I'd like to ask you a few questiones....
1- Have TCs or Turkey ever attemted to annex whole Cyprus to Turkey in the previous century as Greece and GCs did?
2- Why didn't GCs consider TCs as Cypriots and take them to their sides to start an independent struggle against British rule instead of giving an annexation struggle with Greece? Because GCs was considering themselves as Greeks and TCs as Turkish colonialists?
3- The idea of Enosis which was the most divisive element amongst two communities had been initiated long before the Taksim idea initiated... What had GC expected from TCs to do while they strongly were desiring to annex Cyprus to Greece? In that cold war era ain't it normal for them to retaliate with Taksim idea and take their side by Brits?
4- The two underground organizations, namely EOKA and TMT sustained their prohibitted ideals ENOSIS and TAKSIM afterwards the ROCs foundation in relation with their motherland backers... They undermined the RoC and took under some of the politicians who had key status in government under their control in order to achieve their goals. They thretened, deluded or enforced the innocent Cypriots in direction of their aims... While they were fighting for their prohibitted aims also fighting against communists within their own communities... Why were they fighting against each other and communists? Enosis/Taksim and a pure rightwinged Cyprus? Or something else?
WWS Case Study 3/00
Policy Watershed: Turkey's Cyprus Policy
and the Interventions of 1974
James H. Meyer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 5:45 a.m. on July 20 1974, the government of Turkey began to land troops on Cyprus. At the break of dawn, landing craft carrying Turkish soldiers began to reach the island’s shore, and at 6:07 a.m. nineteen C-13 transport planes began to drop paratroops into the main Turkish enclave between Kyrenia (Girne) and Nicosia. At 6:30 a.m. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit went on Turkish National Radio to announce the decision his government had made.
The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and sea. Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. Meanwhile, I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly the United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have the dispute settled through diplomatic methods.1
The Turkish forces met only scattered resistance by disorganized Greek-Cypriot forces, and soon established an area of control over the fifty-mile Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor. In response to Turkey’s offensive, the Greek government of General Demetrios Ioanides announced that Greece would begin preparing a general mobilization of its armed forces.2
The Turkish intervention into Cyprus was made in response to the coup d’état that had been committed four days earlier against the Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios. The coup had been committed by Greek Cypriot elements favoring enosis, the integration of Cyprus into Greece3, and was the culmination of a power struggle that had long been taking place on Cyprus between ‘moderates’ such as Makarios and extremist followers of Cypriot militia leader George Grivas4. As a guarantor power of the 1960 Zürich-London Accords, Turkey had sworn to maintain both the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. With Cyprus’ independence threatened, Turkey was entitled to act to restore the status quo. The Turkish invasion was therefore seen as having been launched in support of preserving the Cyprus status quo—its territorial integrity and independence.
On July 22, a cease-fire was signed between Turkey and the new Cyprus regime, and on July 23 the military junta governing Greece collapsed. The fall of the junta, which was seen to have been supportive of both enosis and the new Cyprus government of Nicos Sampson5, then led to the fall of the ten-day old Sampson regime itself. With Cyprus President Makarios negotiating with the Turkish and British governments at the United Nations in New York, temporary presidential responsibilities were assumed by Cyprus House of Representatives Speaker Glevkos Clerides, as was stipulated in the Cyprus Constitution.6 Five-party negotiations including representatives from Turkey, Greece, Britain and the two Cypriot communities then started in Geneva.
