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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001515

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: PREL EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU TROIKA MEETINGS: TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION
PROCESS SPUTTERS ONWARD

REF: ANKARA 1454

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey-EU Troika consultations held June 4 in
Ankara were constructive and served to underscore the
continued mutual commitment to pursuing eventual Turkish EU
membership, according to GOT and EU officials. Turkey's
membership aspirations continue, and the technical process,
though slowed by the EU's December freezing of negotiations
on eight chapters as a result of Turkey's refusal to open its
ports to Cypriot vessels, is moving ahead as well. The
question of how many additional chapters will be opened for
formal negotiation later this month remains. However, the
negotiation process continues, notwithstanding French
President Sarkozy's apparent determination to end it as well
as faltering public support in Turkey. END SUMMARY

CONSULTATIONS SHORT BUT SUBSTANTIVE
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) Turkey-EU Troika consultations held June 4 in Ankara
were short but substantive, focusing not only on Turkey's
membership aspirations, but on broader international topics.
According to various EU member state embassy officials here,
the meetings lasted only three and a half hours due to German
FM Steinmeier's commitments later in the day in Berlin for
Germany-Canada consultations. In addition to Steinmeier, the
EU delegation was led by EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli
Rehn and Portuguese State Minister Joao Cravinhoas. Turkey's
key representatives included FM Abdullah Gul, State Minister
and Chief Negotiator on EU Accession Ali Babacan, Foreign
Policy Advisor to the PM and FM Ahmet Davutoglu, and MFA
Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan, among others.

TURKEY'S EU ASPIRATIONS
-----------------------

¶3. (C) Ahmet Dogan of Turkey's Secretariat General for EU
Affairs said the EU delegation underscored the Union's
continued commitment to the negotiations and reiterated the
hope that formal talks on an additional three chapters could
be initiated before the end of June. Dogan said the three
chapters under consideration, on Economic and Monetary
Policy, Financial Controls, and Statistics, have no opening
benchmarks which Turkey needs to clear prior to the opening
of negotiations. Should the EU decide to move forward as
planned in these three areas, Turkey would be asked to submit
an opening position paper for each chapter; GOT bureaucrats
are busy preparing those.

¶4. (C) In contrast to Dogan's optimism about moving ahead
with all three chapters, German Embassy officials here said
that Steinmeier offered no such assurances. The German
presidency objective is to proceed if possible. They see the
process as open, and open-ended; whether or not member states
object to opening all three chapters at the moment, the
process itself will continue. Steinmeier noted that a large
majority of EU countries favor Turkey's candidacy, but it is
no secret that some - and at least two in particular (Cyprus,
France) - are critical. Steinmeier indicated to his Turkish
hosts that Turkey must help turn them around.

Sarkozy and Turkey's EU Accession
---------------------------------

¶5. (C) Reports of French President Sarkozy's determination to
offer Turkey status short of full membership, perhaps as
early as this December, have received considerable media
attention here and contributed to a backlash among the
Turkish public against EU membership talks. French embassy
officials confirmed press reports that Sarkozy's government
intends to try to block opening of negotiations on the
Economic and Monetary Policy (EMU) chapter. They pointed
out, however, that it may be too late. Dogan noted France
and Cyprus view opening negotiations on three new chapters as
rewarding continued Turkish intransigence on opening its
ports to Cypriot vessels; they are pressing to open just one
new chapter. He said the GOT will be disappointed, but not
surprised, if in the end the EU offers to open two new
chapters. Ironically, Turkey has a good story to tell on the
EMU, as it is already in compliance with two of the
Maastricht criteria only six years after its financial
crisis. Moreover, a Turkish EU Secretariat official pointed
out to us that opening the EMU chapter is purely symbolic in
any case, because nothing really happens on this chapter
until the Eurozone is ready to admit the accession country,

ANKARA 00001515 002 OF 003


after the country gains EU membership. The French officials
lamented that French efforts will only worsen soured
bilateral relations over the French parliament's passage of
an Armenian genocide resolution last Fall.

EU Keeping An Eye on Turkey
---------------------------

¶6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, FM Gul told the EU
delegation that Turkey-EU relations would play a role in the
July 22 general elections. Gul expressed hope that the
Turkish electorate would decide to re-elect a party committed
to continuing the EU negotiation process. Commissioner Rehn
underscored the EU's hope that Turkey's election would be in
accordance with democratic principles and Turkey's
constitution. Gul reiterated the Justice and Development
Party (AKP)-led government's commitment to pursuing the
reform agenda established earlier in the year in its EU
roadmap. He also indicated the next government, presuming
AKP is again in power, would take up the process of passing a
new Foundations Law and reform of penal code article 301,
both of which have been high priorities for the EU.
According to Dogan, the EU delegation emphasized the
importance the EU gives to Turkey's continued work in
enhancing freedom of expression and freedom of religion, as
well as trade union rights. The Troika also criticized the
military's role in Turkey, pointing to the April 27 "coup-by
memorandum" that many believe influenced the constitutional
court's decision to negate the presidential election process.
At the same time, Dogan said the EU delegation emphasized
its support for Turkey's secular democracy, which many Turks
would read to mean support for AKP's more secular opposition.

¶7. (C) Steinmeier pointed to the April 18 murders of three
Christians in Malatya as a big concern for the EU, which also
reflected very negatively for Turkey in the European press.
He stressed the need for a change in mentality among Turks
toward religious minorities and recommended that GOT
ministers meet with leaders of these communities. Steinmeier
expressed the EU's continued commitment to Turkey in its
fight against PKK terrorism but appealed for GOT restraint
and no precipitous action in connection with its struggle
against the PKK in northern Iraq. Gul responded that Turkey
has no hidden agenda regarding Iraq; it wants a unified Iraq
that is friendly, democratic, and stable. However, a lack of
sovereignty causes chaos, which breeds terrorism. Gul said
the PKK has gained access to weapons and explosives and the
ability to freely train its cadres in northern Iraq. Turkey
is expecting more urban bombings and the GOT is concerned
about how the Turkish public and media will react in the
current politically-charged environment.

Searching For a Way Forward on Cyprus
-------------------------------------

¶8. (C) On Cyprus, Steinmeier said the German presidency would
continue to put forth its best effort on a new trade
regulation for direct trade with northern Cyprus and opening
ports/airports. State Minister Cravinhoas pledged similar
effort on the part of the Portuguese. However, Steinmeier
said that even if no progress is made on direct trade, Turkey
remains obligated in the EU's eyes to open its ports and
airports to ROC trade. The Turks predictably countered with
the need to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and to find
a solution under UN aegis to the continued division of the
island. Gul blamed the Cypriot government for obstructionism.

