Tough year ahead for Turkish foreign policy
Monday, December 20, 2010
SEMİH İDİZ
All indications suggest that 2011 will be a year in which Turkish foreign policy will face serious challenges.
Gone are the heady days when the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, administration was said to be forging ahead with proactive steps designed not just to bring peace and stability to the region but also to place Turkey on the map as an influential player that can arbitrate serious international disputes.
Today there is little talk of Turkey’s influence, and a lot of talk about “Turkey straying from the Western fold,” thus diminishing the value of any potential influence it may have had as an important player as far as its traditional partners and allies are concerned.
The impression one gets instead is of a foreign policy that is increasingly under siege, a state of affairs that will most likely force the Turkish government into a “reactive” mode as it tries to ward off the negative consequences of certain developments in its relations with the world at large.
Ties with the United States are already suffering from a recent bout of serious turbulence as a result of the highly active Armenian lobby, which clearly feels it has a chance to “get Turkey” this time, given the state of affairs between Ankara and Washington. Those relations will no doubt continue to remain frosty, relative to plummeting Turkish-Israeli ties, since the effect this is having on the U.S. Congress is already tangible.
In a recent phone conversation with Prime Minister Erdoğan, President Obama apparently provided reassurances that ties with Turkey continue to be of the utmost priority for his country and that anything that might have been leaked by WikiLeaks would not alter this fact.
In a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly gave assurances that the administration would do its best to ensure the Armenian lobby does not make any headway in the U.S. Congress this time.
Under normal circumstances this assurance may have counted for something. Given the state of ties and the number of people “gunning for Turkey” in the U.S. Congress, the value of Clinton’s reported assurance has yet to be tested.
In the meantime, it is very unlikely the Erdoğan government will revisit efforts to normalize ties with Armenia any time soon, given that it has painted itself into a corner on this score vis-a-vis Turkish and Azeri public opinion. In a nutshell, Ankara can not be seen to be initiating anything new in this respect until progress is made in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Had the Erdoğan government made headway with Armenia in line with the protocols it signed with that country in 2009, this would undoubtedly have taken away the force of some of the anti-Turkish initiatives of the Armenian diaspora – but this was not to be.
It seems that domestic political considerations weighed heavily on Prime Minister Erdoğan’s thoughts in the end, making one wonder why his government bothered to initiate a normalization process with Armenia in the first place if it was not going to be able to stand behind it in the face of inevitable criticism at home.
As for the breakdown in ties with Israel, which are clearly fueling the animosity towards the AKP government in the West, things do not appear too promising in this respect either – despite the recent nicety of Turkey’s sending fire-fighting planes to that country to help fight a devastating forest fire there.
Turkey is determined not to budge until Israel somehow atones for the murder of nine Turkish activists on the Mavi Marmara. Israel appears just as determined not to apologize or pay compensation, with Israeli commentators suggesting – apart from any legal considerations – that to do so would be a useless concession given what they believe to be Prime Minister Erdoğan’s and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’ innate hatred of Israel.
The dispute with Israel is now also showing signs of spilling over into the Cyprus issue. Israel’s demarcation of an economic zone of interest in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Greek Cypriot administration has already resulted in fresh diplomatic exchanges between Ankara and Tel Aviv and has led to angry commentary in the Israeli media as a result.
What makes Turkey’s position even more difficult in this respect is that Israel has also come to similar agreements with Egypt and Lebanon, much to the annoyance of Ankara, even if the agreement with Beirut has still to be endorsed by parliament. Turkey tried, but failed, to stop these countries signing these agreements with the Greek Cypriot administration.
Meanwhile Turkey’s position on Iran continues to cast a shadow over its ties with not just the U.S. but also Europe. The U.S. and the European Union are now acting in unison to increase pressure on Iran with new sanctions – beyond the extent of those foreseen by the United Nations Security Council. This will clearly increase Ankara’s isolation with respect to Iran since the Erdoğan government believes there is no need to impose any sanctions at all on that country.
A second round of talks between the P5+1 group (comprising the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) and Iran are set to be held in Istanbul at the end of January. It is unlikely Turkey will have any say in those talks beyond hosting them, especially if it continues to argue on behalf of Tehran on issues such as sanctions.
The other important aspect of Turkey’s Iran policy is that it is now seen by all, as a result of WikiLeaks, that Ankara is not only alone in the West on this score, but also in the Middle East, where we were led to believe by AKP executives it was enjoying increasing influence.
It may have influence among the region’s radical elements, but it is now apparent this influence does not extend to the representatives of the region’s established order, who are clearly wary of Iran’s nuclear pretensions and are therefore unlikely to look too warmly on Turkey’s pro-Tehran approach on this issue.
In the meantime, Turkey’s almost-severed ties with Israel have more or less ensured there is no space for Ankara in any effort to bring about peace in the Middle East, since it is Washington, acting together with the established elites in the region, that is pushing the process along.
In the end it all comes back to what Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was quoted as suggesting months ago – much to the annoyance of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu: namely, a Turkey that has severed ties with Israel, having lost its neutrality, will be unlikely to find a place at the table trying to negotiate peace between Israelis and Arabs.
Other serious challenges Ankara is set to face next year will include the need to find a means to forge ahead in EU membership talks. Belgium, the EU’s most recent term president, attempted to have the chapter on competition opened but Turkey failed to meet the necessary criteria to do so.
Obstacles placed on Ankara’s path by the Greek Cypriot administration and France aside, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will be able to fulfill the criteria of the chapters that it can open. In the meantime it is clear the Cyrus issue will remain a “Sword of Damocles” as far as Turkish-EU ties are concerned.
None of this makes for a pretty picture in terms of the inflated image of a Turkey playing a major role in the world that has been put forward by the AKP.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=tough-year-ahead-for-turkey8217s-foreign-policy-2010-12-20
please turkey carry on, don't let anyone stand in your way when it comes to your over inflated image spurred on by your as it seems over the top inflated policy...
i reckon something is brewing here and the army is not far behind the home made brew...this can't go for ever...
