All4114All wrote:antifon wrote:quattro wrote:antifon wrote:Is it too late for Turkish Cypriots to negotiate the 1963 ideas provided that:
a. Turkey will come under extreme pressures to remove herself from Cyprus
b. Turkey will face growing TC opposition as their fear of extinction grows
c. Greek Cypriots will never agree a federation on a 1960 "equality" logic
Read Makarios' ideas in 1963, together with his reasoning. In my view, the document constitutues a visionary statement, perhaps even to form the basis for the solution to Turkey's 87 year old internal conflict between its majority ethnic Turk and minority ethnic Kurd communities.
SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR FACILITATING THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE AND FOR THE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN CAUSES OF INTER- COMMUNAL FRICTION (1963)
http://antifon.blogspot.com/2010/12/pre ... osals.html
My opinion:
http://antifon.blogspot.com/2011/01/tri ... hobia.html
http://antifon.blogspot.com
.
Thank you.
Anti going back to 1960 is something ,but we have to negotiate the 13teen points with tCs and my believe is that those point cause all the mess .
As a matter of fact no, 1960 itself was the pandora's box (η αιτία), with 1963 being simply the excuse (η αφορμή). Makarios' 1963 proposed ideas ( http://antifon.blogspot.com/2010/12/pre ... osals.html ) were an attempt to surpass unworkability issues and promote unity as opposed taksim.
In other words, how one views the November 30th 1963 ideas depends what the vision is. If it is TAKSIM, i.e. separation, then it is bad because the entire 13 points try to promote unification, the exact opposite of what the tCypriot leadership/Turkey were aiming for at the time & still do.
Of course, point#1 alone of the 13 [a tragic choice of number for the superstitios; he could have easily added a 14th that fathers of all newborns be automatically eligible for season tickets to their favorite team], is enough to scare the vast majority of tCypriots away. I would be apprehensive too if I were a tCypriot. There should be various specific issues where tCypriots should have veto powers, hopefully to come out on the negotiation table. But a veto across the board was preposterous, and would be even more so today with Cyprus a member of the EU.
The document was never discussed. It was not a take-it-or-leave it proposition. Unfortunately, just as is the case today, it was even worse then, we were speaking not with tCypriots but indirectly to Turkey by proxy and its fascist establishments.
See relevant Wikileaks revelation ( http://antifon.blogspot.com/2011/01/wik ... osses.html ) which, if we are to believe Wikileaks, proves that today we speak to Eroglu who in turn speaks to Erdogan who in turn indirectly answers to the generals! Some democracy for you!
http://antifon.blogspot.com
.
I am curious to understand why people emphasize the 1960 constitution was unworkable? This is the view of many G/C and yourself to justify Makarios actions of amending the 1960 constitution with a 13 point amendment. The brick in front of your view is that you claim the unworkable constitution because the G/C claim was the democratic of their population which outnumbered T/C was not acceptable, basically saying that why should we oblige with this constitution which allows another community to share this island when we are the majority. This is a misinterpretation of the constitution. This anger was expressed by the 1963 Christmas violence. Which was the main focus of the constitution to avoid such circumstances that both communities should enjoy in freedom and not allow one community to rule the other? The 1960 constitution involved both Greek and Turkish constitutional lawyers and using other constitutions around the world as an example to formulate a new law and not at all unworkable. The rumours that have never been buried and continue today as to your comment is that the people who started the rumour that the 1960 constitution was unworkable never ever wanted or had the intention to implement the constitution.
If the T/C and G/C veto power or voting could not come to a conclusion as was the case of the first ripples in calling the constitution unworkable then it must be a failure in the representatives and not the constitution.
The main objective was requirement of separate majority of certain laws to be raised cannot be justified of the constitution to be unworkable. It is hard to justify how the T/C can be legally protected against being outvoted without veto-rights against the passing of laws. There is no legal weight that can be justifying the disrespect for the constitution.
The constitution can be changed with the consent of all concerned. A safe basis for the peaceful future cannot be established removing the fundamental rights of the T/C. So changing the constitution by declaring it unworkable by disregarding it this allows the development of a civil war over the resulting dispute.
1. Was the constitution unworkable or was it the representatives that were unworkable?
2. The constitution gave rights to T/C and the majority found this unacceptable hence laying blame to the constitution unworkable.
3. There is no legal support for the change of the constitution declaring it unworkable.
My conclusion is that the constitution was workable it was the representatives that were unworkable. The constitution should include all concern if any amendments were to be change and not a one man mission; it clearly indicates that Makarios never wanted to implement the constitution and there were other plans set in motion the constitution was an excuse.
Take this from a good unbiase source .
The EOKA campaign ended in 1959 when Greece and Turkey, under pressure from Washington, agreed in Zurich to proposals for a form of limited independence for Cyprus, with both enosis and taksim precluded, with a constitution to be guaranteed jointly by Britain, Greece and Turkey, and with Britain acquiring sovereign ownership of substantial land areas, the SBAs, for military and intelligence use. The 1959 deal was reluctantly accepted by the Greek Cypriots, with deep misgivings and only after intense pressure on them from the Athens' government, which in turn was under pressure from the governments of America and Britain. The arrangement ratified in London was heavily criticised by many observers because it contained clauses that were inherently separatist, because it provided a small proportion of the population with a veto over the functioning of the state, because it gave Ankara and Athens a formal involvement in Cypriot affairs and because its success would be dependent on the doubtful premise of long-lasting goodwill from Athens and Ankara and from all of the key personalities and political elements in both communities.