Can I ask specifically what was wrong with the Annan plan, because from a Tc perspective it required compromises on our part too, for example refugees from Guzel Yurt (mourfo) becoming refugees again for a third time in their own lifetime.
But never the less I am interested in what the GC felt was so wrong about it, but please give specific details so we can better understand - As many (even moderate) Tcs see the plans rejection as a GC rejection of unification.
The Annan plan
The Annan plan
by DTA » Tue Mar 01, 2011 5:26 pm
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by Hermes » Tue Mar 01, 2011 5:59 pm
Specific reasons for rejection by the Greek Cypriots
As summarised by "The Case Against the Annan Plan", Coufoudakis and Kyriakides and the Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan dated 7 June 2004
Turkey obtained divisive bi-zonality provisions, strategic economic benefits, and “security” arrangements, allowing her to intervene militarily, making full independence impossible.
The Turkish Cypriot constituent state, would have been integrated to Turkey making United Cyprus Republic (UCR) answerable to Turkey.
Turkey would have constrained UCR΄s economic development by securing provisions in the Law on the Continental Shelf that prevents the UCR from exploring and exploiting her maritime resources in the seas of Cyprus.
Turkey was granted rights to interfere with the Treaty between Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Cyprus' rights to its Continental Shelf in the south would have also been answerable to Turkey.
The fifth revision of the Annan plan imposed the “Cooperative Agreement on Civil Aviation with Turkey” on Cyprus. The management of Cyprus air space would have been subject to Turkey’s consent. It would have also allowed Turkey to take all necessary actions (even military action) in the event of any threat to aircraft passengers, airport or aviation facilities in Cyprus airspace.
Turkey was granted the right of stationing Turkish troops on the island of Cyprus perpetually, again making full independence impossible.
The Ethnic groups in Cyprus are Greek 77%, Turkish 18%, other 5% of the population. (2001) The Annan plan equates the representation of the two major ethnic groups in the proposed Senate and in the Supreme Court giving 50-50 representation to the two communities. The majority becomes a minority in important decision centres.
The plan created a confederation even though it utilised the term "federation" because there was no hierarchy of laws, while central authority emanated from the so-called component states. Note that the United States abandoned its original confederal structure because it was unworkable. In 1789, a federal constitution was established containing a clear federal supremacy clause. The Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot (77% of population) and Turkish Cypriot judges (18% of population), plus three foreign judges; thus foreign actors would cast deciding votes.
The Plan did not include a settlement regarding the repatriation of Turkish settlers living on Greek Cypriot owned land in Northern Cyprus, while after 19 years, the possibility of abolishing the derogation of 5% of Greeks and Turkish citizens who could settle in Cyprus, is obvious, and the danger of a permanent mass settling of Cyprus by Turkey is visible.
Nearly all the Turkish settlers would be granted citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. The central government would have limited control towards future Turkish Immigration. Those settlers opting to return to Turkey would be compensated by Cyprus and Greek Cypriots. Even though Turkey systematically brought in the settlers to alter the demography of the island, it had no responsibility for their Repatriation.
The Plan simply disregarded the plain language and clear meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1949, section III, article 49, which prohibits colonisation by an occupying power. Article 49 states in its last paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."
The Plan did not deal in full with the issue of demilitarisation of the legally invalid 'TRNC', and Greek Cypriots felt they had no reason to believe Turkish promises concerning the withdrawal of troops.
Cyprus would be excluded from the European Common Defense and Foreign Policy, while Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus even after the accession of Turkey to the EU with intervention rights, (a military invasion - occasionally used euphemistically), in the future Greek Cypriot component state.
Many Greek Cypriots interpreted the Right of Return policy as seriously flawed, meaning only 20% of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return over a time frame of 25 years, whereas Turkish Cypriots would have had full right of return. The plan denied to all Cypriots rights enjoyed by all other EU citizens (right of free movement and residence, the right to apply to work in any position (including national civil services, the right to vote).
