knows well and likes the new "foreign minister"
(Huseyn Ozgurgun), whom he pointed out the Embassy had sent
to the U.S. on a Visitors Program, and expected to work well
with him. He said he hoped Ozgurgun's appointment was a sign
that Eroglu did not want to be disruptive to the talks.

¶8. (C ) Nami said that Talat greatly appreciated the good
will shown by the US in the invitation to meet Secretary
Clinton. Nami suggested that more progress could be made and
TC attitudes towards the talks improve if the P-5 "took a
more unified approach." He also suggested that early
discussion of a donor's conference to fund the cost of a
settlement would help make a positive outcome a more
realistic prospect to TCs. He recommended "turn up the heat"
on the GCs by telling Christofias that while there may be no
time table, there was a clear trend. Without a solution,
Talat would be replaced as leader next April by a hardliner
(probably Eroglu), and the talks would end. He urged us to
use the "very helpful, excellent language" from the April 30
UNSC PRST to stress that we expect "decisive progress in the
near future" and for the talks to conclude this year.

Christofias Refuses to Acknowledge "Progress"
-----------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Nami remains frustrated by Christofias' slow and
careful approach, and his unwillingness to say positive
things about the talks in public. For example, Nami related
with exasperation that Christofias refused to use the word
"progress" in the statements worked on May 5. The TCs had
wanted to note the "good progress" of the talks, but
Christofias would only agree to "work done". Talat replied
"you are the president, you should be more forceful!"
Christofias then told Talat "I have my problems. Respect my
situation." Nami also objected to the GC side's continuing
tactics of preventing visiting dignitaries from meeting with
Talat in his office, attacking Turkey (Nami said it is silly
for the GCs to blame Turkey for inability to agree on
arrangements for electing the federal executive or on
property. "All Turkey cares about are security and
guarantees," and those issues have not been touched yet), and
inhibiting the EU assistance program. Nami said that the
Orams decision had been a heavy blow from which it took the
TCs a couple of days to recover. Talat now agrees that talks
must proceed. "The problem is" said Nami, "we don't know how
many more blows like this we can absorb."

¶10. (C) Comment: The Orams decision pushed the Cyprus talks
to the brink of a crisis, with Talat already smarting from
rejection in local polls and now under pressure from the
newly elected UBP leadership to leave the talks. Strong
support from the U.S., the UK and Downer helped keep him at
the table. However, the TCs are badly battered and Talat,
while still personally popular, is losing TC public support
for the negotiations as GCs continue to claim EU has
vindicated their position on property. Nami believes that we
and the rest of the P-5 should usethe April 30 UNSC PRST to
"challenge the leaders to move faster" and start talking
about "concrete targets" as a means of"turning up the heat on
both sides" without pushing the GC Cypriot hot button of
"asphyxiating timetables."

¶11. (C) Comment continued: Most importantly, UN Special
Advisor Downer needs to spend more time on the island. His
presence during this crisis could have lowered the pressure
on Talat, provided a neutral voice the media could turn to
for comment and reassured TC public opinion. There needs to
be a neutral party both sides can turn to at critical moments
who can take decisive corrective action, and there is no one
else who can fill that role in Cyprus. Ambassador Urbancic
will raise these issues with Downer when the SYGSA returns
tot he island. End Comment and ACTION REQUEST.


Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09NICOSIA305.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000670

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2029
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV OVIP CY GR TU
SUBJECT: MFA U/S APAKAN TALKS CYPRUS, N-K, AEGEAN, AND
MORE; FM DAVUTOGLU LOOKING FOR S MEETING IN DC

REF: ANKARA 666

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) ACTION REQUESTS in Paras 4 and 6.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey is concerned about signs that contrary
to GOT expectations of US efforts to lessen the isolation of
Turkish Cypriots, it appears the USG is actually making
decisions that have the opposite effect. The GOT is
extremely concerned about the negative impact the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) decision on the Orams property case
will have on comprehensive settlement negotiations. It hopes
the US, UN, and others will weigh in with the UK and the EU
to urge that such court decisions which have a clear
political motivation and impact be frozen until a settlement
can be achieved. President Gul and U/S Apakan look forward
to meetings later in the day with Azeri President Aliyev and
Armenian President Sargsian and are hoping to make progress
on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. GOT officials are still
considering how to move forward on providing additional
support to Afghanistan, while they would like to see progress
in organizing a regional investment conference on Iraq. MFA
will look into continued Greek claims of overflights of Greek
islands by Turkish military aircraft, though Apakan said GOG
"exaggerated claims" in the past lead MFA to view such
complaints with skepticism. He will need to consult with
political leaders before determining the GOT's ability to
consider accepting Uighur detainees from Guantanamo. Apakan
noted newly appointed FM Ahmet Davutoglu would like to meet
soon with Secretary Clinton. Davutoglu is considering a
visit to the United States at the end of May and early June
to attend the opening session of the UN Security Council
under the Turkish presidency and the American Turkish Council
meetings in Washington, DC, and would like to combine that
visit with an initial meeting with the Secretary. END SUMMARY

¶3. (C) Ambassador met May 7 with MFA U/S Ertugrul Apakan to
discuss a number of outstanding issues. During the tour
d'horizon, Apakan conveyed to Ambassador a diplomatic note
providing Turkish views on the way forward on a historical
review of events associated with 1915 (septel).

DAVUTOGLU TO WASHINGTON; MEETING WITH S?
----------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Apakan indicated newly appointed Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu is hoping to make his first visit as minister
to the United States at the end of May/early June. He would
like to attend the American Turkish Council Conference in
Washington as well and is hoping to be able to meet with
Secretary Clinton on the front end of that visit. ACTION
REQUEST: Please advise if Secretary Clinton is available and
willing to meet with Davutoglu in the late May/early June
time frame.