With the fall of the Sampson government and its sponsors in Athens, it seemed as if the return to power of President Markarios, who had governed Cyprus since the island became independent in 1960, would herald a withdrawal of Turkish forces and a return to the pre-coup status quo. The negotiations for a Turkish withdrawal, however, proved to be more complicated than anticipated. With its soldiers on the ground in Cyprus, Turkey began to harden its line, insisting upon the creation of a new administrative framework for the island. The Turkish proposals were for a governmental structure consisting of either a loose bizonal federation or an even looser multicantonal federation.7 The latter of these two proposals was known as the “Günes Plan”, after Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Günes. Upon receipt of the Günes Plan in Geneva, Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros and Acting Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides asked for 36 hours in order to consult with their governments. In response, Foreign Minister Günes noted that further delays would create security problems for the exposed Turkish troops in Cyprus and demanded an immediate yes-or-no answer to his proposal. The five-party negotiations then broke down.8
The next morning, August 14, the reorganized and heavily reinforced9 Turkish troops on Cyprus recommenced the military operation that had been suspended on July 22. Before long, 37% of the island was under Turkish control, creating 180,000 Greek refugees fleeing to southern points in the island.10 Subsequently, Turkish Cypriots living in the south left their homes to seek refuge in the north. Today, less than 1% of the population of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is Greek Cypriot, while just over 1% of the Greek-administered area of Cyprus is Turkish Cypriot.11
In Athens, the new government of Constantine Karamanlis—who had come to power following the collapse of the military administration—found itself in an excruciating dilemma. As a guarantor state of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Greece also had a right to intervene militarily to preserve the territorial integrity of Cyprus, now threatened by Turkey. Karamanlis’ initial predilection was thus to declare war on Turkey and battle Turkish troops in Cyprus and anywhere else the two sides might meet.12 Military advisors to the new Greek President, however, informed Karamanlis that the Greek Army was unprepared for a general war against Turkey. This would be particularly the case if the focus of the war’s activity would be in relatively distant Cyprus, as Greece had hundreds of poorly defended islands located within one hundred miles of the Turkish coast.13 Thus Karamanlis acquiesced to the advice of his military staff. Instead of declaring war against Turkey, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO in protest against what he saw as a lack of support from Britain and the United States in restraining Turkey.14
There were thus not one but two military operations carried out by Turkey on Cyprus. The first one, launched on July 20, had seemed to be both consistent with and a natural extension of fourteen years of Turkish policy in support of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. However, with the successful landing of troops on Cyprus in July, Turkish objectives appear to have changed dramatically. Suddenly, Turkey was no longer arguing in defense of the status quo, but rather was seeking to overthrow it. Turkey’s objective now became the replacement of the governmental structure that had been in place since 1960 with a framework based upon the concept of taksim, the division of the island’s Greek and Turkish communities.
The events of 1974 generate several questions. What led Turkey to abandon its policy of supporting the 1960 treaties? Having already scored a major military and diplomatic success and seemingly well on its way to restoring the status quo ante in Cyprus, why did Turkey make the diplomatically and economically costly15 move of expanding its occupation force to control 37% of the island? What prompted Turkey to withdraw its support for the Cypriot governmental structure of 1960 and propose instead a bizonal or multicantonal structure? More importantly, what changes had taken place internationally and within Turkey that led Ankara to the conclusion that it could afford to pursue a more aggressive policy in Cyprus?
Turkey’s decision to abandon its support for the 1960 Accords in favor of a new constitutional arrangement resulted from a combination of two sets of circumstances: circumstances resulting from trends that had been developing for more than a decade, and events that took place immediately after the Cyprus coup and Turkey’s initial invasion. Given the multidimensional quality of the formulation of Turkish Cyprus policy in 1974, this case study is divided into three broad sections. First there will be a brief discussion of Cyprus’ pre-independence history, including an account, in summary form, of the domestic and international political factors at play with regard to the creation of an independent Cyprus. Secondly, I will analyze the international scene as it involved Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the years 1960-1974. Much of this discussion will focus upon Turkey’s relations with the United States during this period, as it was this relationship which was primarily responsible for Turkey’s policy of restraint in its Cyprus policy in the years leading up to 1974. Thirdly, I will provide a detailed breakdown of the events of July and August 1974 as they unfolded. My conclusion will be based upon an understanding that Turkey’s change of policy after its initial invasion resulted from several trends that had been developing for more than a decade, combined with events that had occurred in the immediate aftermath of the coup and July invasion. Together, these factors led Turkey to embark upon what was seen to be an abrupt change of policy in 1974. In retrospect, however, Turkey’s policy ‘switch’ ought to have taken fewer people by surprise.
THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY OF CYPRUS
1571-1955
In 1571 the Ottoman Empire defeated the Venetian rulers of Cyprus and established its first garrison there. Ottoman soldiers were given timars, fiefs of land, and were encouraged to settle on the island permanently. Following substantial population growth in the seventeenth century, Turks grew to represent approximately twenty percent of the island’s inhabitants, with Greeks making up most of the rest of the population.16 By 1970 there were approximately 130,000 Turkish Cypriots and 440,000 Greek Cypriots on the island.17
In 1878 the British government was granted the right to administer Cyprus ‘in the name of the Sultan’ in return for British diplomatic support following the Ottoman Empire’s disastrous 1877-78 war with Russia. Britain then annexed the island outright as a colony when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in 1914. In 1915, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece as an inducement for its entry into World War I, an offer the Greek government declined. Pro-enosis agitation, however, had been present on the island since the arrival of British administration in 1878. This agitation intensified during the period between the two world wars. In 1931 the Government House of Cyprus, which housed the British administrators of the island, was burned to the ground by a Greek Cypriot mob. This event was interpreted by the British to have been instigated by pro-enosis elements. British suppression of the enosis movement followed soon afterward.18
During the Second World War the Greek alliance with Britain led to support among the Greek Cypriot community for the British war effort. In response to this improvement in Cypriot-British relations during the war, the British administrators proposed at the war’s conclusion the establishment of a more democratic and representative government in Cyprus. This initiative, however, was opposed by both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriot leadership opposed the proposed reforms because they believed that their acceptance of a limited representative government would be understood by the British as an abandonment of their enosis objectives. Turkish Cypriot leaders opposed the democratization initiative as a move that would subjugate the Turkish Cypriot minority to the Greek Cypriot majority.19
Pro-enosis agitation among both Greek mainlanders and the Greek Cypriots continued throughout the postwar pre-independence era (1945-1960). In 1948, King Paul of Greece declared that Greece desired the union of Cyprus and Greece and in 1951 a petition sponsored by the Cypriot Orthodox Church was presented to the Greek government and claimed that 97 percent of all Greek Cypriots supported enosis.
By the 1950’s, however, the shaping of much of the world into the bipolar superpower system had created a situation in which Britain, Greece and Turkey now found themselves members of an increasingly vital and cohesive system of Western military alliance. In 1952 both Turkey and Greece were admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1955 Turkey and Britain became members of the Baghdad Pact. Thus to Britain, maintaining good relations with both Turkey and Greece became increasingly important. It was similarly important for both Britain and the United States, the leader of the NATO alliance, that Greece and Turkey perpetuate the spirit of rapprochement that had existed between them since the 1930’s. For Turkish and Greek leaders as well, the maintenance of mutually satisfactory relations was highly desirable, despite the bitter legacy of the two countries’ more recent enmity. Greece was just emerging from a period of violent civil war, and looked to its postwar/post-civil war era with hopes for peace, stability and development. Turkey, on the other hand, was feeling even more than Greece threatened by an increasingly belligerent Soviet Union20, and hoped to achieve security through its newly concluded alliances. With the era of British colonial administration winding down in Cyprus, it was clear to all of the countries involved that Turkish-Greek cooperation was of profound importance to the stability of the two countries themselves. It was, furthermore, of equally great importance to the cohesion of the regional alliances that were being created by the United States as part of its policy of ‘containment’ against the expansion of Soviet influence.21
The dismantling of British colonial governments from India to Palestine to Cyprus, however, gave rise to nationalist tensions over the political shape of the newly independent countries. In the case of Cyprus, these tensions spilled over into Turkish-Greek relations. This, in turn, became a concern of the United States due to the roles both Greece and Turkey played in the overall Cold War power struggle.
Towards Independence: 1955-60
On April 1, 1955 EOKA—a pro-enosis terrorist group whose Greek initials stood for the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters—set off its first bombs against British installations. EOKA was headed by Lieutenant Colonel (later General) George Grivas, a Cypriot-born officer of the Greek army with a history of right-wing extremism. Operating from secret bases in the Troodos Mountains in the central region of the island, EOKA launched a low-level guerilla campaign against British rule. British military and colonial authorities were the primary targets of EOKA terrorists, although several Greek Cypriot ‘collaborators’ were killed as well. Some Turkish Cypriots, who tended to support either the continuation of British rule or the partition of the island into two (taksim), were also killed, but were not a primary target of EOKA. This has been interpreted as having likely stemmed from a desire of EOKA to not unnecessarily transform inter-communal tensions into inter-communal warfare, thereby complicating a British withdrawal from the island.22
In 1958, however, inter-communal enmity did erupt into rioting, kidnappings, reprisal killings and the evacuation of minorities from several villages. This led to an announcement by the British that unless Greece, Turkey and the Cypriot communities came together to negotiate a new constitutional framework for Cyprus, British troops would be withdrawn into their bases. From this point forward, Britain’s objectives were to negotiate an independence framework for Cyprus which would not exacerbate Turkish-Greek tensions and which would continue to safeguard Britain’s strategic interests.23
In February of 1959, Greece and Turkey undertook bilateral talks in Zürich over the shape the constitution of an independent Cyprus should take. The outline of these talks was then taken to London to present to the British government. It was only at this point that representatives of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities were invited to take part in the negotiations. The two Cypriot delegations were presented with the agreements, which became known as the Zürich-London agreements, as a fait accompli. In these agreements, both enosis and taksim were prohibited, and Turkey, Greece and Britain were all named as guarantor states to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Greece, Turkey and Britain had clearly worked in a spirit of diplomatic compromise, understanding the rationale for one another’s political and security concerns. However, the exclusion of the Cypriots themselves from the decision-making process created an agreement which the Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriots, obviously did not feel themselves a party to. This would be demonstrated repeatedly in the decade to follow.
