Lack of planning scuppered our dreams
By Nicos Rolandis Published on April 10, 2011
have a look what he is saying .....are they noticed any of his remarks ?
I can hear how angry you are towards this man...u are angry because he tells the truth....
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE 1950s, I was a young man, loaded with dreams and full of aspirations.
It was also the time when Cyprus stood on her feet and started the struggle for liberation, seeking union with Greece (enosis). It was a vision dating back centuries.
Some of us, talking in confidence to each other, expressed concern as to whether our small motherland could ever reach and embrace her dream. It was obvious that Greece herself had serious doubts about the whole venture, the British were strongly against it and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had rejected the idea.
I remember how heroic the struggle and sacrifice of the children of Cyprus were. However it was a struggle without any political planning, and without the acquiescence of Greece. Its Prime Minister, Nicolaos Plastiras, had refused to even receive the Cypriot delegation, which sought to hand over to him the official results of the Plebiscite on enosis. Plastiras sent a message to Makarios: If you came to my humble cottage and asked me to fight for Cyprus I would have gladly accepted it, because I am a soldier. But you come to the office of the Prime Minister of Greece and you ask me to burn Greece to ashes, without really helping Cyprus so, please, stay quiet. It was obvious that Cyprus was fighting for the impossible - without any planning, as usual.
So, the game was lost. Union was converted into Independence. And at the end of the day it turned out to be a special type of independence, with presidents and vice presidents in most of the state organs, with many vetoes and many question marks.
I remember that in 1960 the Greek Cypriot leadership applauded our special type of independence with the words: we have won. After serious consideration I had reached the conclusion with my friends that we had a certain kind of a solution. After all, the dreams which reach the stars are not always feasible on this planet.
But the thinking of the two communities was not in line with such an assessment. Neither community truly believed in the new motherland. The boat started to flounder. And moreover, at that very moment we committed the fatal blunder of suggesting an amendment to the Constitution, which would strip the Turkish Cypriots of most of their privileges under the 1960 Constitution. Greece warned that we should not do it. But we did it - without any planning, as usual.
So, we entered a decade full of dangers. We lost control. We went back to union with Greece - the House of Representatives voted unanimously in favour in 1967, in contravention of the Constitution. Later on we opted for what was feasible, but soon we turned back once more to enosis. While George Grivas was fighting the Turks in Skarinou, other leaders were talking to the Turkish Cypriots. Yet, at the same time, the Greek Cypriot leadership entertained the impression, (believe it or not) that the Turkish Cypriots would end up boiling in their own juice.
In 1974 came the Greek coup d etat. It was a horrendous crime. It opened wide the gate for the Turkish invasion. Cyprus was crucified. The impermissible assessment that the Turkish Cypriots would boil in their own juice proved wrong. We all boiled in the juice of disaster.
By that time I was a young industrialist, with a family, Lelia and three children. Businesses had lost a large part of their assets and also their prospects. Our lives were stripped of dreams. Looking back, I mused that if in 1960 we were mandated to ruin our country, it would indeed have been very difficult to achieve it in such a perfect way!
In 1976 I entered politics and in 1978 I was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In those years two important plans were proposed to us. In November 1978 we had the Anglo-American-Canadian Plan, in which US President Jimmy Carter was the protagonist (hence the huge weight it carried). Then, in August 1983, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar proposed the Indicators. The occupation was not yet solidified. We almost had no settlers and the terms on territory, constitution, properties and many other issues were quite favourable. But we were seeking something better, so we rejected both initiatives - without any planning, as usual.
I handed in my resignation from the post of Foreign Minister.
Of course nothing better was in the wings. On the contrary, after rejecting a number of other initiatives over the years, we have ended up today with an impasse. The issues of territory, properties, constitutional arrangements, security are all deadlocked. As far as the Turkish settlers are concerned a Turkish Cypriot leader put it to me recently as follows: We have 200,000 Turkish Cypriots, he said, including 120,000 Turks (settlers) who have been Ťnaturalised. These will stay here under any circumstances. We also have an additional number of approximately 250,000 Turks who live and work here. A number of the 250,000 Turks will also stay in Cyprus.
Just compare the above with the situation in 1983, when we had 15,000 Turkish settlers, ready to depart upon the payment of a compensation of $5,000 per capita (which the Americans were prepared to pay), an arrangement which was eventually rejected by us. Just like that - without any planning, as usual.
These days I follow the developments in connection with the off share oil and gas. We may have a substantial wealth down there. My view is that we are handling this issue in the same naďve manner as we did in the political field, from 1960 until today. We are under the false impression that once we have sovereignty we can act in any manner we consider appropriate, overlooking the Turkish Cypriots and failing again to follow the example and advice of Greece (which also has sovereignty), and which acts very cautiously in regard to her own oil and gas reserves. Unlike our stance which appears to be without any planning, as usual.
The offshore oil issue I kicked off in 1998 as Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism with the support of President Clerides. I negotiated for three years with the Egyptians and in February 2003 I signed in Cairo the Agreement for the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Egypt and Cyprus, the first EEZ Agreement ever signed in the Eastern Mediterranean. I also negotiated the EEZ issue with Lebanon and Syria during respective visits to the above countries and also started talks with the Ambassador of Israel on the subject. (Some people shamelessly make repeated false statements that the EEZ Agreement with Egypt was signed by the late Tassos Papadopoulos, a falsehood which, I know, would have infuriated Tassos if he were alive).
And I call upon you, President Christofias, to have your eyes wide open in respect of the offshore oil and gas reserves. All great alliances, conflicts and wars in history were connected one way or the other with vital economic interests, and oil is one of them.
The tragedy of 1974 may be repeated, if we are not prudent. Back then the average man in the street and even Makarios were taken aback and could not easily realise and assimilate the sudden disaster.
Mr President, the national issue and the offshore oil are both potentially explosive. We may have the hallucination that we live in the sunshine, at the very time the tempest bursts upon our heads, as happened in the past. Make sure that we shall not act yet again without planning as usual.
And do not tell me that Europe will protect us, because Europe was there during the Greece-Turkey crisis over Imia when there was almost war, and it did nothing.
Nicos Rolandis was Minister of Foreign Affairs 1978-1983, and Minister of Commerce, Industry & Tourism 1998-2003
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus-probl ... 0b252a%2C1