CYPRUS
------

¶5. (C) Apakan raised concerns expressed to him by Turkish
Cypriot officials during the initial visit of newly appointed
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on May 6. Apakan said there
appears now to be an issue regarding the continued ability of
Embassy Nicosia to issue visas on a separate paper to "TRNC"
passport holders. Apakan alluded to a dispute between State
and DHS on the matter. Apakan also conveyed "TRNC" concerns
about the notification its representative in Washington had
received that Talat and future "TRNC" leaders will no longer
be eligible for a Diplomatic Security protective detail
during visits to the US. Ambassador noted he had not
previously heard of the visa problem, was aware of the
security issue, and would look into both and get back to him
with the facts. (NOTE: Post subsequently consulted with
Embassy Nicosia and understands the visa issue is resolved.
END NOTE) Apakan said these issues arise just as the GOT is
hoping to see steps from the USG to further ease the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots as a way to further bolster
the settlement negotiations. Instead, it seems Washington is
moving in the opposite direction.

¶6. (C) Apakan also expressed dismay over the European Court
of Justice decision on the Orams property case. He noted the
decision gives the Greek Cypriots "sweeping jurisdiction"
over the Turkish Cypriots and posited that the point of
comprehensive settlement negotiations is to establish a new
partnership on the island, not simply to "resume the old
Republic of Cyprus." Apakan said the GOT hopes the USG and
UN officials will convey their concerns to the UK and the EU
and "call for court decisions on such matters to be frozen
until a settlement is reached," adding that the ruling on
such a politically charged issue should not be allowed to
negatively impact settlement negotiations. Referring to
court decisions in the 1980s and 90s on direct flights to
Ercan and cutting off citrus exports directly to EU
countries, he called this yet another effort to derail the
negotiating process. Apakan noted he had called in HMG Amb.
Baird and President Gul had called PM Brown on this issue and
said the GOT would continue to work hard to try to keep the
negotiating process on track, and vowed Turkish support for
Talat's efforts to reach a deal. ACTION REQUEST: Department,
as appropriate, raise this issue with the UN, EU and UK.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH
----------------

¶7. (C) Apakan indicated he will accompany President Gul later
in the day on his visit to Prague to attend the dinner hosted
by the Czechs for participants in the Eastern Partnership
Summit, as well as the May 8 Southern Corridor Summit.
Ambassador conveyed USG hope that meetings involving Azeri
President Aliyev, Armenian President Sargsian, and Gul will
help achieve momentum on some of the outstanding issues
concerning Nagorno-Karabakh with which the Minsk Group has
been grappling for some time. Ambassador also noted PM
Erdogan's planned May 12 visit to Baku and May 16 visit to
Sochi could be very helpful in seeking a breakthrough on
Nagorno-Karabakh.

AFGHANISTAN/IRAQ
----------------

¶8. (C) Ambassador requested further information on the GOT's
plans to enhance its support for Afghanistan, particularly on
civilian efforts. Apakan said the GOT continues to develop
its plan and is not yet in a position to discuss it with us,
but hopes to do so soon. On Iraq, Apakan expressed continued
GOT interest in hosting a regional investment conference to
encourage investment in Iraq and asked that the US and Turkey
continue to consult and cooperate on this.

AEGEAN
------

¶9. (C) Ambassador referred to Deputy U/S Haydar Berk's
planned visit to Athens for a Turkey-Greece Steering Group
meeting and asked about recent reports of alleged Turkish
overflights of Greek islands in the Aegean. Apakan said MFA
would look into the GOG complaints. He did not dismiss the
possibility that such overflights had occurred, and
differentiated the issue from the normal Greek complaints
that we routinely raise, but said exaggerated claims by the
GOG in the past make him and MFA somewhat skeptical (see
reftel).

UIGHUR RESETTLEMENT
-------------------

¶10. (C) Ambassador raised the possibility that Turkey might
consider favorably a formal USG request to accept for
resettlement ethnic Uighurs currently in custody at
Guantanamo Bay. Turks, Ambassador pointed out, applauded
like so many others the President's decision to close
Guantanamo. But as a strategic partner, we need them to do
some heavy lifting to make the decision feasible. Apakan
again indicated the need for a political level decision and
said he would get back to us on the matter.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09ANKARA670.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000315

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF EAST EUROPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: COURT DECISION IMPACT ON ECONOMY AND
PUBLIC OPINION

REF: A. NICOSIA 305
¶B. NICOSIA 301

Classified By: AMB F URBANCIC FOR REASONS 1.5 B AND D

¶1. (C) The decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
requiring other EU member-states to enforce rulings made by
Republic of Cyprus (RoC) courts in regard to property in the
part of Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot (TC) administration is
having a profound impact on economic confidence in north
Cyprus, and on public attitudes towards reunification on both
sides. More people in both communities feel their points of
view (either, "our property rights can't be negotiated away"
or "the EU is under the control of the anti-Turkish grouping
, so TCs can never expect fairness from Greek Cypriots (GCs)
or the EU") are vindicated by the decision. Any future
compromises by Christofias on property will be taken by many
GCs as betrayal of the principles suggested by the ECJ
decision. For Talat, the Orams ruling has reduced his
negotiating leverage and increased the already high level of
suspicion of the EU among TCs . To reestablish positive
momentum, the leaders agreed at their last meeting to speed
up the pace of the negotiations, but the degree of difficulty
in achieving success has increased substantially with the
Orams verdict. End Summary.