Turkey and Cyprus: Turkey’s interests
As any glance at the map of Cyprus will suggest, Turkey’s primary interest in Cyprus stems from the nearly 150 miles of Cypriot coastline located just seventy miles to the south of Turkey’s ‘soft underbelly’ in the East Mediterranean. 250 miles to the west of Cyprus lies Rhodes, the easternmost of nearly 2,400 Greek islands--more than 100 of which are populated--located in the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. Covering an area of approximately 80,000 square miles, the Greek Islands form a stranglehold over most Turkish outlets to the sea. Guarding the entrance to the Dardenelle Straits leading to the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul is Limnos. Located just ten miles off the Turkish coast and blocking the entrance to the sea from the major port of Izmir (Turkey’s third-largest city after Istanbul and Ankara) are the islands of Lesbos and Khios. Indeed, there is no Aegean Turkish city which would not be vulnerable to Greek blockade in the event that war broke out between the two countries. Thus, out of nearly 1,500 miles of coastline, just 250 miles—that between Rhodes and Cyprus--would have relatively free access to the Mediterranean were war to break out between Greece and Turkey and with Cyprus in unfriendly hands. With the northern coastline of Cyprus in the friendly hands of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus24, however, the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun have relatively free access to the sea and the amount of secure coastline Turkey would have in a war against Greece is doubled.
Furthermore, Turkey is practically surrounded by potential enemies. This was even more the case in 1974 than it is today. To the west is Greece. To the north was Zhivkov’s Bulgaria and over the Black Sea were Ceaucescu’s Romania and the Soviet Union. To the east lay countries whose relations with Turkey have ranged from cordial to openly hostile as the decades have passed: Iran, Iraq and Syria. Were Cyprus to have become a satellite of Greece or even part of Greece itself, the Turkey of the 1960’s and 1970’s would have been completely surrounded by potentially hostile neighbors.
In addition to protecting the interests of Turkey itself, Turkey has an obvious interest in safeguarding the welfare of the Cypriot Turkish population. Although in the republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk revanchist sentiment and Ottoman nostalgia have never run high, Turkish citizens certainly do not like seeing their fellow Turks outside of Turkey treated badly. Thus in March of 1964, after a series of attacks by Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriot community, there were demonstrations in Turkey demanding the invasion and partition of Cyprus.25 Similarly, the immense public acclaim bestowed upon Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit after the initial leg of the 1974 invasion was quite possibly a significant factor in the Turkish decision to proceed with the second leg of the invasion three weeks later.
Thirdly, the Turkish approach to Cyprus also has to be seen within the context of broader Turkish-Greek relations. Given the many aspects of Turkish-Greek conflict--including the status of various uninhabited islands in the Aegean, Greek and Turkish minorities in the two countries, disputes over the distribution of mineral rights in the Aegean, and the Cyprus issue itself26--any retreat on one particular issue would conceivably be seen by the other party as a sign of weakness. Thus, within the context of the ‘cold war’ being fought generally between Greece and Turkey, an abandonment of the Cyprus cause could prompt a ‘domino effect’ and encourage aggressive behavior by the other side on one of the other ‘fronts’ of the general Turkish-Greek dispute.
Limiting Turkey’s freedom to maneuver on the Cyprus question, however, was Turkey’s presence in the NATO alliance. Although membership in the alliance had done much to relieve Turkey’s security concerns on its eastern border with the Soviet Union, Turkey’s evolution from non-aligned Kemalist republic in the 1920’s-1940’s to NATO member in the 1950’s was accompanied by increasing dependency upon American weapons, spare parts and expertise.27 With both Greece and Turkey integrated into an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, the trade-off for both of these countries was increased security in exchange for decreased independence. More precisely, increased contact with the United States had increased the amount that could be lost by behaving in too independent a manner. This was Turkey’s experience after the 1974 invasion, when the United States instituted a weapons embargo against Turkey.