Cooperation on Central Asia
---------------------------

¶9. (C) The Troika and Turkish delegations also discussed
Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Middle East Peace Process and
intra-Palestinian factional fighting, ongoing fighting in
Lebanon, prospects for Turkish-EU cooperation in Central
Asia, and efforts to improve ties between Turkey and Armenia.
On Central Asia, Steinmeier described a change in EU
strategy, now focused not only on energy but in helping push
for positive change in the entire region. The EU wants to
enhance EU-Central Asia cooperation on transport routes and
civil society dialogue, as well as energy projects like
Nabucco. The GOT delegation spoke of the great potential for
Turkish-EU cooperation in this region, especially in energy.
MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz described the four "D's" of the
Turkish approach: democracy, dialogue, development, and
diversification. The Turks recognized that the Central Asian
states had for too long been under the thumb of big brother;
they were being careful not to appear to be a newer, more
modern version of the same. The Portuguese added that

ANKARA 00001515 003 OF 003


EU-Central Asia consultations would take place on the margins
of UNGA later this year. Cravinhoas also appealed for
Turkish pragmatism in its dealings with Armenia, viewing the
lack of bilateral ties as an obstacle to greater regional
cooperation.

¶10. (C) COMMENT: Despite political forces determined to drive
Turkey and the EU apart, the process continues to sputter
forward. With the AKP government having made EU accession a
centerpiece of its program, it is struggling to resist rising
anti-EU sentiment in Turkey and a more openly hostile
Euroscepticism from the military. Technocrats working
outside the glare of the media spotlight remain fully
committed to ensuring the process lives on. High profile
officials like Olli Rehn continue to warn of the dire
consequences for relations between the West and Islam should
Turkey's aspirations be extinguished. On the Turkish side,
Minister Babacan said the alternative to Turkey's EU
avocation is to be a third world country. The July 22
elections will help clarify whether the Turkish public - now
slightly favoring membership - sees the EU accession process
as an unacceptable national humiliation or a worthwhile
effort. In the meantime, planning for future Turkey-EU
cooperation will continue.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/06/07ANKARA1515.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU SW
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS
CONTRARY TO EU ASPIRATIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 467
¶B. STATE 77681

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,c)

¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador discussed reftels joint efforts
with Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp August 5 and noted, in
particular, that rising Turkish-Greek tensions over recent
Aegean events could inadvertently impact Turkey's EU
accession bid. Asp commented that Greece and Cyprus already
have attempted to raise the issue in the July GAERC meeting.
As EU President, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to take steps
that would ease stresses with Athens and Nicosia, namely
opening the Halki Seminary and backing down on objections to
Cypriot oil explorations. Despite a general feeling that
heavy lifting on Cyprus would have to wait until MFA U/S
Apakan (a hardliner on Cyprus/Greek issues) left for his new
assignment in September, Asp reported that he has already
seen signs of flexibility, including some from Apakan
himself. The most promising is a possible GOT declaration of
non-aggression and peaceful resolution regarding the
continental shelf. End Summary.

¶2. (C) In an August 5 meeting, the Ambassador reiterated to
Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp that the USG intentions to
work in tandem with Stockholm on issues related to Turkey's
EU accession bid as earlier discussed by EUR DAS Matt Bryza
and Swedish MFA Director Lars Wahlund in a July 19 DVC (ref
A). The Ambassador noted a disappointing turn from warming
Turkish-Greek relations punctuated by recent Turkish military
flights over the Greek-populated Agathonisi and Farmakonisi
islands. Such events could adversely impact the upcoming
Ankara Protocol review in November should Athens decided to
drag Brussels into a bilateral dispute over the Aegean.

¶3. (C) Asp commented that Brussels has traditionally chosen
to "stay out" of Turkish-Greek disputes. However, given the
importance of this year's Ankara Protocol review, he has
articulated similar concerns to the GOT. Both Greece and
Cyprus raised territorial complains against Turkey at the
July EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting, reported Asp. As EU President, Sweden
managed to kill the discussion by convincing other members
not to intervene. Nevertheless, Cyprus will likely revive
the issue again before November. Asp agreed to echo the
Ambassadors concerns over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi with the
GOT.

¶4. (C) Under its EU Presidency, Stockholm has pushed Ankara
to open Halki Seminary as it would gain Turkey good will with
the Greek Orthodox community and benefit Istanbul as a 2010
European Capitol of Culture. Asp said that Swedish MFA U/S
Frank Belfrage pushed U/S Apakan hard on this issue during an
August 3 Brussels meeting. Asp had also encouraged lead GOT
EU negotiator Egemen Bagis to do the same and to show more
flexibility toward Cyprus. Bagis reportedly responded that
he was working on Halki, but that it would ultimately require
a reciprocal act in Northern Thrace. (NOTE: In contrast to a
month ago, we are hearing this linkage every time Halki comes
up. This is significant step backward. END NOTE) Cyprus,
however, would have to wait until September, when Apakan
assumes his new position as Turkish UN Permanent
Representative in New York.

¶5. (C) Asp reported, however, that Apakan has show signs of
softening his traditionally incalcitrant position on Cyprus.
During his meeting with Belfrage, Apakan reportedly said that
he would consider allowing Cypriots to attend one of the
three OECD education and cultural programs that Turkey had
previously blocked. Belfrage also encouraged Apakan to show
more flexibility on energy issues, namely Cypriot oil
exploration, as current Turkish objections will just prolong
Nicosia's efforts to block the opening of additional EU
chapters (namely energy) and to contemplate issuing a
declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution on the
matter. Asp reported he had been told since that the GOT was
working on such a resolution and would consult with the
Swedes regarding content and timing. (NOTE: Asp opined that
the EU has shot itself in the foot over the energy chapter by
allowing Nicosia to block its opening. Momentum is growing
amongst members to increase pressure on Cyprus to step down;
Nabucco has helped with this. END NOTE) Nevertheless, he
expressed concern to the Ambassador that the Turks may ask
the GOC for a guarantee of equal rights on the continental

ANKARA 00001145 002 OF 002


shelf in return. On the Ankara Protocol, Apakan reportedly
said that Turkey may consider a variation of the Finnish
Proposal of opening one airport and one port in exchange for
Famagusta.