Turkish Cypriots See ECJ Decision as Greek Cypriot Plot
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶2. (C) "How can we make any new investments here until we
understand how the Orams ruling will play out?" a leading TC
businessman asked us on May 7. He then sought our opinion
about a complicated scheme for hiding his UK and TC assets.
While some in the TC business community play down the
long-term economic fallout from this case, they are all
uniformly angry that the ruling was made at this time. None
believes it is simply a court decision based on principle but
insist that it is part of a long-planned political maneuver
by the RoC to gain advantage in the reunification talks. They
point to the alleged ability of the court to have delayed a
decision on "public policy" grounds and the fact that the
president of the court was a Greek judge as evidence that, on
Cyprus and Turkey policy, the EU is controlled by an
anti-Turk grouping led by Cyprus and Greece.

Who has the Land?
----------------

¶3. (C) Under a point system established in 1975 which gave
credit for factors such as whether individuals were refugees
from the RoC-controlled area, fought with the TC military, or
had family members killed by GCs, GC-owned land in the north
was redistributed to TCs based on how many points people
could claim-the more points, the more property. In return, TC
individuals with property in the south ceded any right to
these properties to the "TRNC." With about 85 percent of land
in north Cyprus originally owned by GCs, and a building boom
which followed the failure of the 2004 Annan Plan,
considerable economic activity has taken place on disputed
property. As chief TC negotiator Nami told us on May 5, "How
can he (Christofias) expect us to use less than 20 percent of
the land? We need to have an economy here too."

Bank Risk and the Worsening TC Economy
-------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Banks in north Cyprus typically lend very
conservatively to developers working on GC-titled land. Loans
are usually for no more than 50 percent of the value of the
collateral and with maturities of less than 5 years. As a
result, banks in the north have loan to deposit ratios of
only 5 to 45 percent. The "Governor" of the "Central Bank"
told us that, for this reason, banks he supervises will not
face financial harm because of Orams. Nevertheless, he did
not know how much collateral is outstanding on GC land and
said he is undertaking a study of the issue. Others are not
so sanguine. One commercial banker said that "some banks have
been more aggressive" and that it is possible that some
mortgage-holders will simply stop making payments on the
theory that they may lose the property in any case to the
original GC owner. This is made worse because so much new
development was aimed at the foreign (typically UK)
holiday/retirement home market and these buyers are no longer
likely to take new risks buying property in north Cyprus. The
UK High Commission web site points out to would be
property-buyers in the north that such purchases are a
criminal offense under GC law with a maximum sentence of
seven years imprisonment.



¶5. (C) Real estate brokers in north Cyprus say there has not
been panic selling, but at least in part because there are so
few buyers. TC -titled property before Orams typically
carried a 10-20 percent premium over GC-owned properties.
That spread is expected to go up significantly, but no data
is yet available. Brokers say some Russian, Israeli and
Turkish Cypriot investment groups are being formed to buy
from desperate sellers at rock-bottom prices (presumably
because they have no assets in the EU and therefore are
beyond the reach of the ECJ decision), but the market has not
yet adjusted. In any case, the important TC construction
sector, which was already moribund in the wake of
overbuilding, now has even less likelihood of improving
without an overall settlement of the island's division. Orams
exacerbates an 18 month economic slide that has seen auto
sales decline 70 percent this year compared to last, imports
reduced by 60 percent, and tax receipts well below
projections, requiring the recently-elected "TRNC government"
to seek yet another loan from Turkey to close a USD55 million
budget gap for the month of May.

The Public Opinion Problem
--------------------------

¶6. (SBU) Public opinion among TCs, whose skepticism about
reunification was reflected in the election of two-state
advocate Dervis Eroglu as "Prime Minister" in April, took a
further hit with the Orams ruling. Pro settlement columnist
Ipek Ozerim writes "my anger started to boil over at the
biased EU, the ineptness of the TCs, and at the under-handed
GCs. The property problems on the island are rooted in a
political conflict and only a comprehensive solution can
solve them. The talks between Christofias and Talat offered
the best chance for this. Instead, the south went for
one-upmanship. In doing so, Cyprus was mortally wounded. I'm
not sure how the talks can continue. The days of trust and
good will are over. It's now every side for itself." At the
May 8 Europe Day event sponsored by the Turkish Cypriot
Chamber of Commerce, only one politician and barely a dozen
businesspeople showed up as TCs did not want to demonstrate
any support for the EU in Orams' wake. For many TCs, the
Orams decision establishes GC court writ over the TC north,
calling into question the meaning of "bi-zonality" that is a
basis for the negotiations. Septel will examine the history
of this concept in Cyprus and how it is perceived by the two
sides.

¶7. (SBU) Among GCs, the general attitude regarding the case
is one of vindication and satisfaction that "those who tried
to buy our stolen land" will be punished. There is also
growing opportunism. GC lawyers are now reportedly working
with their UK colleagues, searching through UK property
records, looking for a list of Britons who are known to own
properties in north Cyprus, or for Turkish-sounding names and
then checking records here to see if they own land in north
Cyprus. Several GC lawyers have told us that they plan to
offer GC property owners contingency deals in return for
20-30 percent of the value recovered. One lawyer explained
that the issue they will be arguing is "illegal trespass" and
seeking back rent. GCs originally from the north who had
never before considered legal action are now musing the
possibility. This includes one of the richest men on the
island, who told the Ambassador last week that he sees no
reason not to receive compensation for the land he owns in
the north.

¶8. (SBU) Christofias' flexibility in trading property for TC
political power is more constrained than it was before Orams.
As one hard-line journalist wrote; "All we have to do is to
make clear to our government that it has no mandate to bring
before the people a solution compromising the rights won by
Orams plaintiff Meletis Apostolides at the European Court." A
former GC judge of the European Court of Human Rights said
"when (UN Special Representative) Downer says that 'both
sides believe they are right and that we should compromise
because we cannot have everything,' he is in effect saying
that Turkey may be right in wanting to institutionalize the
relevant violations of the principles which the UN envoy is
expected to support, that we should compromise our human
rights and accept the Turkish crimes against humanity."