Turkish Policy towards Cyprus: The 1950’s
Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the 1950’s was remarkably mild. In response to the activities of EOKA in the 1950’s Turkey’s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes could not have been more tempered. Initially, Menderes refused to comment, stating only that his government was following the developments on Cyprus and that Turkey wished to maintain good relations with its ally Greece.28 Shortly thereafter, the celebrations marking Izmir’s ‘Liberation Day’ and the end of Greek occupation in 1922 were cancelled by the Menderes government. In reference to this, Menderes declared ‘I am of the opinion that to allow the sacred meaning of September 9 (Liberation Day) to be exploited…would trouble our national conscience’. A few days later, it was announced that ‘Turkey will not take the slightest action which may cause even a small crisis in the Tripartite Alliance’.29
By 1959, Turkey’s Cyprus policy had settled on support for Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity, which was formalized by the Zürich-London agreements with Greece and Britain of that same year. A staunch supporter of the United States and its Cold War policies, compromise on the Cyprus question for the sake of NATO harmony came naturally to Menderes.30 Thus, an agreement between Britain, Greece and Turkey was then hammered out in Zürich and London in August-September of 1960.
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
Establishment
According to the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could not accept union with, or be partitioned by, another state. Thus, both enosis and taksim were expressly forbidden. In the event of a breach of the provisions of this treaty, the treaty’s co-guarantors were to take collective action to return conditions to the status quo. In the event that collective action was not possible, each of the co-guarantors were given the right to undertake unilateral action.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance, which was also signed during the Zürich-London negotiating process, Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus agreed to co-operate for their common defense. A Tripartite Military Headquarters consisting of representatives of the three countries was to be established in Cyprus and commanded on a one-year rotational basis by a representative of each of the three countries. Furthermore, a committee consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus would constitute the supreme political body of this alliance. Contingents of 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers were to be stationed in Cyprus under the command of the Tripartite Headquarters.31
Cyprus was thus incorporated into the pro-Western ring of alliances that the United States had been encouraging its allies around the world to form in order to contain Soviet influence. With Greece and Turkey connected to the British and American defense structures through NATO and the Balkan Pact, and with Turkey furthermore connected to Britain and also to three other32 ‘northern tier’ Middle Eastern states through the Baghdad Pact, the Treaty of Alliance filled in a vital gap in the interlocking defense structure that the United States had established across Eurasia, from Iceland to Pakistan. Simultaneously, the Treaty of Alliance gave both Greece and Turkey the reassurance of having a small contingent of soldiers on the ground in Cyprus at all times. It was also hoped, no doubt, that the Tripartite administration would foster closer Turkish-Greek relations through enhanced levels of interaction and cooperation.
The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were included among the ‘basic articles’ of Cyprus’ new constitution. As ‘basic articles’, they could neither be amended nor repealed. Non-‘basic’ articles of the constitution could be amended only by a majority vote comprised of two-thirds of the members of each of the two communities in the house. Thus, ‘one-third of the house membership plus one’ of either of the two communities could block amendments to even non-‘basic’ elements of the constitution.
The President of the Republic was to be a Greek Cypriot, elected by the Greek Cypriot community. The Vice President of the Republic was to be Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. The Cabinet consisted of a Council of Ministers, including seven Greek Cypriots chosen by the President and three Turkish Cypriots chosen by the Vice President. At least one of the major portfolios of Defense, Foreign Affairs or Finance had to be held by a Turkish Cypriot. Council decisions could be approved after an absolute majority vote, but could be vetoed by either the President or the Vice President.
Despite the bi-communal emphasis of the new country’s constitutional, security and political framework, elements within both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot community viewed the present situation as only the ‘second-best’ alternative to either enosis or taksim.33
As a minority comprising just one-fifth of the island’s population, the Turkish Cypriot community tended to operate from a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, rather than undertake large-scale agitation in favor of taksim, the Turkish Cypriot political strategy was to insist on a strict adherence to the provisions of the 1960 constitution and especially to the treaties which made up the ‘basic articles’. If, however, the constitutional framework proved to be unworkable, the Turkish strategy was to match Greek Cypriot demands for enosis with a demand for double-enosis, namely taksim.