¶6. (C) Comment: Asp is willing to give the Turks the benefit
of the doubt on issues such as the Aegean. As we have noted
previously, Athens' reluctance to explain why overflights of
Agathonisi and Farmakonisi are different (i.e. real
violations of sovereignty) has even the Swedes confused.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09ANKARA1145.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001997

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: EWWT ENRG CY GR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL HANDLE TWO EASTERN MED MARITIME
INCIDENTS VIA DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS

REF: A. ANKARA 1986
¶B. ANKARA 1810

Classified By: CHARGE DOUG SILLIMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D

¶1. (C) Summary: Charge and Econ Counselor met November 17
with MFA Deputy Undersecretary Haydar Berk to discuss two
maritime incidents that occurred in the eastern Mediterranean
on November 14 and 15 in waters that Turkey claims as part of
its continental shelf (reftel B). The first started midday
November 14 southwest of Cyprus when a Turkish naval vessel
encountered two seismic ships chartered by a Norwegian
company. The MFA protested to the Norwegian Ambassador.
Berk said he later received a message that the ship "made a
mistake." Berk argued that the ROC was engaging in "sheer
provocation" by contracting
for seismic work in areas known to be disputed and that
Christofias was damaging the chances of success in current
Cyprus negotiations. The second incident began later
November 14 when the Greek Charge notified Turkey that the
GOG would not allow a Norwegian vessel chartered by Turkish
state oil company TPAO to conduct geophysical research in an
area claimed by both Greece and Turkey. On November 15, Berk
claimed that a Greek naval vessel approached within 50 meters
of the Norwegian vessel and threatened to sink it. Charge
urged the GOT to exercise utmost restraint and caution and
not to engage in any action that could be seen as aggressive
in responding to these maritime incidents. Berk responded
that the GOT intends to use only diplomacy to deal with both
incidents. End summary.

The Turkish - Cypriot Incident
------------------------------

¶2. (C) Berk said the first incident began around noon on
November 14, when a Turkish naval vessel returning from
UNIFIL chanced upon two Norwegian-flagged vessels conducting
oil exploration work in an area south and west of Cyprus, in
an area Turkey claims as part of its continental shelf (see
reftel B). Berk said there was no confrontation or threat
made by the Turkish vessel, which, he believed, had only
radioed to the ships to notify them that they were exploring
in Turkish waters.

¶3. (C) The vessels are owned by Seabird Exploration, a
Norwegian - Cypriot company, and flagged in Panama and Sierra
Leone. They were chartered by PGS, a Norwegian - US company
that the GOT had previously contacted when it was bidding on
GOC exploration contracts Berk said he called in the
Norwegian ambassador on November 14, and she said she would
notify the company of GOT concerns. Berk said he later
received a message that the ship "made a mistake and would be
more careful in the future." The Turkish naval vessel
continued on its voyage back to Turkey. (The GOT also
expressed concerns about PGS's seismic work to Ambassador
Wilson on November 14, see reftel A).

¶4. (C) Berk said he also contacted Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus president Talat about the incident. He said
that Talat called GOC President Christofias to express both
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish concern about the exploration,
but Christofias dismissed those concerns. The ships were
working in areas to the south of Cyprus where Turkey claims
an indirect interest on behalf of Turkish Cyriots, but had
also crossed over into waters southwest of Cyprus that Turkey
claims as part of its continental shelf. This seismic work
was "pure provocation" by the ROC, and did not contribute to
the Cyprus settlement process. Berk noted that under the
Annan Plan, all maritime claims were left to negotiation
after a settlement of the island's division, and that Turkey
continues to maintain this view.

The Greek - Turkish Incident
---------------------------

¶5. (C) the second incident began around 1800 on November 14,
when the Greek Charge notified MFA that the GOG would not
allow a Norwegian ship, the M/V Maelen Ostervold, chartered
by Turkish state oil company TPAO, to conduct geophysical
research work in waters claimed by both Greece and Turkey.
Berk said he called the Greek Charge on November 15, and
informed him that the GOT did not recognize the Greek claim
(apparently based on a continental shelf extending out from
the small Greek island of Meis just off
the coast of Turkey).

¶6. (C) Later on November 15, a Greek naval vessel, T-61
Polimetis, approached within 50 meters of the Norwegian
vessel and, according to Berk, threatened to sink it. The

vessel radioed a report, and the Turkish navy dispatched a
Turkish frigate, Getis, to protect the civilian ship. Berk
said the Greek
harassment of the Norwegian ship began at a point 35 miles
south of Kas on the Turkish coast, and continued to a point
95 miles south, despite the presence of the Turkish frigate.

¶7. (C) Berk said MFA took control of the incident to avoid
escalation and made "hundreds" of phone calls on November 15
and 16 to the Turkish General Staff, the Turkish Navy, the
Greek Embassy and the Turkish Embassy in Athens. MFA asked
the Turkish frigate to pull back from the Norwegian ship to
avoid a confrontation. It did so, to 3.5 nautical miles, but
reported that the Greek ship approached again. Berk asked
the Greek Charge November 15 to call the Greek ship back, and
told him that diplomatic channels were open to resolve the
dispute. The Greek MFA called in the Turkish Charge in
Athens on November 16 and told him that the GOG "did not want
problems" with Turkey, but Berk said despite this assurance,
the Greek warship continued to harass the Norwegian ship
until midnight on November 16.

Urging Restraint and Caution
----------------------------

¶8. (C) Charge urged that the GOT exercise great restraint and
caution in reacting to these sorts of maritime incidents, and
that it avoid any actions that could be seen as aggressive.
Berk said the GOT's emphasis on diplomacy was evident on
November 15-16, when MFA took control of the incident and
ordered the Turkish vessel to pull back despite continued
harassment of the civilian vessel by the Greek warship.