¶9. (C) Comment: The Orams decision has complicated the
dynamics of the reunification process. TCs believe it was a
plot to gain an unfair advantage in the talks and served to
kick them while they were already down economically - "proof"
that GCs cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith. A
sense of continuous betrayal by the EU- starting with the
failure to open direct trade in return for voting in favor of
the Annan Plan and proceeding to the many restrictions the EU
has allowed the GCs to place on spending the Euro 259 million
assistance program for the north - has caused even
pro-solution types to reject the EU as a biased entity.

¶10. (C) Comment continued: Many GCs have long believed that
once they agreed to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (in
1977), they were done compromising. While Orams will not get
GCs their property back, it might make the pain of waiting
more acceptable by extracting rent from those who "illegally
occupy our land." To reverse the negative momentum of the
decision, the leaders in their last meeting agreed to
"intensify" the pace of the talks. However, polls tell us
that the core of GC "yes" voters for the Annan Plan were
refugees from the northern Cyprus. This core may be less
willing to vote "yes" again if they can monetize their assets
in the north via Orams . Property for governance and security
was and is the basic deal that has to be struck between the
two communities. One leg of this deal has now been whittled
down, at least in the eyes of many Cypriots on both sides.



Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09NICOSIA315.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000327

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER SUGGESTS SUBTLE NUDGING OF
GREEK CYPRIOTS

REF: A. NICOSIA 257
¶B. NICOSIA 306

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)

¶1. (C) Summary. "Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) must develop a sense
that the status quo is over," UN Special Adviser Alexander
Downer confided to the Ambassador during their May 15
meeting. Downer suggested that a low-key discussion on the
future of UNFICYP might help break the G/Cs of their
perception that failure in the current round of settlement
negotiations had no real downside. Regarding the stalled
opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, the UN
envoy said he had unsuccessfully urged Turkish Cypriot (T/C)
leader Mehmet Ali Talat to accept a G/C counter-offer
conceding the main T/C demand (electricity to the Turkish
Cypriot Kokkina enclave) but refusing a minor one (overland
supply of a limited amount of fuel). On the negotiations in
general, Downer wanted to achieve real progress this summer
on executive branch governance and power-sharing (a key area
of disagreement) to give Talat the confidence to show
flexibility in other chapters. He welcomed the appointment
of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and hoped the
influence of Turkish MFA CyProb hard-liners would wane.
Downer was equally optimistic regarding the upcoming Swedish
EU presidency, especially after a "lackluster" Czech term.
Regarding the other P-5 members, he sought to capitalize on
perceived Turkish-Russian rapprochement to convince Moscow to
adopt a less militantly pro-G/C outlook, and planned to visit
Russia in June. The UN envoy was noncommittal in response to
the Ambassador's multiple suggestions that he spend more time
on-island. End Summary.

"Greek Cypriots need to be worried"

¶2. (C) Downer voiced concern that unless Greek Cypriots
understood that failure of the present negotiations carried
real costs, they would not be inclined to make the necessary
compromises to ink a deal. "They need to be worried that
this is a new game," he said. The best approach, he said,
was to begin to voice subtle rumblings regarding the future
of UNFICYP, with an eye toward possible changes in the
December renewal. Downer praised a recent comment to this
effect by the U.S. PermRep in New York. He warned, however,
that such hints must be delivered with the greatest finesse;
otherwise, the Greek Cypriots "would go feral." Downer
revealed that President Demetris Christofias had earlier told
him that he would not be "blackmailed" by the possibility of
an UNFICYP non-renewal and would abandon the talks if that
were to occur. The Ambassador said that the USG would work
to support Downer and agreed on the need for a coordinated
tack with the UK. The reaction of the Hellenic lobby in
Washington would have to be figured into this strategy as
well, he added, concurring that the May renewal was not the
time actually to draw down the force.

"UNFICYP renewal process fine this time"

¶3. (C) Downer said that his April 30 oral brief to the
Security Council and the resulting Council Presidential
Statement (PRST) had been satisfactory, and that the
just-underway UNFICYP renewal process was proceeding well.
Aside from "keeping pressure on the Greek Cypriots" regarding
UNFICYP, he needed no additional USG support in the May
rollover exercise. Downer ventured that the language of the
PRST should be put to use in the rollover resolution,
especially its references to "expectations of significant
progress" in the negotiations. He had discussed the draft
UNFICYP report with Talat in their May 15 meeting, in which
he previewed UNFICYP's change of semantics in referring to
Turkish Cypriots' isolation (from "sense of isolation"
"feeling of isolation" -- Talat was supportive) and noted
that the report would mention Turkish hindrance of UNFICYP
access/activity in the north, while noting improvements in
recent weeks.

Turkish Cypriots need to strike deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak

¶4. (C) Downer next mentioned continuing difficulties in
opening the Limnitis/Yesilirmak buffer zone crossing. He had
recommended that Talat drop his continuing demands to send
small amounts of fuel (for three vehicles) overland to
Kokkina, especially since Christofias apparently had
accepted, after much hesitation, the main UN compromise that
G/Cs run electricity to the T/C military base/enclave in
Kokkina in exchange for opening the crossing. Downer
informed that after the leaders had debated Limnitis at their
meeting on May 14, the UN urged the "unrelenting" T/C leader
to "cut his losses" and announce its future opening. Downer
sensed that Ankara was behind Talat's hard line on Limnitis;
he planned to raise the issue in his meetings with Davutoglu
and the MFA on May 18. (Comment: Embassy officers got the
same all-or-nothing attitude on fuel to Kokkina from T/C
negotiator Ozdil Nami at a May 14 meeting.) Ambassador
encouraged Downer to pursue that line in his upcoming
meetings in Ankara May 18-19.