1963-1964
Cypriot independence however, far from leading to an end to inter-communal bloodshed, witnessed a dramatic increase in violence between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The most violent period between Cyprus’ independence and Turkey’s 1974 invasion came between December 21, 1963 until August 10, 1964. During this time 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were reported killed in inter-communal violence.35 In December of 1963 street-fighting broke out in Nicosia and Lanarca, with 87 Turkish Cypriots and 30 Greek Cypriots known to have been killed in a period of ten days. On January 12 1964, a mass grave was exhumed in the village of Ayios in the presence of foreign reporters, British Army officers and Red Cross personnel. The grave contained the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriots believed to have been killed in the village in the third week of December. The observers verified that a number of the victims appeared to have been tortured, and to have been shot after their hands and feet were tied.36
In response to this violence, Turkey threatened in December to invade Cyprus. This led to the imposition by the Makarios government of a cease-fire.37 On December 26, an exchange of hostages took place, with the Makarios government handing over 545 Turkish Cypriots in exchange for 26 Greek Cypriots that were being held by the Turkish Cypriots. On December 30, British troops began patrolling Nicosia.
One of the causes of the December fighting had been President Makarios’ November 30 announcement that he wished to change the 1960 constitution. In response to this, the Turkish Foreign Ministry made what could be considered its first warning to the Greek Cypriots, marking a new stage in Turkish-Cypriot relations. The Turkish Foreign Ministry statement protested against what it called the ‘completely irresponsible statements of the Greek Cypriot leaders against the constitutional regime in Cyprus’.
It is legally insupportable and impossible to argue that such an attempt is an internal affair, for the Cyprus Constitution was established in accordance with an international agreement, and the provisions of this Constitution were guaranteed by the Treaty of Guarantees to which Turkey is a party…A government that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come to power in Turkey’.38
During the period 1963-1974 Turkey’s principle vehicle of choice for solving its problems in Cyprus was NATO. Turkish policy hinged upon a belief that NATO’s dominant power, the United States, would assist Turkey in bringing Athens and Nicosia around to the Turkish viewpoint. Convinced that the Turkish position was the just one, Ankara hoped the United States would convince Athens and Nicosia to unequivocally abandon enosis.39 Indeed, for much of Turkish public opinion, the Cyprus question was simply one of law and order. On December 26, 1963 the lead editorial for the Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet demonstrates the extent to which Turks saw their position as legally unassailable.
Turkey is respectful of international agreements. Turkey is respectful of the law. This is one of the principle characteristics of Atatürk’s republic…Cyprus must understand and we must make Cyprus understand that we will not abandon our legal rights.40
Makarios, however, refused to accept a ‘NATO Solution’, and instead took his case to the United Nations, where a resolution was passed to send an international peacekeeping force to the island. When Turkey attempted to have the Makarios government condemned for its actions, it found itself diplomatically isolated.41
On January 1, 1964 President Makarios announced that he was unilaterally abrogating the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee.42 After consultations with British Commonwealth and Foreign Minister Duncan Sandys, however, Markarios rescinded his declaration and instead announced that he intended to terminate the Treaties by ‘appropriate means’.43 Shortly thereafter a conference was scheduled to convene on January 15 in London at which Turkey, Greece and representatives from the two Cypriot communities would meet in an attempt to settle their disputes.
At the conference, the Greek Cypriots insisted on abrogating the treaties, demanding in their place a unitary Cypriot government which would be free to amend its own constitution. Turkish Cypriot rights would be written into the constitution, but the Greek Cypriots rejected the legitimacy of the threat of external intervention being used to guarantee those rights. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, insisted upon the full implementation of the Constitution of 1960.44 With Greece and Turkey supporting the positions of their respective communities on the island, the conference ended in deadlock on January 31.
Meanwhile, hardly a day passed in Nicosia and Larnaca without an exchange of shots being fired across cease-fire lines. In other parts of the country, fighting proceeded apace. In February, 31 Turkish Cypriots and 10 Greek Cypriots were reported killed in inter-communal fighting. In March, 26 Turkish Cypriots and 12 Greek Cypriots were killed.45
On March 13, 1964 Turkey informed Makarios that it would intervene unilaterally unless there was an immediate cessation of all actions against the Turkish Cypriot community, an immediate cease-fire, a ‘green-line’ zone agreement in Nicosia, the lifting of the siege from Turkish districts, the restoration of telephone and postal service to Turkish areas, and the return of Turkish hostages.46 This note was rejected by President Makarios, prompting mass demonstrations in Turkey in favor of invasion and partition. Prime Minister Ismet Inönü convened an extraordinary session of the Turkish Parliament and on March 16 Inönü’s government was given the authority to send troops to Cyprus by a vote of 489 to 0 with four abstentions.47
Lack of support on the Cyprus question from the United States in the United Nations, however, had led to a great disillusionment with America in Turkey. On April 16 President Gürsel took NATO to task for not supporting ‘our national and just cause’ and concluded that ‘Turkish-Greek Friendship is dead’.48 In the Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet, Prime Minister Inönü was quoted as saying “I believed in the leadership of America, which is the responsible party in the alliance; now I am paying a penalty”49
As the crisis developed, a turning-point in Turkish-U.S. relations occurred with the arrival of a letter sent by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to Prime Minister Inönü on June 5, 1964. In the letter, Johnson wrote:
…a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention.