¶9. (C) Berk said the GOT was surprised by the Greek action,
noting that there have been disputes in the past in the
Aegean, but this is the first confrontation in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Despite the two incidents occurring in the
same weekend, Berk said the GOT did not believe them to be
related.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

SILLIMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/11/08ANKARA1997.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000910

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, L/EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR ECON EPET CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ROC CONDEMNS TURKISH NAVY HARASSMENT IN
ITS EEZ

REF: A. URBANCIC-FITZPATRICK EMAIL OF 11/14/08
¶B. ANKARA 1986
¶C. NICOSIA 813

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This cable contains an action request -- please see
Paragraph 9.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY: The Cypriot Foreign Ministry on November 14
summoned the Ambassador to protest Turkey's alleged same-day
harassment of two RoC-contracted vessels conducting seismic
exploration in waters Cyprus considers part of its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). MFA Permanent Secretary Nicolas Emiliou
made no specific request of the Ambassador during the
20-minute meeting, but, "given your relationship with
Turkey," implied the USG should caution Ankara that such
behavior was unacceptable. The Ministry intended to summon
ambassadors from the other P-5 nations to conduct similar
briefings later in the evening, he added. On November 15,
the UK High Commissioner in Nicosia informed the Embassy that
London was prepared to demarche Ankara and even issue a
public statement in support of the RoC maritime claims.
Turkish and T/C contacts long have warned the GoT would take
steps to prevent RoC-sponsored mineral exploration as long as
the Cyprus Problem remained unsettled. END SUMMARY.

------------------------
You Must Come...Urgently
------------------------

¶3. (C) MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas
Emiliou urgently summoned the Ambassador the afternoon of
November 14 (Ref A). In his usual somber tone, the MFA
diplomat informed that there had been an incident hours
earlier off the southwest coast of Cyprus. There, two
scientific vessels, respectively flying Panamanian and Sierra
Leonian flags, were conducting seismic research on behalf of
the Republic of Cyprus. They were approached by one or two
Turkish Navy ships and, under orders to depart the area or
otherwise face unspecified but serious consequences,
eventually retreated into RoC territorial waters. "The act
represented the culmination of provocative Turkish behavior
that had commenced when Cyprus signed a maritime delimitation
agreement with Lebanon, but was the first time Turkey
directly interfered with ongoing Cypriot activities," Emiliou
asserted. Other recent provocations included Turkish
live-fire military exercises in 2007 just outside RoC
territorial waters that endangered civilian maritime and air
traffic.

¶4. (C) A signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), the Republic of Cyprus had rights to resource
exploration and exploitation in its EEZ, Emiliou continued
(Ref B). The incident had occurred well within its exclusive
zone, only 27 nautical miles off the island. Turkey
maintained its own maritime claims that far exceeded those
stipulated in the UN convention, however, and was
aggressively arguing the spot in question lay on its
continental shelf. Emiliou noted that the Turkish MFA
website carried thinly-veiled threats warning Cyprus not to
survey in the area. Further, on October 8 the Turkish Navy
had warned Cyprus directly to halt exploration activities
(NFI). Turning again to the November 14 incident, the GoT
vessels had further violated international law by not
identifying themselves, the MFA diplomat alleged. One had
gotten close enough to the research ships to show its hull
number -- F927. The Turkish captain had threatened
(presumably by radio) unspecified action should the civilian
vessels not retract their equipment and depart the area,
Emiliou continued. They did, and retreated to RoC
territorial waters. (Note: DoD sources were unable to place
the Turkish naval vessel "F927" in the area on November
13/14. The frigate F240 was off the southeast coast of
Cyprus shortly beforehand, however, and conceivably could
have steamed westward to intercept the exploration vessels.)

---------------------------------
High-level Instructions to Engage
---------------------------------

¶5. (C) RoC President Demetris Christofias himself had
ordered the MFA to demarche UN P-5 embassies immediately upon
word of the incident, Emiliou noted. The U.S. was first in

NICOSIA 00000910 002.3 OF 002


line, owing to its close relationship with Ankara. "We know
you support Turkey's eventual European Union accession," he
continued, "and this is unacceptable behavior for an aspiring
EU state." Cyprus recently had felt pressure to "show more
understanding" on opening additional EU Acquis chapters,
specifically Energy. Yet acts of aggression like this
incident were exactly the reason the RoC was blocking -- and
would continue to oppose -- green-lighting those negotiations.

¶6. (C) President Christofias had no intention of allowing
the maritime incident to derail current Cyprus Problem
negotiations with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat,
Emiliou assured. Clearly, however, this type of unwarranted
aggression did not contribute to a constructive environment
for the talks. "We believe your assistance here is vital,"
Emiliou concluded.

-------------------
Others Get Involved
-------------------

¶7. (C) On November 15, resident UK High Commissioner Peter
Millett contacted the Ambassador to relay London's latest
thinking on the dispute. As a fellow UNCLOS signatory which
sided with Cyprus in this EEZ dispute, HMG was prepared to
demarche the Turks in Ankara, Millett relayed. It also stood
ready to voice public support for Cyprus's right to exploit
its economic zone, although it would not state specifically
where exactly the EEZ lay. Further, the UK did not
countenance Turkey's claims that all eastern Mediterranean
littoral states potentially had rights in the disputed area,
making a multilateral delimitation imperative. (Note:
separate reporting from London indicated the Brits would take
a soft line with the Turks -- watching developments and
urging restraint -- while the French, at London's behest,
would push harder. Highlighting Paris's talking points was
an admonition that Turkey's saber-rattling over maritime
resource exploitation could not come at a worse time for its
own EU accession path and the still-nascent Cyprus
negotiations.)

--------------------------
Comment and Action Request
--------------------------

¶8. (C) With both sides having drawn their lines in deepest
red, the November 14 incident comes as no great shock.
Turkish Cypriot "officialdom" and resident Turkish "Embassy"
contacts long have reported that any attempt by the Republic
of Cyprus to exploit mineral resources in "contested" waters
would be opposed, with force if necessary. Conversely, Greek
Cypriots vehemently contend they have law on their side,
stemming from the RoC's accession to UNCLOS, their successful
negotiation of delimitation agreements with Egypt and Lebanon
(although Beirut has yet to ratify the latter), and public
support from powers like the United States. On the related
issue of the Energy chapter of the EU Acquis, the RoC has
shown no intention to budge until Ankara backs down on
maritime exploration and exploitation.