Talat in Reasonable Spirits

¶5. (C) Talat's spirits were "not too bad," Downer gauged,
somewhat surprising after late April's twin blows: the T/C
leader's CTP party's electoral defeat on April 19, and the
European Court of Justice's verdict in the Orams property
case a week later. Downer reported that, despite the losses,
Talat was behaving "reasonably" in the negotiations and was
repeating his desire to reach the referendum stage by the end
of 2009 or early 2010. T/Cs had even agreed to work during
part of the August vacation period. While careful not to set
specific deadlines, Downer hoped that both sides would soon
finish a first reading of all negotiating chapters and return
to "governance and power sharing" before the summer break.
The sides should be able to cover quickly the two outstanding
topics, "territory" and "security," as the distance between
their positions could only be bridged in the subsequent "give
and take" period. (Note: G/C sources claim they will also
insist the leaders tackle another chapter, provisionally
titled "Migration," dealing primarily with Turkish "settlers"
on the island.) Downer said Talat had agreed with his
observation that T/Cs would be more flexible in negotiating
other chapters were they first to obtain the political
equality in the federal government that they so desperately
sought.

"Don't want to lose time on CBMs"

¶6. (C) Downer claimed he did not want to lose a lot of time
on 22 already-agreed confidence building measures (CBMs),
whose full implementation has been stalled largely over G/C
fears of "upgrading" the north. He pointedly asked one of
his aides to investigate the present state of allowing
ambulances from both sides to cross the Green Line freely,
which to date has been stymied by a G/C refusal to purchase
insurance coverage for the north. (Note: Downer's aide
reported on May 16 that the insurance issue had been resolved
and that ambulances should be able to cross in the next day
or two.)

"Recent events not all bad"

¶7. (C) Downer aimed to capitalize on the recent appointment
of Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey's foreign minister and the
upcoming Swedish EU Presidency in order to move the
settlement process forward. He hoped that the arrival of
Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey's "zero problems with
neighbors" policy, would result in waning influence on Cyprus
for hard-line MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan. (Note: Our
pro-solution T/C contacts share the same hope.) Downer
expected an energetic Swedish EU presidency, especially
needed after a "do-nothing" Czech one, and hoped to meet FM
Carl Bildt soon -- although getting to Stockholm was
"difficult."

Getting Russian on board

¶8. (C) Downer hoped he could utilize a perceived slight shift
in Russia's Cyprus policy -- thanks to apparent
Russian-Turkish rapprochement on energy and Armenia -- to
weaken Moscow's hitherto slavishly pro-G/C stance. According
to rumors Downer relayed, Putin supported a more balanced
Russian approach on Cyprus, while the Foreign Ministry
continued to argue for traditional pro-Greek Cypriot
policies. Downer noted that he planned to visit Moscow in
late June.

Downer Non-committal about spending more time on island

¶9. (C) The Ambassador recommended strongly that Downer spend
more time on the island in order to be able to defuse unseen
crises. The U.S. and UK had had to engage in urgent triage
after the Orams-ECJ crisis, but simply could not fill
Downer's shoes owing to G/C suspicions over "Anglo-American"
motives. The UN envoy praised the Ambassador and British
High Commissioner Peter Millett for their efforts to calm
Talat and keep him at the negotiating table in the aftermath
of Orams. In parrying the Ambassador's request, however, he
joked that he already lived "in a wonderful country
(Australia)." Downer did regret his absence at the May 14
leaders' meeting, where Christofias and Talat had battled
inconclusively over Limnitis. He would remain in the region
until June 3, his time on the island punctuated by trips to
Ankara and Athens, then return to Cyprus after a short
vacation.
Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09NICOSIA327.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001501

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID CY EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: GETTING TO YES IN THE CYPRUS REFERENDA: ACTION
PLAN FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

REF: (A) NICOSIA 0586 (B) ATHENS 1196

Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------
Summary:
--------

¶1. (C) With Cyprus guaranteed entry into the EU no matter
what the outcome of the referenda, EU officials feel bereft
of carrots to encourage a positive Greek Cypriot response.
Promoting a "yes" vote in Cyprus will depend on our use of
the Cyprus Pre-donors' Conference on April 15 to prove that
there are real economic benefits for the south in the Annan
Plan, and also to encourage clear political signals from
European governments that the EU endorses the UN's Plan as
the opportunity of a generation and the "European way." USEU
recommends the following efforts in the run-up to and
immediately after the Pre-Donors' Conference:

-- Senior EU leadership, in particular Hirep Solana, but also
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen and Relex Commissioner
Patten, should be pressed to engage Greek and Cypriot
leadership both publicly and privately on the need to support
the Annan Plan.

-- Encourage a strong indication of European support for a
successful referendum at the April 16 Gymnich.

-- Work with the European Parliament to send a signal via a
non-binding resolution encouraging a "yes" vote to the Annan
Plan.

At the conference itself, we should:

-- Seek specific commitments to identify European Commission
funding for the property commission -- the clearest signal to
Greek Cypriots that they too will benefit from peace.

-- Advocate with the EU concerted, visible efforts to discuss
and ideally to develop intra-zonal investment packages that
will benefit all islanders.

-- Consider ear-marking pledges to elements of the Annan Plan
that specifically address compensation for Greek Cypriots and
that can be used to make a political argument in the south
for a "yes" vote to the Annan Plan.