Inönü was also reminded that:
Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States’ consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished…I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.50
Johnson’s letter, in the words of Mehmet Gönlüböl, Professor of International Relations at Ankara University:
…became the most important factor since World War II to affect the relations between the two countries unfavorably. This document was…received with great surprise and created strong repercussions, not only in leftist circles, but in public opinion as a whole.51
Although the letter was not made public for eighteen months, reports of its contents were leaked to the Turkish press almost immediately upon its receipt.52 The letter strongly influenced a liberal intelligentsia which had been adopting an increasingly anti-American stance since the early 1960’s.53 By now, however, the calls for a re-appraisal of Turkish foreign policy began coming from inside the government as well.54
Turkey: 1964-74
From 1964 onwards, Turkey was to formulate a policy which, while never questioning the basic pro-Western and pro-NATO stance of Turkey’s diplomatic orientation, began taking steps towards adopting more independent positions.55 As the Turkish government never went out of its way to offend the United States needlessly, and as Turkish and American foreign policy interests tended to converge on most major foreign policy issues, Turkey’s fundamental approach to policy formulation did not change greatly. However, there was a discernable increase in the independence of Turkish policy on several questions of both major and minor importance. Three examples of these include: 1) Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union, 2) The decision to reintroduce poppy production, and 3) Cyprus.
Turkey and the Soviet Union
On the very day Prime Minister Inönü received his letter from Johnson, he appealed in a radio broadcast for warmer relations with the Soviet Union. In doing so, he appeared to place just one condition upon an improvement in relations with Moscow:
But, there is something we ask of them: they must acknowledge our need for security in causes we are pursuing.56
On October 30, 1964 Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin visited Moscow amid rumors that Moscow might finance the Keban dam in eastern Anatolia, leading to an ‘Aswan on the Euphrates’.57 In May of 1965 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko traveled to Ankara and two months later Prime Minister Ürgüplü of Turkey traveled to Moscow. Premier Alexei Kosygin then visited Ankara in 1966. In September of 1967, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow, establishing what was seen as a new working relationship with the Russians. In Moscow, Demirel declared:
I think we have entered a new era in our dealings with the Russians. As is known, there had been great strain between our countries over the years, and in the period after World War II we had no relations at all. Now that gap has been bridged; I am not suggesting that all doubts are gone, but I think the hostility is gone.58
Poppies
The issue of Turkish poppy production, while of relatively minor importance to Turkish-American relations generally, is also indicative of a conscious effort on the part of Turkish politicians to display their primary commitment to Turkish interests, rather than to the interests of Turkey’s American benefactor. In July of 1971, the military-installed (following the military intervention into politics on March 12, 1971) government of Nihat Erim agreed to end the cultivation of poppies, used to manufacture opium, in Turkey. In exchange for this, the United States agreed to provide $35 million, of which $15 million was used to compensate Turkish poppy growers and $20 million was given to the Turkish government for other agricultural investments.59
This agreement has been aptly described as the sort of deal that only a government unconcerned about electoral politics could have made.60 The decision to eradicate poppy cultivation was extremely unpopular throughout the country, and practically all political parties running in the 1973 elections promised to overturn it if they were elected.61
One of the first acts of the government of Bülent Ecevit elected in 1973 was thus to repeal the ban on growing poppies and to distribute poppy seeds to licensed farmers. Although the issue of Turkey’s poppy production was hardly the sort of disagreement that could cause a rupture in relations between allies, the Turkish perception that the United States had bullied Ankara into banning poppy production contributed considerably to anti-American sentiment in Turkey in the early 1970’s.62 Ecevit’s repeal of the ban therefore assumed greater significance than it otherwise would have as it was seen in Turkey as a rebuke of American bullying and an assertion of Turkish independence and the protection of Turkish interests.63
Cyprus: 1967