Turkish Cypriots would have gained all the basic demands it made, from the first day of the implementation of the solution. To be exact, 24 hours after the holding of the referendum. In contrast, everything that the Greek Cypriots were aspiring to achieve, would have postponed without guarantees and depend upon the good will of Turkey to fulfil the obligations it undertakes.
The return of the Turkish occupied land will take place in the period between three and a half months and three and a half years from the moment the solution is signed with no guarantees whatsoever that this shall be implemented. The Cypriot-Greek proposal of placing these areas under the control of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and not the Turkish army has been rejected.
The Plan did not address the issue of the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) on the island, although parts of the SBAs would be transferred to the governments of the two constituent states.
The British were granted rights to unilaterally define the continental shelf and territorial waters along two base areas and to claim potential mineral rights. Under the 1959-1960 Zürich and London Agreements, Britain did not have such rights (see the 2nd annex to the Additional Protocol to the 1959 Treaty of Establishment).
The plan absolved Turkey of all responsibility for its invasion of Cyprus and its murders, rapes, destruction of property and churches, looting and forcing approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and property. The Cyprus government filed applications to the European Commission on Human Rights on September 17, 1974 and on March 21, 1975. The Commission issued its report on the charges made in the two applications on July 10, 1976. In it the Commission found Turkey guilty of violating the following articles of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Article 2 - by the killing of innocent civilians committed on a substantial scale;
Article 3 - by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71;
Article 3 - by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons detained;
Article 5 - by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees and missing persons - a continuing violation;
Article 8 - by displacement of persons creating more than 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and be refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes.
The plan failed to provide payment by Turkey:
for the lives of innocent civilians killed by the Turkish army;
for the victims of rape by the Turkish army;
for the vast destruction of property and churches by the Turkish army; and for the substantial looting by the Turkish army.
The Plan subverted the property rights of the Greek Cypriots and other legal owners of property in the occupied area:
by prohibiting recourse to European courts on property issues;
by withdrawing all pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights and transferring them to local courts;
by allowing Turkish Cypriots and illegal mainland Turk settlers/colonists to keep Greek Cypriot homes and property they were illegally given following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and not having to reimburse the rightful owners of the property for 30 years of illegal use;
by a highly complicated, ambiguous and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and which is based on the principle that real property owners can ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law. The Greek Cypriot property owners would have to be reimbursed by the to be federal treasury which would be funded overwhelmingly by the Greek Cypriots, meaning that Greek Cypriots would be reimbursing themselves.
The Plan would have the effect of protecting those British citizens who illegally bought Greek Cypriot property from settlers or persons who are not owners; in the occupied north of Cyprus. They would, in effect, not be held responsible for their illegal action.
The cost of economic reunification would be borne by the Greek Cypriots. The reunification cost has been estimated close to $20b
Following Annan 5 plan the Greek Cypriots would not have been allowed to make up more than 6% of the population in any single village in the Turkish controlled areas in the north thus they would have been prevented from setting up their own schools for their children and would not have even been able to give birth once this quota was reached.
According to UN 260 resolution Genocide is: (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
The agreement places time restrictions in the right of free, permanent installation of Greek Cypriots back to their homes and properties in the to be Turkish Cypriot state, which constitutes a deviation from the European Union practices. Those Greek Cypriot refugees that would return to their homes in regions under Turkish Cypriot administration would have no local civil rights, because the political representatives of Turkish Cypriot state would be elected only from Turkish Cypriots.
The functional weaknesses of the Plan endanger, inter alia, the smooth activity and participation of Cyprus, with one voice, in the European Union. While the Greek Cypriots have with many sacrifices achieved Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Greek Cypriots could very easily be led to the neutralization of the accession until the adoption of all necessary federal and regional legal measures or the loss of the benefits of the accession or the facing of obstacles in Cyprus participation in the Economic and Monetary Union and other European institutions.
