by Bananiot » Wed Dec 29, 2010 1:02 am
On many occasions I talked about the dangers of going after the desirable rather than the feasible. Such dangers existed before 1974 and the events of 1974 simply prove the political inadequacies of those insisting on maximalist lines. Makarios was such a person who pursued maximalist policies.
In 1968 he blew away the opportunity to solve the Cyprus issue when the TC's and Turkey accepted the 13 points he wanted to change in the Constitution for some mere local powers that would be granted to TC's. Again, in April 1971, Denktash sent a letter to Klerides, then President of the House of Representatives, accepting almost all 13 points and asking for the powers, duties and competences of the local government to be integrated into the Constitution. Makarios again gave a loud no.
Having failed to convince Makarios that under the circumstances the proposed solution, that Greece as well as Turkey accepted, was the best possible (imagine our joy if this proposal was put forward today), the governments of Greece and Turkey (both ruled by coupists) brought back the old Acheson Plan that among else gave a large base to Turkey in Karpasia, without movement of people. Makarios duly rejected this too, which of course was much worse than the 1967 and 1971 Denktash-Klerides agreements. This is what Makarios had to say, in rejecting the Acheson plan: "I disagree on this for the basis for establishing such ethnic criteria for the determination of the areas that will locally be governed by TC's, is a racist one and this can only divide further our divided state". I remind you that the same argument, more or less, is used today by the rejectionists in order to oppose BBF.
Makarios, it was pretty much obvious by then, was only interested in the total abandoning of the Zurich agreements that gave TC's certain prerogatives that he did not stomach. Makarios wanted the formation of a pure Greek State with the TC's reduced to a minority. He went beyond his proposals of 1963 and in a letter to Papadopoulos of Greece in June 1971 he states that the circumstances in 1963 were different from those of today. Thus, Makarios in effect admitted that the proposals of 1963 had nothing to do with the so called dysfunctional constitution but rather with eliminating the bicommunal nature of Cyprus.
Makarios thought that he was on the brink of success, for he believed that it was matter of time the TC's would succumb to economic difficulties and the hardships of the enclaves. He failed to consider the dangers that existed as long as the issue remained unsolved and eventually we all paid a hefty price. He failed to take into consideration all the factors that constituted the Cyprus issue and probably thought, being a priest, that a divine hand always protected Cyprus. Still, this is a poor excuse for Makarios that made a series of wrong and hurtful political judgements.
Will the report tomorrow reflect his political myopia? I very much doubt it. If the report has a sole aim to polarise society in view of the forthcoming elections, we have seen this act before. It remains to be seen whether voters will return once again to their political stables in order to save the day for the parties. You see, in this plantation, parties only count. Forget about Cyprus, as long as the parties get their share of votes.