Between August of 1964 and November of 1967, it is estimated that 109 Turkish Cypriots and 60 Greek Cypriots died in inter-communal fighting. On November 15 1967, the Cypriot National Guard, which was led principally by Greek officers from the mainland under the command of General Grivas, attacked Turkish Cypriot positions. In Turkey, there were again demonstrations in favor of invasion and partition.64 On November 16 and 17 the Turkish Parliament and Senate met in a special joint session and authorized the government to use the Turkish Armed Forces if circumstances required it. The Armed Forces had, in fact, already been mobilized and the Air Force was conducting reconnaissance missions over Cyprus. Cemal Tural, who was Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, later wrote:
In the 1967 crisis the cabinet took the decision to intervene in Cyprus. But in the four hours that followed I do not know what happened; the cabinet decided to postpone the action. There was not a thing left for us to say. I obtained the decision to postpone the action in writing…65
In response to the Turkish sabre-rattling, General Grivas was recalled to Athens and Greek troops stationed in Cyprus were withdrawn. Although diplomatically the actions of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel had been a success, politically they had been a failure. Demirel was criticized by all opposition parties for having missed a chance to intervene in Cyprus and settle the problem once and for all.66 At the same time, anti-American sentiment became much more widespread in Turkey, particularly in the years 1968-71. During this period, Sixth Fleet visits to Turkey were reduced, and even temporarily stopped due to anti-American demonstrations and the kidnapping of US military personnel.67
With just several inter-communal homicides taking place per year, the period 1967-74 was one of relative tranquility on Cyprus, the result of increasing U.N. peacekeeping on the island. Tensions within the Greek Cypriot community, however, began to intensify. Specifically, these resulted from splits which had developed between Makarios and the more fiercely pro-enosis party of General Grivas’ supporters, who were enraged at Makarios for his expulsion of the Cypriot leader as a concession to Turkey in 1967. On January 27, 1974 Grivas died of a heart attack. Although Grivas well-known an outspoken pro-enosis renegade, he has also been described as having had a controlling influence over his militiamen. With his passing from the scene, pro-enosis provocations intensified on the island.
Meanwhile, Turkey was headed toward developing a considerably more independent foreign policy. With the return of elections 1973, Bülent Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party was able to form a coalition with the Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan to create a government. With the rise to power of Mr. Ecevit—a Social Democrat with a strong admiration for the social and diplomatic orientation of the Scandinavian countries68--the traditionally non-aligned approach to foreign policy of Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party had met modern-day leftist anti-Americanism.69 The result was a strong desire on the part of the new government to continue the process of diversifying its foreign policy. Ecevit’s coalition partner Erbakan, himself more interested in fostering ties with the Muslim world, was also content to see a diversification in Turkey’s foreign policy away from NATO and the United States. Thus, in the year of the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had in place a government which was arguably the most skeptical of American intentions of any the country had had in the history of the Republic.
As it is seen and known Turkey diplomaticaly did everything she can in order not to intervene imediately... What mistakes Turkey did between the dates July 15 1974 and July 20 1974? What mistakes Greece and their puppet regime in Cyprus did between those dates?
[quote] Following this second offensive begun on 14 August, Greek-Cypriot retaliatory killings began against the Turks after the ethnic cleansing of Greek Cypriots from their homes had occurred, and the majority of the human rights violations were becoming known. In the village of Tokni, 69 Turkish Cypriots were murdered and later found in a mass grave. In Aloa, 57 Turkish Cypriots were killed, while in Maratha a further 88 corpses were discovered in a mass grave.
Those mass murders were committed between the dates 23rd of July and 14th of August... Wasn't Turkey rightful to sustain her operation in order to protect other TCs life who were in GC controlled areas?
Shortly to say: Retaliations followed by retaliations; ilegal actions followed by illegal actions just for nothing but in expence of a big ctatstrophe... Thousands of Cypriots, foreign soldiers lost their lifes...
Were those who planned and direct all these illegal actions arrested and interrogated by any of the so-called guarantor powers or relevant RoCs security forces?
Because those criminals of both sides had been become the heroes and put into power as a prize of their glory supposedly they won against leftists... They protected the capitalist countries interests well but failed to find a just, viable solution to Cyprus problem... Was that possible with those ultra nationalists? Of coarse not... And we still hope that those ultra nationalists who have been in power since 1960 and our so-called left wing going to find a just, viable, stable solution to Cyprus problem...
But be sure of that they will keep protect the westernworlds interests instead of Cypriots...