The Economy of Cyprus would have been separate with the plan. There will be no common Monetary policy, fiscal policy and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
Many Greek-Cypriots felt that the demand that the Cyprus issue be resolved before Cyprus' entry to the EU was so that the reunification would not have to contain elements of European law which were incompatible with certain provisions in the Annan Plan. This was further backed up by many who demanded the EU accept all derogations even if they violate European Court Decisions, European Law and UN Security Council Resolutions. Both Romano Prodi and Günter Verheugen repeatedly indicated that any such derogations should only be for a short period of time and should not violate any European Laws.
As summarised by "The Case Against the Annan Plan", Coufoudakis and Kyriakides and the Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan dated 7 June 2004
Turkey obtained divisive bi-zonality provisions, strategic economic benefits, and “security” arrangements, allowing her to intervene militarily, making full independence impossible.
The Turkish Cypriot constituent state, would have been integrated to Turkey making United Cyprus Republic (UCR) answerable to Turkey.
Turkey would have constrained UCR΄s economic development by securing provisions in the Law on the Continental Shelf that prevents the UCR from exploring and exploiting her maritime resources in the seas of Cyprus.
Turkey was granted rights to interfere with the Treaty between Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Cyprus' rights to its Continental Shelf in the south would have also been answerable to Turkey.
The fifth revision of the Annan plan imposed the “Cooperative Agreement on Civil Aviation with Turkey” on Cyprus. The management of Cyprus air space would have been subject to Turkey’s consent. It would have also allowed Turkey to take all necessary actions (even military action) in the event of any threat to aircraft passengers, airport or aviation facilities in Cyprus airspace.
Turkey was granted the right of stationing Turkish troops on the island of Cyprus perpetually, again making full independence impossible.
The Ethnic groups in Cyprus are Greek 77%, Turkish 18%, other 5% of the population. (2001) The Annan plan equates the representation of the two major ethnic groups in the proposed Senate and in the Supreme Court giving 50-50 representation to the two communities. The majority becomes a minority in important decision centres.
The plan created a confederation even though it utilised the term "federation" because there was no hierarchy of laws, while central authority emanated from the so-called component states. Note that the United States abandoned its original confederal structure because it was unworkable. In 1789, a federal constitution was established containing a clear federal supremacy clause. The Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot (77% of population) and Turkish Cypriot judges (18% of population), plus three foreign judges; thus foreign actors would cast deciding votes.
The Plan did not include a settlement regarding the repatriation of Turkish settlers living on Greek Cypriot owned land in Northern Cyprus, while after 19 years, the possibility of abolishing the derogation of 5% of Greeks and Turkish citizens who could settle in Cyprus, is obvious, and the danger of a permanent mass settling of Cyprus by Turkey is visible.
Nearly all the Turkish settlers would be granted citizenship or residence rights leading to citizenship. The central government would have limited control towards future Turkish Immigration. Those settlers opting to return to Turkey would be compensated by Cyprus and Greek Cypriots. Even though Turkey systematically brought in the settlers to alter the demography of the island, it had no responsibility for their Repatriation.
The Plan simply disregarded the plain language and clear meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1949, section III, article 49, which prohibits colonisation by an occupying power. Article 49 states in its last paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."
The Plan did not deal in full with the issue of demilitarisation of the legally invalid 'TRNC', and Greek Cypriots felt they had no reason to believe Turkish promises concerning the withdrawal of troops.
Cyprus would be excluded from the European Common Defense and Foreign Policy, while Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus even after the accession of Turkey to the EU with intervention rights, (a military invasion - occasionally used euphemistically), in the future Greek Cypriot component state.
Many Greek Cypriots interpreted the Right of Return policy as seriously flawed, meaning only 20% of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return over a time frame of 25 years, whereas Turkish Cypriots would have had full right of return. The plan denied to all Cypriots rights enjoyed by all other EU citizens (right of free movement and residence, the right to apply to work in any position (including national civil services, the right to vote).
Turkish Cypriots would have gained all the basic demands it made, from the first day of the implementation of the solution. To be exact, 24 hours after the holding of the referendum. In contrast, everything that the Greek Cypriots were aspiring to achieve, would have postponed without guarantees and depend upon the good will of Turkey to fulfil the obligations it undertakes.