¶9. (C) We recommend that the U.S. take the middle ground,
urging restraint and dialogue and cautioning the sides to
compartmentalize the dispute to prevent it from harming the
Cyprus talks. Longer-term, however, we will need Department
guidance on balancing the Republic of Cyprus's EEZ claims
with those of Turkey. A Houston-based, midsize oil and gas
firm already has won a 2007 RoC tender to explore for oil and
gas in a bloc to Cyprus's southeast, and likely will be
conducting additional seismic testing in the spring. Last
week in Las Vegas, the RoC announced the opening of bidding
for a dozen additional offshore blocs, some of which hold
great promise (Ref C). We expect the company will request
the USG to defend its commercial interests in the disputed
waters. ACTION REQUEST: 1) Language we can supply to the
RoC as the official view on the status of its EEZ, even if
the U.S. view is that some of the waters are in dispute. We
propose to deliver that language to the RoC as an aide
memoire. 2) The guidance should also take into account the
likelihood that U.S. companies may request USG assistance in
defending their commercial interests in these areas.
Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/11/08NICOSIA910.html

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UNCLAS NICOSIA 000912

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EWWT ENRG GR TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS TO PURSUE LOW-KEY APPROACH ON TURKISH
MARITIME ISSUE

REF: A. ANKARA 1986
¶B. NICOSIA 910

¶1. (SBU) U/S of Energy, Solon Kassinis, told econoff that the
recent events involving ships conducting seismic soundings
off SW Cyprus and near Kastelorizo Greece and Greek and
Turkish warships were "nothing unusual" and should be
"downplayed." He criticized Cyprus MFA for calling in the P-5
Ambassadors regarding the incidents, arguing that "this plays
right into Turkish hands." The U/S claims he has spoken to
President Christofias about the matter and the President has
agreed with Kassinis' low-key approach.

¶2. (SBU) Kassinis further believes that sending a ship to
conduct geophysical research off Kastelorizo was similarly
designed to raise the profile of Turkey's maritime claims at
the same time as these claims were being asserted by Turkey
off Cyprus. The action of the Greek naval vessel was "rising
to the Turkish bait' Kassinis asserted. He encouraged the US
and other P-5 nations to quietly urge the Turkish government
to exercise restraint in this matter given the sensitivity of
the settlement negotiations in Cyprus and the fact that
maritime border issues have been a problem for decades.
Kassinis says he will ask the seismic ships under GoC
contract to pull well back from the northern portions of the
blocs they are exploring and may "even send them to Egypt for
a month or so."

¶3. (SBU) Kassinis returned to Cyprus on Sunday from a
conference in Las Vegas where he quietly (no press) announced
the next round of bidding for offshore exploration blocs. He
claims major companies, including Chevron, will buy the
seismic data on the blocs and he expects them to bid. He will
attend a conference in London next week where he will present
data to another forty-two energy companies. No media have
reported on Cyprus opening the next round of bidding nor has
the Cyprus press reported that at the end of October Noble
Energy became the first company to agree to an offshore
exploration and production agreement with the RoC.

¶4. (SBU) Comment: Kassinis' main interest is ensuring the
maximum number of bidders for the next round of offshore
tenders. Given the timing of these incidents just after
Kassinis made his announcement of the next round of bidding,
Turkey's actions do appear designed to make potential bidders
back off. The GoC is willing to keep calm and avoid any
escalation of this matter, but would appreciate our quietly
urging the Turks to show similar restraint. Kassinis fully
expects future such incidents to occur.
Urbancic

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/11/08NICOSIA912.html

[boomerang]

S E C R E T ANKARA 001747

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2028
TAGS: PREL PM CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY LIKELY TO SUPPORT CANCELLATION OF ANNUAL
MILITARY EXERCISES IN CYPRUS; BUT FORMAL DECISION PENDING

REF: STATE 106964

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (S) Turkey is likely to support the call for cancellation
of the annual Turkey-Turkish Cypriot military exercise Toros,
according to MFA DDG for Northeast Mediterranean Kerim Uras,
though a formal decision has yet to be taken. Uras told us
the afternoon of October 8 that senior MFA colleagues were at
Turkish General Staff (TGS) headquarters at the same time
coordinating the decision on the issue. Pointing out that
Turkey had been a strong proponent of the mutual moratorium
on mil exercises on the island until the Greek Cypriots
unilaterally abrogated the agreement by carrying out
Nikiforos in 2005, Uras said he did not see any reason why
the GOT would not want to resume it. He cautioned, however,
that he could not authoritatively provide a positive response
to Christofias' call, in support of our call (reftel) and
that of HMG, until it was fully cleared throughout the GOT.
Uras also said that when a decision is made, the Turks will
want to make sure that it is Talat who makes the announcement.

¶2. (C) Uras said the GOT and the Turkish Cypriots are a bit
discouraged at the tactics adopted by Christofias and the
Greek Cypriots, which do not lend themselves to moving ahead
quickly toward a final settlement. He lamented what he
described as the constant "negativity" and "Turkey-bashing"
in which the Greek Cypriots have engaged in recent months,
citing negative G/C comments at UNGA, using negative
influence in Strasbourg on ECHR cases, and blocking the
inclusion of experts with any involvement in the Annan Plan
negotiations from participating in a newly comprised EU panel
of experts on Cyprus (e.g., Frank Hoffmeister). However,
Uras said Ankara's plan is to continue to give Talat the
space he needs to negotiate a deal, and to remain in a
supportive role. He described the G/C side as a "reluctant
seller," equating Nicosia to a carpet dealer who sets an
initial (high) price as a final, take-it or leave-it offer.
He described the Greek Cypriot approach to negotiations as
being "top-down," with a focus on trying to solve all the
major issues at once, making it difficult to achieve forward
momentum anywhere. Meanwhile, he claimed Talat is taking
more of a "bottom-up" approach in which much of the
underbrush can be quickly agreed to by the two sides,
creating a sense that a deal is achievable with sufficient
compromise from both sides. He asked that the U.S. urge
Christofias to take a more constructive approach so that
momentum can be maintained.

¶3. (S) Uras described UNSRG Downer as "pragmatic" and they
have no real complaints about his efforts to date. He noted
that Downer, like anyone new in such a position, is
constantly advocating "new approaches" and counseling against
"clinging to old formulae." However, Uras pointed out, it
seems clear that after 40 years of Cyprob discussions, the
superstructure of a settlement acceptable to all sides is
largely known to everyone. We just need to figure out a way
to put a facade on it that can gain public acceptance on both
sides. Uras expressed concern about recent statements by HMG
officials that have given Ankara the impression London no
longer supports the long-standing principle of political
equality between the two communities in Cyprus. He noted
several comments by senior British officials to Turkish
counterparts in recent weeks to the effect that the ROC is an
EU member state, has the upper hand, and is a reality with
which the Turks will have to deal; that Turkish Cypriots have
equality as citizens of a member state, etc. The effect has
been to raise GOT fears that the EU and others are willing to
allow Nicosia to play a delaying game with a view to
ratcheting up pressure on Turkey as 2009 progresses. Uras
expressed the hope that the USG still supports the concept of
political equality between the two communities, which we
assured him we do.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/10/08ANKARA1747.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007451

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2013
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY MFA CYPRUS DEPARTMENT HEAD ON UPCOMING
CYPRUS INITIATIVE, ELECTIONS

REF: STATE 327579


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary. MFA Cyprus Department Head Levent Bilman
worries that despite its planned initiative for a Cyprus
settlement, Turkey will be unfairly blamed for future
breakdowns in negotiations. He claims Turkey's initiative
will be prepared in line with the SYG's requirements and
said, without giving details, that the GOT will prepare
public opinion for the concessions necessary for final
settlement. He requested U.S. intervention with the SYG once
Turkey's proposal is submitted and with the Greek Cypriots to
reach an agreement. End Summary.


