Gasman wrote:you cant hand pick the parts of the 1960 agreement you like then ignore the rest, its either all or none
But isn't that what Makarios wanted to do?
You see,GAsman??? Some of our GC friends here are very good at picking and choosing what suits them...Your post did not suit them,so they simply ignored it...Now ,what were you saying? Oh,yes,MAKARIOS...he is responsible for a lot things in our bloody history...Thank you for keeping these fools on their toes,or rather on their heels...
Polyviou asserts that Mr Makarios was forced to sign the London and Zurich Agreements. In 1959, the Greek government allegedly gave Mr Makarios an ultimatum: either he accepted the Agreements as they stood or Greece would abandon him, and Cyprus, still a British colony, would in all probability be partitioned between Greece and Turkey. Consequently, says Mr Polyviou, Mr Makarios eventually signed. Many other writers, especially Greek ones, take a similar view.
But, as readers of Glafcos Clerides's Cyprus: My Deposition will know, Mr Makarios himself explicitly denied that the Greek government had forced him to sign: "... no power on earth could have compelled me to sign," Mr Makarios stated on 21 May 1959; "if I had believed [the agreements] to be contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus."
Mr Clerides suggests that Mr Makarios always intended to sign the agreements but it was a natural piece of brinkmanship on his part to try to get better terms if he possibly could. This is why he pretended to have second thoughts.
I find Mr Clerides's account convincing. Mr Makarios knew in 1959 that the Greek government had obtained the best terms they could get for the Greek Cypriots. So, in one sense, his acquiescence in the Zurich and London Agreements was done freely. But, this did not mean that it was sincere. It certainly did not mean that he had given up his struggle to make Cyprus Greek. His acquiescence was just a temporary measure.
My favourite document concerning Mr Makarios's real attitude towards the 1960 Accords occurs in a 'top secret' letter he wrote to the then Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, on 1 March 1964. This was written at the very time the discussions were going on at the UN in New York that were to lead to Security Council Resolution 186, a resolution destined to aid the Greek side considerably in getting themselves recognised, on their own, as the Cyprus government. This is what Mr Makarios wrote to Mr Papandreou:
"Our aim, Mr Premier, is the abolition of the Zurich and London Agreements, so that it may be possible for the Greek Cypriot people, in agreement with the Motherland, to determine in an unfettered way its future. I am signatory of these Agreements on behalf of the Greeks of Cyprus. In my personal opinion, in the conditions then prevailing, 'naught else was to be done'. But not for a moment did I believe that the Agreements would constitute a permanent settlement. It was a settlement of harsh necessity and, in my view, was the solution of the Cyprus drama which was the lesser evil at that time. Since then internationally and locally the conditions have changed and I think the time has come for us to undertake to rid ourselves of the Agreements imposed upon us… The unilateral abrogation of the Agreements without the process of law and without the agreement of all he signatories will possibly have serious repercussions. But we shall not proceed to any such action without prior agreement with the government of Greece..."
What a very remarkable statement that is, coming from a Head of State who was referring to a very fundamental contract he had entered into, not only with the other main community on the island, but also with quite significant powers whose well-known interests he seemed confident he could somehow by-pass or confound!
As we know, this agreement was an international one: not just an informal arrangement with Dr Küçük. It was a binding covenant with the Turkish Cypriots, with Greece, with Turkey (the latter only 40 miles away and soon to have the second most powerful army in NATO), and not least with Great Britain, whose sovereign bases and electronic facilities on the island were perceived by the United States as indispensable aids in the Cold War with the USSR, a War then perhaps at its height. The 'serious repercussions' Mr Makarios so disarmingly described as merely 'possible' have been with us to this day.
Gasman wrote:Just reading about it now ...Polyviou asserts that Mr Makarios was forced to sign the London and Zurich Agreements. In 1959, the Greek government allegedly gave Mr Makarios an ultimatum: either he accepted the Agreements as they stood or Greece would abandon him, and Cyprus, still a British colony, would in all probability be partitioned between Greece and Turkey. Consequently, says Mr Polyviou, Mr Makarios eventually signed. Many other writers, especially Greek ones, take a similar view.