-------------------------
The EU's Cyprus Realities
-------------------------

¶2. (C) EU interlocutors have repeatedly told us that
regardless of outcomes of the Annan Plan referenda, Cyprus
will enter the EU on May 1st. (Indeed, legally, there is no
other option, as the accession treaty has been ratified.)
The Annan Plan referenda in north and south will simply
determine whether the island enters the EU as a unified whole
or as the south alone. Turkish Cypriot voters in the North
know that their one chance to enter the Union soon will be a
"yes" vote -- and the Turkish government at home knows that
its future hopes for accession also hinge importantly on a
positive outcome. The battle then clearly is on the Greek
side of the island. Since the accession question for the
Greeks has been resolved, persuasion must take other forms.
The problem is that this reality defines and constrains EU
leverage on the Republic of Cyprus, as the Greek Cypriot
population knows that it will enter the EU irrespective of
the outcome of the poll. Informed northern Cypriot voters,
in contrast, by now are equally aware that their only chance
of entering the EU for the foreseeable future is predicated
on a "yes" vote in the referendum.

¶3. (C) Our challenge is to promote a "yes" vote in the south
given the realities cited. We also understand from the
Commission that many Greek Cypriots see the Annan Plan as
providing far more carrots to the Turks than to the Greeks.
A successful strategy to encourage a "yes" vote by the Greek
Cypriots must address this reality. While Hirep Solana,
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, and EU Parliament
President Pat Cox have repeatedly stated their desire to
facilitate a settlement publicly and privately, they -- and
their staffs -- admit privately to us that the political
leverage of accession is now gone. As officials of the
Union, they have also been reluctant to publicly encourage a
member state to adopt a specific course of action, especially
if Greek government support is tepid. Brussels-based
officials know that they hold no leverage but political
opprobrium against a rejectionist Cypriot republic. The EU's
relative failure to enforce discipline against the Austrian
government during the Haider crisis proved that Cyprus has
little to fear from the EU in this regard.

---------------------
Cyprus as the spoiler
of Turkish accession
---------------------

¶4. (C) The larger question of Turkish accession is another
element to the Cyprus equation in Brussels. We have heard
that some EU member countries wary of offering an accession
negotiation date for Turkey are secretly hoping for failure
of the Annan Plan. (Informed Commission interlocutors cite
France, Austria, and the Netherlands as members of the group
of those opposed.) The entry of the Republic of Cyprus
without northern Cyprus into the EU would immensely
complicate Turkey's EU vocation, and provides these
Turko-skeptics an easy out. Even strong friends of Turkey in
the EU, such as Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, have told
us that the political reality of the continued existence of
the "TRNC" -- and the illegal Turkish occupation of a part of
EU territory -- would be a potential deal-killer for Turkey
in December, no matter whether Turkey and Turkish Cypriots
supported the peace plan.

----------------------
Our last best shots:
Using the Pre-donors'
Conference and Gymnich
----------------------

¶5. (C) Given the current political reality in Brussels, our
last shots at favorably influencing a Cyprus deal under the
Annan Plan are primarily through the April 15 Pre-Donors'
Conference and the April 16 informal EU foreign ministers'
meeting. We will need to change Greek Cypriot perceptions
that the deal does not offer them enough and that waiting for
more is not a viable strategy. Thus, we need to work with
the EU to ensure that the message rings loud and clear out of
the conference that settlement will bring concrete benefits
to the south as well as the north, and that "Europe" favors a
yes vote. There are two key elements to this effort:
political and public diplomacy aimed at steering the Cypriot
population toward yes, and setting out a series of financial
incentives to convince waivering Greek Cypriots they will
benefit from unification. Obviously, a key element in this
will be the need to work with the European Commission and
other key potential donors at a strategy to be unveiled at
the Pre-Donors' Conference to underscore the EU and the
international community's commitment to addressing the
concerns of the south. Such an approach might include:

-- pushing the EU to ensure sufficiently high-level
representation at the conference, and a specific commitment
by the European Commission to fund or identify funding for
the property commission, which will be of particular benefit
to the south. The south needs tangible evidence of the
benefits of the Annan Plan.

-- concerted, visible EU efforts to develop intra-zonal
investment packages that will benefit all islanders. An
example of this might be a private-public partnership
addressing Greek desiderata for the development of the
tourist industry in ways that benefit both sides of the
former Green Line.

-- ear-marking pledges to elements of the Annan Plan that
specifically address compensation for Greek Cypriots,
especially the property commission. Given that property
issues are particularly important to the south, we need to
show just how important this issue is to us.

¶6. (C) The donors' conference will be followed immediately
by the informal EU Foreign Ministers' meeting in Dublin.
This would provide a good occasion for some back-room
straight-talk from their European colleagues with the Greek
and Cypriot FM's, and could also provide an opportunity for
the Irish EU Presidency to come out publicly with a call for
Cypriots to step up to the historic occasion provided by
these votes -- combined with a public pledge that the EU is
ready to support a peace deal. We recommend a letter from
the Secretary to the Irish FM, copied to his colleagues, and
perhaps followed up by an S phone call.

¶7. (C) We also endorse Athens' and Nicosia's views that
senior EU leadership, in particular Hirep Solana but also
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen and External Relations
Commissioner Patten, should be strongly encouraged to engage
Cypriot leadership both publicly and privately on the need to
support the Annan Plan. The Secretary raised this April 2
with Solana, and he pledged to do all he could to help
convince the Greek Cypriots. It would be useful if the
Secretary followed up to see what Solana has been doing. A
well-placed press interview by Solana or another leading EU
figure could be a key indicator of how far the EU is prepared
to lean in favor of an agreement. In a similar manner, the
Irish Presidency should become engaged, and PM Ahern and FM
Cowen encouraged to raise with their Cypriot and Greek
counterparts the importance of seizing this historic
opportunity.

¶8. (C) We also believe that it would be useful to engage
European Parliament President Cox with an eye towards a
parliamentary resolution advocating support for the plan.
Ambassador Schnabel will seek an occasion in the coming days
to discuss the issue with Cox.

