Kikapu wrote:Filitsa wrote:Here's a hypothetical, Kikapu:
TC President ... GC V.P. ... TC sponsored bill originates in the Upper Chamber .... GC V.P. breaks the tie and kills the bill ... same TC sponsored bill re-introduced in the Lower Chamber this time. Chances are it will be killed there too because the GC's are in the majority. Now what?
In your hypothetical, Filitsa, the bill will just die if compromises are not reached to change the bill in the lower house and then back at the upper house. This is where "horse trading" comes into play.
Anteroom negotiations are indeed a significant part of the legislative process in the U.S., but for this to work in CY requires a tremendous amount of good will on the parts of GC and TC legislators. The predisposition of distrust between the two communities (of which this forum is a microcosm), begs the question of good will. Does the good will exist, and is it pervasive enough to make the system work?
Kikapu wrote:All bills need to pass both the lower and the upper house to become law, once the President signs it, of course or if the President refuses to sign the bill which have a majority of 6-5 upper house including the VP's vote as a tie-breaker, then the upper house can invoke "cloture" clause at three-fifths of 10 senators, which will be 6 votes. 6 senate votes can override the President's veto as long as the same bill has a majority vote in the lower house. The VP cannot vote to make the 6 votes needed in the upper house when invoking the "cloture" clause vote.
This way, despite the TCs will be a minority in the lower house, the majority GCs will not be able to get a bill through in the upper house unless the TCs also approve it, regardless whether the TC is a President or a vice President. This is the built in veto power that the TCs will have and also their safeguard against being politically pushed aside. The important thing to remember however, that these upper seats (and lower house seats) are not given to the TCs and the GCs as an entitlement, but rather it is given to each state, the north and the south. The senators will need to be elected by those living within those states, is the reason why the north state needs to reduce it's territorial size in order to have the most number of TCs in the north state to maintain an overwhelming majority TCs, so that all elections are Democratically held, but will favour the TCs in the north for them to elect 5 TC senators all the same and the GCs will do the same in the south. Without this arrangement, there will not be any incentive for the TCs to give any land back to become part of the south state which would place many of the displaced GC refugees in the south, which would actually benefit the TCs to maintain a majority in the north.
My understanding of cloture is different than yours. I understand it as the act of closing debate to call for a vote. Nevertheless, my understanding of the above - correct me if I'm wrong - is that the V.P. is prohibited from voting to override a veto, so practically speaking, 5 TC-affirmative votes plus 1 GC-affirmative vote will override the veto in the Upper Chamber, that is, of course, if the Lower Chamber also garnered enough votes to override it. I'm not convinced that this will work. Practicially speaking, what incentive does a GC have to cross "party lines" and vote with the TC's? Really, the effect is no different than allowing the V.P. to vote.
You lost me at territorial size, Kikapu. Why is this relevant? Isn't representation to the Lower Chamber based on population?