But, as readers of Glafcos Clerides's Cyprus: My Deposition will know, Mr Makarios himself explicitly denied that the Greek government had forced him to sign: "... no power on earth could have compelled me to sign," Mr Makarios stated on 21 May 1959; "if I had believed [the agreements] to be contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus."
Mr Clerides suggests that Mr Makarios always intended to sign the agreements but it was a natural piece of brinkmanship on his part to try to get better terms if he possibly could. This is why he pretended to have second thoughts.
I find Mr Clerides's account convincing. Mr Makarios knew in 1959 that the Greek government had obtained the best terms they could get for the Greek Cypriots. So, in one sense, his acquiescence in the Zurich and London Agreements was done freely. But, this did not mean that it was sincere. It certainly did not mean that he had given up his struggle to make Cyprus Greek. His acquiescence was just a temporary measure.
My favourite document concerning Mr Makarios's real attitude towards the 1960 Accords occurs in a 'top secret' letter he wrote to the then Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, on 1 March 1964. This was written at the very time the discussions were going on at the UN in New York that were to lead to Security Council Resolution 186, a resolution destined to aid the Greek side considerably in getting themselves recognised, on their own, as the Cyprus government. This is what Mr Makarios wrote to Mr Papandreou:
"Our aim, Mr Premier, is the abolition of the Zurich and London Agreements, so that it may be possible for the Greek Cypriot people, in agreement with the Motherland, to determine in an unfettered way its future. I am signatory of these Agreements on behalf of the Greeks of Cyprus. In my personal opinion, in the conditions then prevailing, 'naught else was to be done'. But not for a moment did I believe that the Agreements would constitute a permanent settlement. It was a settlement of harsh necessity and, in my view, was the solution of the Cyprus drama which was the lesser evil at that time. Since then internationally and locally the conditions have changed and I think the time has come for us to undertake to rid ourselves of the Agreements imposed upon us… The unilateral abrogation of the Agreements without the process of law and without the agreement of all he signatories will possibly have serious repercussions. But we shall not proceed to any such action without prior agreement with the government of Greece..."
What a very remarkable statement that is, coming from a Head of State who was referring to a very fundamental contract he had entered into, not only with the other main community on the island, but also with quite significant powers whose well-known interests he seemed confident he could somehow by-pass or confound!
As we know, this agreement was an international one: not just an informal arrangement with Dr Küçük. It was a binding covenant with the Turkish Cypriots, with Greece, with Turkey (the latter only 40 miles away and soon to have the second most powerful army in NATO), and not least with Great Britain, whose sovereign bases and electronic facilities on the island were perceived by the United States as indispensable aids in the Cold War with the USSR, a War then perhaps at its height. The 'serious repercussions' Mr Makarios so disarmingly described as merely 'possible' have been with us to this day.
there's loads more, but this refers specifically to the 'constitution'.
BirKibrisli wrote:In any other country Makarios would have been charged with high treason,and probably hanged for his actions...He was the President,swearing to uphold the independence and the sovereignty of his country,and behind close doors he was plotting to destroy the Republic and make it a province of another country...Our GC friends here might be very tolerant of this act of treachery but history will not be so...
Get Real! wrote:BirKibrisli wrote:In any other country Makarios would have been charged with high treason,and probably hanged for his actions...He was the President,swearing to uphold the independence and the sovereignty of his country,and behind close doors he was plotting to destroy the Republic and make it a province of another country...Our GC friends here might be very tolerant of this act of treachery but history will not be so...
No, Makarios abandoned Enosis ideas once the RoC kick started. In fact he was even persecuting Greek nationalists in the late 60s and early 70s.
Why do you think Greece tried to overthrow him in 74?
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