SAMMIS

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04BRUSSELS1501.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001787

SIPDIS

EUR FOR RIES & WESTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2014
TAGS: PREL CY TU EUN UN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU HAND-WRINGING ON CYPRUS REFERENDUM: NO CARROTS,
FLIMSY STICKS

Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) One day away from a Cyprus Referendum, EU officials
are wringing their hands in Brussels about the likely fate of
the Annan Plan -- and the likely accession of a divided
Cyprus into the EU on May 1. The Head of the Commission's
Cyprus unit told us April 23 that he is anticipating numerous
headaches due to Turkish non-recognition the Republic of
Cyprus -- a full EU member -- as of May 1. Pressed by us on
the possibility of EU actions to punish Cypriot
intransigence, our interlocutor noted that Article 7 of the
EU Treaty could be used, although he pointed out that this
stick is untried, and thus should be considered a flimsy one.
In a related action, EU Parliament Pat Cox has initiated a
separate Article 7 proceeding on the run up to the
referendum, although EU Parliament action is more symbolic
than determinant, barring further Council action.

¶2. (C) Comment: Despite the hand-wringing, the EU no longer
has any carrots to encourage a positive vote in southern
Cyprus, and its only stick, the unprecedented imposition of
Article 7 of the Treaty of European Union, would be very
difficult to wield, requiring as it does a consensus
(excluding Cyprus) to proceed and a qualified majority to
punish. Article 7 could in an extreme application lead to
the denial of its European Council vote to Cyprus. But
Turkey's situation as of May 1 is far worse. Its accession
quest is now crippled by its non-recognition of an EU member
and on-going occupation of sovereign EU territory. Combined
with EU dissatisfaction with the Layla Zana sentence, this
has been a bad week for Turkey in Brussels. End comment and
summary.

--------------------------------
Facing Facts: There is No Plan B
--------------------------------

¶3. (C) One day away from a Cyprus Referendum expected to
reject the Annan Plan in the south, EU officials are wringing
their hands in Brussels about the likely demise of the Annan
Plan -- and the certain accession of a divided Cyprus into
the EU on May 1. Commission Cyprus Unit Head Leopold Maurer
told us April 23 that he is anticipating numerous headaches
due to Turkish non-recognition the Republic of Cyprus -- a
full EU member -- starting as early as two weeks from now.
As an example, he cited a working meeting on the Turkish-EU
customs relationship that will now need to address Turkish
non-recognition of Cypriot goods. Given Cyprus' full EU
membership, it will be covered by EU agreements with Turkey
on the same terms as any other EU state.

----------
No Carrots
----------

¶4. (C) Despite good efforts by Commissioner Verheugen, EU
Parliament President Cox, and Hirep Solana to make positive
statements about the need for a yes vote, Cyprus politicians
know that the EU holds no positive leverage at this point.
EU officials have been especially miffed that their
entreaties were kept off the airwaves by Greek Cypriot media.
Even so, as the treaty of enlargement has been ratified, and
accession is a done deal, there is nothing more the EU
bureaucracy can offer by way of blandishments to southern
Cyprus voters. The April 15 Pre-Donors' Conference, with its
generous promise of post-settlement assistance, was the EU's
last carrot, and it apparently failed to find a taker in the
south.

----------------------------
And the Stick Looks Weak...
----------------------------

¶5. (C) Pressed on the possibility of EU sanctions for
Cypriot intransigence and manipulation of the vote, Maurer
noted that Article 7 of the EU Treaty could theoretically be
used, although he noted that this stick has never been used
under any circumstances. As a politically theoretical
instrument with many bars to use, it should be considered a
flimsy one to wield in an attempt to get Cyprus voters to
change their votes.

¶6. (C) Maurer explained that under Article 7 of the Nice
Treaty, member states could unanimously (with the exception
of Cyprus itself) and with the two-thirds assent of the
European Parliament, determine that rejection of the Annan
Plan, or the circumstances of that rejection, were "a serious
and persistent breach" of one or more of the Article 6
provisions calling for respect of the "principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law...". The Council would then vote by
qualified majority rules on what sanctions to impose.

¶7. (C) We noted to Maurer that any member state could block
the invocation of Article 7 under the terms outlined by the
treaty, and some member states, (Greece, for example) would
probably be inclined to do so. Maurer agreed, but reiterated
that this was the only legal avenue available to the EU to
attempt to redress any manipulation of the Cyprus poll,
presuming that the UN Secretary General decided that the
polling had not been free or fair. (Comment: although Maurer
didn't mention them, the only other punishments we could
imagine might be ones entailing blocking Cyprus from getting
anticipated benefits, rather than trying to withdraw existing
ones. In theory, the EU could send a clear message to Cyprus
that so long as the Green Line persists, Cyprus could never
expect to get full Schengen treatment; another might be to
block Cyprus admission into the Eurozone. End comment.)

--------------------
EU Parliament Begins
Article 7 Proceeding
--------------------

¶8. (C) On April 23, EU Parliament President Cox's diplomatic
adviser Joe Dunne (strictly protect) told us that President
Cox received a letter from DISY leader Nico Anastassiades
complaining about the management of the referendum in Cyprus.
Following consultations with party leaders, Cox referred
Anastassiades' complaint to Parliament for consideration as
an Article 7 proceeding. Dunne said that there was no
objection from party leaders to proceeding along this route,
and he assessed that there was a reasonable prospect of
getting a two-thirds majority in Parliament, probably on the
last and only remaining scheduled vote of this session, on
May 5. We asked Dunne about the difficulty of getting a
consensus in the European Council (including Greece but
excluding Cyprus) on Article 7. He replied that his focus is
getting a two-thirds majority in Parliament, and said that he
is optimistic about this prospect. The Council issues are
not his purview, and he would not be drawn into speculation
on the ultimate outcome of an Article 7 effort in the
Council.