The return of the Turkish occupied land will take place in the period between three and a half months and three and a half years from the moment the solution is signed with no guarantees whatsoever that this shall be implemented. The Cypriot-Greek proposal of placing these areas under the control of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and not the Turkish army has been rejected.
The Plan did not address the issue of the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) on the island, although parts of the SBAs would be transferred to the governments of the two constituent states.
The British were granted rights to unilaterally define the continental shelf and territorial waters along two base areas and to claim potential mineral rights. Under the 1959-1960 Zürich and London Agreements, Britain did not have such rights (see the 2nd annex to the Additional Protocol to the 1959 Treaty of Establishment).
The plan absolved Turkey of all responsibility for its invasion of Cyprus and its murders, rapes, destruction of property and churches, looting and forcing approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and property. The Cyprus government filed applications to the European Commission on Human Rights on September 17, 1974 and on March 21, 1975. The Commission issued its report on the charges made in the two applications on July 10, 1976. In it the Commission found Turkey guilty of violating the following articles of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Article 2 - by the killing of innocent civilians committed on a substantial scale;
Article 3 - by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71;
Article 3 - by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons detained;
Article 5 - by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees and missing persons - a continuing violation;
Article 8 - by displacement of persons creating more than 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and be refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes.
The plan failed to provide payment by Turkey:
for the lives of innocent civilians killed by the Turkish army;
for the victims of rape by the Turkish army;
for the vast destruction of property and churches by the Turkish army; and for the substantial looting by the Turkish army.
The Plan subverted the property rights of the Greek Cypriots and other legal owners of property in the occupied area:
by prohibiting recourse to European courts on property issues;
by withdrawing all pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights and transferring them to local courts;
by allowing Turkish Cypriots and illegal mainland Turk settlers/colonists to keep Greek Cypriot homes and property they were illegally given following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and not having to reimburse the rightful owners of the property for 30 years of illegal use;
by a highly complicated, ambiguous and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and which is based on the principle that real property owners can ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law. The Greek Cypriot property owners would have to be reimbursed by the to be federal treasury which would be funded overwhelmingly by the Greek Cypriots, meaning that Greek Cypriots would be reimbursing themselves.
The Plan would have the effect of protecting those British citizens who illegally bought Greek Cypriot property from settlers or persons who are not owners; in the occupied north of Cyprus. They would, in effect, not be held responsible for their illegal action.
The cost of economic reunification would be borne by the Greek Cypriots. The reunification cost has been estimated close to $20b
Following Annan 5 plan the Greek Cypriots would not have been allowed to make up more than 6% of the population in any single village in the Turkish controlled areas in the north thus they would have been prevented from setting up their own schools for their children and would not have even been able to give birth once this quota was reached.
According to UN 260 resolution Genocide is: (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
The agreement places time restrictions in the right of free, permanent installation of Greek Cypriots back to their homes and properties in the to be Turkish Cypriot state, which constitutes a deviation from the European Union practices. Those Greek Cypriot refugees that would return to their homes in regions under Turkish Cypriot administration would have no local civil rights, because the political representatives of Turkish Cypriot state would be elected only from Turkish Cypriots.
The functional weaknesses of the Plan endanger, inter alia, the smooth activity and participation of Cyprus, with one voice, in the European Union. While the Greek Cypriots have with many sacrifices achieved Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Greek Cypriots could very easily be led to the neutralization of the accession until the adoption of all necessary federal and regional legal measures or the loss of the benefits of the accession or the facing of obstacles in Cyprus participation in the Economic and Monetary Union and other European institutions.
The Economy of Cyprus would have been separate with the plan. There will be no common Monetary policy, fiscal policy and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
Many Greek-Cypriots felt that the demand that the Cyprus issue be resolved before Cyprus' entry to the EU was so that the reunification would not have to contain elements of European law which were incompatible with certain provisions in the Annan Plan. This was further backed up by many who demanded the EU accept all derogations even if they violate European Court Decisions, European Law and UN Security Council Resolutions. Both Romano Prodi and Günter Verheugen repeatedly indicated that any such derogations should only be for a short period of time and should not violate any European Laws.