Turkey's Upcoming Initiative


¶2. (C) Calling in poloff on December 4, Bilman handed over
copies of recent media interviews of Cypriot President
Papadopoulos and former President Clerides. He pointed out
Clerides' quotes to the effect that "we had to put blame on
the Turkish side for the failure of negotiations, while not
accepting anything or making any concession during the
negotiations." He particularly emphasized Papadopoulos'
statements that he had no intention of signing the Annan Plan
in Hague.


¶3. (C) According to Bilman, these showed that Turkey had
been unfairly blamed for breakdown of Annan Plan
negotiations. He worried this would happen again if there
were a breakdown when Turkey offered its new Cyprus
initiative after the elections. "If we're going to get
blamed, what's the point?" he asked rhetorically. Bilman
quickly added that the GOT was still committed to going
forward with its initiative, but was concerned about what the
response would be.


¶4. (C) Poloff replied these quotes demonstrated the
importance of Turkey framing its initiative in Annan Plan
terms, both procedurally and substantively, in order not to
leave room for anyone to claim Turkey had not done its part.
If it did not agree to Annan Plan procedures, or if it
contained substantive non-starters that re-opened basic
principles, Turkey's initiative would be rejected and Turkey
would again be blamed for the impasse.


¶5. (C) Bilman claimed Turkey was preparing its initiative in
line with the SYG's requirements. However, he worried that
in evaluating the proposal, the SYG, although
well-intentioned, would rely on advisors who would take a
harsh view of the initiative. He said Turkey would need help
with "access" to the SYG.


¶6. (C) Bilman asked for examples of non-starters; poloff
cited insistence on pre-settlement recognition of the "TRNC"
(reftel). Asked whether the GOT had thought about how to
prepare Turkish public opinion for the concessions necessary
to reach final settlement, Bilman replied the GOT had thought
about this, but he offered no details. He said PM Erdogan's
December 3 statements that there were "two different states,
two different religions, two different languages" on Cyprus,
fit with the Annan Plan's bicommunality provisions. He was
confident the public would accept a final agreement.


¶7. (C) Bilman predicted that even if an ostensible agreement
were reached, Greek Cypriots would use the Russians to block
approval in the Security Council. The Russians, he pointed
out, voted with the Greek Cypriots in the COE against the
recent Loizidou settlement proposal. He said the Greek
Cypriot side needed to be pressured in order for real
agreement to be reached; he asked for U.S. help in doing
this. Even if Turkey did everything in its power to reach
agreement, the Greek Cypriots would not have sufficient
pressure on them and felt they would suffer no consequences
for failing to respond. Poloff responded that leverage with
the Greek Cypriots would be highest prior to Cyprus' May 1 EU
accession.


December 14 Elections


¶8. (C) On elections, Bilman noted that voters lists were
complete; he claimed the "TRNC High Election Board" ("HEB")
had received 1232 objections and had stricken 921 names from
voter rolls due to insufficient proof of residency. He
claimed the "HEB" had received no additional objections to
the voter lists outside those in pending court cases.
Despite opposition claims to unequal time on local
television, Bilman said "reports from the island" suggested
these were untrue. He said the "Speaker" of the "TRNC
Parliament" had invited COE and OSCE observers to the island,
but none had come. Europe, he complained, had prejudged the
results and would recognize an opposition victory, but not a
victory but the current government parties.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/12/03ANKARA7451.html

[boomerang]

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007767

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY REACTS TO THE ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS


REF: ANKARA 7662


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).


¶1. (C) Summary: Close results in northern Cyprus' December
14 elections have unleashed a wave of speculation about their
meaning and possible coalitions on both sides in Turkey's
Cyprus debate. However, amid the media hype there is a clear
sense that all eyes are now on Ankara. Ankara's EU diplomats
are still digesting the results and have no post-election
action plan to engage the Turks. MFA officials expressed to
visiting UK officials hope for a broad-based coalition
government with which the GOT could negotiate without
worrying about being accused of a sellout. As it had with
Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on the eve of the
elections, the MFA sketchily outlined its plans to move
forward to re-start negotiations. End Summary.


Election Results Fodder for Both Sides


¶2. (U) The election results have prodded both the pro- and
anti-Denktash media to think harder about Cyprus than in the
past. Consistently pro-Denktash leftist-nationalist
Cumhuriyet, under the banner headline "Peace Offensive from
Denktash", called the elections a "lesson in democracy."
However, even Cumhuriyet's hard-core socialist-nationalist
columnist Hikmet Cetinkaya hinted at the question of poverty
and corruption under Denktash in his Dec. 17 column. A range
of columnists in other papers, including establishmentarians
like Murat Yetkin in Radikal, are urging the GOT to take
advantage of the opening to solve the Cyprus question. Most
pro-settlement columnists believe that the election results
have created more maneuvering space for the GOT to reach a
settlement and increased GOT leverage on the "TRNC." The
Turkish press has also picked up on the dramatic increase in
opposition votes over the last election as a signal of
dissatisfaction with the Denktash status quo. The media is
awash in speculation about the possible permutations for
coalitions and the effects upon a possible solution. But
while media predictions vary wildly, there is a clear sense
that all eyes are on Ankara.


No EU Post-Election Action Plan on Turkey


¶3. (C) With the exception of the UK, Ankara's EU diplomats
are still digesting the election results and, like the media,
are caught up in speculation about possible coalitions. Seen
from Ankara, there is no EU plan for engaging the Turks on
Cyprus. Asked what the EU's action plan is, the Dutch DCM
shook his head and wished the EU had one; the German
political counselor said the EU does not need an action plan
-- Cyprus is Turkey's problem.