---------------------------
Comment: Much Hand Wringing
- Good Parliamentary Action
---------------------------

¶9. (C) With the Accession Treaty signed, sealed, and
delivered, the Commission no longer holds either carrots or
sticks to push a Cyprus deal. Given this reality, working
level Commission priorities have shifted focus from finding a
Cyprus settlement to making Cyprus's EU accession work on an
island divided into mutually hostile camps. The immediate
impact of Cyprus accession will be to put Turkey in
non-compliance with its customs treaty with the European
Union, given that Turkey's deals with the EU now have to
apply in Turkey's obligatory dealings with new EU member
Cyprus. Over the longer term, Turkey is going to have to
cede additional ground on Cyprus issues if it is to maintain
good relations with the EU during its run up to talks on an
accession date. This hurts Turkey's prospects for a
favorable accession deal in December, and adds to the bad
blood in a relationship already scarred this week by EU
dismay about the Layla Zana verdict.

¶10. (C) More to the positive side, EU Parliament President
Cox has once again shown his willingness to try to go the
extra mile for a Cyprus settlement, even as the EU's
political options for encouraging settlement diminish. We
are not in a position to evaluate Cox's adviser's assessment
that he can get a two-thirds majority in Parliament to
sanction Cyprus on Article 7 grounds. If he does, however,
the quest to punish rejectionist Cyprus through Article 7
will likely face an extremely tough environment in the
European Council, where Greece alone can block further
action. Even then, all members except Cyprus would have to
accept the premise that Cyprus' expected no vote -- or the
process that led up to it -- indeed constitutes "a serious
and persistent breach" of one or more of the Article 6
"principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law...".

Schnabel

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04BRUSSELS1787.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002341

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: Despite the wake of the GCs' "no," we need
to move toward an eventual GC "yes" to the Burgenstock
agreement. On the Turkish side, we should help Ankara
preserve the its delicate balance for Cyprus settlement;
encourage the Erdogan government to continue its "one step
ahead" policy; reach out to Turkish Cypriots; and engage the
EU. End Summary.


Help Preserve the Balance in Ankara


¶2. (C) The Erdogan government and the MFA pieced together a
tenuous Cyprus balance with the military, the President, the
bureaucracy and Parliament that enabled them to move forward
for the past four months. The possibility of receiving a
date in December to begin EU accession negotiations may help
preserve the balance over the next few months. However, this
balance is not locked in: it remains precarious and subject
to the vagaries of Turkish politics.


¶3. (C) We must work preemptively to help maintain the
balance in Ankara. In the event the GCs ever bring
themselves to endorse the basic terms of the Annan Plan, a
settlement will still require Turkish Parliament's and
President Sezer's formal approval. While the military has no
formal role, it still wields enough behind-the-scenes power
to scuttle an agreement.


¶4. (C) Progress in two key areas will help maintain the
balance:


-- Primary law: We should work with the UK to gain more
specific guarantees that the terms of an ultimate settlement
will become primary EU law. This will help meet President
Sezer's and the military's principal reservations and dampen
the effect of domestic political critics.


-- TCs' situation: We must act on our promise to ameliorate
the TCs' situation (more below). This will strengthen the
hand of pro-solution forces in the Turkish government and
bureaucracy, allowing them to point to "progress" on the
island stemming from Turkey's pro-settlement orientation.


Encourage Turkey to Continue "One Step Ahead"


¶5. (C) Erdogan's Cyprus mantra has been to stay "one step
ahead" of the GCs. This has played well domestically and in
Europe. We should encourage its explicit continuation. We
expect the GOT to push back, arguing Turkey's efforts and TC
referendum approval already put it one step ahead and now it
is the GCs' turn. Still, many Turks worry that, come
December, the EU will have forgotten Turkey's achievements.
We can effectively use this argument to urge continued steps
ahead, albeit small ones. In doing so, we need to be careful
not to cross the line that would fuel expectations of
re-opening negotiations; the specter of new negotiations will
unravel Ankara's support for the agreement.


¶6. (C) For starters, we should again raise the idea of
easing passport requirements for GCs. Although Ziyal told us
on April 20 this will not happen, "TRNC Interior Minister"
Murat told Nicosia DCM on April 22 that discussion on this
were still ongoing. We can also press the Turks to complete
unfinished technical work on the agreement.


Speak Promptly, Act Concretely To Help Turkish Cypriots


¶7. (C) We need to speak out promptly and then act concretely
on our promises not to leave TCs out in the cold. While the
EU reaction is key, we cannot be seen in Ankara to be merely
the tail on an EU dog. We should begin by announcing
specific steps the U.S. plans to take, followed by their
gradual implementation. This will have the twin salutary
effects of helping maintain Ankara's pro-settlement stance
and demonstrating to GCs the cost of a continued "no." At
the same time, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is a
united Cyprus, we should take great care not to raise Turkish
expectations of a divided island. Some steps should include
honoring "TRNC" export documentation; helping TCs gain
economic assistance, including from the IMF, World Bank and
EU; opening TDA and ExIm operations to the Turkish Cypriots,
particularly in the tourism sector; removing the ban on
direct travel by USG officials to Cyprus via the north;
offering technical assistance to build rule of law and to
combat money laundering; ending restrictions on flights to
the north; a visit to Washington by Talat; upgrading the
status of the "TRNC's" representation in Washington.


Engage the EU


¶8. (C) The goal of getting a date to begin EU accession
negotiations remains an effective, largely-accepted external
discipline in Ankara. We should encourage the EU to
explicitly recognize Turkey's positive efforts on Cyprus in
the months leading up to December. This will reassure Turkey
its efforts have not been in vain and will help
pro-settlement forces hold the line in Ankara. We should
raise the idea of opening some channel for TCs to express
themselves within the EU. While staying out of technical
details, we should keep reminding the EU of the importance of
working to give Turkey the primary law guarantees it needs to
keep President Sezer and the military on board.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04ANKARA2341.html