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by DTA » Tue Mar 01, 2011 6:25 pm
Thanks for this but I kind of wanted forum members opinions not what Paps had to say, nevertheless lets look at a few of these points.
There is a lot written so lets take them one or two at a time if you guys dont mind:
(but the BBF was always going to be bi-zonal),
what were these, can you give details?
the right of intervention since the Roc's foundation has already been given to Turkey and the Uk and Greece- was this different?
How would this be done? the northern part of the island would become a province for of Turkey?- seriously confused here what does that mean.
There is a lot written so lets take them one or two at a time if you guys dont mind:
1) Turkey obtained divisive bi-zonality provisions
(but the BBF was always going to be bi-zonal),
strategic economic benefits, and “security” arrangements
what were these, can you give details?
allowing her to intervene militarily, making full independence impossible
the right of intervention since the Roc's foundation has already been given to Turkey and the Uk and Greece- was this different?
The Turkish Cypriot constituent state, would have been integrated to Turkey making United Cyprus Republic (UCR) answerable to Turkey.
How would this be done? the northern part of the island would become a province for of Turkey?- seriously confused here what does that mean.
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by Hermes » Tue Mar 01, 2011 6:48 pm
DTA wrote:Thanks for this but I kind of wanted forum members opinions not what Paps had to say.
You asked why the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan and I gave you the reasons. The President outlined his reasons at the time and the people gave their verdict. In retrospect, the Annan Plan was even more horrific and duplicitous than people realised. The main points outlined above are summaries from the book "The Case Against the Annan Plan" by Coufoudakis and Kyriakides.
Prof. Coufoudakis has since argued that in the particular case of Cyprus, "Kofi Annan and his staff exceeded their jurisdiction; misled the international community in their reports and actions on Cyprus; became parties instead of facilitators in the Cyprus problem and undermined the credibility of the United Nations by attempting to impose a settlement tailor-made by the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. They did so by threat, disinformation, by violating cardinal rules of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and European law."
I hope that's sufficient for you.
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by DTA » Tue Mar 01, 2011 6:54 pm
Not really I want to get to the points that that the Gcs had the most problem with and why they as individuals rejected it. Chief Akridas's views for me and almost all Tcs (and i hope Gcs as well) will always be tainted by the fact that he is claimed to be (by Cleredes (spelling) if memory serves me right) Chief Akridas
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by Hermes » Tue Mar 01, 2011 7:08 pm
DTA wrote:Not really I want to get to the points that that the Gcs had the most problem with and why they as individuals rejected it. Chief Akridas's views for me and almost all Tcs (and i hope Gcs as well) will always be tainted by the fact that he is claimed to be (by Cleredes (spelling) if memory serves me right) Chief Akridas
Well I voted against the Annan Plan for most of the reasons outlined above. Of course, it turns out that Papadopoulos was right in his assessment that this was a plan devised to give Turkey everything it wanted on Cyprus and to effectively dismember the island, disenfranchise the Greek Cypriot majority and to legalise the Turkish invasion, occupation and plunder of the island. We also now know that the UN negotiators acted outside their remit and were party to a monstrous betrayal of UN principles and international law. All in all, one of the most shameful episodes in recent political history.
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by DTA » Tue Mar 01, 2011 7:17 pm
Not trying to be argumentative here but was really looking for specifics, for example if the points that I have quoted (and they were in no order just the first two sentences of the article that you posted) were part of the reason why you voted no, could you answer my questions (which were specific to those points) so I (we) can better understand?
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by DTA » Tue Mar 01, 2011 7:25 pm
Bananiot wrote:Papadopoulos was second in command of the Organisation. The leader was Yiorgadjis, the first husband of Papadopoulos's wife.
My memory serves me wrong then thank you for the correction I thought I read somewhere that Cleredes (spelling) had stated that Chief Akridas (as he signed at the bottom of the plan) was Papadopoulos
Bannoit not to derail this thread but everything I have read about Cleredes points that he is an honorable guy - would you say that this is the case?
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