¶4. (C) Ankara's EU diplomats are uncertain about the effect
of Cyprus settlement to Turkey's accession hopes. Most agree
that lack of a settlement will be fatal. However, the Irish
DCM claimed Turkey could still receive a date to begin
accession negotiations without settlement on Cyprus, although
he admitted it would be difficult. Several others speculated
that concern about Cyprus would get lost in December 2004
amid concerns about an EU Constitution and the recent
admission of 10 new members. Nor is there unanimity among
Ankara's EU diplomats on the criteria the EU will use in
December 2004 to determine whether Turkey's performance on
Cyprus is satisfactory. Several recognized that, because the
Cyprus question is not formally part of the political
criteria, EU language on Cyprus is vague. However, they
agreed that once the settlement process appears
"irreversible", Turkey will have cleared the EU's Cyprus bar.


MFA Election Readout


¶5. (C) According to the UK Political Counselor, Turkish MFA
U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin gave their election readouts
to visiting UK Foreign Office Permanent U/S Jay on December
¶15. MFA spent much of the meeting asserting that the
election in the North were free and fair. Ziyal averred that
he had personally instructed Turkey's "Embassy" in the "TRNC"
and Turkish military on the island not to interfere. The
British side noted that NGOs had raised questions about
fairness; the Turks charged that the NGOs were biased against
the government parties and had given money to the opposition.




¶6. (C) Ziyal and Ilkin said they hope for a broad-based
coalition government that will avoid past divisions. The GOT
wants to be able to come to a solution without worrying about
accusations of a sellout (of Denktash and Turkish honor) from
important, disgruntled factions outside the AK government.
U/S Ziyal interpreted the elections as showing that Turkish
Cypriots are ready for a settlement, but not at any price.
Turkey's Parliament will not settle for just anything, and
the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) will ratchet
up its rhetoric, he predicted. The government will have to
expend much political capital to get a settlement approved.
Another MFA official added that the AK government's
calculations could be influenced by Turkey's March 28 local
elections; according to the UK political counselor, the other
Turkish officials quickly cut him off.


GOT Timeline for a Settlement

¶7. (S) Ilkin reviewed the GOT's envisioned timeline, as he
had with Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on December 12
(reftel): the GOT will begin talks with Denktash in January,
with an eye toward opening talks with the Greek Cypriots in
the beginning of February. The GOT hopes for an agreed
statement of basic principles and a basic government
structure in place by late April. The GOT does not think it
can finalize all aspects of the negotiations by May 1, but
thinks it can have the basic settlement outline in place,
Ilkin asserted. The GOT is amenable in principle to a
referendum on the results of negotiations, but will not agree
to a referendum without knowing what the text will be. Ilkin
appealed to the British for help in pressuring the Greek
Cypriot side once Turkey tables its proposal.


¶8. (C) Comment: Despite the clear sense that the ball is
now in Ankara's court to make the next move toward a
settlement, there is currently no public consensus about what
constitutes an acceptable settlement. The GOT, relying to an
extent on the expertise of MFA officials who themselves are
in search of a way to break out of the 29-year stasis, wants
a proposal that garners a degree of consensus. It has not
yet fleshed one out. The lack of a clear plan is also due to
entrenched opposition to a settlement from parts of the
Turkish establishment which have enjoyed a cozy, mutually
beneficial material relationship with Denktash. In any case,
P.M. Erdogan will face a major leadership challenge in
convincing the public to accept compromises on a question
that for decades has been a hot button for Turkey's strong
nationalism. End Comment.
EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/12/03ANKARA7767.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000004

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2009
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR EINV AM CY TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES U.S. VISIT, CYPRUS, NATO
SUMMIT WITH PM


Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with Turkish PM Erdogan
December 31 in advance of Erdogan's late-January U.S. visit.
The Ambassador said White House officials view the visit as
an opportunity to enhance U.S.-Turkey relations and set the
stage for the June NATO Summit in Istanbul. The USG and GOT
continue to work to address GOT concerns over the conditions
of a USD 8.5 billion loan to Turkey. He urged the GOT to
resolve outstanding investment disputes with U.S. companies
and improve relations with Armenia. Erdogan offered to send
a high-level MFA team to Washington in advance of his visit
to discuss the Summit. He said he is committed to resolving
investment disputes and improving relations with Armenia
through reciprocal steps. The GOT remains committed to
Cyprus negotiations based on the Annan plan and may hold a
Cyprus summit once a government is formed in the "TRNC." End
Summary.


-------------------------------------
U.S. Visit Sets Stage for NATO Summit
-------------------------------------


¶2. (C) The Ambassador told Erdogan that President Bush and
other top USG officials are looking forward to his visit to
Washington in late January. A column in the Turkish press
claiming that the PM would only have a 20-minute meeting with
President Bush was incorrect. The Ambassador outlined the
PM's White House program, which he said was similar to the
format used for other world leaders, including UK PM Blair,
Spanish President Aznar, and French President Chirac. White
House officials would welcome a visit by senior MFA
representatives in advance of Erdogan's visit to discuss the
June NATO Summit in Istanbul. The White House is interested
in using the Summit as a means to promote the values of the
NATO alliance in the greater Middle East. Turkey has much to
contribute to this goal, and the USG is eager to discuss the
vision and substance of the Summit with the GOT. Erdogan
thanked the Ambassador for his efforts in support of the
Washington visit. He said he believes the visit will have an
important impact on the Middle East, Cyprus, and the NATO
Summit. In addition to the Washington meetings, Erdogan will
also speak to groups in New York and Boston. Turkish
businessmen traveling with Erdogan will meet with U.S.
counterparts. These meetings should help strengthen and
expand Turkey-U.S. relations. The GOT could send a
high-level MFA delegation to Washington 10-15 days before the
PM visit to discuss the Summit. Erdogan said the Turkish
press is unreliable and frequently strives to make the GOT
look bad. He asked the Ambassador to tell the press that the
column concerning Erdogan's visit was inaccurate; the
Ambassador agreed.


------
Cyprus
------


¶3. (C) The Ambassador formally delivered to Erdogan a letter
from President Bush concerning the PM's U.S. visit and
Cyprus. The Embassy delivered the letter informally in
advance of Erdogan's December 30 briefing on the MFA Cyprus
plan. Erdogan said the letter was constructive and had been
a useful element in his exchange with the MFA. He noted that
since coming to power in the November 2002 elections, the GOT
has consistently supported negotiations based on the Annan
plan, and he said that continues to be the goal. Elements of
the Turkish State agreed that negotiations on the basis of
the Annan Plan need to resume as soon as possible, but
internal discussions on details of the approach are
continuing. After a "TRNC" government is established the GOT
wants negotiations to resume quickly. It might be necessary
to hold another summit with the "TRNC" leadership in Turkey
to move the initiative forward.


----------------------------------
Working to Resolve Loan Conditions
----------------------------------


¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG continues to work
with the MFA to address the GOT's concerns over the language
tying the USD 8.5 billion loan to Turkey to a GOT agreement
not to enter northern Iraq unilaterally. The goal is to meet
the political requirements of the GOT while staying within
the limits of U.S. congressional legislation. The Embassy
has confirmed with the U.S. Treasury Department that the
money will continue to be available while both sides work to
resolve the issue. Erdogan said the political opposition,
particularly in Parliament, has been "very ugly" on this
issue, even accusing the GOT of "selling" Turkey. Neither
the U.S. nor the GOT can afford to allow the GOT's opponents
to use this issue as a political tool to damage the
U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership.


-------------------------------
Outstanding Investment Disputes
-------------------------------


¶5. (C) Erdogan said the GOT is committed to maintaining
fiscal discipline. The government plans to stick to its 2004
inflation target of 12 percent. Growth for next year should
meet the 5 percent target, but the goal for the following
year should be 7 or 7.5 percent. The Ambassador said that
Erdogan's visit should highlight Turkey's solid economic
performance, but should also focus on progress on some
outstanding investment and business disputes. If a few of
these disputes could be resolved before the visit, it would
enable both sides to portray Turkey as a good place for U.S.
companies to invest. For example, the GOT has made
significant progress on the Cargill zoning dispute, though
Parliament must pass legislation in order to fully resolve
it. Erdogan said he places a high priority on resolving
these types of disputes, and had given instructions to
resolve the Cargill issue. The GOT needs to take the
necessary measures to attract foreign direct investment. He
asked whether the Embassy could provide a list of all such
disputes involving U.S. companies. The Ambassador said the
Embassy had given the list to a number of GOT officials, and
would also send a copy directly to the PM's office.


--------------------------
Turkish-Armenian Relations
--------------------------


¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador said Turkish-Armenian relations might
also be raised during Erdogan's visit. Anything Turkey could
do to enhance relations, particularly in the economic field,
would he helpful for both Armenia and northeastern Turkey.
It would also help the U.S. administration politically.
Erdogan said the GOT has a positive approach toward relations
with Armenia, and has even encouraged the Azeris to take a
positive approach. The GOT is willing to negotiate, but the
Armenians must agree to take reciprocal steps.


--------------------------
Rotations Through Incirlik
--------------------------


¶7. (C) The Ambassador thanked Erdogan for the GOT's decision
to approve the use of Incirlik to rotate troops in and out of
Iraq. The USG will handle the rotations in a low-key manner,
with no public comments, but is very grateful for the
support.

EDELMAN

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/01/04ANKARA4.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000295

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH FIRST ARMY COMMANDER ON US/TURKEY
RELATIONS, CYPRUS, GME


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5(b&d)


¶1. (u) Summary: During the course of a February 26 courtesy
call by the Ambassador, First Army Commander General
Buyukanit offered his views on U.S.-Turkish
military-to-military relations, the ongoing Cyprus
negotiations, and the Greater Middle East. End Summary.


Mil-Mil Relations
-----------------
¶2. (c) Buyukanit noted that the March 1, 2003, vote in the
Turkish Parliament had been a major setback to relations. As
the then-Deputy Chairman of the Turkish General Staff (TGS),
he recalled having worked around the clock for several days
in the lead-up to the vote. As a result, Buyukanit took it
personally when Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz later
"criticized" the Turkish military in a CNN Turk interview for
not demonstrating sufficient leadership. Buyukanit defended
the TGS, but concluded that he saw the whole incident as a
"black spot" on his career. The Ambassador reassured the
General that we understand there were many factors which
contributed to the parliamentary vote and that Wolfowitz
remains one of Turkey's strongest supporters.


¶3. (c) The Ambassador added that much of the damage to the
relationship has already been repaired with renewed contacts
and a resumption of the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG)
meetings. Buyukanit expressed his satisfaction with the
resumption of the HLPG meetings and suggested that such
meetings adopt the broad, "strategic" focus that
characterized the bilateral exchanges in the 1980s. The
Ambassador agreed and noted that the November HLPG had
included such a discussion on Iraq. Following up on these
talks with other discussions between regular HLPG meetings
would also be important to maintaining a healthy dialogue.
The upcoming visit of DOD Jim Townsend to Turkey would be one
such useful opportunity. The June NATO Summit in Istanbul
would be yet another opportunity for high-level discussions.


Cyprus
------

¶4. (c) Initially reluctant to comment on the ongoing
negotiations in Cyprus (an issue on which he had spent
"years" and had "hundreds" of meetings), Buyukanit did note
that he sees the island as "strategically" important only as
it relates to Turkey's EU membership. "What will happen if
(there is a solution and) Turkey does not join the EU?," he
asked. As for the ongoing talks, Buyukanit urged caution to
ensure that "today's solutions not become tomorrow's
problems." With a few "necessary modifications" (nfi), the
plan could work. Moreover, Buyukanit added, "I know" that
when UNSYG Annan sits down to "fill in the blanks" on the
plan, that it is "really the U.S. and the U.K." that will be
calling the shots. The Ambassador expressed confidence that
Turkey will eventually be an EU member and that a durable
Cyprus settlement can be found. The U.S. has a role, the
Ambassador admitted, but it would be UNSYG Annan who makes
the final decisions on the details of unresolved elements of
the plan.


Greater Middle East
-------------------

¶5. (c) The Ambassador sketched the background and thinking
that underlies a new USG focus and commitment to support
democratic and economic reform in the Greater Middle East
(GME). Buyukanit agreed that Turkey would be one of the
prime beneficiaries of greater stability and democracy in
this region. Disavowing the much-discussed notion that
Turkey can be a "model," Buyukanit argued that if the U.S.
succeeds there, Iraq itself could be the model for Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and other countries in the region. Buyukanit
singled out the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as particularly
intractable and commented that the U.S. would have a critical
role to play here and in the whole region.
ARNETT

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/02/04ISTANBUL295.html